Transcript Market and Morals

Plato’s Republic - 2nd set
[1]
Justice and the Gang of Thieves
Plato argues: Injustice sets people at odds:
Suppose: the unjust are always trying to outdo everyone else, be they just or unjust
[And so are like “the ignorant and the bad”]
So: it would be stupid for the gang of thieves to practice injustice toward each other
[true; but what about practicing it towards everyone else??]
Justice, on the other hand, harmonizes people, and enables effective common action
[I add: including the actions of thieves and others bent on evils....]
Plato’s Republic - 2nd set
[2]
Justice (by contrast) is not essentially rivalrous (competitive):
To be a good doctor is not necessarily to be better than another doctor
[or is it?
- being a “good” doctor - one you can recommend - perhaps is being better than some…
- Some valuations are comparative, some aren’t:
- ‘outstanding’ vs. ‘terrific’
- even so, all doctors could be pretty good (that’s what licensing is supposed to accomplish
...]
But Socrates is right about justice:
- To be just is not to be more just than the next person
- Justice as such is not got at the expense of someone else
[that’s the idea, anyway]
[3]
Justice and the Good Life
“So it turns out that injustice divides, and the unjust person becomes her own
enemy, as well as the enemy of good people everywhere.”
• which is the better, happier life - that of the just or of the unjust?
Socrates pursues this by asking,
• What is the function of man?
Claim (definition?) A good thing of type F is one that performs well the
function of F.
So: a good man is one who performs well the function of man
Claim: the “peculiar excellence” of the soul is justice
And happiness will consist in that
So: the just man (and only the just man) is happy
Is this true??
[4]
Is this true??
Questions:
a) Does man have “a function”?
b) If so, Is a human happiest who performs that function?
How do we find out??
-- These important questions will be pursued later ...
Meanwhile: a distinction about the idea of ‘good’
Glaucon’s distinction: three sorts of goodness:
1) Goodness “in itself” [Intrinsic’ good. Example: the taste of chocolate]
2) Goodness for its effects [‘extrinsic’ good. Example: dental work]
3) Mixed (some of each) [apples: taste good and are good for you]
Which would justice be?
Glaucon’s claim: not the first (or third, then); but maybe the second
[5]
Glaucon’s claim:
Ordinary people think that justice is good for its rewards
- such as honor and praise
- [note: maybe his selection isn’t quite right ...]
When the just man pays his bills, that’s good for the creditor
- but is it good for the debtor? No!
- (except insofar as it gets the creditor off his back)
-
Socrates claims otherwise. But how will he support his claim?
[Maybe he would be happier being just, but how about you and I?]
[6]
Glaucon’s story: The “ring of Gyges”
- makes the wearer invisible
- So, he can get away with things most people can’t
- Which should he do, then?
Adeimantus: The just man on the rack:
- Suppose justice is punished instead of rewarded?
- The just man gets thrown in jail, tortured on the rack ...
- Is it really better to be just, in that case?
- It doesn’t look like it!
- [If it is better, how? Does the good man enjoy being tortured?
- [cf. the story about Benjamin Jowett ...]
[7]
Soul and State: Plato’s famous “Analogy”
Socrates replies by spinning out a theory - of the Soul and the State
This occupied the rest of the book.
Step one: let’s look at a “bigger case” - the State
[the thought is that the State, being so much bigger, will perhaps enable us
to see justice in it more easily ...]
1. Its origin:
- People benefit from division of labor
- Various classes of people do what they are better at
- Trade develops, and all benefit from it
- so a productive class arises
2. Wealth leads to war
first, the polis will “encroach on neighboring lands”
second, this will lead to quarrels [presumably internal as well as external]
- So, there is a need for soldiers
3. And a need for “guardians” (the rulers)
- which is a specialist class of intelligentsia
Plato makes many claims about these people
[8]
The classes in Plato’s State:
1. Ordinary people: The Economic class: producing what people are
interested in
- Note that this is not Marx’s distinction.
- the Producing classes would include both workers and “capitalists” all who participate in the production of the society
- their main virtue will be temperance, order - and obedience....
2. Soldiers [should we now say, also, Administrators?]
- they do what their masters tell them ...
- to be like bulldogs
- courage is their virtue
[what about intelligence?]
3. The rulers, or “guardians”
- which is a specialist class of intelligentsia
- Plato makes many claims about these people ... [next slide]
[9]
The “Guardians”:
Fierce with enemies, gentle with citizens
- Discerning
- Well-trained “from a tender age”
- Educated in music and mathematics, athletics and poetry
- Devoted to the “freedom of the city”
- “a philosopher. He must understand the true nature of courage,
temperance, generosity, and the other good things
- “prescribe the kind of medicine and law to be used”
- “they will instead take their greatest delight in the performance of
public duty, and will do it to the best of their ability.”
The Guardians will be told that they are born different from other people
- they have a “soul with divine gold”
- [maybe this isn’t even a myth!(?)]
- (but it sounds like it. It’s been called “the Noble Lie” - starting a long
discussion, whether the truth must always be told in the interest of the
public good...)
[10]
Virtues in the State:
1) Temperance
2) Courage
3) Wisdom
OK, now where is
(4) Justice?
• Justice isn’t just another virtue.
It has to do with the
proper organization and balance of the whole
The principle: “Each part is to perform its own particular function”
- and not trying to usurp what the others do….
When they do that and nothing else, we have Justice!
- But that is harmony.
Note that justice is a matter of the external relations among the components,
rather than about their internal nature.
[But these must be related, somehow ... hang on!]
• So: Justice (in the State) = the Harmony of the Society
[11]
Virtues in the Soul:
Claim: the parts of the Soul are like the parts of the State
1) Appetites
2) Passions (or “spirited element”)
3) Reason
The corresponding virtues being:
1) Temperance
2) Courage
3) Wisdom
(4) And the virtue of the soul as a whole?
A-hah! That’s Justice!
So, again, Justice isn’t merely “another” virtue.
It has to do with the proper organization and balance of the whole soul
The principle: Each part of the soul is to perform its own particular function
- and not trying to usurp what the others do….
When they do that and nothing else, we have Justice!
[An elegant theory.....]
Justice (in the individual) = the Harmony of the Soul
[12]
Analogy between Soul and State
Three Parts
State
Soul
Virtue
Workers
Appetites
Self-control
Soldiers
Passions
Courage
Rulers
(guardians)
Reason
Wisdom
[13]
And Justice, in both cases, is the harmony of the whole
-
Each part doing its own thing, performing what its own nature ordains,
not interfering with what the other “parts” do ..
-
In the individual, this is:
having one’s appetites and passions under the control of Reason
-
in the State, it’s:
having the lower classes subordinate to the rule of the wise (guardians)
-
[The Guardians are to be the embodiments of Reason, evidently....]
[14]
Analogy between Soul and State - Does it Work?
-
1. Does the soul have three “parts”?
[How do we know?]
-
Here is Plato’s initial reasoning about this:
-
“But think of the soul: doesn’t it often seem to behave in contradictory ways?
Aren’t we sometimes pulled both this way and that? If so, then our principle,
that no one thing can be in two opposite conditions at once, calls upon us to
recognize that the soul must have at least two elements or parts in it”
-
Question: why will this get us just three “parts”?
-
Example: Chocolate or vanilla?
- the soul might be pulled both ways!
Do we have a chocolate-seeking “part” of the soul, and a vanilla-seeking part?
It’s not clear where this would end!
Plato surely already has an idea how the soul is divided, rather than
discovering it by this method…
[15]
The Soul
- Plato’s official division:
- Reason
- Passions
- Appetites
-
Plato’s real thesis about the soul is that it should be ruled by Reason.
For that purpose, it wouldn’t really matter whether its constituency had one,
two, or seventeen parts… would it?
Does it matter how many “parts” either the soul or society has?
• Status of the “passions”
- Plato says that reason needs an “ally” in putting down the unruly
appetites… this gives a rationale for the desired total of three parts. .. But
why does reason need an “ally”? ….
• And why would the “passions” be its “ally”?
- Don’t we often have nonrational, even irrational passions?
- Nonrational: no particular “reason” for it, we just have it
- Irrational: contrary to reason - e.g., self-defeating
That’s a very serious question, in context…..
[16]
The Soul
- Reason
- Reason: it “reasons” - I.e., draws logical inferences, constructs arguments
- But, does it also “direct” as Plato thinks?
- If so, how?
-
A distinction: theoretical vs. practical reason
Theoretical: concerned with “relations of ideas” - mathematics, logic and
“information processing” - in short, truth
Practical: aimed at making decisions
-
-
How are the two related?
a. Practical requires theoretical:
[deciding to achieve end E by doing x requires a judgement that x will in
fact achieve e.g., you want a hamburger, you go to Edna’s burger stand…
b. But not obviously vice versa… do we like chocolate because it’s
“reasonable”??
Reason: Monarch of the soul? Or Democratic equal ...?
That is: does Reason govern the rest of the soul as a sort of monarchy, or is
it more “democratic”?
[17]
The Soul
- Practical Reason: two views
-
1, Reason as a “monarch”: it would have its own “interests” and the rest of
the soul is to be subordinated to it
-
2. Reason as “democrat”: it would govern in the interest of the passions and
appetites. [both? Are they different? … we’ll discuss that later]
-
Plato thinks the second is bad.
Is he right?
Does the first view even make any sense??
-
Problem: Don’t people who just love to do mathematics have a “passion”
for it? Or even an “appetite”??
-
Choice: spend the afternoon working on Poincare’s Hypothesis, or going to
the beach with your boyfriend…
This is a real choice
Is Plato assuming that Mathematics simply has to win?
Why??
-
[18]
The Soul
-
Might reason tell us to pursue pleasure?? [Why not?]
Why does Plato think that reason “rules”?
‘clearly reason is designed to rule over the rest” [p. 13, lh.]
How does he know that it is “designed” to do that?
[Who designed it, after all??]
A thought: the claim that “reason rules” doesn’t really say anything
People make decisions; “reason” is just the name for this fact.
If this is right, then the claim that some rule is better than other sorts of rule
would be meaningless (“reason makes the decisions rationally” would mean
the same as “reason makes the decsions”)
(Yet we do say that some people are unreasonable, even irrational. What are
we getting at when we say this? - an important question!)
So the plot thickens!
[19]
The Appetites
Sometimes Plato identifies appetite with “desire”
But he thinks that reason “desires” us to do various things. Now what?
Passions
He calls this the “spirited” element.
A person very determined to succeed at what he’s doing is ‘spirited’
But where is there a separate thing called “appetite,” then??
- Very difficult!
A suggestion:
- perhaps ‘appetite’ lines up with sensation (especially, pleasure)
- then “spirit” might be the sense of energy
People can pursue the satisfaction of appetites in a more or less spirited way…
Mathematics can also be pursued more, or less, “passionately”
It is less clear that an “appetite” for mathematics can be understood as a desire
to feel certain sensations!
But it is also unclear why this should imply that doing mathematics is better
than drinking beer or dancing…
[20]
The Soul
- Reason
-
Reason as a “monarch”: it would have its own “interests” and the rest of the
soul is to be subordinated to it
-
Reason as “democrat”: it would govern in the interest of the passions and
appetites.
-
Plato thinks the second is bad.
Is he right?
Does the first view even make sense??
[21]
The Soul and “Harmony”
‘harmony’: no clashing among the parts
- i.e., Part x functions without interfering with Part y
But what about Part x interfering with part x?
That is: what about one of one’s passions interfering with another, or one
appetite with another?
Obviously that’s possible too, and would make for “disharmony.”
-
Two large questions:
-
A) why is harmony supposed to be such a big deal? Why is it good?
B) Does Harmony = Justice??
[22]
The Soul and “Harmony”
- A) why is harmony good?
Plato’s account: The soul is harmonious when each “part” is doing what it’s
supposed to be doing (performing its “function”)
This implies that the parts are “supposed to be” doing something
What does that mean?
Stomachs digest.
Are they “supposed to” digest?
Yes: that’s the only way you’ll get any energy into your body
So: stomachs do this -- but do they do it because they “ought” to?
Or is that meaningful?
Plato’s main concern is that Reason should rule over the rest of the soul
But it is unclear when that is so…
[23]
The Soul and “Harmony”
-
A2) why is harmony good? - Another account
Note that insofar as the soul is nonharmonious, it can’t be getting what it wants.
For its efforts to achieve x prevent it from achieving y, which it also wants
BUT Is it possible to satisfy all of one’s desires?
And is it even desirable? Or is life more interesting because we have some
frustrations as well as some successes?
Quantifying
Perhaps we should say that it is good to avoid major frustrations
The soul should be free of big conflicts…
This is a model of Psychological Health
This would be good for the same reason that physical health is good…
It enables us to get things done
And it “feels” good…. Freedom from worrying stress, e.g.
[24]
The Soul and “Harmony”
- B) Is Justice Harmony??
Plato claims: “here is, then, a natural order in the soul, as in the state; and
whatever subverts that order is unjust, while whatever maintains it is just.”
What’s his criterion for this?
“And will the just person ever steal from others, or from the state? Or commit
treachery or sacrilege? Or violate an oath or break an agreement? Or again,
would he engage in adultery? Or fail to honor his parents, or neglect the divine
services?”
- [Glaucon replies: “Certainly not, Socrates.”]
Question: Is Glaucon right?
- Plato’s picture is of “internal” harmony
- Nonharmonious people are neurotic
- But - are they unjust?
- Mentally healthy people have their “acts together”
- But are these necessarily morally right acts?
- Or is Plato just begging the question here??
[25]
The Soul and “Harmony”
Testing the view:
1. Can harmonious souls be unjust?
-
It looks like it. Aren’t there happy criminals, fanatics, con artists,
etc?
2. Can Just souls be nonharmonious?
- Again, it looks like it. Aren’t there honest, fair, kind, nonviolent
people who are miserable?
- (Some of them commit suicide, e.g.)
The Criteria
- How do we know that just people are honest and nonviolent??
- Plato assumes it from the start - his discussants all agree on this
- Should they agree? How do we know that we’ve got it right?
-
[note: we are quite sure that we are…. But that doesn’t yet tell us
why!…]
[26]
“Harmony” and Justice
- an idea
Let’s call “ordinary justice”
Let’s call “harmony”
‘Justice1’
‘Justice 2’
The question is: would J2 imply J1?
[that is: will “platonically just” people also be “ordinarily just”?
How it might work:
1. People who are Unjust1 will feel guilty, which is Unjust2
2.
If so, 2 will imply 1
(if p -> q then -q -> -p)
Problem: why would they feel “guilty”?
[If they were Thrasymachians, they’d feel proud!]
The problem is Circularity [next slide] ...
[27]
The problem is Circularity:
Jones feel guilty about doing x if Jones thinks that x is wrong
If the disharmony is due to the guilt, and
the guilt is due to the sense of wrongness, then
The wrongness must be prior to the disharmony
- So, the disharmony can’t account for the wrongness.
What’s Needed:
Is to show that there’d be disharmony because we (for example) cheated,
even though we don’t presuppose that it’s wrong to cheat.
Can this be done?
- not obviously!
Problem not solved!
[28]
The Soul and “Harmony”
Is Plato talking about the right thing?
First, a note on “the soul”
1.
Scholars think that this term is not meant in such a way as to entail a
sort of nonphysical entity.
(There’s disagreement about this. However, I agree with them ... more
importantly, we don’t need to worry about that issue ....)
2. A good synonym would be “the self” or “the person” - that is, whatever
it is that is happy or sad, just or unjust, etc. - without importing a theory as
to what this “thing” is ….
3. Maybe, for instance, it’s a neural structure
[If it is, there’s a big question about that ….]
We’ll stick with sense (2) here….
That people think, have personalities, make decisions, act, have emotions,
are ordinary facts about people - not disputable claims.
[29]
The “harmony of the soul” sounds like a fine thing to have
But is it justice?
Or is it, rather, the “good for man”?
- (or, better yet, a good for man - one perhaps among others)
Further thoughts on harmony:
1. Is it the same for everyone?
[the characterization I gave is: lack of discord among different
things in the “soul”
But different people would have different sets of elements that
might clash (or not)
- we don’t all have the same problems!
2. Is it possible to avoid disharmony?
Not altogether, surely!
“into every life, a little rain must fall” -3. Is there a danger that a harmonious soul would be a bore?
Don’t we thrive a bit on some disharmony??
4. Is “harmony” too thin a concept to be of interest? (“peace” might be
better… but - is peace everything??)
[30]
Sample souls:
(1) The buddhist: let’s get rid of all our desires - then they won’t
conflict with each other!
[comment: sounds awfully dull!]
(2) The dedicated artist: everything that doesn’t promote his art gets
suppressed ....
[comments:
(a) What if we just aren’t interested in art?
(b) What if we are, but aren’t very good at it?
(c) What if the “art” is assassination? (or terrorism?!)
(d) Suppression isn’t all that easy - or may be painful.
(would that be a kind of “disharmony”??)
(e) What if we want to do more than one thing??
(like most of us)
(3) The “balancing act”
- we weigh our various interests and abilities, and put them together
as best we can
[31]
Sample souls
(3) The “balancing act” (continued)
- we weigh our various interests and abilities, and put them together
as best we can
- Sounds normal!
It doesn’t guarantee “harmony”
-- or, if it does, then this seems to be a different kind of “harmony”
from mere lack of discord or conflict.
- Mightn’t a happy life include some discord while it’s at it??
-
- quite a lot of good moments, a few bad ones (preferably,
interestingly bad ....)
[This what I call the “secular problem of evil” - that evil, alas, can
be interesting.... at least to read about, or go to operas, or watch
movies containing quite a lot of it ... ]
[32]
Plato’s bias against the “appetites” His general idea is that the appetites are “irrational”
Why?
1. He thinks the appetites are “unlimited” and that this is bad.
[why would it be bad?
- because an infinite appetite could not be satisfied]
- OK: but are appetites infinite just because they’re “unlimited”?
- [No: they’re not infinite - just unspecified:
- if I say, “I’m thirsty” I don’t thereby say how much I want to drink
- BUT I sure don’t want an infinite amount!
- [5 litres of water in quick succession can kill you!]
The point is that ‘unlimited’ in the relevant sense does not imply
‘infinite’
2. The objects of the appetites are nonintellectual
[right. So?]
As earlier discussed: is it really so “rational” to love mathematics?
One suspects more bias here.
Plato is an “intellectual snob”!
[33]
Plato’s being an “intellectual snob is going to affect his views on The
State, as we’ll see.
Because: Plato’s state is ruled by Philosophers (is the idea)
And they are people with a “thirst for knowledge”
[supposedly]
They’re supposed to be trained from the start to love ideas etc.
- on Plato’s account, they also have to love justice
But why do they, if they do??
- because we insist on it?
- [note: in my view, Yes! - that’s a good answer.
- [but we might fail ...]
Plato, however, thinks that the philosopher will love justice just because
he knows what it is like
It’s like a fine diamond - or (better yet) a great quartet by Haydn…
[34]
In what way does the philosopher “love” justice?
Does he love it just as we might love a great piece of music?
- That’s shaky! (isn’t it?
- Hitler loved Wagner, for example!)
The thing is, there needs to be some kind of logic behind the love of
justice
There should be a good reason to love justice
The fact that it looks nice (say) looks like a good reason for some people
(the ones who think it does look nice)
- but then, alas, not others (the people who don’t think so)
Unfortunately, there are people who don’t like Haydn!
(I don’t know how that happened, but …..)
Are there, similarly, people who don’t love justice?
[like Thrasymachus? Or Al Capone …]
[what about bin Laden ….?]
[35]
The State
Plato’s State is composed of:
Ordinary blokes like us
Police to keep us in line
Rulers to tell the police whom to keep in which line
Why do these particular people get to rule??
- because they’re smart
- (and, intellect is such hot stuff!)
Question: is that the right way to do these things?
[36]
Side discussion: A radical idea about women
Plato (uniquely….) thinks that there’s no inherent reason why
women could not also be among the Rulers
His reasoning:
The fact that Jones is bald doesn’t mean he can’t be a good cobbler
Similarly,
The fact that Smith is a woman doesn’t mean that she can’t be a good
Ruler
What Plato has noted is that there’s a difference between individual
differences and group differences
Suppose that most women are not as “suited to ruling” as most men
- but that leaves the unusual ones who are suited
- That’s no reason to forbid women who are suitable! (and likewise,
no reason to include the males who aren’t!
- [but Affirmative Action is another matter… we’ll table that for a few
centuries!]
[37]
The Guardians:
- Communal Living
- Very low salaries!
- Lots of schooling
- No family life…
The point of the schooling is to turn them into philosophers
The mark of the philosopher is wisdom
Especially, it’s Knowledge of The Good
-
evidently the Good doesn’t include a high salary
[note: Plato himself was from a wealthy family, and is said to have
been something of a dandy, wearing expensive rings, etc..]
[comment on today: many leftists are from wealthy families ...
[Al Gore has several homes; in his main one in Tennessee, he uses
20 times the amount of energy that ordinary people do - while
preaching the evils of energy use ...]
[38]
Eugenics
The best of the men, says Plato, must mate with the best of the women so as
to produce the best possible new generations of Guardians.
All of this, of course, requires constant surveillance and care.
Children, for example, are to be removed to a quarter of the city where they
will have the best nurses.
Their education is of prime importance
Plato is for using the best teachers to instill in them the most important
knowledge, and avoid what is inferior.
If you find this doctrine repulsive, you're not alone!
Do we really want the state to be able to take our children away when they
show signs of potential talent at statecraft?
That's worth thinking about ...
[39]
Plato’s “Epistemology” - The allegory of the “Cave”
- the people in the cave sit facing the wall on which shadows are
projected.
[note: it’s a movie theatre!]
The “Divided Line”: a larger distinction, then a smaller one:
1. Opinion
- (1.1) sheer conjecture [shadows]
- (1.2) Hypothesis [about physical objects, say]
2. Knowledge
(2.1) “understanding”: knows many universals (e.g. geometry
and arithmetic)
(2.2) [pure reason]: The Form of The Good - the one complete
universal?
Plato thinks that the The Good is like “the sun” - it illuminates all
If you know that, then you know everything worth knowing!
Hmmmmm…
[40]
(ordinary) People see shadows projected on the wall of the cave
knowing nothing else, they assume that the shadows are the real thing.
They live in ignorance
- and so, of course, they need the enlightened philosopher to drag them out into the
daylight.
Those who have seen the reality itself – e.g., the Guardians – are in a position to
correct those who have not.
Those enlightened ones will reform, serve, and maintain justice – by taking
complete control over the education of the children, among other things.
(Note: One must suppose that they also take complete control over the whole society,
as far as that goes. - Totalitarianism looms!)
The Allegory is interesting for its ideas about metaphysics – that is, the subject of what
there Really Is –
and epistemology – the Theory of Knowledge.
Plato thinks that these lead us to his “guardian” theory of the state...
We, however, will stay in our caves and use what we know about science and common
sense, hoping that that is enough....
[41]
“Philosophers Rule”
This is an idealization: Plato would like it to be true.
Moreover, by the “philosopher” here he means the man who really is wise
[‘philosopher’ is used as a “success” word - the man who not only strives to become, but
has actually succeeded in becoming, wise.]
BUT what we will have in an actual State is --- PhD’s
Not the same thing!
Their degrees will make them think (and make us think) that they are “experts”
And maybe they will ... but expertise isn’t the same as wisdom, which is what
Plato needs if his ideas are to be applicable in the real world.
[42]
A Problem for Politics:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Expertise is required for many matters
We are not experts
- Who decides who’s an expert?
Do we put experts in positions of power?
If so, what keeps them from becoming dictators?
We need to worry about that
..... later!