Transcript Network Forensics Tracking Hackers Through Cyberspace.

STATISTICAL FLOW ANALYSIS
Section 4.1
Network Forensics
TRACKING HACKERS THROUGH CYBERSPACE
PURPOSE
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Identify compromised hosts
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Send out more traffic
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Use usual ports
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Communicate with known malicious systems
Confirm / Disprove data leakage
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Volume of exported data
Individual profiling
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Reveal
• Normal working hours
• Periods of inactivity
• Sources of entertainment
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Correlate activity exchanges
PROCESS OVERVIEW
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Defined
• “Flow record—A subset of information about a flow. Typically, a flow record includes
the source and destination IP address, source and destination port (where
applicable), protocol, date, time, and the amount of data transmitted in each flow.”
(Davidoff & Ham, 2012)
FLOW RECORD PROCESSING SYSTEM
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Flow record processing systems include the following components:
• Sensor—The device that is used to monitor the flows of traffic on any given segment
and extract important bits of information to a flow record.
• Collector—A server (or multiple servers) configured to listen on the network for flow
record data and store it to a hard drive.
• Aggregator—When multiple collectors are used, the data is typically aggregated on a
central server for analysis.
• Analysis—Once the flow record data has been exported and stored, it can be
analyzed using a wide variety of commercial, open-source, and homegrown tools.1
1. PG 161
SENSORS
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Sensor types
• Network Equipment
• Many switches support flow record creation and export
• Cisco - NetFlow format
• Sonicwall – IPFIX and NetFlow
• Be cautious of “sampling” which is not comprehensive data
• Standalone appliances
• Used if existing network software does not support flow data
• Software
• Argus – Audit Record Generation and Utilization System
• Softflowd
• Yaf – Yet Another Flowmeter
SENSOR SOFTWARE
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Argus
• Two packages
• Argus Server
• Argus Client
• Libpcap- based
• Supports BPF filtering
• Documentation specifically mentions forensic investigation
• Argus’ compressed format over UDP
Softflowd
• Passively monitor traffic
• Exports record data in NetFlow format
• Linux and OpenBSD
• Libpcap- based
Yaf
• Libpcap and live packet transfer
• IPFIX format over SCTP, TCP or UDP
• Supports BPF filters
SENSOR PLACEMENT
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Investigators often do not have much control over placement
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Infrastructures should be set up with flow monitoring in mind but usually are not
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Factors to consider
• Duplication is inefficient and must be minimized
• Time synchronization is crucial
• Most flow records are collected on external devices such as firewalls but this ignores
internal network traffic which can be valuable
• Resources are important when planning, prioritize
• Do not over load your network capacity
MODIFYING THE ENVIRONMENT
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Leverage existing equipment
• Switches, routers, firewalls, NIDS / NIPS
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Upgrade network equipment
• If existing equipment will not work deploy replacements
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Deploy additional sensors
• Use port mirroring to send packets to standalone sensor
• Network tap another option
FLOW RECORD EXPORT PROTOCOLS
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Proprietary – Cisco’s NetFlow
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Open source – IPFIX
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Relatively new and not yet matured – better tools on the horizon
NETFLOW
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Maintains a cache that tracks the state of all active flows observed
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Completed flows marked as “expired” and exported as a “NetFlow Export” packet to a
collector
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Newer versions (NetFlow v9) are transport-layer independent: UDP, TCP and SCTP
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Older versions only support UDP and IPv4
IPFIX
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Extends NetFlow v9
• Handles bidirectional flow reporting
• Reduces redundancy
• Better interoperability
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Extensible flow record data using data templates
• Template defines data to be exported
• Sensor uses template to construct flow data export packets
SFLOW
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Supported by many devices – not Cisco
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Conduct statistical packet sampling
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Does not support recording and processing every packet
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Scales very well
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Generally not very good for forensic analysis
COLLECTION AND AGGREGATION
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Placement factors to consider
• Congestion
• Flow records generate network traffic and can intensify congestion
• Choose location where this will cause low network impact
• Security
• Export flow records on separate VLAN if possible
• Isolate physical cables
• Encrypt using IPSec or TLS
• Reliability
• Consider using TCP or SCTP over UDP
• Capacity
• One sensor or many?
• Analysis strategy
• Can affect all of the above, plan accordingly
COLLECTION SYSTEMS
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Commercial options
• Cisco NetFlow Collector
• Manage Engine’s NetFlow Analyzer
• WatchPoint NetFlow Collector
COLLECTION SYSTEMS CONTINUED
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Open source options
• SiLK – System for Internet Level Knowledge
• Command-line
• Most powerful – biggest learning curve
• Collector specific tools – flowcap and rwflowpack
• Flow-tools
• Modular and easily extensible
• Only accepts UDP input
• Nfdump / NfSen
• Collector daemon – nfcapd
• UDP network socket or pcap files
• Argus
• Supports Argus format and NetFlow v 1-8
• NetFlow v9 and IPFIX not yet supported
ANALYSIS
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Defined
• “Statistics—“The science which has to do with the collection, classification, and
analysis of facts of a numerical nature regarding any topic.” (The Collaborative
International Dictionary of English v.0.48).” (Davidoff & Ham, 2012)
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Purpose
• Store a summary of information about the traffic flowing across the network
• Forensic data carving does not apply
• Still very useful
FLOW RECORD TECHNIQUES
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Goals and resources
• This should shape your analysis
• Access available time, staff, equipment and tools
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Starting indicators – triggering event
• Example evidence:
• IP address of compromised or malicious system
• Time frame of suspect activity
• Known ports of suspect activity
• Specific flows which indicate abnormal or unexplained activity
FLOW RECORD TECHNIQUES CONTINUED
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Analysis techniques
• Filtering
• Baselining
• “Dirty Values”
• Activity pattern matching
FILTERING
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Important to narrow down a large pool of evidence
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Remove extraneous data
• Start by isolating activity relating to specific IP address/es
• Filter for known patterns of behavior
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Use small percentages of data for detailed analysis
BASELINING
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Advantage of flow record data vs full traffic capture
• Dramatically smaller allowing for longer retention
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Build a profile of “normal” network activity
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Network baseline
• General trends over a period of time
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Host baseline
• Historical baseline can identify anomalous behavior
• Most flow patterns will change dramatically if host is compromised or under attack
“DIRTY VALUES”
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Suspicious keywords
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IP addresses
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Ports
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Protocols
ACTIVITY PATTERN MATCHING
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Elements
• IP address
• Internal network or Internet-exposed network
• Country of origin
• Who are they registered too?
• Ports
• Assigned / well-known ports link to specific applications
• Is system scanning or being scanned?
• Protocols and Flags
• Layer 3 and 4 are often tracked in flow record data
• Connection attempts
• Successful port scans
• Data transfers
• Directionality
• Data coming in (something downloaded) or going out (something uploaded)
• Volume of data transferred
• Lots of small packets can indicate port scanning
• Large amounts of data usually cause for concern
SIMPLE PATTERNS
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Many-to-one IP addresses
• DOS attack
• Syslog server
• “Drop box” data repository on destination IP
• Email server (at destination)
One-to-many IP addresses
• Web server
• Email server (at source)
• SPAM bot
• Warez server
• Network port scanning
Many-to-many IP addresses
• Peer-to-peer file sharing
• Widespread port scanning
One-to-one IP addresses
• Targeted attack
• Routine Server communication
COMPLEX PATTERNS
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Fingerprinting
• Matching complex flow record patterns to specific activities
• Example:
• TCP SYN port scan
• One source IP address
• One or more destination IP addresses
• Destination port numbers increase incrementally
• Volume of packets surpass a specified value within a given period of time
• TCP protocol
• Outbound protocol flags set to “SYN”
FLOW RECORD ANALYSIS TOOLS
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flowtools
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SiLK
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Argus
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FlowTraq
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Nfdump / NfSen
SiLK
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Rwfilter
• Extracts flows of interest
• Filters by time and category
• Partitions them by protocol attributes
• Generally as functional as BPF
Rwstats, rwcounts, rwcut, rwuniq
• Basic manipulation utilities
Rwidsquery
• Can be fed a Snort rule or alert file and it will figure out which flow matches it and writes
an rwfilter to match it
Rwpmatch
• Libpcap-based program that reads in SiLK-format flow metadata and an input source and
save only the packets that match the metadata
Advanced SiLK
• Includes a Python interpreter “PySiLK”
FLOW-TOOLS
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Variety
• Flow export data collection
• Storage
• Processing
• Sending tools
• “flow-report”
• ASCII text report based on stored flow data
• “flow-nfilter”
• Filter based on primitives specific to flow-tools
• “flow-dscan”
• Identifies suspicious traffic based on flow export data
ARGUS CLIENT TOOLS
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Ra
• Reads
• Filters
• Prints
• Supports BPF filtering
Racluster
• Exports based on user-specified criteria
Rasort
• Sorts based on user-specified criteria
Ragrep
• Regular expression and pattern matching
Rahisto
• Generated frequency distribution table for user-selected metrics: flow duration, src
and dst port numbers, byte transfer, packet counts, average duration, IP address,
ports, etc
FLOW TRAQ
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Commercial tool by ProQueSys
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Supports many formats and
sniffs traffic directly
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Users can
• Filter
• Search
• Sort
• Produce reports
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Designed for forensics and
incident response
NFDUMP
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Part of the nfdump suite
Includes
• Aggregate flow record fields by specific fields
• Limit by time range
• Generate statistics
• IP addresses
• Interfaces
• Ports
• Anonymize IP addresses
• Customize output format
• BPF-style filters
NFSEN
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Graphical, web-based interface for nfdump
ETHERAPE
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Libpcap-based graphical tool
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Visually displays activity in real time
• Colors designate traffic protocol
• HTTP
• SMB
• ICMP
• IMAPS
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Does not take flow records as input
Works Cited
Davidoff, S., & Ham, J. (2012). Network Forensics Tracking Hackers Through Cyberspace.
Boston: Prentice Hall.