Transcript George C. Homans

George C. Homans
Born in Boston, Massachusetts
August 11, 1910
 Homans entered Harvard College in 1928 with
an area of concentration in English and
American literature.
 In the 1930s he attended a faculty-student
seminar at Harvard with Pareto.
 In 1939 he became a Harvard faculty member,
a lifelong affiliation in which he taught both
sociology and medieval history.
 In 1964 Homans was elected President of the
American Sociological Association.
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Homans continued…
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Homans’s work is divided into two phases
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The first phase is considered inductive and the
second phase is considered deductive.
Credited as the founder of behavioral sociology
and the social exchange theory.
Other social exchange theorists: John Thibaut,
Harold Kelley, Peter Blau.
Died in Cambridge, Massachusetts May 29,
1989.
Publications…
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English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century
(1941)
The Human Group (1950)
Social Behavior as Exchange (1958)
Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (1961,
revised 1974)
Coming to My Sense: The Autobiography of
a Sociologist (1984)
Link to Behavioral Psychology
Operant conditioning: the use of consequences
to modify the occurrence and form of behavior.
- Skinner and the pigeon experiment
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“This kind of psychologist is not interested
in how the behavior was learned: ‘learning
theory’ is a poor name for his [Skinner’s] field.
Instead, he is interested in what determines the rate of emission
of learned behavior, whether pecks at a target or something else.”
-Homans
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Sources: http://www.reference.com/search?q=operant%20conditioning
Operant Conditioning
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Satiation: the rate of behavior falls off if the behavior is
often reinforced.
–
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Extinction: the rate of emission of behavior stops when
it is not reinforced.
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When the pigeon is given much more corn each time it pecks, the less
hungry it will become and the less it pecks.
If the pecking is not reinforced with corn, eventually the pigeon will
stop pecking.
Cost: aversive stimulation, results in a decrease in the
emission of behavior.
–
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Fatigue is an example of a “cost.”
Other examples: A Clockwork Orange, treatment for alcoholism
An Exchange Paradigm
• Homans notes that Skinner’s pigeon experiment cannot really
be an exchange since the behavior of the pigeon hardly
determines the behavior the psychologist.
• In the case of two men, however, where exchange is real and
determination is equal, “each is emitting behavior reinforced to
some degree by the behavior of the other.”
– Smiling, nodding, furrowing of the brow, etc.
– Talk show hosts
• NOTE: The concern is not how each learned in the past the
behavior he emits or the behavior he finds reinforcing.
• Values: reinforcers; that which strengthens a response.
• “As he emits behavior, each man may incur costs, and each
man has more than one course of behavior open to him.”
An Exchange Paradigm
“The problem is not, as it is often stated,
merely, what a man’s values are, what he
has learned in the past to find reinforcing,
but how much of any one value his
behavior is getting him now.”
- Homans
The Influence Process
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Cohesiveness: anything that attracts people to take
part in a group.
Two kinds of reinforcing activity: “social approval”
and activity valuable in other ways, such as doing
something interesting (Festinger).
Communication/Interaction: measure of the
frequency of emission of valuable and costly verbal
behavior.
The Influence Process
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The more cohesive a group is, the more valuable the
social approval or activity the members exchange
with one another and the greater the average
frequency of interaction the members.
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Question: What is an example of a group that’s
cohesiveness is proportionate to the social approval
and activities members exchange with each other?
The Influence Process
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Conformer: people whose activity the other group
members find valuable.
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Since members are satiated by the conformer’s behavior,
interaction with him/her is less.
Deviates: a member whose activity is not particularly
valuable.
–
Interaction with a deviant is high in order to increase the
cohesiveness of the group. However, if the deviate fails to change
his behavior and subsequently reinforce the other members, they
start to withhold social approval from him/her.
Practical Equilibrium
“…We sometimes observe [equilibrium], that
for the time we are with a group-and it is
often short-there is no great change in the
values of the variables we choose to
measure.”
Practical Equilibrium
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The more closely a member’s activity conforms
to the norms of the group, the more interaction
and liking choices he gets from them too.
Other variables affect the relationship between
liking and conformity. For instance, if the person
who conforms the most also exerts some
authority over the group, members may like this
person less than might have otherwise.
“An incidental advantage of an exchange theory is that
it might bring sociology closer to economics-that
science of man most advanced, most capable of
application, and, intellectually, most isolated.
Economics studies exchange carried out under
special circumstances and with a most useful built-in
numerical measure of value.”
-Homans
Discussion: Address the critique that Homans’ social
exchange theory reduces human interaction to a
purely rational process that arises from economic
theory.
Social Behavior as Exchange (1958)
Profit and Social Control
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Less valuable actions by an individual
member lead to less value reinforcement
from other members.
Less valuable actions, however, mean a
reduction in costs which off set the loss in
sentiment (reinforcement).
Profit and Social Control cont.
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Problem of social control
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So, why does every member’s behavior persist?
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If this were true behaviors would not stabilize
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People stabilize their behavior at the point where
they are doing the best they can for themselves
under the circumstances.
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Their actions may not be the “rational” best
Homans support for this theory: lack of another answer
Profit and Social Control cont.
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Supportive Experiment: H.B. Gerard “The
Anchorage of Opinions in Face–to–Face
Groups”
Profit and Social Control cont.
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Formed artificial groups to discuss a topic and to
express their opinions about the outcome of the
discussion.
Types of groups:
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High-attraction: people would like one another
Low-attraction: people would not like one another
Measured opinions during and after discussion
looking at the number of subjects who changed their
opinions to meet those of the group majority or a
paid participant.
Profit and Social Control cont.
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Percentage of subjects changing toward someone in
the group
Group type
Agreement
Mild
Disagreement
Strong
Disagreement
High-attraction
0
12
44
Low-attraction
0
15
9
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Percentage of subjects changing toward the paid
participant
Group type
Agreement
Mild
Disagreement
Strong
Disagreement
High-attraction
7
13
25
Low-attraction
20
38
8
Profit and Social Control cont.
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Gerard found more shifting of opinions
toward the group majority, and less shifting of
opinions toward the paid participant in the
high-attraction group as compared to the
low-attraction group?
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Question: Based on Homan’s notions of
value and reinforcement, how would you
explain this outcome?
Profit and Social Control cont.
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If you think that members of a group have
much to give you – in this case, acceptance
– you are more apt to give them much in
return – here, a change in opinion.
Otherwise you will not receive the reward.
If you feel the group has little to offer you,
you will give it little value and will not be
willing to sacrifice much cost.
Profit and Social Control cont.
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Homans’s explanation:
Participants expected 2 different types of
reinforcement from their group:
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acceptance: from their agreement with the group
“maintenance of one’s personal integrity”: from
sticking to their own opinion when in opposition
to most of the group
Profit and Social Control cont.
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Participants assign value to each type of
reinforcement
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Those in the high-attraction group assign a higher
value to acceptance.
Value for “maintenance of personal integrity”
depends on the subject’s original position in
relation to the other’s in the group
Profit and Social Control cont.
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Rewards are in competition with one another
– rewards are alternatives to each other.
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Profit = Rewards – Cost
–
The cost of a particular action is the equivalent to
the foregone value of the alternative reward.
Profit and Social Control cont.
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High-Attraction group:
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Agreement subjects: they get much in acceptance
and has to sacrifice little of personal integrity.
Therefore, they have a high profit and re not likely
to change their opinion
Strong disagreement subjects: get much reward
for maintaining their personal integrity, but they
also have to sacrifice much in group acceptance.
Therefore they have low profit and are more likely
to change their opinion.
Profit and Social Control cont.
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Low Attraction group:
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Mild disagreement subjects: receive little reward
for maintenance of personal integrity, but have
little cost in acceptance either. Therefore, their
profit is low, and they are likely to change their
opinion.
Strong disagreement – high reward for
maintenance of personal integrity and low cost for
acceptance. Therefore, they have a high profit
and are not likely to change their opinion.
Profit and Social Control cont.
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Thus, change in behavior is greatest when
one’s perceived profit is the least.
When a person reaches their highest profit –
i.e. does the best they can in a given
situation - behavior is least likely to change
and it becomes stabilized.
Profit and Social Control cont.
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In a social group or organization, an
individuals profit is partly at the mercy of
others. Thus, an individual’s profit may not
be as high in a group it they would be
individually.
Profit and Social Control cont.
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Given the Homans’s explanation that profit = reward – cost, and
his ideas about social control, do you accept his theory that an
individual’s behavior stabilizes when people do the best they
can? Can you think of any examples that would either support
or contradict his ideas? Do you see any limitations in his
theory?
Social Behavior as Exchange (1958)
Distributive Justice
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Practical equilibrium is more probable than
the individual pursuit of profit left to itself.
An Example of this is behaviors of
subgroups.
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2 groups working together: the group who has
more responsibility (more pressure, larger stakes)
demands more pay than the other group
This is not a dispute over absolute wages, but
over wage differentials.
Distributive Justice cont.
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Wage and responsibility provide status within the
group
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When status factors are in line there is status
congruence
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Known as status factors
Leads workers to not complain about their position relative
to other workers
Pay is the reward
Responsibility (foregone peace of mind) is the cost
Distributive Justice cont.
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Distributive justice claims that if the costs of
on person is higher than another, the
rewards shall be higher as well.
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The inverse of this theory should also be true and
is known as noblesse oblige.
Distributive Justice cont.
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Profit = Reward – Cost
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Pay is the reward
Responsibility (foregone peace of mind) is the
cost
Though the reward and cost are different,
profit should be the same
Distributive justice is one condition of group
equilibrium.
Distributive Justice cont.
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Do you believe that Homans’s theory of
distributive justice is a reasonable account of
how social equilibrium is achieve in society?
What problems or limitations could arise in
this theory?
Social Behavior as Exchange (1958)
Exchange and Social Structure
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Example of Social Structure:
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Agents of an investigative firm have the duty to
prepare reports for the law. Reports have to be
prepared carefully, in proper form and agents
have to take strict account of any regulations.
Agent are reluctant to ask their supervisors
questions believing it would reflect negatively on
their ability to do their job. Instead, they seek
assistance from other agents.
Exchange and Social Structure cont.
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Because of the amount of consultations between agents, the
value of any one consultation becomes deflated and the cost of
the many interruptions becomes inflated
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The more prestigious agents have more consultations
relative to other agents. Thus their prestige was given less
value and their interruptions were more costly. For less
prestigious agents, a feeling of inferiority was more costly.
Exchange and Social Structure cont.
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The result: More equal exchanges between
agents.
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More prestigious agents consulted less often with
other highly competent agents
Less prestigious agents interacted more often
with other agents at their same level
Exchange and Social Structure cont.
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Rewards = advice
Cost = time lost because of interruptions,
feelings of inferiority.
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More prestigious agents sacrificed less cost with
less interaction among other highly prestigious
agents.
Less prestigious agents had less feelings of
inferiority by interacting with other agents at their
same level.
Exchange and Social Structure cont.
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This theory illustrates how social structures in
equilibrium might be the result of a process
of exchanging behavior rewarding and costly
in different degrees, in which, the increment
of reward and cost varied with the frequency
of the behavior – i.e. with the frequency of
the interaction.
Exchange and Social Structure cont.
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Can you think of any other examples of how
social interactions have lead to the
establishment of social structures? How
have these examples influenced the social
equilibrium?
The Logic of
Collective Action
Mancur Olson
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Born 1932 Died 1998
A leading American
economist and social
scientist
He made contributions to
institutional economics on
the role of private property,
taxation, public goods,
collective action, and
contract rights in economic
development.
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In his first book, The Logic of Collective
Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups, he said that only a benefit reserved
strictly for group members will motivate one
to join and contribute to the group. This
means that individuals will act collectively to
provide private goods, but not public goods.
Collective Action
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His most famous contribution is the idea of
collective action.
Collective action is the pursuit of a goal or set
of goals by more than one person.
The premise of this theory was that the
rational person would not participate in
collective action because its benefits could
not be mutually exclusive.
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Mancur Olson made the highly controversial claim that
individual rational choice leads to situations where individuals
with more resources will carry a higher burden in the provision
of the public good than poorer ones. Poorer individuals will
usually have little choice but to opt for the free rider strategy,
i.e. they will attempt to benefit from the public good without
contributing to its provision. This also encourages the underproduction (inefficient production) of the public good.
However, further theoretical analysis showed that this is not the
case when individuals have widely-differing perceptions of the
utility of the public good.
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"But it is not in fact true that the idea that groups will act in their
self-interest follows logically from the premise of rational and
self-interested behavior. It does not follow, because all of the
individuals in a group would gain if they achieved their group
objective, that they would act to achieve that objective, even if
they were all rational and self-interested. Indeed unless the
number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there
is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act
in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will
not act to achieve their common or group interests."(pg. 2)
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"Since a uniform price must prevail in such a market, a firm
cannot expect a higher price for itself unless all of the other
firms in the industry have this higher price. But a firm in a
competitive market also has an interest in selling as much as it
can, until the cost of producing another unit exceeds the price
of that unit. In this there is no common interest; each firm's
interest is directly opposed to that of every other firm, for the
more the firms sell, the lower the price and income for any
given firm. In short, while all firms have a common interest in a
higher price, they have antagonistic interests where output is
concerned."(pg. 9)
Examples
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OPEC
National Art Association
Discussion Questions
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What are some reasons that people would
participate in collective action if others could
reap the benefits of their work?
What are some other examples of
organizations that are built upon the idea of
collective action?
James Samuel Coleman
Rights to Act
James Samuel Coleman
•Born May 12, 1926 in Bedford
Indiana
•Died March 25, 1995
•Coleman was a sociological theorist
who studied sociology of education
and public policy
•Coleman received his bachelor's
degree in Chemical Engineering from
Purdue in 1949, and received his
Ph.D. from Columbia in 1955
•Coleman’s Foundations of Social
Theory stands as one of the most
important sociological contributions
of the 20th century.
What are Rights?
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If a person has a legal right to take an action or to
use or dispose of a good or a resource or to control
the outcome of an event, this implies that the person
may do so without interference from legal authorities.
Clear cut definition.
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None of this causes any problems, however, the
problems that arise lies in the broad area of rights
that are not covered by law.
What are Rights?
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For example, if Bob feels that he has the right to smoke at a
given place and time but Susan does not, it cannot be said that
Bob has the right, despite the fact that he believes he does. It
can only be said that the right to smoke at that time and place is
in dispute.
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According to Coleman, it can be provisionally said that an actor
has a right to carry out an action or to have an action carried
out when all who are affected by exercise of that right accept
the action without dispute.
What are Rights?
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This conception of rights implies that there is
not a single “objective” structure of rights of
control, but a structure of rights of control
subjectively held by each actor in the system
Private Worlds
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1.
2.
The private world of an actor consist of the full
distribution of rights as perceived by the actor, together
with the actor’s interest.
Two sources of conflict in the system of private worlds:
One source is a difference in perceptions of where
rights lie: One actor perceives a right to be in his/her
hands, and second actor perceives the right not to be
in the first actor’s hands, but in his own.
A second source is a conflict of interest that can exist
even when the locus of rights is perceived the same by
all.
Private Worlds
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In this conception there are as many systems of actions as
there are actors and each actor has a set of interest in events,
as well as a subjective conception of rights of control for all
events in which he/she has some interest.
This interests of different actors taken together produce an
overall structure of interest.
Each actor’s subjective conception of rights cover covers all
events in which he/she has some interest, as well as some in
which he/she does not.
This is a portion of overall structure of rights that overlaps
extensively with that of others; and the different conceptions
may be inconsistent.
The Example
Nonsmoker’s conception
of who holds the right
Smokers
Smokers
Smoker’s conception
of who holds the right
Nonsmokers
1
2
3
4
Nonsmokers
Who holds smoking rights?
Cell
1
2
3
4
Smoker’s
Conception
Smokers
Smokers
Nonsmokers
Nonsmokers
Nonsmoker’s
Conception
Smokers
Nonsmokers
Smokers
Nonsmokers
Action
Who holds the right of an
action?
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There is a general tendency for the conceptions of different
persons about who holds the rights into agreement
overtime.
The actions that take place in cells 2 and 3 of the table tend
to bring conceptions into consistency. The dispute that
arises in cell 2 leads each actor to recognize that his
conception of rights is not universally held. If the dispute
involves more than two persons, one side will recognize that
it is in the minority and may yield to the majority. In cell 3 the
actions of the actors produce a less strong movement
toward consistency, because there is no confrontation.
There will, however, be a recognition that one’s own
conception of rights is not universally held, and some
movement toward the local majority can be expected.
Equilibrium Changes
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In the case of smoking, exogenous changes
such as increased concerns with health,
coupled with evidence about the negative
effects of smoking on the health of smokers
and that of others nearby have moved the
conceptions of smoking rights in many
settings out of cell 1, an equilibrium state,
and into cell 2 or 3.
Equilibrium Changes
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If nonsmokers are, as might be expected, more
health conscious and quicker to accept evidence of
negative health effects of smoking than are smokers,
the movement will in most instances be from cell 1 to
cell 2. As long as the exogenous effects continue to
move people from a conception that smokers have
the right to control smoking to the conception that
nonsmokers have it, majorities against smokers’
rights to smoke will develop in both cells 2 and 3,
and this will move the system toward the new
equilibrium, in which all agree that nonsmokers
control those rights.
Equilibrium Changes
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Once the new equilibrium is established, it is
meaningful to say that nonsmokers hold the
rights regarding smoking – just as it is
meaningful to say that smokers hold the
rights regarding smoking when there is an
equilibrium in cell 1.
Formal Authority
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Example: A memorandum distributed by a library administrator to
faculty members who had studies in the University of Chicago library
in the fall of 1988:
In re:
Smoking in Faculty Studies I have been asked to request that faculty
who smoke in their studies please keep the study door closed. It
seems a reasonable request and so I am distributing this note and
asking that smokers cooperate with their neighbors. I also wish to
remind everyone that smoking is not permitted in the corridors.
Thank you.
Formal Authority
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As this memorandum indicates, formal
authority over actions of faculty members in
their library studies that affect others is held
by library administrators. The right of control
over actions is implicitly given up by a faculty
member in acquiring a study.
Formal Authority
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In view of the theory of rights as based on power-weighted
consensus, one may ask, what can be said about how rights
ought to be distributed. That is, what distribution of rights is
right? The implication of this theory is that the question is
unanswerable in general; it can be answered only in the context
of a particular system of action, and there the answer is that the
existing distribution of rights is right.

What is right is defined within the system itself, by the actors’
interests and relative power in that system. The theory implies
that moral philosophers searching for the right distribution of
rights are searching for the pot of gold at the end of the
rainbow.