Transcript 247E-253A, pp. 269-75 - San Jose State University

The Sophist
to 259C (p. 283)
Philosophy 190: Plato
Fall, 2014
Prof. Peter Hadreas
Course website:
http://www.sjsu.edu/people/peter.hadreas/courses/Plato
Plato’s Academy, a
mosaic in the Museo
Nazionale, Naples,
(Photo: Giraudon)
Date at which the Dialogue Begins
The Sophist takes place one day after the conversation of the
Theaetetus. The connection is made with the last line of the
Theaetetus: “But let us meet here again in the morning,
Theodorus.” (210D, p. 234) And at the end of the Theaetetus
Socrates also says: “And now I must go to the King’s Porch to
meet the indictment that Meletus has brought against me;”
So the Sophist takes place not many days before Socrates’
trial in 399 BCE.
Central topic of the dialogue:
To distinguish the sophist from the true
philosopher, and in so doing, to sketch the
structure of the world of Forms.
Beginning of the Sophist.
(216A-p. 236)
THEODORUS: We’ve come at the proper time by
yesterday’s agreement, Socrates. We’re also bringing this
man who’s visiting us. He’s from Elea and he’s a member of
the group who gather around Parmenides and Zeno. And he’s
very much a philosopher.
(p. 238 – 218A)
VISITOR: . . . So I’ll accept Theaetetus as the person to talk
with. But if you’re annoyed at how long the job takes, you
should blame your friends here and not me.
THEAETETUS: I don’t think I’ll give out now, but if
anything like that does happen we’ll have to use the other
Socrates over there as a substitute. He’s Socrates namesake,
but he’s my age and exercises with me and he used to sharing
lots and tasks with me.
The focus on kinds or types is conveyed in the
introduction of the Sophist.
(217A-p. 237)
THEODORUS: “ . . . What special thing do you have in
mind?
SOCRATES: This: did they think that sophists, statesmen
and philosophers make up one kind of thing or two? Or did
they divide them up into three kinds corresponding to the
three names and attach one name to each of them?
THEODORUS: I don’t think it would offend him [the Eleatic
Stranger] to tell us about them, Or would it sir?
VISITOR: No, Theaetetus, it wouldn’t offend me. I don’t
have any objection. And the answer is easy: they think there
are three kinds. Distinguishing what each of them is, though
isn’t a small or easy job.” [my emphasis]
The Method of Division or diaeresis is
not described in the Sophist but it is
described in exalted terms in Plato’s
late dialogue, Philebus
It called “a gift of the gods to men” in
the Philebus
“It is not very difficult to describe it, but
extremely difficult to use it. For everything in
any field of art that has ever been discovered has
come to light because of this.” (404, 16C)
“ . . . hurled down from heaven by
some Prometheus along with a most
dazzling fire.” 404, 16D
Jan Cossiers,
17th century
The Method of Division as Described in
the Philebus.
“And the people of old, superior to us and living in closer
proximity to the gods, have bequeathed us this tale, that
whatever is said to be consists of one and many, having
in its nature limit and unlimitedness. Since this is the
structure of things, we have to assume that there is in
each case always one form for every one of them, and we
must search for it, as we will indeed find it there. And
once we have grasped it, we must look for two, as the
case would have it, or if not, for three or some other
number.” (16D, p. 404)
The Method of Division as Described in
the Philebus [continued]
“And we must treat every one of those further unities in
the same way, until it is not only established of the
original unit that it is one, many and unlimited, but also
how many kinds it is. For we must not grant the form of
the unlimited to plurality before we know the exact
number of every plurality that lies between the unlimited
and the one. Only then is it permitted to release each
kind of unity into the unlimited and let it go. The gods, as
I said, have left us this legacy of how to inquire and learn
and teach one another.” (pp. 404-5; 16D-17A)
Difference Between the Concerns of the Eleatic Visitor and
Socrates in the Sophist
The Eleatic visitor says there that his method takes no
interest in the relative goodness or badness of the kinds.
ELEATIC STRANGER: “The method [the method employed
by the Eleatic Stranger] aims at acquiring intelligence, so it
tries to understand how all kinds of expertise belong to the
same kind or not. And for that it values them all equally
without thinking that some are more ridiculous than others,
as far as their similarity is concerned. And it doesn’t consider
a person more impressive because he exemplifies hunting by
military expertise rather than by picking lice.” (p. 247, 227A –
B).1
1. Adapted from Dorter, Kenneth, “The Method of Division in the Sophist: Plato’s
Second Deuteros Plous.”
Difference Between the Concerns of the Eleatic Visitor and
Socrates
When the visitor’s sixth attempt to identify the sophist leads
instead to a type that resembles the Socratic philosopher, he
says:
VISITOR: Well then, who are we going to say the people who
apply this form of expertise are? I’m afraid to call them
sophists.
THEAETETUS: Why?
VISITOR: So, we don’t pay sophists too high an honor. 1
1. Ibid.
Practicing‘hunting’ the sophist through an easier
and more ‘trivial’ example:‘the angler’
“ Visitor: . . . Theaetetus, since we think it’s hard to hunt
down and deal with the kind, sophist, we ought to practice
our method of hunting on something easier first – unless you
can tell us about another way that’s somehow more
promising. [my emphasis]
Theaetetus: I can’t.
Visitor: Do you wants to focus on something trivial and try to
use it as a model for the more important issue?
Theaetetus: Yes.
Visitor: What might we propose that’s unimportant and easy
to understand, but, can have an account given of it just as
much as more important things can? For example, an angler:
isn’t that recognizable to everybody, but not worth being too
serious about?” (218D-E; p. 238-9)
‘Angling’ defined by method of division
(219A-221C; pp. 239-41)
Expertise (τεχνη)
Acquisitive
Productive
by taking possession
Hunting
Combat
by mutual willing exchange
hunting of living things
aquatic
hunting
hunting of lifeless things
land hunting
fishing
bird-catching
strike-hunting
with enclosures,
nets, baskets, etc.
torchhunting
by hooks
spearing
angling
But the Method of Division (Diaeresis) as Practiced
by the Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist, as Opposed to
How it is Practiced by Socrates in the Philebus, May
Be Itself a Sophistic Exercise
“There can be no doubt that the Stranger makes remarks
about diaeresis which encourage us to regard it as a quasimathematical procedure of universal competence. But these
remarks must be measured against the actual functioning of
diaeresis in the Stranger’s hands. Perhaps diaeresis is like the
sophist in wrongly claiming to know everything.”1
1. Rosen, Stanley, Plato’s Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image, (South Bend, IN: Sty.
Augustine Press, 1999), p. 85.
What Is A ‘Sophist’ diaeresis I
(222B-223B, p. 242-3)
1.There are two kinds of land hunting: hunting of wild and tame animals.
Humans are presumed to be tame animals.
2.There are two types of hunting tame animals: hunting by force, i. e.,
piracy, enslavement, tyranny; and by expertise in persuasion, i. e.,
through legal oratory, political oratory and by conversation.
3.Hunting by persuasion may divided into public and private persuasion.
4.Hunting by private persuasion may be divided into as motivated by
earning wages or giving gifts. Giving gifts is illustrated through lovers
gaining in private persuasion by also giving gifts.
5.Hunting for the purpose of gaining salaries is divided into two groups: in
the first group the practitioners provide pleasurable conversation,
through flattery, for money; the second group converses, so it claims for
the sake of virtue, but its practitioners accept monetary wages.
6.The sophist is of the first type: “ . . . hunting by persuasion, hunting
privately, and money earning. It’s the hunting of rich prominent young
men.”
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What Is A ‘Sophist’ diaeresis II
(223C-224D, p. 244-5)
1.Expertise in acquisition has two parts, hunting and exchanging
2.Exchanging has two types, giving and selling
3.Selling is divided into selling what the seller makes and the other is
purveying, that is selling what others make.
4.If the selling is done within one’s own city it is called retailing. If it is
done between cities it is called wholesaling.
5. Selling between cities for cash is divided between nourishing and use for
the body or the soul.
6.Selling as wholesaling so as to nourish the soul, is divided into ‘the
display of soul-wholesaling’ and secondly in ‘expertise selling’ of virtue.
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Sophist #2: “‘the display of soul-wholesaling’ and secondly in
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transmitted to over 3000 stations a week. Sexual scandals in the 1980s and
1990s led the Assemblies of God to defrock him.
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What Is A ‘Sophist’ diaeresis III & IV
(224D-E, p. 245)
1.Same as diaeresis II, except diaeresis III & IV pick up from
alternative in diaeresis II about whether selling and exchange
is across cities or in one own city. In Diaresis III & IV, “ . . .
Sophistry falls under acquisition, exchange, and selling either
by retailing things that other make or by selling things that he
makes himself. It’s the retail sales of any learning that has to
do with the sorts of things we mentioned [that is with
virtue].”
2.If the retailing is of goods that he bought from others it’s
come to a result via diaeresis III. If it’s involves the retailing
of one’s own goods it’s diaeresis IV.
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What Is A ‘Sophist’ diaeresis V
(224E – 226A, p. 245-6)
1.The hunter is occupied with contests. Contests are divided
into peaceful and warlike contests.
2.Warlike contests are divided into bodily violent and
argumentative.
3.Argumentative contests, contest relying on words are
divided into public debates that involve lengthy speeches and
private disputations that depend on shorter questions and
answers.
4.Private disputation are divided into those without serious
concerns, ‘chatter,’ and a second that makes money because
it causes pleasure in its audience.
Bill Maher
Especially as he presents him self in “HBO's Real Time
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1.Sophist #5: “The sophist makes money through disputes
because of the pleasure it brings to its audience.”
Introduction to the Sixth diaeresis1
“We come now to the last, longest, and most interesting of the
initial set of diaireses. There will be a final division of the
terrain at the end of the dialogue The major stretch of the
dialogue from 231B9 to 264B9 is thus a digression from the
diaeretic exercises. However, the digression is needed, according
to the Stranger, because of the inadequacy of diaeresis, which
cannot grasp the sophist by itself.”
...
“The Stranger agrees with Theaetetus that both hands are
needed to capture the sophist (226B1). He then starts off
abruptly on a new scent, one which is entirely independent both
of the angler paradigm and the first four [by our count five]
definitions of the sophist.”
1. Rosen, Stanley, Plato’s Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image, (South Bend,
IN: St. Augustine Press, 1999), p. 115.
Introduction to the Sixth Diaeresis
[continued]1
“The Stranger poses a question that puzzles Theaetetus, but
which our preliminary reflection makes quite pertinent. Do we
give names to some tasks performed by servants?”
...
“Whereas in the Statesman the Stranger explicitly compares
diaeresis to the homely art of weaving, in the Sophist, he
implicitly [or almost explicitly] compares diaeresis to bread and
clothes making. In both these arts, natural products are
modified in accord with human need, the result is in each case
an artifact, but one directly toward a natural end, the
preservation and care of the living body.”
1. Rosen, Stanley, Plato’s Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image, (South Bend,
IN: St. Augustine Press, 1999), p. 117-8.
What Is A ‘Sophist’ diaeresis VI
(226B – 231B, p. 245-6)
1.The main type of arts at issue are those that involve kinds of
dividing up. They may involve separating worse from better,
in household skills, e. g., filtering, straining and winnowing,
and separating like from like, e. g., carding, spinning and
weaving. Both are kinds of ‘discriminating.’ Discrimination
that leaves what’s better and throws away the worse is called
‘cleansing.’
2.Cleansing is divided into those that treat the body, such as
gymnastics and medicine, and those that treat the soul
cleansing it from wickedness or ignorance.
3.Ignorance can consist in not knowing but thinking you
know (229C) or lack of learning. The latter is handled
through education.
What Is A ‘Sophist’ diaeresis VI [continued]
(226B – 231B, p. 245-6)
4. As for thinking one’s knows when one doesn’t, one has to
get rid of the belief in one’s wisdom. How to treat that? Some
people “cross examine someone when he thinks he’s saying
something though he’s saying nothing. Then since his
opinions will vary inconsistently, these people will easily
scrutinize them. They collect his opinions together during the
discussion, put them side by side, and show that they conflict
with each other at the same time on the same subjects in
relation to the same things and in the same respects.” (230BC, p. 250-1) “ . . . This is nothing other than our noble
sophistry.”
Sophist VI
Getting People to Realize They Don’t Have
Knowledge When They Think They Have
(230B-D; pp. 250-1)
“Visitor: They cross-examine someone when he thinks he’s
saying something though he’s saying nothing. Then, since
his opinions will vary inconsistently, these people will easily
scrutinize them. They collect his opinions together during
the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they
conflict with each other at the same time on the same
subjects in relation to the same things, and in the same
respects. The people who are being examined see this, get
angry at themselves, and become calmer toward others.
Sophist VI
Getting People to Realize They Don’t Have
Knowledge When They Think They Have
(230B-D; pp. 250-1)
(continuing) “Visitor: They lose their inflated rigid beliefs
about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter to hear
or has more lasting effect on them. Doctors who work on the
body think it can’t benefit from any food that’s offered to it
until what’s interfering with it from inside is removed. The
people who cleanse the soul, my young friend, likewise think
the soul, too, won’t get any advantage from any learning
that’s offered to it until someone shames it by refuting it,
removes the opinions that interfere with learning, and
exhibits it cleansed, believing that it knows only those things
that it does know, and nothing more.”
Summary of Six Types of Sophist that Method of Division
would seem to Uncover
(231D-E; p. 252)
“Visitor: But let’s stop first and catch our breadth, so to speak. And while
we’re resting let’s ask ourselves, “Now, how many different appearances
has the sophist presented to us?” I think we first discovered him as a hired
hunter of rich young men.
Theaetetus: Yes.
Visitor: Second, as a wholesaler of learning about the soul.
Theaetetus: Right.
Visitor: Third, didn’t he appear as a retailer of the same things?
Theaetetus: Yes, and fourth as a seller of his own learning?
Visitor: Your memory is correct. I’ll try to recall the fifth way: he was an
athlete in verbal combat, distinguished by his expertise in debating.
Theaetetus: Yes.
Visitor: The sixth appearance was disputed, but still we made a concession
to him and took it that he cleanses the soul of beliefs that interfere with
learning.
Theaetetus: Definitely.”
First six definitions of‘Sophist’ defined by method of division
Expertise (τεχνη) (221D- p. 242)
Discriminative
Acquisitive
226C-231B; pp. 247-251
Sophist VI: Cathartic
method of Socrates
by taking
possession
by mutual willing
exchange
Hunting
(Angler)
Combat
fighting
competition
violence
Sophist II:
selling of
display of
expertise &
things of soul
224A-p. 244.
controversy
public
speeches
Sophist III: selling
of acquisition of
expertise &
things of the soul
224D-p. 245.
Sophist IV:
self-taught
expertise &
things of the
soul 224D-p.
245.
Sophist I: The
hunter of rich
prominent
young men, by
flattery (223B,
p. 243)
Sophist V:
making money:
through debating,
disputation, 226Ap. 246, 252
But All of the Six Definitions of Sophist
May Not Have Genuine Knowledge
(323A-324C; pp. 254-5)
“Visitor: Well, then, suppose people apply the name of a
single sort of expertise to someone, but he appears to have
expert knowledge of lots of things. In a case like that don’t
you notice that something’s wrong with the way he appears?”
(323A – p. 252)
But All of the Six Definitions of Sophist
May Not Have Genuine Knowledge [continued]
(232A-234C; pp. 252-5)
(continued) “Visitor: . . . In fact, take expertise in disputation as a whole.
Doesn’t it seem like a capacity that’s sufficient for carrying on
controversies about absolutely everything?
Theaetetus: It doesn’t seem to leave much out anyway.
Visitor: But for heaven’s sake, my boy, do you think that’s possible? Or
maybe young people see into this issue more keenly than we do.
Theaetetus: Into what? What are you getting at? I don’t fully understand
what you’re asking.
Visitor: Whether it’s possible for any human being to know everything.
Theaetetus: If it were, sir, we’d be very well off.
Visitor: But how could someone who didn’t know a subject make a sound
objection again someone who knew about it?
Theaetetus: He couldn’t. (232E-233A; p. 253)
L. Ron Hubbard
“The evidence portrays a man who has
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Memorandum of Intended Decision, Church of Scientology of California vs. Gerald
Armstrong. Quoted by Miller, pp. 370-71
Renewed attempt to define the‘Sophist’ by
method of division
Diaeresis VII
Expertise (τεχνη) (232A-237A; pp. 252-7)
Productive
(233E-254)
Imitative
(234B- p. 254)
magician: deludes
people he can produce
anything he wants
(234C-p. 255)
Likeness-making (235E-p.
256)
Appearance-making
(236C-p. 256)
ANAYSIS BREAKS
OFF OVER QUESTION
OF NON-BEING
Escaping criticism, 1874, Pere Borrell Del Caso (1835-1910)
“Visitor: . . . Then we know that when he shows his drawings from far
away he’ll be able to fool the more mindless young children into thinking
that he can actually produce anything he wants to.” (234B; p. 255)
Example of Representational Art, David Abed: Still Life with Brown Jug, Oil
“Visitor: One type of imitation I see is the art of likeness-making. That’s the
one we have whenever someone produces an imitation by keeping to the
proportions of length, breadth, and depth of his model, and also by keeping to
the appropriate color of its parts.” (253E-p. 256)
Gliterari Elvis, The Official Bad Art Museum of Art, Cafe Racer located, 5828 Roosevelt Way,
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“Visitor: Wouldn’t appearance-making be the right thing to call expertise in
producing appearances that aren’t likenesses? Theaetetus: Yes, definitely.”
(236C; p. 256)
The Problem of Non-Being
236C-239D
Being and Not-Being
“To define the sophist as an expert in deception, as
someone who produces false appearances by means
of statements, the Stranger needs to show that
Parmenides was wrong; he needs to demonstrate that
it is possible to say and to think that things that are
not are, and to do so without contradiction. He starts
with a series of puzzles about not-being and then
suggests that we may be in similar confusion about
being.”1
1. Gill, Mary Louise, "Method and Metaphysics in Plato's Sophist and
Statesman", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/plato-sophstate/>.
Paradoxes of Non-being
Talking of Non-Being Reduces One to Silence
(237C-E; p. 258)
“Visitor: But anyway this much is obvious to us, that that which is
not can’t be applied to any of those things which are.
Theaetetus: Of course not.
Visitor: So if you can’t apply it to that which is, it wouldn’t be
right either to apply it to something.
Theaetetus: Why not?
Visitor: It’s obvious to us that we always apply this something to
a being, since it’s impossible to say it by itself, as if it were naked
and isolated from all beings. Isn‘t that right?
Theaetetus: Yes.
Paradoxes of Non-being
Talking of Non-Being Reduces One to Silence
(237C-E; p. 258)
(continued) “Visitor: Are you agreeing because you’re thinking
that a person who says something has to be saying some one
thing?
Theaetetus: Yes.
Visitor: Since you’d say the something is a sign of one, and that
a couple of things is a sign of two, and somethings is a sign of a
plurality?
Theaetetus: Of course
Visitor: And it’s absolutely necessary, it seems, that someone
who does not say something says nothing at all.
Theaetetus: Yes.”
Paradoxes of Non-being
Argument Applied in General to Thinking and Conceiving
Non-Being
(238; p. 259)
“Visitor: Do you understand, then, that it’s impossible to say,
speak or think that which is not itself correctly by itself? It’s
unthinkable, unsayable, unutterable, and unformulable in
speech.
Theaetetus: Absolutely.”
The Visitor From Elea Quotes from
Parmenides’ Poem:
(237A; p. 257)
Never shall this force itself on us, that
that which is not may be;
While you search, keep your thought far
away from this path.
Images
Reconsidered
The Sophist proposes a ‘likeness’ and in so doing forces us to
agree that ‘that which is not’ in a way ‘is’.
(240B-C; p. 261)
“Visitor: So you’re saying that that which is like is not really
that which is, if you speak of it as not true.
Theaetetus: But it is, in a way.
Visitor: But not truly you say.
Theaetetus: No, except that it is really a likeness.
Visitor: So it’s not really what is, but it is really what we call a
likeness?
Theaetetus: Maybe that which is not is woven together with
that which is in some way like that – it’s quite bizarre.
Visitor: Of course it’s strange. Anyway, you can see that the
many-headed sophist is still using this interweaving to force us
to agree unwillingly that that which is not in a way is.”
Shift from asking What is Non-Being? to What is
Being?
(244B; p. 263)
Visitor [as if speaking to Ionian and Eleatic Pre-Socratics]:
“Then clarify this for us, since we’re confused about it. What do
you want to signify when you say being? Obviously you’ve
known for a long time. We thought we did, but now we’re
confused about it. So first teach it to us, so we won’t think we
understand what you’re saying when just the contrary is the
case.”
NOTE: Martin Heidegger makes this passage an introductory epigram in
Being and Time.
The Battle of the Giants
undred Hander' giants throwing rocks 'Fall of the Titans' by Rubens
“The Battle of Gods and Giants”
of the
Question of Being
(246B; p. 267)
“Visitor: It seems that there’s something like a battle of gods and
giants among them, because of their dispute with each other over
being.
Theaetetus: How?
Visitor: One group drags everything down to earth from the
heavenly region of the invisible, actually clutching rocks and
trees with their hands. When they take hold of all these things
they insist that only what offers tangible contact is, since they
define being as the same as body. And if any of the other say that
something without a body is, they absolutely despise him and
won’t listen to him any more.
Theaetetus: These are frightening men, you’re talking about. I’ve
met quite a lot of them already.”
“The Battle of Gods and Giants”
over the question of Being
(246C; p. 268)
“Visitor: Therefore the people on the other side of the debate
defend their position very cautiously, from somewhere up out
of sight. They insist violently that true being is certain
nonbodily forms that can be thought about. They take the
bodies of the other group, and also what they call the truth,
and they break them up into little bits and call them a process
of coming-to-be instead of being. There’s a never ending battle
going on constantly between them about this issue.”
The Attempt to
Define Being
Proposed Definition of Being and Its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
“VISITOR: I’m saying that a thing really is if it has any capacity
at all, either by nature to do something else or to have even the
smallest thing done to it by even the most trivial thing, even if it
only happens once. I’ll take it as a definition that those which are
amount to nothing other than capacity.
THEATETUS: They [materialists– ‘native earthborn giants’]
accept that, since they don’t have anything better say right now.
VISITOR: Fine. Maybe something else will occur to them later,
and to us too. For now let’s agree with them on this much.
THEATETUS: All right.
VISITOR: Let’s to the other people the friends of the forms. You
serve as an interpreter for us.
Proposed Definition of Being on Its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
THEATETUS: All right.
VISITOR: You people distinguish coming-to-be and being and say that they
are separate? Is that right?
THEATETUS:”Yes.”
VISITOR: And you say that by our bodies and through our perception we
have dealings with coming-to-be, but we deal with real being [ὄντως οὐσίαν,
ontōs ousian, literally beingly essential being] by our souls and through
reasoning You say that being always stays the same and in the same state,1 but
coming-to-be varies from one time to another.
THEATETUS: “We do say that.”
VISITOR: And what shall we say this dealing with is that you apply in the two
cases. Doesn’t it mean what we said just now?
1. Note the assumption made about being, “always stay the same and in the same
state.” This is not a view attributable to Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger or
indeed any modern canonic philosopher inasmuch as they take a position on ‘Being’
what generally they do not.
Proposed Definition of Being and its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
THEATETUS: “What?”
VISITOR: What happens when two things come together, and by some
capacity one does something to the other or has something done to it? Or
maybe you don’t hear their answer clearly, Theaetetus. But, I do, probably
because I’m used to them.
THEATETUS: Then what account to they give?
VISITOR: They don’t agree to what we said to the earth people about being.
THEATETUS: What’s that?
VISITOR: We took it as a sufficient condition of beings that the capacity be
present in a thing to do something or have something done to it, to or by even
the smallest thing or degree.
THEATETUS: Yes.
Proposed Definition of Being and Its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
VISITOR: In reply they say that coming-to-be has the capacity to do
something or have something done to it, but that this capacity doesn’t fit with
being.
THEATETUS: Is there anything to that?
THEATETUS: We have to reply that we needs them to tell us more clearly
whether the soul knows and also that being is known.
VISITOR: “Yes,” they say
THEATETUS: Well then, do you say that knowing and being known are cases
of doing, or having something done? Or is neither a case of either?
VISITOR: Obviously neither is a case of either, since otherwise they’d be
saying something contrary to what they said before.
THEATETUS: That’s correct.
VISITOR: But for heaven’s sake are we going to be convinced that it’s true
that change, life, soul and intelligence are not present in that which wholly is
[τῷ παντελῶς ὂντι, tō pantelōs onti; literally in the ‘all-perfect being’], and
that it neither lives nor thinks, but that it stays changeless, solemn and holy,
without any understanding?
Proposed Definition of Being and its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
THEATETUS:If we did sir. we’d be admitting something frightening.
VISITOR: But are we going to say that it has understanding but doesn’t have
life?
THEATETUS: Of course not.
VISITOR: But are we saying that it has both those things in it while denying
that it has them in its soul?
THEATETUS: How else would it have them?
VISITOR: And are we saying that it has intelligence, life and soul, but that it’s
rest and completely changeless even though it’s alive?
THEAETETUS: All that seems completely unreasonable.
VISITOR: Then both that which changes and also change have to be admitted
as being.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: And so, Theaetetus, it turns out that if no beings change then
nothing anywhere possesses any intelligence about anything.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely not.
Proposed Definition of Being and its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
VISITOR: But furthermore if we admit that everything is moving and
changing, then on that account we take the very same thing away from those
which are.
THEATETUS: Why?
VISITOR: Do you thing that without rest anything would be same, in the
same state in the same respects?
THEATETUS: Not at all.
VISITOR: Well then, do you see any case in which intelligence is or comes-tobe anywhere without these things?
THEATETUS: Not in the least.
VISITOR: And we need to use every argument we can to fight against anyone
who does away with knowledge, understanding, and intelligence but at the
same time asserts anything at all about anything.
THEAETETUS: Definitely.
Proposed Definition of Being and its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
VISITOR: The philosopher – the person who values these things the most –
absolutely has to refuse to accept the claim that everything is at rest, either
from defender of the one or from friend of the many forms. In addition he has
to refuse to listen to people who say that that which is [τὸ ὂν, to on]changes in
every way. He has to be like a child begging for “both,” and say that that
which is [τὸ ὂν, to on]– everything -- is both the unchanging and that which
changes.
THEATETUS: True.
VISITOR: Well, now. apparently we’ve done a fine job of making our account
pull together that which is, haven’t we?
THEATETUS: Absolutely.
VISITOR: But for heaven’s sake, Theaetetus, . . . Now I think we’ll recognize
how confused our investigation about it is.
Proposed Definition of Being and its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
THEATETUS: Why, though? What do you mean?
VISITOR: Don’t you notice, my young friend, that we’re now in an extreme
ignorance about it, though it appears to us that we’re saying something.
THEATETUS: It does to me anyway. But I don’t completely understand how
we got into this situation without noticing.
VISITOR: Then think more clearly about it. Given what we’ve just agreed to,
would it e fair for someone to ask the same question we asked about the people
who say that everything is just hot and cold?
THEATETUS: What was it? Remind me.
VISITOR: Certainly. And I’ll try, at any rate, to do it be asking you in just the
same way as I asked them, so that we can move forward at the same pace.
THEAETETUS: Good.
VISITOR: Now then, wouldn’t you say that change and rest are completely
contrary to each other?
THEAETETUS: Of course.
Proposed Definition of Being and its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
VISITOR: And you’d say they both equally are, and that each of them
equally is?
THEATETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: When you admit that they are, are you saying that both and each
of them change?
THEATETUS: Not at all.
VISITOR: And are you signifying that they rest when you say that they both
are?
THEATETUS: Of course not.
VISITOR: So do you conceive that which is is a third thing alongside them
which encompasses rest and change? and when you say that they both are, are
you taking the two of them together and focusing on their association with
being?
THEAETETUS: It does seem probably true that when we say change and rest
are, we do have a kind of omen of that which is, as a third thing. [[literally: We
run the risk of prophesying – speak as a mediator between god(s) and humans
-- when we speak of being as a third thing.]
Proposed Definition of Being and its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
VISITOR: So that which is isn’t both change and rest; it’s something different
from them instead.
THEATETUS: It seems so
VISITOR: Therefore by it’s own nature that which is doesn’t either rest or
change.
THEATETUS: I suppose it doesn’t.
VISITOR: Which way should someone turn his thoughts if he wants to
establish for himself something clear about it.
THEATETUS: I don’t know.
VISITOR: I don’t think the line is easy. If it isn’t something changing, how
can it not be resting? And how can something not change if it doesn’t in any
way rest? But now that which is appears to fall outside both of them. Is that
possible.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely not.
VISAITOR: In this connection we ought to remember the following:
THEAETETUS: What?
Proposed Definition of Being and its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
VISITOR: When we asked what we should apply the name that which is not
to, we became completely confused. Do you remember?
THEATETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: And now aren’t we in just as much confusion about that which is?
THEATETUS: We seem to be in even more confusion if that is possible.
VISITOR: Then we’ve now given a complete statement of our confusion. But
there’s now hope, precisely both that which is and that which is not are
involved in equal confusion. That is, in so far as one of them is clarified, either
brightly or dimly, the other will ne too. And if we can’t see either of them, then
anyway we’ll push our account of both of them forward as well as we can.
THEATETUS: Fine.
VISITOR: Let’s give an account of how we call the very same thing, whatever
it may be, by several names.
THEATETUS: What, for instance? Give me an example.
Proposed Definition of Being and its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
VISITOR: Surely we’re speaking of a man even when we name him several
things, that is, when we apply colors to him and shapes, sizes, defects and
virtues. In these cases and a million others we say that he’s not only a man but
also is good and indefinitely many different [literally other] things. And
similarly on the same account we take a thing to be one, and at the same time
we speak of it as many by using many names for it.
THEATETUS: That’s true.
VISITOR: Out of all this we’ve prepared a feast for young people and for oldlate-learners. They can grab hold of the handy idea that it’s impossible for
that which is many to be one and for that which is one to be man. They
evidently enjoy forbidding us to say that a man is good, and only letting us say
that that which is good is good, or that the man is a man. You’ve often met
people, I suppose, who are carried away by things like that. Sometimes they’re
elderly people who are amazed at this kind of thing, because their
understanding is so poor and they thing they’ve discovered something
prodigiously wise.
Proposed Definition of Being and its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
THEATETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: Shall we refuse to apply being to change or to rest, or anything to
anything else? Shall we take these things to be unblended and incapable of
having a share of each other in the things we say? Or shall we pull them all
together and treat them all as capable of associating with each other? Or shall
we say that some can associate and some can’t? Which of these options shall
we say they’d choose, Theaetetus?
THEATETUS: I don’t know how to answer for them.
VISITOR: Why don’t you reply to the options one by one by thinking about
what results from each of them?
THEATETUS: Fine.
VISITOR: First, if you like, let’s take them to say that nothing has any
capacity at all for association with anything. Then change and rest won’t have
any share in being.
THEATETUS: No, they won’t.
Proposed Definition of Being and its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
VISITOR: Well then, will either of them be, if they have no association with
being?
THEATETUS: No.
VISITOR: It seems that agreeing to that destroys everything right away, both
for the people who make everything chance, for the ones who make everything
an unchanging unit, and for the ones who say that beings are forms that
always stay the same and in the same state. All of these people apply being.
Some do it when they say that things really are changing, and others do it
when they say that things really are at rest.
THEATETUS: Absolutely.
VISITOR: Also there are people whop put everything together at one time and
divide them at another. Some put them together into one and divide them into
indefinitely many, and others divide them into a finite number of elements and
put them back together out of them. None of these people, regardless of
whether they take this to happen in stages or continuously, would be saying
anything if there isn’t any blending.
Proposed Definition of Being and its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
THEAETETUS: Right
VISITOR: But furthermore the most ridiculous account is the one that’s
adopted by the people who won’t allow anything to be called by a name that it
gets by association with anything else.
THEATETUS: Why?
VISITOR: They’re forced to use being about everything, and also separate,
from other, or itself, and a million other things. They’re powerless to keep from
doing it – that is from linking them together in their speech. So they don’t
need other people to refute them, but have an enemy within around talking in
an undertone inside them like the strange ventriloquist Eurycles1.
THEATETUS: That’s a very accurate comparison.
VISITOR: Well then, what if we admit that everything has the capacity to
associate with everything else?
1. Aristophanes, Wasps, 1017-20. Eurycles was supposed to be able to make
oracular predictions by means of a demon that lived in his chest.
Proposed Definition of Being and its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
THEAETETUS: I can solve that one.
VISITOR: How?
THEATETUS: Because if change and rest belonged to each other then change
would be completely at rest and conversely rest would be completely changing.
VISITOR: But I suppose it’s ruled out by very strict necessity that change
should be at rest and that rest should change.
THEATETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: So the third option is the only one left.
THEATETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: Certainly one of the flowing things has to be the case: either
everything is willing to blend, or nothing is, or some thing are and some things
are not.
THEATETUS: Of course
Proposed Definition of Being and its Problems
(247E-253A, pp. 269-75)
VISITOR: And we found that the first two options were impossible.
THEATETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: So everyone who wants top give the right answer will choose the
third.
THEATETUS: Absolutely.
VISITOR: Some will blend and some won’t, they’ll be a good deal like letters
of the alphabet. Some of them fit together with each other and some don’t.
THEATETUS: Of course.
Identity, Being and
Existence
Differences Among Some Canonic Philosophers
Between Existence, Identity and Being
Philosopher
Existence
Identity
Being
Aristotle
A hylomorphic
compound,
primary
substance
A law of thought, a
necessary condition of
any particular or
universal, i. e., A=A.
A syncategorematic
notion; a relation between
potentiality and actuality
Descartes
Primarily the ‘I
am’, other
existences are
derivative from
it.
Descartes proposes the
identity of indiscernibles
in the Sixth Meditation
God as the most perfect
being. Descartes proposes
the ontological argument
in the Fifth Meditation
Leibniz
Monads
Liebniz’s Law: entities x
and y are identical if
every predicate
possessed by x is also
possessed by y and vice
versa
“I maintain also that
substances, whether material
or immaterial, cannot be
conceived in their bare
essence without any activity,
activity being of the essence
of substance in general.”
Monadology
Differences Among Some Canonic Philosophers
Between Existence, Identity and Being
Philosopher
Existence
Identity
Being
Hume
Not a property,
presumed by
contiguous vivid
impressions
Hume rejects Identity
over time.
no metaphysics of reality
is possible
Kant
not a property of
individuals
A transcendental unity
of apperception
an ens realissimum, an
individual being
containing in itself the
ground of 'the sum-total
of all possibility’, is a
natural but illusory idea
of reason. (A 573/B 602 )
Russell
A quantifier, a
second order
property: ∃x(Tx)
There exists an x
such that x is a
thing.
If a name/predicate can An illusory confused
be substituted and
idea.
preserve the truth value
of a proposition, they
are identical.
Differences Among Some Canonic Philosophers
Between Existence, Identity and Being
Philosopher
Existence
Identity
Being
Heidegger
Human existence
is Da-sein and
other existences
are present-tohand.
As discussed in Identity
and Difference, identity
is a primitive
‘belonging with.’
Being or Sein is pretheoretically presumed by
Da-sein although not
definable.
References for slides used in this powerpoint
Slide #20: photograph of Jimmy Swaggart: http://www.setcelebs.com/img/jimmy-swaggart-02.html
Slide #26, picture of Bill Maher: http://www.ticketmaster.com/Bill-Maher-tickets/artist/821441
Slide #35, photograph of L. Ron Hubbard:
http://f.edgesuite.net/data/www.scientology.org/files/profile-LRH.jpg?__utma
Slide # 41: photograph of Hamlet text: http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0E95yopCdY/U2ezBjSnixI/AAAAAAAASII/8VPCqftV3yk/s1600/to_be_or_not.jpg