Transcript the franchise, voter registration, and voting turnout

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
MECHANICS
The Franchise: 1789
• Under the original constitution, who had the right to
vote?
– for U.S. House?
– for U.S. Senate?
– for Presidential electors?
– for state and local officials?
The Franchise: 1789 (cont.)
• Voter qualifications (including for U.S. House and
Presidential electors) were set entirely by state law
– Proviso: The House of Representatives shall be composed of
members chosen every second year by the people of the several
states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the
state legislature. [Article 1, Section 2]
• Property-owning/tax-paying qualifications were common,
and
– often scaled to level of office
• Perhaps 50% of adult white males were eligible to vote
in early elections,
– plus some free blacks (and even some women) were eligible to
vote in some elections in some states.
The Franchise: 1830s
• “Jacksonian Revolution”:
– Almost all adult white males got the right to vote
– All Presidential electors were popularly elected
(except in SC)
– Voter mobilization campaigns by competing
(Democratic and Whig) political parties greatly
increased voting turnout, i.e.,
• the proportion of eligible voters who actually cast votes.
– But non-whites (and most or all women) lost the right
to vote (in so far as they previously had that right).
14th Amendment
• Section 1. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
...; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
• Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives
in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such state. [IMPLICATION FOR
ELECTORAL COLLEGE]
15th Amendment
• Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any state on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
• Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.
The Franchise: Turn of the 20th Century
• The “Jim Crow” regime was established in the South.
– “Jim Crow” had two main elements:
• de jure segregation; and
• de facto disenfranchisement (poll tax, literacy test, grandfather
clause, “white primary,” intimidation)
– Blacks remain enfranchised outside the South (but relatively few
lived outside the South until WWI and WWII)
• Women gained the right to vote in some states
(especially in the West) in late 19th/early 20th centuries.
– Caused dramatic “apportionment effects” in Electoral College:
• E.g., 1916
State
IL
NY
PA
Electoral Vote
29
45
38
Popular Vote
2,192,707
1,706,305
1,297,189
– 19th Amendment (1920)
• The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.
The Franchise: 20th Century
• 23rd Amendment (1963)
– The District constituting the seat of government of the United States shall
appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct a number of electors
of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators
and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if
it were a state, but in no event more than the least populous state; they
shall be in addition to those appointed by the states, but they shall be
considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice
President, to be electors appointed by a state; and they shall meet in the
District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of
amendment.
• 24th Amendment (1964)
– The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other
election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice
President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure
to pay any poll tax or other tax.
• Voting Rights Act (1965)
• 26th Amendment (1971)
– The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or
older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any
state on account of age.
The Franchise: Continuing Issues
• Failed 27th Amendment
– Section 1. For purposes of representation in the Congress, election of
the President and Vice President, and article V of this Constitution, the
District constituting the seat of government of the United States shall be
treated as though it were a State.
• Felon disenfranchisement:
– State laws vary
• Voter ID laws, etc.
• Presumably the franchise should be uniform across all states
and DC if the Electoral College were replaced by a direct
national popular vote through a constitutional amendment.
• Apportionment of electoral votes is based on total population,
– including non-citizens and illegal immigrants (in so far as counted by
census)
Voter Registration
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Prior to the late 19th century, only informal voter registration systems exists:
– probably a lot of fraudulent voting
– “vote early and vote often”
States adopted voter registration laws in the late 19th century,
– which produced an evident decline in total turnout.
Voter registration systems undoubtedly
– reduced fraudulent voting, but also
– may have had the effect of “vote suppression.”
Typically, people who are eligible to vote have to take some initiative to get
themselves registered.
– Moreover, registration list were periodically purged of non-voters.
Mid to latter part of 20th century, general liberalization of registration laws
(by states, by courts, and by Congress)
– “Motor Voter” Act (1993)
– Help America Vote Act (2002) [provisional ballots]
Voter registration evidently remains something of a mess in many states
and localities.
– “deadwood” problem
There is uncertainty (and passionate academic dispute) concerning the
typical turnout rate among registered voters.
Voting Turnout
• “Total actual vote”/ “Total potential vote”
• In the U.S., voting turnout in Presidential elections is
usually calculated as
– total recorded vote for President,
– divided by the census estimate of the voting age population (VAP)
• However, such turnout is often (mistakenly) characterized
as the percent of eligible (or even registered) voters who
actually voted.
• Election workers who report “high” turnout on election
night are looking at the number of voters who showed up
as a percent of registered voters on their lists.
Problems with PV / VAP
• Numerator misses
– spoiled ballots
– Presidential abstentions
• Denominator
– includes
• (legal and illegal) immigrants
• institutionalized population (generally ineligible or unlikely to
vote)
• felons perhaps not eligible to vote
– but excludes eligible voters overseas.
Some Reasons for National
Differences in Turnout
• Some countries have compulsory voting.
• Some countries make election day a holiday.
• Most countries have (national) voter enrollment (vs. state
voter registration) systems,
– in which case, about 90-95% of eligible voters are enrolled, and
– turnout denominator is (usually) the number of enrolled voters
[not VAP].
• U.S has unusually frequent elections with many
offices/propositions at stake in each (“long-ballot”):
– federal/state/local offices
– separate executive and legislative (and often judicial) elections
(sometimes with runoffs)
– referendums
– plus primaries (sometimes with runoffs)
TURNOUT IN SELECTED COUNTRIES,
1960-2005
TURNOUT DECLINE IN ALL
OEDC COUNTRIES (1960-2000)
Ballot Types and Ballot
Access
• Early voting was informal, perhaps
oral, otherwise voters had to create
own ballots, hardly secret
• Mass party competition (1830s on)
led to party ballots
–
–
–
–
printed by parties
listing only party candidates
distribution to party supporters
hardly secret (differently colored
paper)
• Implications:
– No “ballot access” problem
– Hard for voters to “split ticket”
– Enhanced influence of party
leaders
– Easy to arrange (even on election
eve) “fusion” between (major or
minor) parties
“Australian Ballot” Reform (~1890)
• Government election authority prints ballots
– all voters receive same ballot at polling place
– ballots list all candidates for all offices
– secures secret ballot
• Implications:
– “Ballot access” must be regulated
• filing fee, deposit, petition, etc.
– It becomes much easier for voters to cast “split ticket” ballots.
– It reduces the influence of party leaders and organizations.
– It becomes harder to “fuse” party tickets.
• In fact, “fusion” may be prohibited.
– Partisan vs. non-partisan [Australian] ballots
• U.K. vs. U.S. example
• what information listed for each candidate?
Fundamental Implication of a
Partisan Australian Ballot
• Which candidate is entitled to be listed on the ballot
under a given party label?
• This produces government [in U.S., state government]
regulation of party organization and nominating
procedures,
– in particular, in the U.S. it led to primary elections,
– by which a candidate is entitled to be identified on the
ballot as a party nominee by virtue of winning a
government-run election.
Two Formats for U.S. [Australian Ballots]:
Party-Column/Line Ballot vs. Office Block Ballot
• This distinction is relevant only if
– the ballot is partisan, and
– two or more offices are at stake in a single election; and
– it is especially relevant if many offices are at stake [“long ballot”]
• Party-Column/Line Ballot:
– Such a ballot is set up so that all candidates of a given party
appear in the same column or line.
– In effect, it is several party ballots placed together on the same
page.
– It encourages “straight ticket” voting.
– It may provide for a “straight party” vote.
– It raises the question of party order on the ballot.
• Office-Block Ballot:
– Such a ballot groups together all candidates for a given office.
– It encourages “split ticket” voting,
• though it can (but usually does not) provide a “straight party” vote.
– It raises the question of candidate order in each block.
A PartyColumn
Ballot
(Indiana,
1956)
An Office-Block Ballot (Massachusetts 1956)
An Office
Block
Ballot
With a
Straight
Party
Option
[Missouri]
The Notorious Butterfly Ballot
Presidential Election Ballots
• Does the ballot make any reference to Presidential
electors? [Today, usually but not always]
• Does ballot list Presidential elector candidates
individually? [Today, usually not]
• Does ballot allow or require voters to vote for electors
individually? [Today, never]
• If voters are required to vote for electors individually,
does the ballot indicate the candidates to whom the
elector candidates are pledged? [Today, not relevant]
• Does state law allow “fusion” of elector candidate slates?
[NY does]
Kansas
(1960)
Vermont: 1960 vs. 2012
New York (1960) [allows “fusion”]
Hawaii
(1960)
Alabama (1960)
Maryland
(Baltimore
Co.)
2008
No mention
of electors
But they
actually exist
=>
Election Administration
• Prescribed by state law (with increasing but still
secondary federal regulation)
• Administered by counties, often with in ballot technology
etc. variation from county to county.
• Episodic tasks, heavily dependent on more or less
volunteer labor
• Historically party organizations were involved
– Checks and balances?
Voting Technology
• Paper ballots used universally into 20th century
• 1930s onwards: automated technology becomes
available
– 1930s: lever machines
• e.g., New York, Alabama
– 1950s: punch cards machines
– 1960: optical scan machines
– 2000s: touch-screen (“ATM”) machines
Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project
• Assessment of reliability of different voting technologies
• Rate of apparently spoiled ballots
– residual votes = # names checked off minus votes for particular
office
– undervotes vs. overvotes
– does voter get feedback?
• Reliability, Security, and Verifiability
–
–
–
–
–
Paper
Optical
Lever
Punch card
Touch-screen
http://vote.caltech.edu/drupal/
Experimental study
of reliability of
alternative voting
technologies
Brookings Institution,
2008
Why does the U.S have bigger voting
technology problems than other countries?
• “Long ballot”
–
–
–
–
Federal system
Multiple offices (plus propositions, etc.)
Overlapping districts
Need rapid counting at precinct level
• U.K. vs. typical U.S. election cycle
– UK: MP, local councillor [MEP, MSP etc.]
• Where combined, separate ballots for each office, ballot pooled for counting
– US: President, US Senate, US House, Governor etc.; state
Senator; state House; county executive or mayor, county &/or
city council, school board, state &/or local judges etc; other
offices; bond issues; propositions; initiatives [and primary &/or
runoff elections]
Other Administrative Issues
• Absentee ballots
– excused vs. unexcused
• Early Voting
• Mail ballots (Oregon)
House Size, Apportionment,
and Districting
• Each of these factors, which pertain directly to House
elections, is also relevant to Presidential elections.
– House size and apportionment determine how many electoral
votes state get (beyond the guaranteed floor of 3).
– The Maine/Nebraska (Modified District) system of awarding
electoral voters is based on Congressional Districts.
• House size is not fixed by the Constitution, except that
“the number of Representatives shall not exceed one for
every thirty thousand, but each state shall have at least
one Representative.”
Implications of Increasing House
Size for Electoral Votes
• Increasing the number of House seats allows a more
precise apportionment among the states.
• Increasing the number of House seats reduces the
impact of the 3-electoral vote floor relative to the total
number of electoral votes.
• On both counts, increasing the size of the House
increases proportionality in the allocation of Electoral
Votes and, in particular, reduces the small state
advantage.
• Changing House size can change the outcome of
Presidential elections (all else equal).
House Size and the 2000 Election
• In 2000, Bush carried 30 states and Gore 21 (including DC), so
– on the basis of “House” Electoral Votes only, Gore would have
beaten Bush:
• Bush: 271 – 60 = 212
• Gore: 267 – 42 = 225
• 2000 was the first time since 1916 that an electoral vote victory
turned on “Senatorial” electoral votes.
• And it was the first time since 1876 that a popular vote loser became
an electoral vote winner on the basis of “Senatorial” electoral votes.
• As a result, a larger House size could have given Gore an overall
[House + Senatorial] Electoral Vote victory.
• But, perhaps surprisingly, the relationship between increasing
House size and Gore’s electoral college advantage was not
“monotonic.”
See M. G. Neubauer and J. Zeitlin, “Outcomes of Presidential Elections and House Size,”
PS: Politics and Political Science, October 2003
The Apportionment Clause
• Article I, Section 2, Clause 3
• Representatives [and direct Taxes] shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within
this Union, according to their respective Numbers [which
shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of
free Persons, including those bound to Service for a
Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
fifths of all other Persons]. The actual Enumeration shall
be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the
Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall
by Law direct.
The Apportionment Problem
• But the Constitution does not specify a mathematical
formula by which this apportionment would be
calculated.
• When Congress took up the first Apportionment Bill in
1790, it discovered that solving this problem was not
straightforward.
– The apportionment problem is a standard problem in applied
mathematics (e.g., MATH 100).
• Two rival apportionment formulas were proposed:
– Hamilton proposed a quota system;
– Jefferson proposed a divisor system.
Hamilton’s Method [Largest Remainders]
• Fix the size of the House, e.g., at 105.
• Determine each state’s proportion of the apportionment
population.
– For example, New York had 9.77685% of the population. Given
a House of 105 members, NY would ideally have 9.77685% x
105 = 10.26569 seats (NY’s quota).
• But NY and every state must have a whole number of
House seats.
• The most obvious remedy is to round off quotas in the
normal manner (giving NY 10 seats); but such rounded
whole numbers may not add to 105.
• Hamilton’s method: round all quotas down, then allocate
remaining seats to states according to the size of their
“remainders.”
Hamilton’s Method (cont.)
• Hamilton’s Method obviously “stays in quota,”
– i.e., it gives every state its quota rounded either up or
down.
• But Hamilton’s method is subject to a number of
“paradoxes.”
– The Alabama Paradox: increasing the size of the
House can reduce a state’s seats.
– The Population Paradox: even if state A’s population
grows faster than state B’s, A can lose seats to B in
the later apportionment.
– The New State Paradox: admitting a new state, even
while expanding the size of the House so that the
“old” states together have the same number seats as
before, can redistribute those seats among the “old”
states.
Divisor Methods
• All divisor methods award House seats sequentially to states on the
basis of their “priority” for an additional seat.
• Initially, every state’s priority is determined by its population, so the
first seat is awarded to the largest state.
• Thereafter, a state’s priority is determined by its population divided
by some function of n, where n is the number of seats it has already
been awarded.
• Different divisor methods use different functions of n.
• Alternate characterization:
– Select a divisor approximately equal to the total population of all
states divided by the total number of House seats, i.e., the
average CD population.
– Divide each state’s population by this divisor and round off the
resulting quotient by some rule to produce an provisional
apportionment.
– Different divisor methods use different rounding rules.
– Adjust the divisor up or down until the required number of seats
has been apportioned.
Jefferson’s Method [Greatest Divisor]
•
•
•
•
Fix the size of the House, e.g., at 105.
House seats are awarded sequentially.
The first House seat is awarded to the largest state.
The second House seat is also awarded to the largest
state if its population divided by 2 is greater than the
population of the second largest state; otherwise it is
awarded to the second largest state.
• In general, each additional seat is awarded to the state
with the “strongest claim” to the seat, where this claim is
determined by the population of the state divided by the
number of seats it has already been awarded plus one,
i.e., n+1
Jefferson’s Method (cont.)
• With respect to the alternate characterization, Jefferson’s
rounding rule is to round all quotients down to the
nearest integer.
• Jefferson’s method (like other divisor methods) is not
subject to the Alabama, Population, or New State
Paradox.
• But Jefferson’s method (like other divisor methods) does
not stay in quota. In particular (for Jefferson),
– a big state may get more than its quota rounded up, and
– a small state may get less than its quota rounded down.
• Put otherwise, Jefferson’s Method exhibits bias (to the
advantage of big states and disadvantage of small
states).
Other Divisor Methods
• John Adams advocated the divisor rule that rounds all
quotients up to the nearest integer.
– It is the divisor rule most favorable to small states.
• Daniel Webster advocated the divisor rule at the
midpoint between Jefferson and Adams, i.e., that rounds
all quotients up or down to the nearest integer in the
normal manner.
– It is the divisor rule least biased toward either big or small states.
• The Hill-Huntington divisor method is the apportionment
method now in effect.
– It is slightly biased toward small states.
Apportionment Legislation
• When it first passed the 1790 Apportionment Bill,
Congress used the Hamilton Method.
• Washington rejected the bill (on Jefferson’s urging),
exercising the first Presidential veto in history.
• Congress failed to override the veto and passed a new
Apportionment Bill based on Jefferson’s method.
• Throughout the 19th Century, in each Apportionment Bill
Congress always changed (and usually always
increased) the House size and often changed the
apportionment method.
• Congress discovered the Alabama Paradox while
debating 1870 bill and never used Hamilton Method
thereafter.
Apportionment Legislation (cont.)
• Congress established a “permanent” House size of 435
in 1913.
• Congress prescribed a “permanent” apportionment
method (the Hill-Huntington “Method of Equal
Proportions” in the 1940 Apportionment Bill.
• Thus, since 1940, apportionment has been on
“automatic pilot” and Congress no longer passes a new
Apportionment Bill each decade.
– The definitive work on this subject is by M. Balinski and H. P.
Young, Fair Representation.
– The authors argue that the optimal apportionment formula is the
divisor method proposed by Daniel Webster.
Other Variations on Election 2000
• Using the actual (Hill-Huntington) apportionment formula
on the 1990 Census:
– Bush 271
Gore 267
• Using Jefferson’s apportionment formula on the 1990
Census:
– Bush 266
Gore 272
• Using Hill-Huntington on the 2000 Census:
– Bush 280
Gore 258
• Using Jefferson on the 2000 Census:
– Bush 277
Gore 261
• Under all variations above, Gore wins on the basis of
“House” electoral votes only, because Bush has an 18
vote advantage based on “Senate” electoral votes only.
Districting
Article I, Section 4, Clause 1
The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the
legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law
make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of
choosing Senators.
Since 1967 (and at various earlier times as well) Congress has prescribed that the “manner” of holding elections for Representative
shall be by Single-Member Districts (SMDs), thereby producing
“single-winner” elections in each district.
All states with two or more Representatives are therefore required
to divide themselves into a number Congressional Districts
(CDs) equal to their House seat apportionment.
Districting is either done by the state legislature or by another body
prescribed by state law (or by courts when legal issues arise).
Districting (cont.)
• In Maine and Nebraska, Presidential electors are elected by district,
rather than statewide.
• Any state is free to adopt such a system and several other states
(including Florida) have considered the district system.
• Under the Maine/Nebraska system, the two “Senatorial” electors are
elected statewide, while the remaining “House” electors are elected
from CDs (on an SMD basis).
• Thus creating CDs is relevant to Presidential selection in Maine and
Nebraska and potentially in other states as well.
• Since 1964 Supreme Court rulings have required that CDs within
each state have (virtually) equal populations.
• District boundaries must cut across natural and jurisdictional
boundaries to comply with these court rulings.
• Computer technology and geographic information systems make it
possible to readily determine the likely political effects of alternative
districting plans.
• As a result, district boundaries have been drawn in increasing weird
ways.
Such “gerrymandering” can produce undoubtedly
weirdly shaped districts
Closer to home
Gerrymandering
• It is commonly claimed that such “gerrymandering”
produces districts that are safe for one or other party and
therefore non-competitive.
• If this is true, and if CDs were used to elect Presidential
electors, then presidential election campaigns would
focus on a relatively few “battleground” CD.
• However, CDs are not nearly as safe for one party or the
other as the outcomes in House elections seem to
suggest.
– House elections vs. Presidential vote by CD