Transcript Computer-Mediated Communication

Computer-Mediated
Communication
Collective Action and CMC: Game
Theory Approaches and Applications
Coye Cheshire
//
April 2, 2016
Critiquing Hardin and Olson
I do believe there is another side to this, which is that
people's actions may not match their intentions. How
actively are people really balancing these issues of
public good and free riding on a daily basis? People's
concepts and mental models of contribution might also
be very different.
-George H.
I worked at Microsoft, which (as a pretty sizable
company) is often afflicted with some of the
shortcomings that Olson ascribes to large groups. On
several occasions, I witnessed events and
occurrences where bodies within the company (both
individuals and teams) would essentially work against
the greater good because they wanted a certain
outcome that would have been more locally beneficial
to themselves.
-Brendan C.
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Critiquing…topics of research
After reading the collaborative action
background pieces, I was totally ready
to read about amazing developments in
Web2.0 and enabling more flash
mobs…I guess I should have expected
two Usenet articles seeing how last
week featured two eBay articles.
Anyways, enough ranting.
-Adam J.
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Considering the Core of Olson’s
Argument: Self-Interest in Small
versus Large Groups
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The “Free-Rider Problem” in Online Systems of Collective
Action (Bimber et al.)
Communality and
Discretionary
Databases
“Second-Order”
Communality
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Choice, Assumption of Intention and
Collective Action
I would argue, however, that in the case of
blogs in particular, the individual is still making
a decision to enter into the public sphere. If an
individual really did want to write a blog solely
for personal reflection, he or she could write in
an offline journal instead. The person is
specifically choosing to put his or her
reflections in the public sphere. In doing so, it
becomes a public good rather than a private
one.
-Alison M.
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When is it a public good…private good…club
good?
Pressing a little harder on their use of language which
characterizes a deterioration of the public/private
boundary, one might wonder why they still cling to the
language of 'public good' in the end. Namely, if the
boundary slips away between these two terms, then
the two terms themselves slip away since they are
mutually co-constitutive. No more public, no more
private—just one big muddy swamp. And if there is no
more public as we know it, can we say that there are
still 'public' goods as such?
-David H.
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Why Game Theory for mediated
communication?
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Game Theory (definition)
“Game theory is the systematic study of
interdependent rational choice. It may be
used to explain, to predict, and to evaluate
human behavior in contexts where the
outcome of action depends on what several
agents choose to do and where their choices
depend on what others choose to do.”
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-ethics/
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Game Theory and Core Concepts
 Analytical vs. Behavioral
Game Theory
 Cooperative and NonCooperative Games
 Zero and Non-Zero Sum
Games
 One-Shot vs. Repeated
(example for cooperative game)
 Equilibria
 (i.e., Nash Equilibrium)
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Types of Social Dilemmas
Different social dilemma games
make different use of the payouts:
T>R>P>S Prisoner’s Dilemma
But also…
T>R>S>P Chicken
T>P>R>S Deadlock
R>T>P>S Stag Hunt
Reward
Temptation
Sucker
Punishment
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Coop.
Coop.
A
Defect
B
Defect
3 (R)
5 (T)
0 (S)
3 (R)
0 (S)
1 (P)
5 (T)
1 (P)
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Example: Chicken Game
T>R>S>P Chicken
Coop = Swerve
Defect = Do Not Swerve
Reward
Temptation
Sucker
Punishment
Swerve
A
No Swerve
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Swerve
B
No Swerve
3 (R)
5 (T)
1 (S)
3 (R)
1 (S)
-1 (P)
5 (T)
-1 (P)
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 2-person repeated PD  N-person PD
Public Good
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The N-person PD
“No one wants to pay taxes because the
benefits are so diffuse and the costs are so
direct. But everyone may be better off if
each person has to pay so that each can
share the benefits”
cf. Schelling 1973; Axelrod 1984
http://www.flickr.com/photos/cogdog/4353774/
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The Evolution of Cooperation
 Axelrod’s famous (1984)
tournament allowed individuals
to submit any strategy.
 All strategies played each
other in the tournament.
 The winner was one of the
shortest submissions, about 4
lines of code.
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The Simple Effectiveness of the Tit-for-Tat Strategy
 Tit-for-Tat: begin
with ‘cooperate’
and then do
whatever the
opponent did on
the last turn.
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Lessons from Tit-for-Tat
 Be nice
 It starts by cooperating. Most topscoring strategies do this.
 Be forgiving
 It quickly and happily returns to
cooperation without holding a grudge.
 Be able to retaliate
 It never allows defection to go
unpunished.
 Be clear
 It is predictable and easy to understand.
It pays to be predictable in non-zero sum
games.
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Considering the “Shadow of the Future”
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How is tit-for-tat different in the two
types of situations?
 2-person repeated PD
 N-person PD
Public Good
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Some common complaints…
 “A theoretical tool
cannot explain real life,
right?”
 “Hey, isnt this rational
choice?”
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(Picture courtesy vismod.media.mit.edu)
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The Value Fallacy: Individuals and Collectives
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Finding “Roles” in Online
Collective Action Behaviors
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Structural similarity
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Critique…
…some of methods seems too obvious. For
example, with the first method, authorline,
authors suggest that they can find 'answer
person' by finding users who only answers rather
than start new threads. Isn't it a 'definition' of
'answer person'? :(
However, I think utilizing multiple signatures is a
good approach to deal with varying levels of
relations between users' actual behavior and
structural consequences.
-Chulki L.
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Revisiting our earlier question…Where does
this apply to CMC?
Del.ic.ious
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