Transcript Strategy of the Civil War 1863

STRATEGY OF THE CIVIL WAR
1863
© Nicholas Noppinger 5/6/14
Class concepts
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Why Gettysburg?
Was Vicksburg the key?
Was Little Round Top important to the battle?
A review of logistics
A review of strategy, operations and tactics
No shoes- if you review Hill’s and Heth’s battle
reports it was a reconnaissance in force
 1863 was the last opportunity for the CSA to win
militarily, if they ever had that ability
 1864 would be the last year they could win it
politically
Why the shooting?
o We have all been told that the war was
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inevitable
House Divided
Slave and Free would eventually clash
This was a fight which should have been
averted back at the time of the Constitution
America was not living up to its ideals… All
men are created equal
The Civil War was all about freeing the slaves?
Dogmatic Statements- The
Historical Paradox
 The South seceded because of slavery. They wished
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to protect the institution where it existed and more
importantly allow it to expand in the West and in
areas outside the United States. (Cuba, parts of
Mexico)
States rights issues alone, outside of slavery, were
not enough to unite the South into a singular union.
The South was quite prepared to violate Northern
states rights in the furtherance of slavery.
The South was concerned about GOP political
patronage in the South.
The Southern system was based upon the idea of
white supremacy.
Dogmatic Statements- The
Historical Paradox
 On the other hand, the North was not prepared
in 1861, if ever, to end slavery where it existed.
 However, they did not wish to see slavery
expanded beyond where it already existed.
 They were resentful of the power of the
slaveocracy.
 Most Northerners were as racist as Southern
whites. Most wished to exclude blacks from
their local areas.
 Most Northerners fought to preserve the
Union.
The Problem for Blacks
 A choice, if you could call it that, is one between
chattel slavery in the South or
 Secondary status in the North and South, without
the ability to vote*, some restrictions on movement,
serving on a jury, etc.
 *VT and MA allowed black suffrage, in theory, but in
practice black participation was extremely limited.
Many of today's historians
get it wrong
 They inject late 20th-early 21st Century social
mores (Post Civil Rights Era) into the historical
equation. Thus their histories tend to be biased.
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“[Antebellum Republic] Grounded in ruthless ideas of inequality of race,
class and gender.” The Age of Lincoln, Orville Vernon Burton (498)
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“If preserving the Union was the war’s deepest meaning, then it merely
restored the status quo Antebellum.” Throes of Democracy: The
American Civil War Era 1829-1877, Walter A. McDougal (399-400)
 “a goal [fighting for the Union] too shallow to be worth the
sacrifice of a single life.” Barbara Fields, interview in Ken
Burn’s The Civil War, 1989.
Many of today's historians get
it wrong.
Many of today's historians get it wrong.
What the Union meant for
Northerners and Southerners
 “for wee must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill,
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the eies of all people are uppon us[sic];” John Winthrop-City Upon
a Hill 1630. Later taken up by JFK and Reagan.
Heightened sense of American Nationalism and American
Exceptionalism
For the North: Maintenance of the Union was always the top
goal.
A Union that must be held against the selfish actions of
slaveholders, who lost an election.
The United States was an example to a world suffering from
oligarchy.
On the other hand- The South viewed themselves as the wronged
party.
That they were the true inheritors of the American ideal of liberty
and freedom.
An Imperfect Union
 Modern historians judgment.
 While women and blacks were not considered
equals to white men, is today's society that
much better? Will we pass the test of future
historians?
 Show me a perfect country or people group.
 The people of the Civil War era understood
their problems, but viewed themselves as
distinct from the rest of the world.
The Antebellum global
context
 A point often forgotten
 Adds to the idea of American Exceptionalism
 Failures of the 48’s- Wave of “classically liberal”
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Revolutions in Europe
The birth of political “isms”
The “temporary” failure of the ideas of the French
Revolution (liberty, equality, and fraternity)…
distinct from the American model
Followed by violent reactionary counter-movement.
The ’48’s come to America (Carl Schurz, Franz Sigel)
Revolutions in Europe 1848
Europe 1850
The Unexamined Civil War
 As we tend to glamorize the war, it is largely
forgotten or ignored that:
 Many Union and Confederate soldiersenlisted for reasons other than ideology,
largely financial.
 That many people in the country simply
wished to live their lives, with only a minimal
interest in the war, with the hope that their
lives were only minimally disrupted.
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Gary Gallagher The Union War (5.)
The Proper Role of
Historians
 “the supreme task of the historian, and the one of
most superlative difficulty, is to see the past through
the imperfect eyes of those who lived it.” “The
ultimate fault of modern [Civil War] historiography is
that ‘we credit Lincoln and his Republican allies for
accepting a war, whose magnitude they could not
[and did not] know, and for choosing results which
they could not [and did not] foresee.’” David M. Potter, The South
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and the Sectional Crisis. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1968) 246.
Daniel W. Crofts, Reluctant Confederates, Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis. (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1989) 359; Potter, 245.
 Unfortunately, historians today like to use modern
morals to bludgeon the people of the past,
particularly those of the South.
Back to the modern historian
 De-emphasis on Union.
 View that the Civil War and Reconstruction were
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a correction on the American Revolution
A correction that did not come to full fruition
until the 1960’s
And is still going on today.
Views anything remotely critical as being neoConfederate.
Egalitarian, leftwing, activist view of history that
distorts the past as much or more than corrects
it.
The Lost Cause
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Confederate generals such as Lee and Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson represented the virtues of
Southern nobility and fought bravely and fairly. On the other hand, most Northern generals were
characterized as possessing low moral standards, because they subjected the Southern civilian
population to indignities like Sherman's March to the Sea and Philip Sheridan's burning of the
Shenandoah Valley in the Valley Campaigns of 1864. (Not true-ignores Confederate atrocities)
Losses on the battlefield were inevitable due to Northern superiority in resources and manpower.
(ignores other factors, such as Union generalship)
Battlefield losses were also the result of betrayal and incompetence on the part of certain
subordinates of General Lee, such as General James Longstreet, who was reviled for doubting Lee
at Gettysburg, and George Pickett, who led the disastrous Pickett's Charge that broke the South's
back (the Lost Cause focused mainly on Lee and the eastern theater of operations, and often cited
Gettysburg as the main turning point of the war). (Too narrow of a focus)
Defense of states' rights, rather than preservation of chattel slavery, was the primary cause that
led eleven Southern states to secede from the Union, thus precipitating the war. {The South was
quite willing to forget dogmatic states rights in order to achieve its aims)
Secession was a justifiable constitutional response to Northern cultural and economic aggressions
against the Southern way of life. (Arguably true)
Slavery was a benign institution, and the slaves were loyal and faithful to their benevolent
masters. (Not if you were black)
Without slavery, the slaves would have taken control of the South. (Questionable)
The problems of both sides
 Ignores, minimizes or cherry picks the
information from the people who lived at the
time.
 Presents a distorted view of history even if
some parts of it contain elements of the
truth.
The Civil War today
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Heroism
Freedom
Racial Equality
Overemphasize the positive
Re-enactments- movies like Gettysburg, Gods and Generals,
Glory, Gone With the Wind
 They forget that it transformed the role of the Federal
Government, particularly that of the President, for good or bad.
 That it brought the greatest suffering ever faced by this country.
 That it brought want, destruction, starvation, death, pestilence,
fear and every other kind of evil that comes hand in hand with
war.
The Real Civil War
Cost between 600,000 to 630,000 dead, over 6 million today
The Bloodiest Day Sharpsburg [Antietam] September 17, 1862
15 percent chance of being casualty
The Real Civil War
$10 billion dollars over $200 billion today, officially.
Some estimates place the dollar figure over One Trillion.
A question of Union
 Wasn’t the Declaration of Independence an
article of political secession?
Slavery and Secession
 Neither were new concepts in 1860.
New York’s Ratification of the
US Constitution July 26, 1788
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…That the powers of government may be reassumed by the people
whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness; that every
power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said Constitution
clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the
departments of the government thereof, remains to the people of the
several states, or to their respective state governments, to whom they
may have granted the same; and that those clauses in the said
Constitution, which declare that Congress shall not have or exercise
certain powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to any powers not
given by the said Constitution; but such clauses are to be construed
either as exceptions to certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for
greater caution….
…That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a wellregulated militia, including the body of the people capable of bearing
arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state….
Rhode Island’s Ratification of
the US Constitution May 29,
1790
 …III. That the powers of government may be
reassumed by the people whensoever it shall
become necessary to their happiness….
Virginia’s Ratification of the
US Constitution June 26, 1788
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WE the Delegates of the people of Virginia, duly elected in pursuance of a
recommendation from the General Assembly, and now met in Convention, having
fully and freely investigated and discussed the proceedings of the Federal
Convention, and being prepared as well as the most mature deliberation hath
enabled us, to decide thereon, DO in the name and in behalf of the people of Virginia,
declare and make known that the powers granted under the Constitution, being
derived from the people of the United States may be resumed by them whensoever
the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, and that every power not
granted thereby remains with them and at their will: that therefore no right of any
denomination, can be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified, by the Congress,
by the Senate or House of Representatives acting in any capacity, by the President or
any department or officer of the United States, except in those instances in which
power is given by the Constitution for those purposes: and that among other essential
rights, the liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be cancelled, abridged,
restrained or modified by any authority of the United States.
The Missouri Compromise 1820
 Maintained the balance of power between
the Slave States (11 before adoption) and the
Free States (also 11 before adoption)
 Admitted Missouri (Slave) and Maine (Free)
into the Union.
 Slavery prohibited north of 36°West
30°North. (Arkansas boundary.)
 Maryland supported.
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Something Northerners would
like to forget, The Hartford
Delegates from Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, New
Convention
Hampshire, Vermont and Connecticut met to discuss
such items as how to get around various unpopular laws
like the Embargo Act of 1807 and Non-Intercourse Act of
1809, and lastly secession.
 Secret sessions
 This was during the War of 1812.
 New England states allowed their merchants to openly
trade with the British. New England foodstuffs were the
primary source of food for their Canadian garrisons.
Union
Army
Division
Brigade
Brigade
Regiment
Company
Division
Brigade
Confederate
Army
Brigade
Regiment
Company
Regiment
Brigade
Regiment
Army Organization
 During the 18th Century battles of 50,000 plus
were rare
 French Revolution levee en masse (Nation in
Arms)
 Dramatically increases the sizes of armies
 Organized into Departments and Districts
Confusing rank structure
 Confederate- only 6 officers in the Regular
Confederate Army all with the rank of General, the
rest were commissioned Provisional Army plus state
militias and state troops
 Union – US Regulars- US Volunteers, State MilitiasState Troops or Volunteers
 It is possible for a Union officer to have 4 ranks at the
same time. 1 in the Regular Army, 1 in the US
Volunteers, I brevet for each
 For example George Armstrong Custer was on Jan 1,
1865 a Major USA, Brevet Major General USA,
Brigadier General USV, Brevet Major General USV
Louisiana Tigers
14th New York NYSM, aka 14th
Brooklyn, Officially 84th New York
A question of flags
Lincoln as Commander in
Chief
 Novice at the beginning
 A well schooled beginner that increasingly
grasped the basics of military strategy , if not
the complexities.
 After a rough start became an effective
commander in chief
 Arguably, by the end of the war, was more
effective than Jefferson Davis
 Consummate politician and consensus
builder
Military Strategy
 There is usually more than one correct path
to military victory.
The role of the President
 Articles 1 gives Congress the sole power to
declare war, but…
 President’s including Lincoln have taken a
rather broad meaning when it comes to the
use of military forces.
 Many Presidents have taken action,
technically illegal at the time of action, that
were retroactively approved by Congress.
 Lincoln the birth of the Imperial Presidency?
The role of the President
 Article 2 Section 1-The President shall be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States; he may require the
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in
each of the executive Departments, upon any
Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices, and he shall have Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
Clausewitzian types of war
 Limited war- a war of limited goals, such as
taking a territory.
 Unlimited war- a war of complete conquest or
one that attempts to break the enemy’s will.
 Wars of Attrition/Annihilation- target military
forces.
 War of Exhaustion- target enemy means of
production or enemy will.
 Hybrid of both
American Civil War
Confederate wish
for independence
US wish to maintain
the integrity of the
Union
National Policy
Grand Strategy
Military Strategy
Operations
Tactics
National Policy
 The basic and supreme war aim of the nation.
 Restoration of the Union.
 Everything else subordinate and considered
tools to achieving the all encompassing national
policy.
 For the United States- restoration of the
seceding states to the Union by peaceful or
coercive means.
 For the South separation and independence.
 Political in nature.
Grand Strategy
 The mobilization of a nations, political, military, social,
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cultural, religious, and economic forces to achieve the
national policy.
Military planning at its most basic- {a decision to invade the
South). Some overlap with military strategy.
Centers of gravity.
Center of gravity could be a geographical point or the
enemy’s army(ies). There can also be more than one.
Grand strategy includes such things as emancipation.
While it identifies centers of gravity, it is less military in
nature, as it includes all of the factors.
Military strategy
 The more detailed planning and employment
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of military forces in an attempt to carry out
the grand strategy and national policy.
“Arrows on maps”
For example- The Anaconda Plan.
Military in nature- the importance of other
aspects still present but diminishing.
Concentration in time
Concentration in space
Operations
 The planning and employment for a
particular campaign.
 The management and organization of an
army
 For example, prior to the Peninsula Campaign
the decision to land at Fort Monroe or
Urbana.
Tactics
 The employment of troops in a specific
battle.
The Presidency
 Obvious role in National policy and grand
strategy.
 Constitutional role in military strategy, but
what is the role operations?
 Problematic if a President involves himself in
tactics.
National Policy
Grand Strategy
Military Strategy
Operations
Tactics
Changing Confederate Military
policy
 Cordon defense
 Offensive-defensive
 Interior lines
 Limits of a Fabian Strategy
 Limits on Confederate ability to maneuver
 Limits to interior lines and the myth of
Confederate mobility
 Union Navy
Limits
 The daunting geographical size of the Confederacy was largely
irrelevant; the Union military simply did not need to conquer all
736,604 square miles. The heart of the Confederacy, the areas
that produced the most agriculture and industrial products, and
contained the largest portion of its population, consisted of the
areas east of the Mississippi, excluding Florida. This heartland
consisted of only 43% of the geographical area, yet it contained,
including parts of Louisiana east of the Mississippi, 84% of the
white population, 92% of the South's industries, and 73% of its
agricultural production. Texas alone significantly distorts the size
of the Confederacy, yet many regions of that state were sparsely
populated and incapable of sustaining meaningful production.
Ibid, 23-46.
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Robert Tanner's Retreat to Victory is the current standard on
examining the effects of the Confederacy's geography on military
operations.
Railroads
 Union-central control
 Confederate-decentralized cotnrol
 Union cost plus adjustable fee allowing for
profit
 Confederacy-cost plus fixed rate- sensitive to
inflation
Limits to a Fabian Strategy
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In order for the Confederacy to adopt a primarily defensive stance, it would require that they start
with the majority of their country intact. Their armies must be able to beat back, with little or no
loss in territory, Union incursions. If, by following this strategy, the Confederacy lost too much
territory, it could create a cascade that would eventually prove irresistible and unstoppable. The
Northern populace would be encouraged, while the popular will of the South would wither.
Foreign recognition would not be forthcoming if Great Britain and France perceived military and
political weakness. In addition, the initiative would be forever surrendered to the Union, who
could pick a time and place of attack faster than the Confederacy could respond. Loss of territory
would lead to a loss of resources, which would make it increasingly difficult for the Confederacy to
field armies. Lastly, internal realpolitik (slave owners) would not allow the South to surrender
land, which would destroy the servile institution upon which the Confederacy was based. Joseph
Harsh stated that, "[slave owners] instinctively understood the delicate nature of their institution.
Joseph L. Harsh, Confederate Tide Rising. (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998) 7.
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They knew an area occupied by Federal troops, even if the occupation was short
and the area was later reclaimed by Confederates, it would never be the same."
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Ibid, 15.
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Ibid.
Ibid, 18.
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Guerilla Warfare
 Not consistent with the temperament of
most of the Southern population
 Union occupation would result in the
destruction of slavery
Offensive-Defensive
 Allowed the Confederacy the ability to switch
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to the offensive after the benefit of defense
was obtained
Suited the temperament of the Confederate
population
Aimed at striking Northern public opinion
Inconsistently applied
Failure in application does mean it was a
flawed theory
Confederate Departmental System
 Pipeline
 No strategic reserve
 Concentration in time
 Concentration in space
 Commanders often refused to cooperate with
each other
 Commanders missed the big picture by
overvaluing their areas
Davis as Command in Chief
 Often acted as his own GinC
 Was picky about his prerogatives
 Did not like for Sec of War to use initiative
Civil War Combat
 What can you tell me about the effectiveness
of the rifled musket?
Civil War Tactics
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Myth
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The rifled musket completely revolutionized
firepower, particularly lethality over distances
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The military on both sides continued to use
outmoded tactics that led to much higher
casualties
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The Civil War was much bloodier than previous
conflicts because of the rifled weapons.
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Rifled Muskets allowed musket fire for ranges up
to 600 yards.
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The Civil War made the tactical offensive
obsolete.
Reality
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The rifled musket was only marginally more
effective on the battlefield than the smoothbore.
It was the adoption of breech loading repeaters
that made linear formations obsolete.
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The militaries of both used the 1858 (Hardee)
manual which loosened up the linear formation,
which also increased the use of skirmishers. The
Army was well aware, as early as 1853, of the
potential of the rifled musket. Then US Secretary
of War Jefferson Davis authorized a detailed
study to modernize the US Army.
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The Napoleonic Wars were every bit as bloody
and perhaps bloodier using smoothbore
weapons. The Mexican War casualty rate was
proportional to the Civil War.
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There are few examples of sustained effective
musketry fights during the Civil War greater than
300 yards, which itself was rare and only done by
specialized (Berdan) troops. Most Civil war
firefights took place at 140 yards or less.
Civil War Combat continued
 The average Civil War firefight was only a little more than 20 yards
greater than previous wars. This was because the officers were
trained to use terrain as a concealment when applicable.
 The heavy smoke and confusion of the battlefield often made it
difficult to see objects at a great distance, even on flat ground.
 Tactical offensives succeeded in the American Civil War, when
properly executed. The failure rate is about the equivalent to the
Napoleonic Wars.
 The rifled musket only marginally increased firepower on the
battlefield and because of its limited firepower linear tactics were
still needed for command and control. And its role has been greatly
overestimated.
The Rifle Musket
 Many Union and Confederate soldiers were still equipped
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with smoothbore muskets. The Union Army of the
Potomac being the best equipped overall followed by the
Army of Northern Virginia.
Armies in the West (Union and Confederate) had to make
due with smoothbores well into 1863 (Union) and 1864
(Confederate).
With a few exceptions, very few soldiers were trained for
aimed musketry fire
On average a soldier would have to fire 84 times before
he hit another soldier
Soldiers carried usually 60 rounds into battle
Comparison of Casualties
 Napoleonic Wars
 Battle of Wagram
330,000 combatants,
80,000 casualties 24%
 Battle of Borodino
250,000 men, 90,000
casualties 36%
 Battle of Waterloo
190,000, 57,000 cia 30%
 Battle of Austerlitz
133,000, 43,000 cia 32%
 American Civil War
 Battle of Gettysburg
165,000 men, 50,000 cia
30%
 Battle of Antietam
132,000, 23,000 cia 17%
 Battle of Second
Manassas 112,000,
19,000 cia 17%
 Battle of Chickamauga
130,000, 36,000 cia 28%
Comparison of Casualties
 American Revolution about 15%
 War of 1812 about the same
 Mexican War 17%
 There are other factors (use of artillery), but it
is clear that the Civil War was not
substantially more lethal than previous wars.
Why do many CW historians get
it wrong?
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They are not military historians.
The lack perspective or context
Do prominent Civil War historians also research and write about the Napoleonic
era, the eighteenth century, or other wars of the 19th century? Almost none but the rare men who do are the ones who give us the greatest insight into Civil
War combat. How can you understand Civil War tactics without perspective,
without studying what Civil War generals studied, without comparing Civil War
weapons to those that came before and after? You cannot! How can you
understand Civil War tactics by looking solely at the infantry? Many Civil War
historians attempt just that, getting bogged down in the minutiae of battles
instead of gaining perspective by researching other eras. Because of this, many
historians don't fully understand why Civil War combat was indecisive. And
because of their lack of background, when historians specializing in the Civil War
have seen Civil War generals write of "Napoleonic" tactics, firstly - they may not
have understood what Napoleonic tactics were - something more than men
fighting shoulder to shoulder - and secondly, it didn't occur to them that
"Napoleonic" might refer to another Napoleon, Napoleon III. (The Bloody
Crucible of Courage, Brent Nosworthy)
Civil War Combat
 The last of the old
 Evolution not revolution
 More in common with the 18th Century than
with 20th Century
 Great hunting skills and shooting skills do not
necessarily translate to the battlefiled
Civil War Tactics
 Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics
 Von Moltke RR story
 Most documentaries, many histories, including
popular ones forget the mundane issues like supply
and logistics or cultural issues.
 For example. I could win the Vietnam War if I simply
ignored the will of the American people.
 Most Civil War generals understood, or at least
thought they understood these concepts.
 It is not easy to move armies, unlike drawing arrows
and lines on a map.
Major Campaigns
Napoleonic Strategy
 Strategy of the Central Position- Used if
considerably inferior in numbers
Napoleonic Strategy
 Single or double envelopment
Napoleonic Strategy
 Penetration
Napoleonic Strategy
 Battalion Caree
Union Military Strategy
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Modified Anaconda Plan
Control of the Mississippi River
Capture of Chattanooga, Atlanta axis
Capture of East Tennessee/ West North Carolina –support
the Unionists
Blockade
Destruction of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia
At least keep the Operations below the Rappahannock
River.
Eventual capture of Richmond
Discourage foreign intervention-military operations in
Texas. Red River Expedition.
Principal Campiagns
Lincoln-Military strategy
for 1863
 Army of the Potomac-hold the ANV look for
opportunities
 Army of the Cumberland move to
Chattanooga
 Army of the Tennessee and supporting forces
(Army of the Gulf) take the Mississippi
Why the Mississippi?
 Lincoln was under enormous pressure from
Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Loyal Kentucky, Iowa
farmers to open Mississippi to their products.
 Belief that cutting the Confederacy in 2 will
have a major impact on the Confederate
ability to wage war.
 Opens up potential future operations into
Texas- French involvement in Mexico
(Monroe Doctrine)
Confederate options
 Lee invades Pennsylvania
 Lee stays still in Virginia
 Lee takes a portion of his army to Tennessee
for offensive operations
 A Portion of Lee’s Army (at least Pickett’s
Division) goes to Mississippi to help Vicksburg
Jefferson Davis to Joe
Johnston
 In response to Johnston telling Davis that it was
impossible to hold Tennessee and Mississippi
 TO HOLD THE MISSISSIPPI LINE IS VITAL
 In a choice between Richmond and the Mississippi,
Davis felt that the latter was more important
because it gave the Union a solid base for future
operations, it would turn New Orleans into an
economic resource for the North and it was a
political sop to the farmers and politicians of the old
Northwest. Whereas, Richmond's fall would merely
be a blow to foreign public opinion and the loss of
vital manufactories. O.R.52/2, 397-399.
Vicksburg
 "Vicksburg is the nail head that holds the
South's two heads together...Vicksburg is the
key."
 Lincoln -Davis
Vicksburg
 Davis' contemporaries did not value Vicksburg as
highly as the Confederate president did. Lee,
Longstreet, Joe Johnston, and Beauregard
viewed Vicksburg, in and of itself and not
including Pemberton's army, as economically,
militarily and logistically unimportant.
 Source Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones,
How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil
War. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983),
375.
Why Vicksburg was not
important
 The last large scale transfer of troops from
the Trans-Mississippi to the east was in May
of 1862 (Earl van Dorn’s Army and Sterling
Price’s Missouri Division)
 Union control of Memphis (June of 1862) and
New Orleans made large scale transfers
problematic
Why Vicksburg was not
important
 Prior to 1861-180,000 tons per year was
shipped from Northern states to New Orleans
for shipment to the Eastern ports or overseas
 After the opening of the Mississippi- Union
trade only reached 60,000 tons by 1865
 The expansion of the Northern railroads took
up the slack.
Why Vicksburg was not
important
 Once Memphis and New Orleans fell to the
Federal armies, communications with the
Trans-Mississippi was, in the words of the
leading historical expert on Confederate
supply, "little more than a theory."
 Source Richard D. Goff, Confederate Supply.
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1969),
58.
Why Vicksburg was not
important
 The Vicksburg, Shreveport, and Texas Railroad only
stretched from the Mississippi eighty miles to
Monroe, Louisiana and the road network in the rest
of the state was so primitive that no large resource
transfers were able to take place. While the
Richmond Quartermaster, Subsistence and
Ordnance Bureaus were optimistic for supplies from
west of the Mississippi, particularly beef on the hoof,
the Confederacy met with very limited success in
transferring these materials to support its much
larger armies in the East. Ballard, 25.
 Goff, 153.
Why Vicksburg was not
important

The Confederate Commissary General Lucius Bellinger Northrop stated
repeatedly about the difficulties of transferring beeves across the
Mississippi in large numbers and the absolute impossibility of them
being brought to supply the armies in Virginia and Tennessee, largely
because of their emaciated condition in traveling the Texas and
Louisiana backcountry.
 The sources from which beeves in large numbers were to be gotten were
Texas and Florida, and complete arrangements were made for securing a
supply from both states, and large numbers have been obtained from both,
together with a large quantity of pickled beef from Texas. Arrangements
were made in 1862-3, to bring cattle from Texas and put them on the
grasslands of Virginia and Tennessee, but the long drive [inadequate
roads], want of good grass on the way, caused the attempt, which was
made with a few droves, to fail.
 O.R.4, 2, 350-351.
 Lucius Bellinger Northrop, "Report of Commissary General Northrop,"
Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. II, p.99.
Why Vicksburg was not
important







The armies East of the Mississippi acquired beef using Florida cattle of through
the illicit cotton trade that was sometimes sanctioned by both sides.
“retreatin Joe” – Clifford Dowdey
Contemporary views- The Army’s most skillful retreater.’
As Archer Jones and Thomas Connelly remarked, "Johnston seemed content to
let the government see that their strategy would bring disaster. Convinced that
his command status and the government strategy were both wrong, he seemed
almost determined to prove his point, and during the spring [1863] he spent
much time sulking." Connelly and Jones, The Politics of Command, 117.
Richard McMurry- Joe Johnston would fight the decisive battle of the Civil War at
Key West.
*****The combined totals that Pemberton and Johnston possessed in
Mississippi equaled the numbers the Grant had immediately with him. The 2
CSA commanders were simply out generalled.*******
Maintaining a threat in being, threatening Grant’s ability to supply himself
Confederate Railroads
 Confederate railroads were a perishable
commodity.
 By 1863 it was becoming increasingly difficult
to transfer large numbers of troops over great
distances.
 Troops moved often had to take out of the
way routes to reach their destinations
because of the unreliability of CS RR’s
Lee in Tennessee






Dysfunctional Army of Tennessee
Lee and his prima donnas' in the ANV
What would they do?
PGT Beauregard's imaginative plan
Kentucky- the Kentucky Bloc
What caused the high command of the Army of Northern
Virginia to gel around a single leader, if not the character
and leadership of Lee? In other words, the advantage Lee
had of a gelled high command was one of his own making,
just as the disadvantage of an ungelled high command
from which the Army of Tennessee suffered was mainly the
product of Bragg's abrasive personality and chronic
incompetency.
 Castel.
Virginia
 VA and the Carolina’s comprised 37% of the
CSA’s white population thought it was only
20% of the land mass
 VA and the Carolina’s , with VA being having
the longest by far, held 57% of the CSA’s track
mileage
 VA, alone, produced 1/3 of the CSA’s
manufactured products
Virginia
 Tredegar Iron Works was North America’s 2nd
largest factory, and the only facility in the
South capable of producing locomotives.
 Tredegar produced half of the CSA’s cannon.
 The Richmond Arsenal produced 40% of the
CSA’s small rounds and artillery shells.
 Tredegar was one of only 2 facilities in the
Confederacy to produce RR car axles. The
other Etowah Iron Works in Georgia.
Virginia
 To quote the historian Charles Roland,
"Richmond was Washington and Pittsburgh in
one." Charles P. Roland, "The Generalship of
Robert E. Lee," in Lee, the Soldier, ed. by Gary W.
Gallagher (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of
Nebraska Press, 1996) 164.
 The Southern Armies would not have been able
to stay in the field without the products of
Richmond and Virginia.
 The CSA suffered the loss of Memphis, Nashville,
New Orleans and Vicksburg with no appreciable
loss on combat power for 2 years.
Military considerations
 A move north of the Potomac threatened the
Union Center of Gravity.
 In other words, Lee understood that, while the
South could and was, at that time, losing the war
in the West, it could only win or influence its
outcome in the East. The Eastern Theater was
quite simply the United States' center of gravity.
A victory in the Eastern Theater, partly through
public perception, was magnified
disproportionately to a comparable victory in the
West.
 Reid, 281-282; Bowden and Ward, 32-33.
The Army of Northern
Virginia
 In spite of the tragic loss of Stonewall Jackson,
the preponderance of evidence suggests that the
morale of Lee's army was at an all time high.
They understood the numerical disadvantages
they were facing and they wished
wholeheartedly to carry the war into the North.
As a body, they wished to see Northern citizens
suffer the depravations that had been affecting
Southern civilians from the commencement of
hostilities. They also had the utmost confidence
in the generalship of Robert E. Lee.
 Ibid; Bowden and Ward, 21.
Army of the Potomac
 No confidence in its leadership
 Lincoln- "My God! My God! What will the
country say?“
 Tired of defeats
 A third of the Army’s enlistments were
expiring to be replaced by the 1st draft o
draftee’s and less thought of replacements.
 80% of the soldiers who could went home.
Slavery






Lincoln publishes Emancipation Proclamation after Antietam
Aug 22 letter to Horace Greeley
I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner
the national authority can be restored; the nearer the Union will be "the Union as it was." If
there be those who would not save the Union, unless they could at the same time save
slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they
could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this
struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the
Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I
would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do
that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the
Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I
shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more
whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when
shown to be errors; and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views
Democrats make gains in Nov elections
Ridiculed in the Army of the Potomac
McClellan and the new policy on slavery
Reaction to the Emancipation
Proclamation
 "For every Yank whose primary goal was
emancipation were to be found several
whose chief goal was the Union and the
system of government that it represented."
Bell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank: The
Common Soldier of the Union. (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1997) 42-44.
Reaction to the Emancipation
Proclamation
 There is an astonishing number of letters that show not
only an intense hatred for blacks, but also a marked disgust
with both the Republican Party and Abolitionists. While
Abolitionist sentiment did exist, they were in the decided
minority throughout the war. Even soldiers who supported
Lincoln found that they detested Lincoln's Proclamation
and, more importantly, the recruitment of black soldiers. A
survey of immediate post-war regimental histories show
that Northern white veterans downplayed black military
service, while at the same time echoed views that would be
considered extremely racist by today's standards.
 Gallagher, The Union War, 101, 75-118.
 Ibid.
Reaction to the Emancipation
Proclamation
 As Stephen Sears noted, "Emancipation
promised a revolution that few were ready
for; a war for union was one thing, a war to
end slavery seemed something very
different." Stephen W. Sears, Chancellorsville.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996)
12-13.
 Reactions against GOP officials
 Noted increased cruelty shown to blacks
Lincoln on the black race
 After the Emancipation Proclamation was made
public on August 14, 1862 to a black delegation
 “Even when you cease to be slaves, you are yet
far removed from being placed on an equality
with the white race, on this broad continent not
the best single man of your race is made the
equal of the worst single man of ours…I cannot
alter if it I would. It is simply a fact that Negroes
are inferior to whites.”
In defense of Lincoln
 He held a position, while racist today, that was at the
forefront of his time. He was on the dynamic end of a
direction that was moving toward freedom and eventual
equality. Many pro-Southern historians have unfairly
castigated the man for having contemporary views.
 “[the black race] was entitled to all the natural rights
enumerated in the Declaration of Independence; the right
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness…In the right to
eat the bread, without leave of anybody else, which his own
hands earns, he is my equal and the equal of Judge
Douglas, and the equal of every living man.”
 Most whites including Douglass, barely viewed blacks as
human beings.
Lee the strategic thinker
 Lee, in a letter to Secretary of War James Seddon, stated a
desire that every military operation "should bring us near
to the great end which it is the subject of this war to
reach." Lee, Wartime Papers, 388-389.
 Lee was looking forward to the 1863 state elections and
1864 elections.
 Lee, in an April 19, 1863 letter to his wife, was far more
prescient, "If successful this year, next fall there will be a
great change in public opinion at the north. The
Republicans will be destroyed and I think the friends of
peace will become so strong as that the next
administration will go in on that basis." Ibid, 437-438.
Lee the strategic thinker
 In a June 10, 1863 letter to Jefferson Davis, "The
goal was to end the fighting with the
Confederacy still in existence. If that meant
allowing misguided northerners to indulge
the mistaken belief that a compromised
peace would restore the Union, so be it.“
 Lee hoped that a successful move North
would result in severe panic in Northern
cities hurting both social and economic
institutions.
New York Draft riots July 13-16,
1863
 Up to 120 dead
 $1.5 Million in damage
 Over $100 million
today
 Middle and Upper
class, in addition to
street gangs
Lincoln and Civil Rights
 September 24, 1862, Lincoln suspends Habeas Corpus




throughout the country, increasing resistance to enlistment
Clement Vallandigham, January 14, 1863, Lincoln Administration
was fighting not for the Union but for abolition, country has
become one of the worst despotisms on earth ever, the only
trophies of this unconstitutional war are defeat, debt, taxation,
sepulchers, the suspension of Habeas Corpus and violation of
freedom of the press and speech.
May 2, Vallandigham arrested and exiled to the Confederacy
Copperhead sentiment increases, particularly after conscription
Lincoln “Must I shoot a simple minded soldier boy who deserts,
whilst I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him
to desert.”
Increasing opposition to the
war North and South
 Copperheads
 Peace Democrats
 Riots in the South
Supply considerations
ignored
 ANV only southern army in 1863 to cut meat rations.
 Grain crop failure in 1862
 Lack of horse fodder meant that Lee had to spread
his army from the Shenandoah Valley tot eh Great
Dismal Swamp to feed his armies horses.
 The army grain shortage reached critical stages in
the spring of 1863. They were only receiving 400-500
tons per day, when the minimal need was 600 tons
to maintain optimal battlefield mobility.
 Cattle facing severe fodder shortages and lack of
ability to graze.
 Richmond Bread Riots April 2, 1863
Supply considerations
ignored
 The conclusion is that if the Army did not
move north of the Potomac it would starve to
death in the winter of 1863/1864.
Military considerations
 Lee felt that weakening his army would
produce a situation not unlike the Peninsula
Campaign which would mean that the army
would lose its ability to maneuver.
 Lee did not trust the other generals to use his
troops properly.
All I learned about Gettysburg I got from
the History Channel
 The Aliens who built the Pyramids fought with the Union. They used
particle beams to defeat Pickett’s Charge. They were joined by
Bigfoot, the Loch Ness Monster, and the Jersey Devil.
 The CSA was unable to decipher the Da Vinci Code. The Freemasons
and Knights Templar’s were divided.
 Nostradamus and Mayans with their Long Count Calendar predicted
it all.
 You can buy souvenirs of it all at the Pawn Star’s shop.
Order of Battle example
 A Regiment starts at
 A division is made up of
1000 men, by the time
of battle attrition has
reduced it to 200- 550.
 A Brigade is made up of
two or more regiments
about 1500-3000 men
two or more Brigades,
3000-8000 men plus
artillery
 A corps is made up of
two or more divisions
10,000 to 35,000 men
 An army is made up of
two or more corps
35,000-145,000
Numbers
 Army of the Potomac
 Army of Northern
 7 infantry corps
 1 cavalry corps

 93,921***

 360 guns


Virginia
3 infantry corps
1 cavalry division
71,699 men
280 guns
Commanders
I Corps AOP
 I Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John F.
Reynolds, with the divisions of Brig. Gens.
James S. Wadsworth, John C. Robinson, and
Abner Doubleday.
II Corps AOP
 II Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Winfield
Scott Hancock, with the divisions of and Brig.
Gens. John Gibbon, John C Caldwell,
Alexander Hays
III Corps AOP
 III Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Daniel E.
Sickles, with the divisions of Brig. Gen. David
B. Birney, and Brig. Gen. Andrew A.
Humphreys
V Corps AOP
 V Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. George
Sykes, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. James
Barnes, Romeyn Ayres, and Samuel W,
Crawford.
VI Corps AOP
 VI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John
Sedgwick, with the divisions of Brig. Gens.
Horatio G, Wright, Albion P. Howe, and Maj.
Gen. John Newton.
XI Corps AOP
 XI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver O.
Howard, with the divisions of Brig. Gen.
Francis Barlow, and Adolph von Steinwehr,
and Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz.
XII Corps AOP
 XII Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Henry W.
Slocum, with the divisions of Brig. Gens.
Alpheus S. Williams and John W. Geary.
Cavalry Corps AOP
 Cavalry Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen.
Alfred Pleasonton, with the divisions of Brig.
Gens. John Buford, Judson Kilpatrick and
David M. Gregg.
First Corps ANV
 First Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. James
Longstreet. Including the (the divisions of
Maj. Gens. John Bell Hood and Brig. Gen.
George E. Pickett, and Lafayette McLaws.
Second Corps ANV
 Second Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen., with
the divisions of Maj. Gens. Robert E. Rodes,
Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, and Edward Johnson.
Third Corps ANV
 Third Corps Commanded by Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill
with divisions commanded by Maj. Gens.
Richard Anderson, William Dorsey Pender,
and Henry Heth.
Cavalry Division ANV
 Cavalry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. J.E.B.
Stuart. With brigades commanded by Brig.
Gens. Fitzhugh Lee , WH.F. "Rooney" Lee, Wade
Hampton, William "Grumble" Jones , Beverly
Robertson, Albert Jenkins, and John D. Imboden.
Stuart’s Ride
 Jeb Stuart understood his role
 According to Lee’s staff and Longstreet
 On the night of June 21st Lee issued verbal
orders to Stuart that he was immediately to
cross the Potomac, screening the army if the
AOP was crossing the river .
 Historians argue over 2 written orders from
Lee to Stuart
Stuart’s Ride
 Lee’s principal staff officers
 Charles Marshall-Walter Taylor-Charles
Venable
Lee to Stuart June 22, 1863
 I have just received your note of 7:45 from General Longstreet. I
judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest our
progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied.
Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal
a march on us and get across the Potomac before we are aware.
If you find that he is moving northward and that two brigades can
guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move
with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General
Ewell’s right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his
flank, keep him informed of the enemy’s movements, and collect
all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of
General Ewell’s army will probably move towards the
Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route; another by the
Chambersburg….You will, of course, take charge of Jenkins’
brigade and give him necessary instructions….
 Official Records hereinafter listed as OR. OR, I, 27, 3:913.
Stuart’s Ride
 This written order does not give Stuart wide
latitude, nor does it contradict the verbal
orders issued on the 21st.
 Stuart chose to take his three best brigades
with the best commanders and leave the rear
guarded by Beverly Robertson a man Stuart
did not trust.
Lee’s note Ewell June 22
 …I also directed Gen. Stuart should the
enemy have so far retired from his front as to
permit of the departure of a portion of his
cavalry, to march with three of his brigades
across the Potomac and place himself on your
right and keeping in communication with
you, and keep you advised of the movements
of the enemy.…” OR, I, 27, 3:914-15.
Stuart’s Ride
 Longstreet, Stuart’s immediate superior
added an addendum on the night of June 22.
 Telling Stuart to begin his ride via Hopewell
Gap.
 Lee not pleased with this issued the following
order
Lee to Stuart June 23
 If General Hooker’s army remains inactive, you can leave
two brigades to watch him and withdraw with the three
others but should he not appear to be moving northward, I
think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain
tomorrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and
move over to Fredericktown. You will, however, be able to
judge whether you can pass around their army without
hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross
over the river east of the mountains. In either case, you
must move on and feel the right of Ewell’s troops,
collecting information, provisions, etc….Be watchful and
circumspect in all your movements. (Emphasis added)
 OR, I, 27, 3-916.
Stuart’s Ride
 A mysterious 3rd order dated June 23, does not
appear in Lee’s dispatches,
 The only witness was Stuart aide Henry B.
McClellan.
 Some historians accept this at face value
 According to McClellan it gave Stuart complete
freedom of action, with 2 exceptions.
 Stuart was to meet up with Ewell at York.
 Stuart was not to cross with the rear of the Army
at Shepherdstown or Williamsport.
Stuart’s Ride
 Stuart began his ride on the 25th and ran into
strong Union infantry and cavalry at
immediately at Haymarket, VA (Hancock’s II
Corps), forcing Stuart to turn south.
 According to the orders Stuart should have
stopped his ride.
 Lee deserves part of the blame for failing to
make use of the 4 cav bde’s he had with him.
Final Notes before the
battle

Lee was blind.

Meade takes command.

Meade order to protect Washington, Baltimore an engage Lee on favorable terms

“Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstances as they
arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the Army of the Potomac
is the covering army of Washington as well as the army of operation against the
invading forces of the rebels. You will, therefore, maneuver and fight in such a manner
as to cover the capital and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit.....” OR
27 1.315

Meade given broad command

Buford was doing what Jeb Stuart should have been doing.

Reynold’s was feeling the Confederate position.

Pipe’s Creek Circular
Further thoughts
 The AOP point of supply was Westminster
 The most direct route to Gettysburg was the
Baltimore Pike, one of the few macadamized
roads at the time.
 Gettysburg is in volume 27-1 or 2 of the OR
Commanders
I Corps AOP
 I Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John F.
Reynolds, with the divisions of Brig. Gens.
James S. Wadsworth, John C. Robinson, and
Abner Doubleday.
II Corps AOP
 II Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Winfield
Scott Hancock, with the divisions of and Brig.
Gens. John Gibbon, John C Caldwell,
Alexander Hays
III Corps AOP
 III Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Daniel E.
Sickles, with the divisions of Brig. Gen. David
B. Birney, and Brig. Gen. Andrew A.
Humphreys
V Corps AOP
 V Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. George
Sykes, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. James
Barnes, Romeyn Ayres, and Samuel W,
Crawford.
VI Corps AOP
 VI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John
Sedgwick, with the divisions of Brig. Gens.
Horatio G, Wright, Albion P. Howe, and Maj.
Gen. John Newton.
XI Corps AOP
 XI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver O.
Howard, with the divisions of Brig. Gen.
Francis Barlow, and Adolph von Steinwehr,
and Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz.
XII Corps AOP
 XII Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Henry W.
Slocum, with the divisions of Brig. Gens.
Alpheus S. Williams and John W. Geary.
Cavalry Corps AOP
 Cavalry Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen.
Alfred Pleasonton, with the divisions of Brig.
Gens. John Buford, Judson Kilpatrick and
David M. Gregg.
First Corps ANV
 First Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. James
Longstreet. Including the (the divisions of
Maj. Gens. John Bell Hood and Brig. Gen.
George E. Pickett, and Lafayette McLaws.
Second Corps ANV
 Second Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen., with
the divisions of Maj. Gens. Robert E. Rodes,
Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, and Edward Johnson.
Third Corps ANV
 Third Corps Commanded by Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill
with divisions commanded by Maj. Gens.
Richard Anderson, William Dorsey Pender,
and Henry Heth.
Cavalry Division ANV
 Cavalry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. J.E.B.
Stuart. With brigades commanded by Brig.
Gens. Fitzhugh Lee , WH.F. "Rooney" Lee, Wade
Hampton, William "Grumble" Jones , Beverly
Robertson, Albert Jenkins, and John D. Imboden.
Lee Plans the attack July
2nd, 1863
 Hood and McLaws to attack astride and
Perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road
 However, Sickles forward movement forced
Lee to modify the plan
Lee’s own words
 Longstreet was ordered to attack obliquely…
while Ewell was to attack the crest
directly… Longstreet would envelop the
enemy fully, driving them into Ewell
OR 27 2, 308-318
Concentric Plan of Attack
Cemetery Hill
Little Round Top-Reconsidered
 Commanded the Union Position?
 Artillery platform?
 CSA could threaten the Union supply line?
Little Round Top and Civil
War History
 Little Round Top was never part of the plan,






confirmed by Lee, Longstreet, AP Hill, Ambrose
Wright
As Hood’s Division engaged in combat with units on
their right they moved in that direction.
Friction of war
Offered no or very limited enfilading fire on
Cemetery Hill
Could not threaten Union Supply
Union Artillery Reserve on Power’s Hill
It did offer a field of view and a position in which to
anchor the Union line.
1.5 miles from point to point
LRT Continued
 CW Artillery is best not used on harsh heights or slopes
 Battery D 5th US Artillery, Charles Hazlett commanding
 Warren told Charles Hazlettt, that Little Round Top “was no place for
artillery fire – both of us knew that. I told him [Hazlettt] so. ‘Never
mind that’ [Hazlettt] says, ‘the sounds of my guns will be
encouraging to our troops and disheartening to the others…
 Report of Benjamin Rittenhouse (Hazlett’s Deputy)
 “I watched Pickett’s men advance, and opened on them with an oblique fire, and
ended with a terrible enfilading fire. Lt. Samuel Peebles pointed the first or right
piece and Sergeant Timothy Grady the second – both splendid shots. When the
enemy got a little more than half way to our lines, I could use only these two pieces,
as the others could not be run out far enough to point them to the right.”
The Trip
 6am
 Parking lot 6 next to Wawa
 443 402-1783 Home
 443 866 5443 Cell
 410 802-0776 Wife’s cell