Transcript Are Clouds Secure?

Are Clouds Secure?
Security and Privacy
Implications of
Cloud Computing
Subra Kumaraswamy, Sun
Tim Mather, RSA
04/21/09 | Session ID: HOT-105
Session Classification: Intermediate
What We’re Not Going to Discuss
• Existing aspects of information security which
are not impacted by ‘cloud computing’
• There are plenty of existing sources of useful
information about information security, and we
will not attempt to recreate those sources, nor
rehash unchanged practices
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What Not a Cloud?
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What We Are Going to Discuss
Information Security – Infrastructure
(network-, host-, application-level)
Information Security – Data
Security Management Services
(security management, security monitoring, identity services)
Other Important Considerations
(audit & compliance, privacy)
Security-as-a- [Cloud] Service (SaaS)
Where Risk Has Changed: 
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The Cloud: Types
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The Cloud: Pyramid of Flexibility
(SaaS)
(PaaS)
(IaaS)
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Flavors of Cloud Computing
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The Cloud: How are people using it?
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Components of Information Security
Security Management Services
Identity services – provisioning, AAA, federation, delegation
Security monitoring – network, host, application
Management – patching, hygiene, VA, ACL management
Information Security – Data
Encryption, data masking, content protection
Information Security – Infrastructure
Application-level
Host-level
Network-level
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Information
Security –
Infrastructure
Infrastructure – Network-level
• Shared Infrastructure
• VLAN – private and public (tagged)
• DHCP server, firewall, load balancer
• Limitations
• No zones – domains instead
• Traditional port/protocol filtering irrelevant
• Point-to-point encryption (in transit) is doable
• Extranet security jeopardized – unless ‘you’ control cloud (IP)
addressing (questionable)
• Security monitoring – no transparency
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Infrastructure – Network-level
• Threats
• Lack of widespread adoption of secure BGP
• Secure BGP (S-BGP), Secure Origin BGP (soBGP), and Pretty Good BGP
(pgBGP)
• Traffic redirection for eavesdropping
• DNS: domain hijacking
• Lack of widespread adoption of Secure DNS
• Only country-wide adoption: Sweden
• DoS / DDoS
• Mitigations
• Virtual private cloud – VPN-based solution with strong
authentication
• SSL with client-side certs
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Infrastructure – Host-level
• Shared infrastructure
• Hardware – CPU, memory, disks, network
• Software – virtualization layer (e.g., Xen)
• Web Console – provisioning, image management
• Limitations
• Ephemeral IP address assignment
• Patch, configuration management of large number of dynamic nodes
• SLAs are mostly standard – click-through user agreement
• Host-based IDS is customer responsibility
• Access management – OS and vendor specific
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Infrastructure – Host-level
• Threats
• Image configuration drift and vulnerabilities
• Targeted DOS attack
• Potential breakout of VMs; examples: Subvert, Blue Pill, HyperVM
• Attack on standard OS services
• Mitigations
• Reduce attack surface – Secure-by-default, harden image, turn off OS
services, use software firewall, enable logging
• Institute process – Access provisioning, patch, config. mgmt.
• Extend existing IT security standards, practice & processes
• Host-based IDS – Tripwire, OSSEC
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Infrastructure – Application-level
• Shared Infrastructure
• Virtualized host, network, firewall (if hosted on IaaS or PaaS)
• Virtualized stack (e.g., LAMP)
• Database Vs Dataspace (e.g., SimpleDB, BigTable)
• Limitations
• SaaS – application security is a black box
• SaaS/PaaS – no CVE participation
• IaaS/PaaS – customer responsibility to secure applications
• IaaS/PaaS – Limited capabilities for encryption, identity
management
• No option to install application firewall
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Infrastructure – Application-level
• Threats
• OWASP Top 10
• Mash up security
• Denial of service by corporate IPS/Firewalls
• Developers side stepping controls
• Mitigations
• Traditional application security testing and monitoring
• Review provider SDLC and security assurance process
• If possible encrypt data stored in DB
• Manage and protect application “secret keys”
• User awareness – phishing attacks on users
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Information
Security – Data
Data Security
• Confidentiality, Availability
• Multi-tenancy
• Data-at-rest possibly not encrypted
• Data being processed definitely not encrypted
• Data lineage (mapping data flows)
• Data provenance
• Data remanence
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Security
Management
Services
Security Management – Customer Responsibilities
Activities
IaaS
PaaS
OS, DB, Application
Hardening and Patching
• Manage VM Image
hardening
• Manage patching of VM ,
app and DB using your
established process
• Harden applications by • Not applicable
integration by integrating
security into SDLC
• Test for OWASP Top 10
vulnerabilities
Change and configuration • Manage change and
management
configuration management
of host , DB, Application
using your established
process
SaaS
• Customer deployed
application only
• Not applicable
Vulnerability management • Manage OS, Application
• Customer deployed
vulnerabilities leveraging
application only
your established vulnerability
management process
• Not applicable
Access Control
management
• Manage Access control to
VM, zone firewall using
vendor consoles. Install and
manage host firewall policies
• Manage user
provisioning
• Restrict access using
authentication and IP
based restriction
• Delegate
authentication if SAML
supported
• Manage user
provisioning
• Restrict access
using
authentication and
IP based restriction
• Delegate
authentication if
SAML supported
Security Monitoring – Customer view
Activities
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
Network monitoring
• Not available
• Not available
• Not available
Host monitoring
• Install and manage HIDS
such as OSSEC
• Not available
• Not available
• Not available
• Not available
• Monitor security events
using logs stored in VM
Database monitoring
• Install DB security
monitoring tool on the VM
hosting DB
Application monitoring
• Monitor application security • Monitor application
logs
logs that may be
• Monitor application
available – No standard
vulnerabilities using your
preferred tool
Sun ConfidentialInternal Only
• Not available
Identity Services
• Generally, strong authentication is available only
through delegation
• Federated identity generally not available
• Support for SAML v2, WS* and XACML is sporadic
• OpenID is not enterprise-ready
• OpenID  OATH  OAuth  OpenAuth  OpenSSO
• All five are “open” and deal with authentication, but….
• Delegated authorization generally not available
• Generally weak credential management – of weak
credentials
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Other Important
Considerations
Audit & Compliance
• No audit standards specific to the ‘cloud’
• Not operational, procurement (e.g., FAR), or security
• SAS-70 Type 2 is an audit format – not specific
audit criteria
• Most cloud providers don’t even have a SAS-70
• Compliance: so-called Patriot Act Problem
• Location, location, location
• Issue is assurance of compliance (e.g., data lineage – let alone data
providence)
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Privacy
• Loss of Fourth Amendment protection
• Legal order served on provider – not ‘you’
• Some data can be accessed merely by NSLs
• Magistrate judge court orders under §215
• Probably no encryption of data-at-rest
• No indexing or sorting of encrypted data
• Definitely no encryption while data processed
• Promise of 2-DNF (homomorphic encryption), Predicate Encryption
(asymmetric encryption)
• Data remanence: limited attempt to address
• NIST Special Publication 800-88, Guidelines for Media Sanitization
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Security-as-a[Cloud] Service
Security Through the Cloud
• Proliferation of endpoints
• Different OSs, form factors – but all with access to
organizational data
• Scalability & manageability of existing solutions
stretched too far
• USENIX paper in July 2008 in San Jose
• “CloudAV: N-Version Antivirus in the Network Cloud”
• Network-centric: e-mail, vulnerability assessment
• Former host resident: anti-malware, content filtering
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Conclusions
• Part of ‘your’ infrastructure security moves
beyond your control – Get Ready!
• Provider’s infrastructure security may
(enterprise) or may not (SMB) be less robust than
‘your’ expectations
• Data security becomes significantly more
important
• Weak access control, credential mgmt. – unless
delegated back to ‘you’
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Conclusions
• No established standards for redaction,
obfuscation, or truncation’
• No cloud-specific audit requirements or guidance
• “Extending” SAS-70 Type 2 to cloud providers
• No cloud-specific regulatory requirements – yet
• Some foreign prohibitions on using U.S. cloud providers
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Questions?
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Speakers
• Subra Kumaraswamy, Senior Security Manager
– Sun Microsystems
– [email protected]
• Tim Mather, Chief Security Strategist
– RSA, The Security Division of EMC
– [email protected]
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