Transcript Crew Integrated Flight Training

Lori J. Brown
Western Michigan University
WATS/SCSI 2010, Orlando, Florida
[email protected]
Communication Gaps
Fatal Communication
Gaps
Gaps in effective communication, can lead to loss
of life, or create a communication gap that could
impede the information transfer to the pilots.
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Pilots of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 were not immediately
alerted that a passenger had tried to ignite a bomb on the
flight from Amsterdam to Detroit”. The pilots said they had a
problem when the flight landed in Detroit. “there was a
communication gap between the cabin and the flight deck
crew, " which left pilots unaware that there had been an
alleged bombing attempt on-board” (FAA Administrator
Randy Babbitt told a House subcommittee, on February 4,
2010).
The flight deck crew reported they had someone who had
attempted to set firecrackers off.
Thinking the alleged bombing was no more than a prank, air
traffic controllers took no extreme action like routing the
aircraft to a remote location of the airport, “nor did the
cockpit get very excited about it,” (Babbitt, 2010)
The Pilot/Flight Attendant
Communication and Joint Training
Survey
(Brown & Niehaus 2009)
Funded by Western Michigan University,
Faculty Research and Creative Activities Award.
• 29 Countries
•427 Participants (322 complete)
• Translated to Chinese and Spanish
Published in the FAA International Journal of Applied
Aviation Studies, (Summer 2010, in press).
How would you rate your current airline's
level of effective communication between
pilots and flight attendants?
(IJAAS, 2010)
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Pre-departure brief
Figure 1. Flight Attendant/Pilot
only
Communication Effectiveness
France
U.S.
This study has identified barriers, which may leave
flight attendants, and pilots feeling isolated and
may impede effective communication.
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Inadequate Briefing- Brief all of the Crew
No Introductions – Introductions to entire crew
Poor Morale – Pay cuts, Contracts, crew rest
Lack of respect- Begin the flight with open and respectful dialogue.
Fatigue
Fortress Door *
Post 9/11 Procedures and Stressors
Time and Operational Constraints *
Lack of scenario based CRM training
Crew scheduling – Only paired 1-2 legs
Job understanding – Lack of familiarity jump-seating
Gender or assumed sexual orientation
Misunderstanding of the sterile cockpit rule
Aircraft interphone – See HR 2200 (lack of wireless communication)
Unfamiliar Accent
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“I fear that the post- 9/11 security measures
& economic constraints have set CRM back
twenty years. I would have to say that 8 out
of 10 flights are done where the pilots do
their thing and we do ours in the cabin. A
briefing is always done with the Purser (per
FARs) but anything above that is rare. It is not
uncommon, when working in the back, to
have never met our flight deck crew when
they fly just one segment that is dangerous”.
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“Pilot and Flight Attendants often switch
crews after one or two legs. This can cause
misunderstanding and poor communication.
Multiple crew changes during quick turns,
prevent introductions and briefings since
boarding is already under way”.
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“Many flight attendants are now "afraid" to contact the
flight deck due to concerns over breaking the new security
regulations. Many times in my own flights I have only
seen/heard from the pilots twice during the flight. Before
pushback/cabin door closure and once we are parked at
the gate. But yet we are still supposed to come together
and form a cohesive team in the event of some
catastrophic event”.
“Having just completed my annual CRM this afternoon I
was reminded just how little we FAs know about what is
happening up front even during cruse let alone during an
explosive decompression, and how little the Pilots know of
what we are doing”.
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“ There does need to be a fundamental shift in
thinking...something needs to be done to rebuild the
relationship between front and back end.”
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Out of the 224 Flight Attendants sampled
55% reported that they have been hesitant to report a
problem, and
16% indicated that they have had a situation where
they did not reported a problem and did not inform
the flight deck, because they thought they already
knew.
Out of the 51 Pilots sampled
41% indicated that they have had a situation where a
flight attendant reported a problem and did not
inform the flight deck, because they thought they
already knew. Additionally,
57% of the pilots indicated they have noticed that
flight attendants may be hesitant to report a problem
due to misunderstanding of the sterile cockpit rule,
or other reason.
(IJAAS, 2010)
The survey results indicated that
gender has the potential to
impede or influence flight
attendant/pilot communication.
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Male pilot/male flight attendant
Female pilot/male flight attendant
Female pilot/female flight attendant
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79% reported that they think it would be
beneficial for flight attendants and FAMS to
training together (IJAAS, 2010).
“At my airline of employment, during recurrent training
one or two Federal Air Marshals would come in to speak
to the classes. They would discuss their role onboard
the aircraft and what would be expected of the
pilot/flight attendants if they were called to action”.
“As with any resource, in order to use it effectively, one
must know how to use it and that knowledge is best
obtained through joint training. As a pilot, I have gone
through some joint training with the Federal Air
Marshalls and, as a result, I feel I have a better
understanding of their use and function thereby.
This training is done in my airline and shows positive
effects in cooperation”.
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How do you assess the effectiveness of your CRM
program?
CMAQ
Crew Orientated Flight Training (COFT) training
events within Crew Integrated Flight training
(CIFT) curriculum. This can be integrated into
existing training.
AQP
MPL and other competency based training
programs should include flight attendant/pilot
communication and coordination.
Line/Los Checklist- behavioral marker for CRM
assessment (Helmreich)
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“I too have been growing increasingly
alarmed about what has been happening,
especially with new and increasingly younger
pilots who are being hired that never had
Flight Attendants, now they are faced with
this new person to deal with and there is
basically a brick wall between us, and don’t
really know what to do with us.”
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Briefing- Open Interactive
Leadership/Followership
Workload/Distractions
Interpersonal Relationships/Group Climate
Inquiry/Advocacy/Insertion
Preparation/Planning Vigilance
Communication/Decisions
Crew self feedback
Crew Integrated Flight Training (CIFT)
• Evaluate -the effectiveness of your CRM
Programs.
Assess
• Integrate -Accident, Incident, Safety reports,
Change and AQP data into your CRM Program.
• Educate –Real world scenarios
Train
• Crew Integrated Flight Training (COFT)
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While it is doubtful that fortress doors or secondary
barriers will be removed from U.S. Airlines,
communication gaps surrounding these post 9/11
changes can be lessened with the application of
possible remedies
Crew Orientated Flight Training (COFT) training,
development and scheduling may not be realistic for
all carriers in these lean economic times,
improvement of sterile cockpit training, and
improved crew briefings are both viable and crucial.
Coordination of the flight deck and cabin crew has
never been more challenging, than our current
operating environment. Let us not forget the possible
effects of AIRLINE MERGERS on communication and
crew coordination!
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I would like to thank AFA, EAAP, APA,
IFALPA, ALPA, CAPA, AEPA members, and
hundreds of aviation industry professionals
from 29 countries for their participation,
feedback and assistance in the distribution
of the survey.
Dr. Maria Novis, (AEPA) for translating the survey to Spanish.
Dr. Jiazhong Yang, (Civil Aviation Flight University, China) for
translating the survey to Chinese, Dr. Amy Alexander (Aptima,
Inc.) for data analysis, John Niehaus and Beth Seiler for
contributions to the survey design, and development.
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Contact: [email protected] for more
information