Mar. 5 Bureaucracy as policy-making organizations (accountability
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Transcript Mar. 5 Bureaucracy as policy-making organizations (accountability
Mar. 19 Agency Theory as an Analytical Perspective—research on
shirking, “cheating,” and strategic positioning
[Note: This chapter is taken from a newly-published book written by award-winning scholars on public bureaucracy. The chapter
reports on Meier and O’Toole’s empirical study on the behavior of educational agencies in Texas in implementing federal
education policy—as such, it takes a form similar to much research in journals. Graduate students need to gain competence in
reading and understanding of such research literature. This reading serves well both as a straight-forward, well-written research
piece (to help you understand the format of empirical analysis) and a a strong application of Agency Theory as a perspective for
understanding how agencies “behave” (act, respond, cope with) in particular situations.]
Understanding research format: The left column represents usual components of empirical
research write-ups, and the right shows the corresponding sections of the Meier and O’Toole
(M&O) chapter:
Introduction (often no subheading) that explains
the question to be researched or the purpose
of the research.
See second paragraph of M&O chapter pp. 93-94
Existing studies and research that affect how
the authors understand the problem
M&O’s “The Literature” (pp. 94-96)
Explanation of key concepts tested in research:
That which is to be explained—the dependent
variable (dv)—and those that cause or affect
it—independent variables (ivs).
“Cheating as Shirking”—the dv to be explained (pp. 97-100);
performance gaps, prior efforts, resources, task demands,
professional norms—possible ivs (that may or may not explain
the dv).
Method used to test whether possible ivs affect dv.
M&O’s “Data and Methods” (pp.100-104).
Report on the outcome of testing—usually which
ivs affect the dv; if the author’s expectations
(or hypotheses) are supported
M&O’s “Findings” (pp. 104-114)
Discussion about the broad implications of the
research; conclusion (may be a separate section).
M&O’s “Conclusion” (pp. 114-120), particularly about agent
strategy
Mar. 19 Shirking, “cheating,” and strategic positioning—what can
be learned?
[Note: The first set of questions below pertains to your understanding of the reading. The
second raises broader issues for you to consider.]
To what extent and how does the logic of Meier and O’Toole’s research correspond to the
issues Gormley and Balla raise in Ch. 3 “The Bureaucracy’s Bosses?” Be specific.
Explain the significance of the best case (“…ideal situation for political control…” p.93) in M&O’s
research strategy (hint: what would be a “worst case,” and why would it be weak as a basis for their research?)
How many principal-agent dyads (or pairs) can you identify in the M&O chapter?
How does M&O’s use of the agency theory perspective help them “coax out” their
findings and enhance understanding of public agency behavior in their research (or does
it)? Could the same findings/conclusions have emerged without using it? Or did using it
distort the findings/conclusions?
Do you fault the education agencies for “cheating?” Should agent compliance to the
principal be “the way it ought to be?”
Does “cheating” or shirking have any relevance to the issues Gormley and Balla raise in
Ch. 2? Explain.
How might economists (presumably looking from the p/a perspective) differ from sociologists (from an
institutional perspective) in interpreting the implications of M&O’s research?
Are local school administrators forced to cheat or is it a rational, independent choice?
(How do the issues of embeddedness and enactment fit in here?)
What (if anything) can a public manager learn from the Meier&O’Toole chapter?
How does Wilson’s discussion of “circumstances” and (specific) tasks (rather than
general) goals relate to M&O’s study of Texas school districts:
Ever hear of “situation ethics…?” Is “cheating” here an example?
…Those who would view this Texas as as scandalous might have expected people at some
level (operator, management, or executive) “to take a higher road.” What in Wilson Ch. 3
accounts for everybody “buying off” on the strategy?