Transcript maritime defense

The Indo-Pacific Challenge
Matching Commitments and Resources
Toshi Yoshihara
U.S. Naval War College
Snapshot of Global Commons
2007 Maritime Strategy
“Credible combat power will be
continuously postured in the
Western Pacific and the
Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to
protect our vital interests,
assure our friends and allies of
our continuing commitment to
regional security, and deter and
dissuade potential adversaries
and peer competitors.”
Atlantic-Pacific Navy
Indo-Pacific Navy
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance
“U.S. economic and security
interests are inextricably
linked to developments in
the arc extending from the
Western Pacific and East
Asia into the Indian Ocean
region and South Asia,
creating a mix of evolving
challenges and
opportunities. Accordingly,
while the U.S. military will
continue to contribute to
security globally, we will of
necessity rebalance toward
the Asia-Pacific region.”
Indo-Asia-Pacific
“Spanning from the West Coast of the United
States to the eastern coast of Africa and
containing eight of the world’s ten most
populous countries, the Indo-Asia-Pacific region
continues to increase in significance for our
Nation as well as for our allies and partners.
America’s economy and security are inextricably
linked to the immense volume of trade that flows
across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The
economic importance, security interests, and
geography of this vast maritime region dictate a
growing reliance on naval forces to protect U.S.
interests and maintain an enduring commitment
to the stability of the region.”
Enduring U.S. Interests
“The United States has enduring
economic and security interests in the
Asia-Pacific region. And because the
region – stretching from the Indian
Ocean, through the South and East
China Seas, and out to the Pacific
Ocean – is primarily water, we place
premium on maintaining maritime
peace and security.”
Crossover Trends
• Anti-piracy by East Asian navies in IOR
• China’s “one belt, one road”
• India’s “Act East” policy
• Japan’s Indian Ocean presence
• Hypothetical: regional war in East Asia
leads to horizontal escalation to IOR
SASC Testimony, March 2015
SASC Testimony, March 2015
An Ocean Too Far?
• Vast distances
• Chokepoints
• Anti-access technologies
• Force structure
U.S. Navy’s Woes
• Post-Cold War:
– Shrinking industrial base
– Skyrocketing per unit costs
– Ships retiring faster than they are built
• Post-911:
– 2008 financial crisis
– Two wars in the Middle East
– Postwar drawdown
– Current budget crunch: sequestration
• Baseline fleet 2005-2015: 313-308 ships
– Below 290 ships since 2009
– Battle force size (Dec. 31, 2015): 272
Bush
Obama
Congressional Budget Office
2012: The Navy “would
never achieve a force of
310 to 316 between now
[2012] and 2042.”
2013: “Under its 2014
shipbuilding plan, the Navy
would not build enough
ships at the right times to
meet the service’s
inventory goal of 306 battle
force ships until 2037.”
Congressional Budget Office
2014: “Under that alternative [historical
average] plan, the battle force fleet in
2023 would be about the same size as in
the Navy’s plan but by 2044 would
number 242 ships.”
2015: “Under this [CBO’s estimated] plan,
the battle force fleet in 2023 would be
about the same size as in the Navy’s plan
but by 2045 would number 237 ships, as
opposed to the 305 in the Navy’s plan.”
Resource Mismatch?
Projected Size
• Fmr SECNAV John Lehman:
240-250 ships
• Center for Naval Analysis: 230
ships by 2030
Projected Needs
• QDR Panel: 346
• CSBA: 326
• Heritage: 309
• Fmr CNO Greenert 2012 SASC: • CNAS: 300
230-235 ships after sequester
• Fmr CNO Greenert 2013 SASC: • Cato: 241
– 2020 fleet: 255-260 ships
• Sustainable Defense: 230
– 95 deployed; 50 ships in
Asian waters
– Pivot nullified
• PDA: 230
CNO Admiral Richardson
“Barring an unforeseen
change, even as we face
new challenges and an
increasing pace, the
Defense and Navy budgets
likely will continue to be
under pressure. We will
not be able to “buy” our
way out of the challenges
that we face. The budget
environment will force
tough choices but must
also inspire new thinking.”
Distributed Power and Responsibility
• Shared vision among like-minded powers:
freedom of the seas
• “From Wheels to Webs”: beyond hub-andspoke architecture
• Networks among local states
• Bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral, multilateral
“Global Network of Navies”
• Integrate allied and partner capabilities
• Enhance allied and partner capabilities
• Engage allies and partners in regional
and international forums
Convening Power of Navies
• Tailored to needs and capabilities
• Inductive approach to shared norms
• Overlapping networks of permanent to ad
hoc relationships
• Resilient maritime system resistant to
revisionism