VoIP Security

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Transcript VoIP Security

A Comparison of
Traditional Telephony
Security with VoIP
Roy Ford
Agenda
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Into to Telephony (Traditional and VoIP)
Security Risks
Risk Mitigations
Conclusions
The Telephone
PBX
Phone Switch
T1 Trunk
Local Loop
Call Setup
SS7
Network
The Telephone
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Mixture of Analog and Multiplexed digital
technology
Centralized switches that provide power
and establish circuits between phones
2 Types of signaling
• In-band DTMF signaling at phone
• Out-of-band signaling between Switch nodes
over the SS7 network
VoIP
SIP Servers
LAN
Internet
Gateway
PSTN
VoIP
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Distributed architecture of Phones,
gateways and servers over an IP
Network
2 Protocols used to carry voice and
signaling
• Real Time Protocol (RTP) carries voice in
•
UDP packets
Session Initialization Protocol (SIP) does call
setup
SIP Invite
INVITE sip:[email protected] SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP pc33.atlanta.com;branch=z9hG4bK776asdhds
Max-Forwards: 70
To: Bob <sip:[email protected]>
From: Alice <sip:[email protected]>;tag=1928301774
Call-ID: [email protected]
CSeq: 314159 INVITE
Contact: <sip:[email protected]>
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: 142
SIP Call Setup
Traditional Telephony Risks
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Wire Tapping
Toll Fraud
• Phone Phreaking
• Call Forward All
Caller ID Spoofing & SS7 Security
User Identification
VoIP Risks
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Denial of Service
Man in the Middle
Caller ID Spoofing and interception of Call
Setup Information
Toll Fraud
User Authentication
Device Web Servers
VoIP Fuzzing
VoIP and Firewalls
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VoIP does not like Firewalls
Firewall Techniques
• VoIP Aware firewalls
• STUN
• TURN
Risk Mitigation - Traditional
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Physical Security
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Proper Configuration of Call Forwarding
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Caller ID Spoofing
• Physical plant & Access Console
• Wire Tap protection
• Toll Fraud
Risk Mitigation - VoIP
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Segregation of VoIP Traffic
•
DoS isolation
Encryption
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Man in the Middle protection
Server Configuration
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Toll Fraud
User Authentication
Device Web Servers
•
Just Say No
VoIP Fuzzing
Conclusions
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Encryption required for VoIP
Infrastructure issues with VoIP and
Traditional Telephony Similar
The phone is an attack vector in VoIP