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The Direction of Value Flow in
Connectionless Networks
Bob Briscoe
BT Research
19 Nov 1999
context
context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
why think about this?
theory of the value of communications:
• connection-oriented hegemony
[ITU96, Zull97, Clark96, MacKie-Var92]
confusion is abroad in the world
• junk advertising, bundling content+network
why assume multicast sender pays?
alternative proposal seems obvious
• but wasn't when I started
19 Nov 1999
Direction of Value
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context
context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
context
multiservice, multicast IP (real-time apps)
some services usage-charged, whether
packet, flow or even longer term granularity
[Briscoeb99]
electronic tariff announcement
[Rizzo99, Yemini98, Carle98]
most general business model possible?
buyer's market
designed for bundling
• will cover in a future paper...
19 Nov 1999
Direction of Value
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context
context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
new model for what business?
end-system
applic’n
applic’n
present’n
present’n
session
e-commerce
transport
network
transport
e-commerce
network router
network
link
link e-commerce
physical
19 Nov 1999
session
physical
network
link
e-commercelink e-commerce
physical
Direction of Value
physical
5
context
context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
the value of place
value1 = f(i, place1 , time1 )
summary
i
value2 = f(i, place2 , time2 )
xmt value /leg = (value of place-time)
i
i
but competition cost+ margin pricing
who can know the value of place?
N: provider
Y: end-users
– apportionment
clearing grows comms market
19 Nov 1999
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context
pricing
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
end to end pricing
data flow
service
price
ISPs
B
customer
A
19 Nov 1999
end-to-end
pricing
Directionrole
of Value
C
8
context
pricing
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
end-to-end pricing role
not necessarily a business; a role taken by:
– one ISP
– the customer
– a third party (+ bundling content?)
openness to commercial innovation
but…
...what is the best default apportionment?...
19 Nov 1999
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context
pricing
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
default value apportionment
proposal:
– 'sender and receiver both charged'
– slight discrepancy in prices possible
– every leg of every flow is part charged twice
– model self-similar for inter-domain boundaries
19 Nov 1999
Direction of Value
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context
pricing
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
split-edge pricing - per direction
Nd
Ne
Nd
Nb
Wbas
Wabr
Na
Wbar
Wabs
Nc
Nc
19 Nov 1999
price in & out
Direction of Value
separately
each price
between boundary
and remote edge
price effects
localised
contracts localised
global standards
unnecessary
extends
edge-pricing
[Shenker96]
13
context
pricing
pricing
clearing
split edge pricing
scenarios
-
summary
per class
each class
of service
has a
market
class
mismatch
effects
localised
19 Nov 1999
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context
pricing
pricing
clearing
scenarios
split-edge pricing
Nd
Qv
Ne
Nd
Qu
Nb
V Qt
19 Nov 1999
Wbar
Wabs
Qu
per leg
multicast &
heterogeneous
Qw
QoS
Qw see sister
paper for
mathematical
Qu model
unicast,
multicast and
Nc
concast
Wbas
Wabr
Na
summary
Nc
Direction of Value
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context
pricing
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
cost approximation per domain
cf. weighted
star net
cf. half circuit
charging
covers costs on
average
separate rcv &
send prices fit
asymmetric
costs
19 Nov 1999
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context
pricing
pricing
clearing
scenarios
service summary
data
money
interconnect example
-10
-10 10
-10
D
10 10 37
-1•1
11-8•4
10-10 10
-14
3
B
10 -10
E
17 10
-1•1
10 -10
-8•2 11
3
-14
+4-1•3
14
-11
14
-11
9-2•4 15
-12
A +11
-1•1
-8•1
12
-15
+25
-1•1
-7•3
-9
14
-14
19 Nov 1999
3
14
14
-14
-14 0
14
-9
12
-10
12
-10
10
-12
9 9
C
9
Surplus:
A: 2= 11 - 9
B: 1= 9 - 8
C: 1= 4 - 3
D: 4= 37 -33
E: 0= 17 -17
F: 3= 25 -22
G: 3= 18 -15
Tot:14=121-107
+18
-1•1
-7•2
10
2 2 -12
9
-9
F G
10
10
-10
10
-10
Costs:
Direction ofhalf
Value interconnect B=2, others=1
17
access F,G=7; A,D,E=8
context
pricing
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
default value apportionment
choose default to minimise clearing
'only senders' or 'only receivers' charged
halve transaction volume?
requires industry-wide co-operation
unstable - mavericks gain and increase costs of all
multicast requires trusted receiver count [Holbrook99 etc]
'both sender and receiver' charged
majority of comms between consenting parties
value, charge and cost congruent
stable against maverick policies
doesn't match blame for unicast transmission...
19 Nov 1999
Direction of Value
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context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
blame, liability & control: multicast
joint blame for multicast is nice
join
join
sender
router 1
router 2
host 3
host 1
join
host 4
join
host 2
receivers
but once receiver has joined…
– e.g. surprise high QoS multicast traffic
• should receivers pay for this?
…problem same as for unicast…
19 Nov 1999
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context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
blame, liability & control: unicast
but…
...sender always to blame for a unicast or
for 'multicast surprises'
other confusions clarified:
•
•
•
•
19 Nov 1999
request-reply is irrelevant to network layer
value of moving info transitory
value of moving GBs is often for a few bits
cost of xmt << cost of targeting what to xmt
Direction of Value
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context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
dilemma & solution
'sender and receiver both charged'
vs. 'sender to blame'
receiver customarily pays
...but...
sender liable
cf. postage stamp
• sender customarily pays, but receiver liable
19 Nov 1999
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context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
clearing across edges: third party
service
12
money
3
2
46
51
5
45
50
5
5
44
49
clearing
150
19 Nov 1999
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context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
clearing across edges: iterative
service
7
money
3
44
46
100
19 Nov 1999
54
44
51
Direction of Value
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context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
end-to-end model: justification
avoids Int'l Accounting Rate System flaws:
muddling wholesale with clearing
per-flow metering in backbone
trusted end counting for multicast
apportionment needs authentication
therefore unaggregateable
O(acd+1) prices in system 6e26
d5
a = apportionment
schemes per ISP
10
19 Nov 1999
Direction of Value
c 20,000 25
context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
end-to-end model: justification II
localised contract
• jurisdiction clear
• what to meter decided locally
• only need bulk backbone metering
selective openness of clearing process
O(ac2) prices problem still exists 4e9
• but at least feasible
19 Nov 1999
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context
pricing
clearing
clearing
scenarios
summary
exception peering
exceptional failures
– loss of a packet subject to reservation
– excess delay of a low latency packet
no customer revenue
no recriminations between ISPs
– no “who lost packet?”
– no “who delayed packet most?”
assume peers sufficiently dimensioned
19 Nov 1999
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context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
scenarios
summary
scenarios
see paper for...
finding an end-to-end price
sender liable but local payment customary
inter-domain multicast with heterogeneous
quality of service (QoS)
phone to Internet gateway (PIG)
per session accounting bill=anachronism
19 Nov 1999
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context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
scenarios
summary
PIG - phone to Internet gateways
PSTN
service
Internet
money
iterative
end-end
3
1
7
3
2
36
41
100
19 Nov 1999
5
21
5
clearing 59
29
25
24
21
PIG
Direction of Value
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context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
summary
connectionless value flow
split-edge pricing scales infinitely
• price effects localised
• no need for global pricing, accounting, metering
standards
• no per flow metering away from edge
• no need for global contractual environment
• no such thing as trusted multicast receiver count?
'sender and receiver both charged' stable
• customary for unicast - but only sender liable
• telco model must not leak across PIG
19 Nov 1999
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context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
summary
summary
alternative now seems obvious...
value flows outwards
• if unequal value, clear end-to-end
• implications for design of multicast diffserv
openness to commercial innovation
end-to-end intermediary could take 0-50%
of retail ISP and telco markets
• ...and their customer relationships
19 Nov 1999
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context
pricing
clearing
scenarios
more
summary
info
further information
Differential charging (diffchar) project
http://www.labs.bt.com/projects/mware/
Bob Briscoe
http://www.labs.bt.com/people/briscorj/
19 Nov 1999
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