Transcript Document

Learning about History through the
Truman Doctrine Speech
Denise M. Bostdorff
Professor of Political Rhetoric
Department of Communication
ri
Rhetoric
Rhetoric ≠
Rhetoric is generative—
words generate and/or
shape our perceptions
of reality.
Rhetoric can also be
strategic –words can
serve as a means to an
end.
Truman’s Worldview:
Wilsonian IdealismPeace Through Cooperation
Power PoliticsPower as the Ultimate Arbiter
Evolution of White House Views of the
Soviets and “Crisis” in Greece & Turkey
-USSR’s Expansion of Control in Poland,
Rumania, and Bulgaria in 1945
-Stalin’s Election-Eve Address, Feb. 6, 1946
-George Kennan’s Long Telegram,
Feb. 22, 1946, which drew on historic
“stockpile” of anti-Communist rhetoric in
U.S.
Charge d’affaires, Moscow Embassy
-Churchill’s Westminster Address,
Mar. 5, 1946
-Events in Iran and Turkey, Mar.-Sept. 1946
-Clifford-Elsey Report, July-Sept. 1946
Clark M. Clifford,
Special Counsel
to the President
George M. Elsey
Assistant to
Special Counsel
-Truman’s silence led to a rhetorical vacuum
filled by anti-communists
Sen. Styles Bridges,
R-New Hampshire
First post-war
anti-Communist
comic book, 1947
Rep. Everett Dirksen, R-Illinois
Greek Civil War
Started 1943
-ELAS, largest
resistance group
to fight the Nazis,
included the KKE
or Greek
Communists
-EDES, the second-largest resistance group,
was anti-Communist and, eventually, began
collaborating with the Germans against ELAS
-Security Battalions,
formed by the
occupied Greek
government and
funded by the
Germans, were
strongly motivated
by anti-Communism
and also fought
ELAS
-Civilians Suffered the Most
-All sides committed terrible atrocities, with
the effects compounded by World War II
devastation at the hands of the Germans.
U.S. intelligence believed, incorrectly, that
Yugoslavia was training and funding ELAS as
part of “Soviet-inspired plan to dominate all
of Balkans.”
YET, U.S. felt no urgency about helping.
-Post-war Greek government was corrupt,
refused to institute economic reforms, kept
Nazi collaborators in the police & military,
and acted repressively.
American officials deemed Greek Prime
Minister Constantine Tsaldaris to be “a
silly man” (Under Sec. of State Dean
Acheson) and a “stupid fool” (Mark
Ethridge, U.S. delegate to UN Commission
to Greece).
-U.S. considered Greece
to be Great Britain’s
problem, given Britain’s
tacit agreement with
Soviet Union and Britain’s
use of force against an
ELAS-organized protest in
December 1944.
-American citizens were
also largely anti-British at
the time and wary of more
possible war.
-Republicans swept the 1946 elections with
the agenda of rolling back taxes and foreign
involvement.
-The British sent Tsaldaris to the United
States in December 1946 to get help, but the
Truman White House refused to make any
commitments.
And Then—Winter Happened. . . . .
Delivery of the British Diplomatic Notes,
Friday, Feb. 21, 1947
Dean Acheson,
Under Secretary of State
Loy Henderson, Director of
Near Eastern and African Affairs
The Greek Situation Becomes a Crisis
Requiring the Truman Doctrine
*Henderson had submitted a report the day before
that made the case for assisting Greece.
*Acheson edited Henderson’s report to emphasize
urgency before passing it on to Marshall.
“Critical Situation in Greece”
“Crisis and Imminent Possibility of Collapse in Greece”
*Public Information and Public Affairs personnel at
the State Department worked with Policy personnel
on policy.
*Francis H. Russell, director of the Office of Public
Affairs, worked with both information officers and
policy officers of the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee (SWNCC) to develop what U.S. policy was
and an information campaign to gain support for it.
(1) Developed “Informational Objectives and Main
Themes” to be included in messages
See Russell’s “Informational Objectives and
Main Themes” in Appendix A
(2) Decided the President should give an address to
Congress and a fireside chat.
One problem: American citizens might
be shocked by such a speech since the
White House had not treated Greece as
a crisis previously.
http://www.trumanlibrary.
org/whistlestop/study_coll
ections/doc03trine/large/d
ocuments/index.php?docu
mentdate=1947-07&documentid=58&pagenumber=1
Second problem: Not enough time to write
two speeches, so fireside chat is
scrapped.
(3) Recommended preconditioning news
management campaign through off-the-record
briefings to stimulate supportive coverage and
prepare the way for Truman’s speech.
5
James “Scotty” Reston of The
New York Times was one of
many journalists who
publicized the White House
point of view on Greece in the
week prior to Truman’s
speech.
See Appendix B for sample
summary of radio coverage.
The Truman Doctrine Speech
-After a first draft in the
State Department, it
underwent 8 revisions.
-Some of the wording
derived from Russell’s
“Informational
Objectives and Main
Themes”
-Countless individuals
from State (most notably
Joseph M. Jones of
Public Affairs and
Acheson) and the White
House (most notably
Clifford and Elsey) were
involved
Truman before joint session of U.S.
Congress, March 12, 1947
Time to Analyze the Strategic Rhetoric!
http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/truman-special-message-speech-text
Group 1: How did Truman convince his audience that Greece was in a
state of crisis and deserving of $250 million in aid? (paragraphs 5-22, 41)
Group 2: How did he justify an additional $150 million in aid to Turkey, a
less than democratic country that had refused to fight the Axis powers
during World War II? (paragraphs 23-29, 41; compare to paragraphs 5-22
for Greece)
Group 3: How did Truman justify bypassing the United Nations?
(paragraphs 12, 19, 32, 40)
Group 4: How did he encourage his domestic audience to see the
situation as a crisis that demanded immediate action? (paragraphs 2, 3,
15-17, 30-39, 41-51, 54-58)
Group 5: At the same time, how did Truman attempt to allay the fears
of isolationist Republicans and American citizens that his policy
would lead to military intervention or even war and to excessive cost?
(paragraphs 47, 48, 52-53)
Group 6: What exactly did Truman say that U.S. policy was?
(paragraphs 31, 37-39) How did he avoid provoking the Soviet Union?
(paragraphs 12, 32-39; you may also want to search the text
electronically)
Group 7: How did Truman’s direct and simple style and his delivery
assist him in conveying his message? You may want to listen to part
of his speech:
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/audio/sr64-47.ram
Group 8, the devil’s advocates: How did Truman articulate policy in a
way that might be problematic for him in the future? (paragraphs 3739 are key) How did Truman’s language inadvertently feed internal
anti-Communist fears? (paragraphs 32-43)
Sample of Truman’s
Reading Copy: Note
the wide margins and
extra spacing to
accommodate his poor
eyesight.
Additional Resources
Texas A&M University Press’s Series on Presidential Rhetoric:
http://www.tamupress.com/Catalog/ProductSearch.aspx?filter=Titles&se
arch=Presidential+Rhetoric&ExtendedSearch=False&ConsortiumID=0&rh
l=&cid=0&sort=Name&itemsperpage=100&view=List&currentpage=0&pf=
&sf=&sj=0
Voices of Democracy Website for *Free* Assistance
Truman Doctrine:
http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/deliberative-topics/u-sinternationalism-2/harry-s-truman-special-message-to-the-congress-ongreece-and-turkey-the-truman-doctrine-12-march-1947/
Other Significant Speeches:
http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/
Contact Info:
Denise M. Bostdorff
Professor of Political Rhetoric
Dept. of Communication
The College of Wooster
Wooster, OH 44691
[email protected]
Appendix A
Francis Russell’s
“Informational Objectives
and Main Themes,”
Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1947, Vol.
5, The Near East and
Africa (Washington, DC:
United States
Government Printing
Office, 1971), 76-78.
Appendix B
Radio Comment of March 3,
1947, “Summaries of Radio
Comment and Newspaper
Editorials-March 1947,”
SMOF (Staff Member and
Office Files): Rose Conway,
Subject File, Truman
Presidential Library