Chaima Bensaid

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Transcript Chaima Bensaid

DETECTION AND IGNORING BLACK
HOLE ATTACK IN VANET
NETWORKS BASED LATENCY TIME
CH. BENSAID
S.BOUKLI HACENE
M.K.FAROUAN
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OBJECTIVES

the improvements of routing protocols in
vehicular networks in terms of security.

detection and prevention of BLACKHOLE
attack in AODV routing protocol.
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What is a wireless network?
Wireless network is a network set up by using radio signal
frequency to communicate among computers and other
network devices.
Depending on the architecture
without infrastructure
Ad Hoc Network
with infrastructure
Cellular Networks
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VANET NETWORKS

Is a network where each mobile nodes are vehicles
(smart) equipped with communication means (sensor).

the VANET networks are characterized by a high
mobility of nodes.

The Network topology is highly dynamic.
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Communication
Hybride
Communication
V2I
Communication
V2V
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THE ROUTING
The process of moving a packet of data from source to destination.
The routing protocols
LOCALISATION
TOPOLOGy
Geographic protocols
ex: GPSR,GSR,A-STAR
reactive protocols
ex: AODV
proactive protocols
ex: DSDV
Hybrid protocols
Ex: ZRP
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Ad-hoc On demand Distance Vector

AODV is a reactive routing protocol for wireless Ad Hoc
networks. It was designed by Charles E. Perkins and
Elizabeth M. Royer.

Using a sequence numbers to determine the "fresh
routes".

AODV is composed primarily of two mechanisms: Route
Discovery and Route Maintenance
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Ad-hoc On demand Distance Vector
Control packets:
 RREQ
 RREP
 RERR
 RREP-ACK
 HELLO
An entry in the routing table contains:
 The @ destination.
 next hop.
 The distance in number of hops.
 N-seq destination.
 The expiration time of the entry in the table.
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Route Discovery (RREQ)
•Hop Count
•RREQ ID
•IP destination
•Sequence number destination
•IP source
•Sequence number source
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Route Discovery (RREQ)
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Route Discovery (RREQ)
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Route Discovery (RREQ)
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Route Discovery (RREQ)
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ROUTE DISCOVRY (RREP)
The way back :



Each node has saved the way back.
The destination sends a RREP packet to the source.
The source starts to send data packets
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ROUTE REPLY (RREP)
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ROUTE REPLY (RREP)
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BLACKHOLE ATTACK
N
3
N
2
Source
Seq=9
N
1
N
6
N
4
Destination
Seq=10
RREQ
RREP
N
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Attacker
Seq=4294967295
Hc=2
Data packet
Thesource
attacker
starts
discard
packets
passed
it.) +
The
node
its N_seq
routing
table
and
Sending
Prepares
the
a RREP
RREP
: updates
@
to the
+toDest
neighboring
(great
node
value
(up uses
to
malicious the
node
detects
an
active
route
(recovery
new
route
for
sending
data
.
come to the source
N_saut
node
(small
) . value).
of @ Dest )
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PROPOSED APPROACH

Our approach is based on the latency time, which is the
minimum delay of transmission; it refers to the time
required for a packet to go from the source to the
destination through a network.

Whenever a node receives a RREP, it will measure the
latency value by the following formula:
Where:
 time_stamp = the time when the correspondig RREQ
is sent
 Hop_count = the number of hops.
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PROPOSED APPROACH

We note that if a neighbor or a blackhole node sends a
RREP, this value of latency must be equal to
RREP_WAIT_TIME because the hop_count = 1.

According to the AODV implementation in the NS2, the
maximum value of RREP_WAIT_TIME is 1second (the
time during which a source waits RREP before
regeneration of a RREQ).
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PROPOSED APPROACH
So, if the hop_count = 1 the latency value is small.
Otherwise the value of latency increases. So if the
latency value is small, then the RREP is sent by a
direct neighbor or a Blackhole node. After that, we
will compare the difference between source and
destination sequence numbers, if it is big, then the
corresponding node is a Blackhole node. Our
approach is presented by the following algorithm:
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THE ALGORITHM
1.
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MT: cache table malicious nodes.
RT: routing table
Dst_seq_no: sequence number of destination
Src_seq_no: sequence number of source
SrcIP: source IP address.
P: RREP Packet
RecvReply ()
{
If (srcIP ∈MT) {drop (p);}
Else {
If (latency < 0.5)
If (Dst_seq_no >>> Src_seq_no)
{ detect_blackhole (srcIP);
Add_in_MT (srcIP);
Drop (p);
}
Else {continue ;}
}
Else continue;
}
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PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have conducted a simulation study using the famous
Networks simulator ns2.35 to evaluate the performance
of our implemented approach to:




The AODV protocol.
AODV protocol under attack with 3 black holes.
Our proposal (approach 01)
Payal [8] (approach 02)
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SIMULATION PARAMATERS
We have used three different urban VANET scenarios
named U1, U2, and U3 from real areas of the
downtown of Malaga, Spain
scenario
U1
Area size
120 000 m2
Number of
vehicles
60
Number of
connection
10
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U2
240 000 m2
60
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U3
360 000 m2
60
30
40
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SIMULATION PARAMATERS
parameters
Propagation model
PHY layer
MAC layer
Routing layer
Transport layer
CBR packet size
CBR packet rate
Simulation time
value
Nakagami
IEEE 802.11p
IEEE 802.11p
OLSR
UDP
1024 bytes
100kbps
180 s
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METRICS USED

Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): This parameter
represents the percentage of packets delivered to their
destinations .:

The average latency of data packets (Delay): This is
the average time required to deliver data packets from the
source to the destination successfully.

Additive costs (overhead): The number of divided
packets controls (RREQ,RREP, RERR) .

Dropped packet : Number of dropped packets .
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PD Fraction VS nb_ connection
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End to End Delay VS nb_connection
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Dropped Packet VS nb_connection
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Normalized routing load VS nb_connection
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CONCLUSION
In this work we proposed a simple method
for detecting and isolating malicious node
that uses the black hole attack in AODV
protocol. Our method was simulated
under different conditions and shows a
good performance, a maximum rate of
packet delivery and a small traffic control
against to the AODV under attack
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