Transcript Testimony and the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

Testimony
and
the Value of Knowledge
Martin Kusch
<[email protected]>
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A Communitarian Form of
Value-Driven Epistemology
Guiding assumption:
Human cognizers are highly gregarious and
deeply interdependent.
One central claim:
Knowledge is a collective good.
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Central resources and allies:
[1] Genealogy of Knowledge: Craig, Williams
[2] Sociology of Knowledge: Barnes, Shapin
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Central opponent:
Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the
Pursuit of Understanding (2003)
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Cf. Kvanvig, The Intellectual Virtues and
the Life of the Mind (1992)
Do not “divorce epistemological concerns from
the realities of social interaction” (Kvanvig 1992:
178).
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Kvanvig:
The Value of Knowledge and the
Pursuit of Understanding (2003)
•
A satisfactory account of knowledge must
explain both its nature and its value.
•
Value-scepticism about knowledge: there is
no knowledge-specific epistemic value.
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The argument by elimination …
[1]
E.g., knowledge is true belief plus a property
that renders the truth of the belief objectively
likely (e.g. reliabilism).
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The argument by elimination …
[1]
E.g., knowledge is true belief plus a property
that renders the truth of the belief objectively
likely (e.g. reliabilism).
Objection: the Swamping Argument: The
epistemic value of a true belief “swamps” the
value of using a method that makes the belief
likely to be true.
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[2]
Knowledge is (subjectively) justified true belief
plus a fourth condition blocking Gettier cases.
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[2]
Knowledge is (subjectively) justified true belief
plus a fourth condition blocking Gettier cases.
Objection: Fourth conditions are ever more
“complex, ad hoc and gerrymandered …”
But to solve the problem of epistemic value,
we need “simpler proposals in which the value
of the condition is intuitively obvious”.
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Craig’s Genealogy of Knowledge (1990)
Method: Construct a hypothetical historical narrative
of the process in which the concept knowledge
was synthesised.
Question I: Why was an ancestor of knowledge
(i.e. “protoknowledge”) of value in the epistemic
state of nature?
Question II: How did we get from protoknowledge
to our knowledge?
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Part I of Craig’s Genealogy:
“Inquirers” need to classify “informants”.
“Protoknowers” are good informants if they:
-
fit the needs of the inquirer,
are honest towards the inquirer,
convince the inquirer,
are understandable to the inquirer,
are detectable by the inquirer (on the
basis of “indicator properties”).
(But these are not necessary and sufficient …)
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Part I of Craig’s Genealogy (cont’d):
- protoknowledge differs from knowledge:
- it is tied to testimony,
- it is not a fully public concept,
- it does not figure in self-attributions,
- it is not undermined by luck.
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Part II of Craig’s Genealogy: “objectivisation”:
[a]
Self-attributions
[b]
Recommending protoknowers to others:
higher standards
[c]
“Recommended” as an indicator property:
dilution of the detectability requirement
[d]
Group action: dilution of the link to testimony
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Three “Kvanvigian” Objections
The Swamping Objection (2003: 86)
The epistemic value of true belief swamps the
epistemic value of true belief coming from a
tagged good informant.
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The Social Objection
What are the social consequences of knowledge
attributions? And why should we ignore the
conceptual needs of the informants?
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The Relevance Objection
Where are the marks of the history of knowledge?
And what is history to do with us?
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Three Modifications of Craig’s Genealogy
– to block the three objections:
[1]
The institution of testimony as a collective good,
underwritten by intrinsic values. (Williams)
[2]
Protoknowledge attributions are attributions of
honour. (Barnes and Williams)
[3]
Attributions of knowledge are intertwined with
attributions of freedom. (Barnes and Shapin)
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Objections
Modifications
Swamping
One: Intrinsic values
Social
Two: Honouring
Relevance
Three: Freedom
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Modification [1]: Williams’ genealogy of the
institution of testimony
[a]
real vs. imaginary genealogy
[b]
a genealogy of testimony
[c]
the virtues of “accuracy” and “sincerity”
[d]
the testimonial system as a collective good
[e]
the virtues as intrinsic values: stable from the inside
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Intrinsic values …
-
central in our shared system of values;
-
cannot be identified by means of Moore’s
“method of absolute isolation”.
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Modification [1] blocks the Swamping Objection
[a]
The institution of testimony is not of merely
instrumental value to us.
[b]
The value of the institution of testimony is not
swamped by the value of true belief.
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[c]
Williams is right about intrinsic values:
Cf. Frankena’s list: “life, … health, … happiness,
… love, friendship, cooperation … peace …”
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Modification [2]: Barnes and Williams on Knowledge
and Honouring
[a]
The collective good of the testimony system is
secured by means of a system of sanctioning.
[b]
A new free-rider problem?
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Modification [2]: Barnes and Williams on Knowledge
and Honouring
[a]
The collective good of the testimony system is
secured by means of a system of sanctioning.
[b]
A new free-rider problem?
[c]
Interactionism: talk is a “free resource”.
[d]
The deference-emotion system (Scheff)
[e]
New: Protoknowledge attributions as honouring.
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Modification [2] against the Relevance Objection
[a]
The role of honouring in knowledge attributions:
the evidence of epistemologists and sociologists
- Epistemic injustice (M. Fricker)
- Knowledge as credit (Greco, Riggs, Sosa)
- Knowledge and moral concerns (Zagzebski)
- “Honorific uses of ‘knowledge’” (Kvanvig)
- “Knowledge” is used to encourage good testimony
(Reynolds)
- The moral force of knowledge (Durkheim, Bloor)
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More on the Relevance Objection
Marks of protoknowledge in knowledge?
- to know + interrogative constructions
- testimonial metaphors
-
evidence tells us things
sensory organs tell us things or deceive us
being informed
martyrion and martys
discovery
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Modification [3]: Barnes and Shapin
on Knowledge and Freedom
[a]
Attributions of knowledge are attributions of
freedom from (certain forms of) interference. E.g.
protection from the demand to investigate further.
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Modification [3]: Barnes and Shapin
on Knowledge and Freedom
[a]
Attributions of knowledge are attributions of
freedom from (certain forms of) interference. E.g.
protection from the demand to investigate further.
[b]
We often give the good informant concerning topic
t discretion over the social practice to do with t.
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Modification [3]: Barnes and Shapin
on Knowledge and Freedom
[a]
Attributions of knowledge are attributions of
freedom from (certain forms of) interference. E.g.
protection from the demand to investigate further.
[b]
We often give the good informant concerning topic
t discretion over the social practice to do with t.
[c]
The informant has a need to distinguish between
good and bad inquirers: the “protofree” can be
influenced by reports in rational ways.
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Modification [3] against the Social Objection
and the Relevance Objection
[a]
Williams on knowledge and freedom
- Primo Levi’s reflections:
-
to lie to someone is to violate their freedom;
-
the freedom to believe the truth must be
shared;
-
to follow the dictates of nature is not to be
unfree.
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[b]
Shapin (1994): Early-modern natural philosopher:
the reliable testifier is a free man – a “gentleman”.
Maxims:
“(i) assent to testimony which is plausible;
(ii) assent to testimony which is multiple;
(iii) assent to testimony which is consistent …”
“Assent to testimony from sources of acknowledged
integrity and disinterestedness.”
Gentlemen were truth-tellers …
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[c]
Linking the imaginary to the real genealogy –
understanding the performative character of
knowledge attributions:
Precisely because knowledge attributions come
with (a degree of) honour and freedom, gentlemen
will deny knowledge to the “domestics”.
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Tentative Conclusions
[1]
A communitarian value-driven epistemology is
possible.
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Tentative Conclusions
[1]
A communitarian value-driven epistemology is
possible.
[2]
There is a sense in which (bodies of) knowledge
are collective goods: the costs are carried individually the benefits are enjoyed collectively.
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Tentative Conclusions
[1]
A communitarian value-driven epistemology is
possible.
[2]
There is a sense in which (bodies of) knowledge
are collective goods: the costs are carried individually the benefits are enjoyed collectively.
[3]
The collective good of knowledge can exist only
if the testimonial system is of intrinsic value (or
the values underwriting it are intrinsic in Williams’
sense).
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[4]
Craig’s genealogy makes plausible that there is a
link – at least a historical link – between the
epistemic value of (proto-)knowledge and the
realities of social life.
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[4]
Craig’s genealogy makes plausible that there is a
link – at least a historical link – between the
epistemic value of (proto-)knowledge and the
realities of social life.
[5]
Protoknowledge is epistemically more valuable
than true belief. The latter does not swamp the
former since the testimonial system is itself of
intrinsic value.
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[6]
Craig’s proposal is strengthened by combining it
with
(a) Williams’ suggestions concerning the testimonial system as a collective good,
(b) Barnes’ ideas on verbal interaction as a free
resource, and
(c) the proposal that proto-knowledge attributions
are honouring.
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[6]
Craig’s proposal is strengthened by combining it
with
(a) Williams’ suggestions concerning the testimonial system as a collective good,
(b) Barnes’ ideas on verbal interaction as a free
resource, and
(c) the proposal that proto-knowledge attributions
are honouring.
[7]
If we want to explain our intuitions about the
links between knowledge and freedom, we need
to analyse the conceptual needs of the informant
alongside those of the enquirer.
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Further Objections
Objection A:
Knowledge is not like clean air.
Objection B:
We need to understand why individual
items of knowledge are valuable.
Objection C:
Knowledge does not factorise.
Objection D:
What about Gettier?
Objection E:
What about understanding?
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