Transcript Attack Graph - Singapore Management University

Automatic Generation and Analysis of
Attack Graphs
Written by Oleg Sheyner, Joshua Haines, Somesh
Jha, Richard Lippmann, and Jeannette M. Wing
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2002
Presented by HAN Jin
Singapore Management University
September 2008
Outline
• Preliminaries
• Motivation
– Attack Graph Definition
• Automated Generation
– An Illustrative Example
• Automated Analysis
• Limitations
Outline
• Preliminaries
• Motivation
– Attack Graph Definition
• Automated Generation
– An Illustrative Example
• Automated Analysis
• Limitations
Vulnerability
• In computer security, the term vulnerability is
applied to a weakness in a system which
allows an attacker to violate the integrity of
that system.
• Vulnerabilities may result from weak
passwords, software bugs, a computer virus
or other malware, a script code injection, or a
SQL injection.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
•
http://cve.mitre.org/
– CVE is a list or dictionary that provides
common names for publicly known
information security vulnerabilities and
exposures
– Every vulnerability is assigned with a CVE
Number:
E.g. CVE-2008-0075:
Unspecified vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Information
Services (IIS) 5.1 through 6.0 allows remote attackers to
execute arbitrary code via crafted inputs to ASP pages.
Exploit
• An exploit is a piece of software, a chunk of
data, or sequence of commands that take
advantage of a vulnerability in order to cause
unintended or unanticipated behavior to
occur on computer software & hardware.
• Commonly categorized and named by the
type of vulnerability they utilize:
E.g.
SQL Injection Vulnerability  SQL Inj. Exploit
Buffer Overflows Vulnerability  B.O. Exploit
Attack Path
• An attacker may need several steps to
achieve his attack goal:
IIS ASP Input
Processing Error
CVE-2008-0075
Begin State
Adobe Reader
Unsafe Libary Path
CVE-2007-5666
Execute
Arbitrary Code
S1
S2
gain user
privilege
gain administrator
privilege
End State
• Attack path: a series of exploits/atomic attacks
Outline
• Preliminaries
• Motivation
– Attack Graph Definition
• Automated Generation
– An Illustrative Example
• Automated Analysis
• Limitations
Limitations of Former Tools
• Limitations of Vulnerability Scanners
– Generate overwhelming amount of data
Example Nessusscan
•
•
•
•
•
Elapsed time: 00:48:07
Total security holes found: 255
High severity: 40
Low severity: 117
Informational: 98
– No indication of how vulnerabilities can be combined
• Limitations of Intrusion Detection Systems
–
–
–
–
Generate overwhelming number of alerts
Many false alerts
Require extensive human intervention
Alerts are isolated, no indication of how alerts can be combined
• Where does a security administrator start?
What is lacking?
• Context for total network security
• How outsiders penetrate firewalls and
launch attacks from compromised hosts
• Insider attacks
Attack Graph
• Attack graph is the data structure which
is used to represent all possible attacks
on a network
• Formal Definition:
Algorithm for Generating Attack Graphs
Example of Attack Graph Developed by a
Professional Red Team
Sandia Red Team “White Board” attack graph
from DARPA CC20008 Information battle space
preparation experiment
Problem Statement
• Problem: Generating attack graphs by hand is
tedious, error-prone, and impractical for large
systems.
• Goal: Automate the generation and analysis of
attack graphs.
– Generation
• Must be fast and completely automatic
• Must handle large, realistic examples
• Should guarantee properties of attack graphs
– Analysis
• Must enable security analysis by system administrators
• Should support incremental, partial specification
Outline
• Preliminaries
• Motivation
– Attack Graph Definition
• Automated Generation
– An Illustrative Example
• Automated Analysis
• Limitations
Procedure
• XML spec for: network, vulnerability, connections,
safety property…
• NuSMV: symbolic model checkers, modified version,
used to automatically produce AG
• Graph visualization tools
 = Attacker gains root access to Host 1.
4 hosts
30 actions
138 nodes
742 edges
6 minutes
A Graph Larger than Fits on Screen
 = Attacker gains root access to Host 1.
4 hosts
30 actions
larger initial state space
310 nodes
3400 edges
30 minutes
Outline
• Preliminaries
• Motivation
– Attack Graph Definition
• Automated Generation
– An Illustrative Example
• Automated Analysis
• Limitations
An Illustrative Example
IIS Web
Server
attacker
IDS
Windows
IE
LICQ
firewall
firewall
Linux
Action Arsenal
IIS buffer overflow:
remotely get root
Squid portscan:
port scan
LICQ remote-to-user: gain user privileges remotely
IE scripting exploit:
gain user privileges remotely
local buffer overflow: locally get root
Squid
database
Always Detected
Attack goal: disrupt the functioning of the database
Security Property
• Attack graphs depict ways in which an
intruder can force a network into an
unsafe state:
• E.g. in this network
Example Attack Graph
IIS Web
Server
attacker
IDS
Windows
LICQ
firewall
firewall
Linux
Squid
database
Alternative Attack Scenario Avoiding IDS
IIS Web
Server
attacker
IDS
Windows
LICQ
firewall
firewall
Linux
Squid
database
Outline
• Preliminaries
• Motivation
– Attack Graph Definition
• Automated Generation
– An Illustrative Example
• Automated Analysis
• Limitations
Single Action Removal
Minimization Analyzer
• What actions are necessary for the
intruder to succeed?
– Given a fixed set of atomic attacks, not all
of them may be available to the intruder
– Nondeterministically decide which subset
of atomic attacks to choose initially
Minimum Critical Set of Actions
A = the set of actions available to the intruder
Def 1: A set of actions C is critical if the intruder cannot
achieve his goal using only actions in A \ C.
Def 2: A critical set of actions C is minimum if there
is no critical action set of smaller size.
Def 3: A set of actions A’  A is realizable if the intruder can
achieve his goal using only actions in A’.
Minimum Critical Set of Actions (MCSA):
Given a set of actions A and an attack graph G, find
a minimum critical action subset C  A.
Finding a minimum set: NP-complete
Reliability Analyzer
• What is the likelihood that the intruder
goes undetected?
– Interpret as a Markov Decision Process
– Assign probability for detecting each
atomic attack
• Each attack has both detectable and stealthy variants
Probabilistic Attack Graph
Overview of their work
Security Property
System Model
Generator
Phase 1
Attack Graph
Annotations
Query: What actions are necessary
for the intruder to succeed?
Phase 2
Minimization
Analyzer
Attack Subgraph
Query: What is the
likelihood that the
intruder goes undetected?
Reliability
Analyzer
Probabilistic Attack Graph
…
Query: What is the
intruder’s risk of discovery
during an attack?
Risk
Analyzer
Payoff Attack Graph
Outline
• Preliminaries
• Motivation
– Attack Graph Definition
• Automated Generation
– An Illustrative Example
• Automated Analysis
• Limitations
Limitations
• Attack Graph Visualization Problem
Scalability Problem
Too complex and difficult to use for large network
One possible solution:
Ou, X., Boyer, W. F., and McQueen, M. A.
A scalable approach to attack graph generation.
In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS '06).
ACM, New York, NY, 336-345.
Zero-day exploit
• A zero-day (or zero-hour) attack or
threat is a computer threat that tries to
exploit unknown, undisclosed or
unpatched computer application
vulnerabilities
• Current attack graph analysis is based
completely on known vulnerability info
Q&A
Thanks