Transcript New Model of Major Power Relations: China

New Model of Major Power Relations:
China-U.S. Global Cooperation and
Regional Contention
Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer
Presentation to International Conference on
ASEAN and China-US Relations:
New Security Dynamics and Regional Implications
Co-sponsored by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and
the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Sheraton Hotel, Hanoi
March 10, 2016
Outline
1. Xi Jinping’s ‘new model of major country
relations’ and the United States
2. China-U.S. contention in the South
China Sea
3. ASEAN and China-United States
Relations
4. Conclusion
1. New Model of Major Country Relations:
China and the United States
• Evolution of the ‘new model’
• Vice President Xi Jinping visits U.S. Feb. 2012
– ‘new type of relationship between major
countries in the 21st century’
• Sunnylands Informal Summit June 2013
– Xi: no confrontation or conflict, mutual respect,
and win-win cooperation’
– Obama: ‘new model of cooperation… based on
mutual interest and mutual respect’
Areas of Global Cooperation
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Anti-piracy in the Horn of Africa
Climate change
Countering international terrorism,
Non-proliferation in Iran and North Korea
Consultations on Afghanistan
Peace in the Middle East (Palestine and Syria)
Cyber security
Pandemics (Ebola virus)
Areas of Divergence
• Rollback in official U.S. statements
1. Implications of power-sharing by a ‘G2’
2. Chinese pressure on the U.S. to reaffirm the
new model
3. Unilateral expansion of China’s ‘core
interests’
4. Cyber espionage undermines strategic trust
5. Militarization of artificial islands
2. China-U.S. Contention
in the South China Sea
• 17th ARF (July 2010) Hillary Clinton identifies
South China Sea as a ‘national interest’
• China’s construction of artificial islands 201415
• War of words over militarization of the South
China Sea
– ‘great wall of sand’ -v- ‘necessary defence’
• Secretary Carter ‘specific actions will have
specific consequences’
Carrier Strike Group: USS John C.
Stennis and USS Blue Ridge
3. ASEAN and
China-United States Relations
• ASEAN centrality and Southeast Asian regional
autonomy
• ASEAN’s ‘even keel’ between China & U.S.
– ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and
Prosperity (2003)
– ASEAN-US Strategic Partnership (2015)
– 18 ASEAN-China Summits, 5 ASEAN-US Summits
ASEAN-China & South China Sea
• ASEAN statements 1992 and 1995
• Declaration on Conduct of Parties (2002)
– Terms of Reference, Joint Working Group
– Address ‘crucial, difficult and complicated issues’
– Two lists of commonalities
– Code of Conduct unlikely in 2016
• China’s ‘dual-track’ approach
– Excludes United States
ASEAN and China-US
• 18th ASEAN-China Summit
– Freedom of navigation and over-flight
– Implementation of the DOC/self-restraint
– Not to resort to threat or use of force
– Sovereign states directly resolve differences
– International law including UNCLOS
• Special ASEAN-U.S. Summit
– Ensuring maritime security and safety
East Asian Summit 2015
1. Uphold freedom of navigation and over-flight
2. Serious concerns over recent developments
that eroded trust… and may
underminepeace, security and stability
3. Xi’s assurance China does not intend to
pursue militarization
4. Commitment to DOC/self-restraint
5. Peaceful resolution of disputes/UNCLOS
Special ASEAN-US Summit
1. Peaceful resolution of disputes, without
resort to threat or use of force, in accord with
international law/UNCLOS
2. Maritime security and safety, freedom of
navigation and over-flight, unimpeded lawful
maritime commece, non-militarization and
self=restraint
3. Cooperation to address common challenges
in the maritime domain
AMM Retreat, Vientiane
1. Ministers remained seriously concerned took
note of concerns on land reclamation and
escalation of activities, eroded trust
2. Freedom of navigation and over-flight
3. Self-restraint and peaceful resolution of
disputes
4. Full respect for legal and diplomatic process
5. Implementation of DOC, develop COC
Conclusion
• South China Sea now cockpit for China-U.S.
strategic rivalry
• Tensions will get worse before they get better
• Four drivers behind China’s sense of urgency
– UN Arbitral Tribunal decision
– 19 May elections in the Philippines
– New U.S. assertiveness – FONOP
– November U.S. presidential elections
Conclusion
• ASEAN shoud give priority to
– Defining militarization
– Transparency
Implications
• DOC and self-restraint overtaken by events
• China’s refusal to recognize Arbitral Tribunal
will undermine UNCLOS and good order at sea
Conclusion
Implications continued:
• Chinese civil or dual use infrastructure will
lean to construction of ‘some necessary
military facilities’
• China is laying foundations of ADIZ
– Nascent ADIZ already exists
• China’s action have created security dilemma
• Militarization will alter naval balance of power
New Model of Major Power Relations:
China-U.S. Global Cooperation and
Regional Contention
Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer
Presentation to International Conference on
ASEAN and China-US Relations:
New Security Dynamics and Regional Implications
Co-sponsored by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and
the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Sheraton Hotel, Hanoi
March 10, 2016