Transcript Political blocs and US foreign policy

“Southeast Asia between China
and the US:
Neo-Liberals, Neo-Conservatives,
Rising Powers, and Resurgent
Militarists”
Jim Glassman
Department of Geography
University of British Columbia
Outline—Working Backwards
• US Foreign Policy in East/Southeast Asia
• US Neo-liberals and neo-conservatives
• Theorizing class fractions within states
Bill Gates and Hu Jintao, April 2006
Hu Jintao, Howard Schultz
(Starbucks CEO), and Christine
Gregoire (Washington Governor)
Hu Jintao at Boeing
Hu Jintao and George W. Bush
Henry Kissinger and Hu Jintao
States and social theory
• Weberian vs. Marxist approaches
• Poulantzas on the state
– Institutional materiality of the state
– Social division of labor: mental vs. manual
• Extending Poulantzas
– States and social reproduction
– States and production
Thomas Ferguson (1984), “From
normalcy to New Deal: industrial
structure, party competition and
American public policy in the Great
Depression”, International Organization
38, 1: 41-94.
Class fractions and political blocs
in the US state, 1930s-70s
• Liberal internationalists
–
–
–
–
Financial capital (internationally mobile)
High-tech, capital-intensive industry
White, male, industrial workers
Support within Democratic Party
• Conservative nationalists
– Military capitalists
– Low-tech, labor-intensive industries
– Support within Republican Party
Bruce Cumings (1990), The Origins of
the Korean War, volume II: The Roaring
of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton
University Press, Princeton).
Political blocs and US foreign
policy
• Liberal internationalism
• Rollback
• Containment: the compromise
Internationalism
• Metaphor: the open door
• Economic Content: Nonterritorial imperialism,
a regulated open door, a world economy
made safe for free trade, an absence of
obstacles (i.e., protectionism)…a bloc of hightech, competitive industries as the engine of
expansion.
• Political Content: A world under regulated law
(the United Nations)…practical US
dominance assured through proxy-voting
allies and clients in the UN and elsewhere.
Internationalism (cont.)
• Strategic Content: The United States looks
after the whole, the allies the parts; joint world
policing…high-technology and maneuverable
Navy, Air Force, and atomic capabilities more
important than exclusive control of territories
and military bases.
• Ideological Content: …classic Wilsonian
idealism, masquerading as universalism;
human rights and democratization; free trade
as the (regulated) hidden hand that would
bring progress everywhere and liberalize both
transnational intercourse and domestic
political and social structures.
Internationalism (cont.)
• Role of the State: The executive
predominates within the state, at the expense
of vested interests in the State Department
and the military branches…liberalization of
target authoritarian states abroad.
• Social Constituency: Eastern bankers, hightechnology industries that can compete in the
world market, pro-British ethnic groups and
regions, liberal Democrats, Navy and Air
Force (depending on budgets), intellectuals.
Rollback
• Metaphor: positive action
• Economic Content: Classic, not Wilsonian,
imperialism, territorial instead of non-territorial,
resting on expansion by agglomeration and
direct controls rather than indirect, economic
levers; exclusive grasp of raw materials and
markets (because of inability to compete in world
markets); opposition to competition from revived
Japan and Germany.
• Political Content: Opposition to the UN and
collective security…anticommunism by whatever
means necessary means support for reaction
everywhere…
Rollback (cont.)
• Strategic Content: Asia-first, not Europe-first;
away from old-world, immoral diplomacy;
towards new-world, moral imperialism; exclusive
control of territories and bases as means and not
ends; hatred of taxes and communists leads to
fascination with cheap, high-technology
weaponry for obliterating the enemy, thus desire
to use the atomic bomb and the Air Force, or
another panacea like “Star Wars”; allies
dominated and if recalcitrant, abandoned for
fortress America.
Rollback (cont.)
• Ideological Content: Rampant American
nationalism, chauvinism with high (if
specifically American) moral content; eruptive
anticommunism; loathing of unions; frontier
expansionism and Indian Wars as models;
idealist rhetoric, but a non-Wilsonian idealism
resting on entrepreneurial virtues and a
restless search for new ventures, markets,
and raw materials; Friedrich List or Adam
Smith as ideologues, depending on market
position.
Rollback (cont.)
• Role of the State: Strong military departments
but weak regulation of the economy; a heroic
executive, a gutted State Department; strong
FBI and covert action capability; war
capitalism is necessary, vast reinforcement of
military branches in the meantime (often as a
way to pork barrel for local constituencies).
Neomercantilist in its conception of relations
between states, but hostile to state
interventions in markets at home.
Rollback (cont.)
• Social Constituency: Declining nationalmarket firms; labor-sensitive industries,
especially textiles; independent oil
companies; Republican Party right-wing,
especially Western and Sun Belt
constituencies resentful of Eastern
establishment dominance, Rockefeller wing,
and Eastern banks that control provision and
credit; fundamentalist religious groupings that
hate liberal theology or liberals…
US Cold Warriors on Asia, I
“We should cease to talk about vague
and--for the Far East--unreal objectives
such as human rights, the raising of the
living standards, and democratization.
The day is not far off when we are going
to have to deal in straight power
concepts. The less we are then
hampered by idealistic slogans, the
better.”
- George Kennan, 1948
US Cold Warriors on Asia, II
“By tradition and preference Asiatic
people turn to authoritarian government.
In contrast with us, they lack historical
experience of liberty and personal
experience of individualism…They are
particularly susceptible to the seizure of
political power by force or assassination
and to the concealed aggression of
communism.”
- NSC 48, 31 August draft
Southeast Asia’s Cold War Role
“…export from the United States to Japan
of...cotton, wheat coal, and possibly
specialized industrial machinery; the
export from Japan of...low-cost agricultural
and transportation equipment, textiles and
shipping services to Southeast Asia; and
the export from the latter area of tin,
manganese, rubber, hard fibers and
possibly lead and zinc to the United
States.”
- NSC 48, 7 October draft
Class fractions and political blocs
in the US state, 1970s-present
• Neo-liberals
– Financial capital (internationally mobile)
– High-tech, capital-intensive industry
• Neo-conservatives
– Military capitalists and extractive industries
– Low-tech, labor-intensive industries
– Right-wing Zionist groups
Ideology and material interest
in US foreign policy
• Differing material interests
– Neo-liberals: financial firms and TNCs,
globally competitive businesses and
professionals
– Neo-conservatives: military and statist
industrialists, declining and/or national
business interests and unions
• Ideological differences
– Neo-liberals: pro-corporate globalization
– Neo-conservatives: neo-realist
Competition and symbiosis
• Political blocs represent distinct,
competitive interests
• Blocs are dependent upon one another
– Neo-liberals need military enforcement of
property relations, adjustment policies
– Neo-conservatives need global markets
and investment by financial capitalists
• Frequency of compromises
James B. Davies, Susanna Sandstrom,
Anthony Shorrocks, and Edward N.
Wolff, “The World Distribution of
Household Wealth”
Membership in Wealthiest Decile,
by Region, 2000
Other, 14
USA, 25
Latin America, 2
South Korea, 2
Netherlands, 2
Australia, 2
Taiwan, 2
Canada, 2
Spain, 4
France, 4
Japan, 21
Britain, 6
Italy, 7
Germany, 8
Conflicting approaches in US
foreign policy
• Engage China
• Contain China
• “Congage” China
Rebuilding
America’s
Defenses
Strategies, Forces and Resources
For a New Century
A Report of
The Project for a New American Century
September 2000
Security
system
Strategic
goal
Focus of
strategic
competition
st
Cold War
21 Century
Bipolar
Unipolar
Contain Soviet Preserve Pax
Union
Americana
Europe
East Asia
“In sum, it is time to increase the presence of
American forces in Southeast Asia. Control
of key sea lines of communication, ensuring
access to rapidly growing economies,
maintaining regional stability while fostering
closer ties to fledgling democracies and,
perhaps, most important, supporting the
nascent trends towards political liberty are all
enduring security interests for America. No
US strategy can constrain a Chinese
challenge to American regional leadership if
our security guarantees to Southeast Asia are
intermittent and US military presence a
periodic affair.” (p. 19)
The Role of Southeast Asia in
US Strategy Toward China
Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa, C. R.
Neu
RAND’s Project AIR FORCE division
2000
“Tangible signs of US support could
include, for instance, US military
reengagement with the Philippines now
that the Visiting Forces Agreement has
been ratified by the Philippines Senate;
willingness to transfer NATO-releasable
advanced military technology to states
with which the United States has a
close and ongoing military relationship;
and cooperation with ASEAN states on
counterterrorism and regional orderkeeping initiatives.” (p. 72)
Zalmay Khalilzad
The United States and a rising China:
Strategic and Military Implications
Zalmay Khalilzad et al.
RAND’s Project AIR FORCE division,
1999
US Objectives in Asia
• To prevent the United States from being
denied economic, political, and military
access to an important part of the globe;
and
• To prevent a concentration of resources
that could support a global challenge to
the United States on the order of that
posed by the former Soviet Union. (p.
43)
Concerns about Korea
“A major potential effect of unification or
reconciliation would be pressure on the
United States to abandon its military
bases in South Korea. The primary
justification for these bases has
heretofore been the defense of South
Korea from another North Korean
invasion.” (p. 9)
Concerns about Japan
“…Japan could elect to become a major
military power…An alternative strategy for
Japan would be to seek a modus vivendi with
China…The formation of such a relationship
would, however, deal a fatal blow to U.S.
political and military influence in East Asia.
Presumably, for example, such a relationship
would lead to the expulsion of U.S. forces
from Japan and would place potentially
insurmountable pressure on U.S. bases in
Korea.” (pp. 14-5)
Concerns about Indonesia
“The growing sectarian violence and the
demands of the outlying islands for
independence and greater autonomy
are generating stresses that the
Indonesian political system may not be
able to withstand.” (p. 38)
“…a perceived weakening of Jakarta’s
authority or political will might stimulate
demands for full independence.” (p. 39)
The United States and Southeast
Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New
Administration
Report of an Independent Task Force
Sponsored by the
Council on Foreign Relations
J. Robert Kerry, Chair
2001
US objectives in Asia
“The highest American priority should
still be assigned to maintaining regional
security through the prevention of
intraregional conflict and domination by
an outside power or coalition.” (p. 9)
“The United States should promote
market-oriented economic reform...” (p.
10)
Indonesia and China policies
“The United States must cease
hectoring Jakarta and instead do its
utmost to help stabilize Indonesian
democracy and the Indonesian
economy, as well as to re-engage
Indonesia’s army.” (p. 11)
“The United States should pay close
attention to other extraregional actors,
carefully monitoring Chinese behavior in
Southeast Asia…” (p. 12)
US Post-9/11 Strategy in
Southeast Asia
• Re-establish deeper military ties with
the Philippine military
• Restore training and aid to the
Indonesian military (TNI)
• Develop and strengthen a “portfolio” of
military alliances throughout the region
(especially Singapore and Thailand)
Short-term Consequences of US
Post-9/11 Strategy in Asia
• Increased militarization
– Mindanao, Southern Thailand
• Strengthening of authoritarian leaders
– Mahathir, Thaksin
• Reversal of democratization processes?
– Philippine elections, Thai coup
Long-term Contradictions of US
Post-9/11 Strategy in Asia
• The defeat of the Left in East and Southeast
Asia (the Cold War agenda) has generated a
highly competitive center of capitalist
dynamism
• US neo-liberals wish to engage this region
but not all are in competitively advantageous
positions vis-à-vis Asian capitalists
• US neo-conservatives wish to militarily
“contain” the region, but come into conflict
with both neo-liberals and regional elites
US Elections and Foreign Policy
• Will a new regime break out of these
contradictions?
• The short answer: No.
• The long answer
– McCain: Likely continuation of more neoconservative approach of Bush II years
– Obama: Possible move back towards more
neo-liberal approach of Clinton years