Transcript A New Understanding of Well-being and its

A New Understanding of Wellbeing and its Role in Public Policy
Rationale
• Philosophical argument: an understanding of
what well-being is can have a significant
impact on the role that well-being should have
in public policy
• I will present a new understanding of wellbeing that is significantly different from
traditional accounts
• This understanding reframes the debate over
the legitimacy of well-being policy
Legitimate policy
• Legitimacy according to political liberalism:
– Respect-for-persons: states should treat citizens with respect by
treating them as autonomous agents with sovereign authority
over their own affairs
– As long as the pursuit of one’s own conception of the good does
not result in harm to others, it is not the business of the state to
deem whether or not one’s own conception of the good is
worthwhile
– States should not directly promote particular values, but rather
provide citizens with the necessary means to pursue their own
conception of the good
– States should provide its citizens with certain primary goods –
all-purpose goods that people are assumed to want whatever
their conception of the good (e.g. income, health, education)
The illegitimacy of well-being policy
• Well-being, according to traditional accounts, is
something of intrinsic value
• Like other intrinsic values, some people care
about well-being more than others (e.g.
collectivist cultures, cases of self-sacrifice)
• Thus, according to political liberalism, well-being
policy is unjust – such policies unjustly benefit
those who care more about well-being
• Similar to the promotion of values that make up
one religious doctrine over another
Outline
• This seems wrong – surely governments should
promote the well-being of its citizens?
• I will argue that the problem is with our understanding
of well-being
• There are independent problems with traditional
accounts of well-being, which can be solved by viewing
well-being as something of instrumental value
• According to this new understanding of well-being,
well-being policy is legitimate
• It also has important implications for well-being policy
Three problems with traditional
accounts of well-being
• Incommensurability problem
• Scope problem
• Scarcity problem
Problem 1: Incommensurability
• Dan Haybron’s case of Henry:
– Passion for model railways, but turns down opening a
small shop in favour of taking over a farm
– Knows that the model railway shop will make him happy,
but considers farming more worthwhile
– He is unhappy as a farmer, but does not value happiness
above fulfilling his life plan
– Note that: more information/reflection would not change
his values, and he has fulfilled his other main aims (loving
marriage, happy and healthy children)
• Has Henry made a mistake? Life plan vs. happiness –
not obvious which good trumps the other, if at all
Problem 2: Scope
• Theories of well-being are implausible insofar as they
maintain that the fulfillment of all of a person’s values,
or the attainment of all goods, contribute towards their
well-being
• E.g. Cases of self-sacrifice: parent who sacrifices their
well-being for the health and happiness of her
children; environmentalist who sacrifices their wellbeing for saving the Amazon rainforest; and so on.
• Certain values are non-self-interested (or at least lessself-interested) than other values
• But there seems to be no principled distinction
between self-interested and non-self-interested values
Problem 3: Scarcity
• Theories of well-being that maintain well-being is
constituted by certain kinds of value-fulfillment or
goods attainment cannot account for people who seem
to have high levels of well-being without these things
• E.g. Buddhist monks, living a “quiet” life
• These individuals have a heightened sense of vitality,
energy, or “feeling alive”
• They seem to have high levels of well-being without
having high levels of value-fulfilment or goods
attainment (note that: this level of well-being is not
entirely accounted for by higher levels of happiness)
Solution: Well-being instrumentalism
• Well-being only has instrumental value
• Well-being enables someone to appreciate and
engage with life
• Solves the three problems with traditional accounts of
well-being:
– Incommensurability: both lives would enable Henry to
appreciate and engage with life, albeit in different ways
– Scope: certain values or goods enable us to appreciate and
engage with life more than others
– Scarcity: we can appreciate and engage with life without
fulfilling values or attaining goods
The legitimacy of well-being policy
• According to political liberalism and well-being
instrumentalism, well-being policy is just
• Well-being instrumentalism:
– Well-being enables someone to appreciate and
engage with life
• Thus, well-being is a primary good: something
that enables citizens to pursue their own
conception of the good life
3 implications of instrumentalism
• Well-being theory is ultimately empirical:
– What is it that enables people to appreciate and
engage with life?
• Empirical research shows that:
1. Well-being is multi-dimensional and these
dimensions vary considerably by context
2. Across contexts, dominant affective states and
positive causal networks matter
Well-being is multi-dimensional
• Well-being is more like fitness, than height.
• Keller: “There are several mutually irreducible
dimensions of physical fitness. If I can run a mile
farther than you and you can lift ten pounds more than
me, and all else is equal, then who is fitter? The most
informative answer is that I am fitter in one way and
you are fitter in another. There is no additional fact of
the matter about who is fitter on the whole, nor is it
quite right to say that we are exactly as fit as each
other.”
• Well-being has multiple dimensions: feelings, attitudes,
traits, achievements, capabilities, resources, etc.
Well-being varies by context
• Alexandrova: “Different contexts invite different
conceptions of well-being"
• E.g. a social worker out to evaluate well-being of a
toddler with Down Syndrome and autism may ask the
following questions:
– Is this child putting on weight and growing? Trusting the
new family? Trying to play? Does he hurt himself? Makes
eye contact? Etc.
• They would not ask these questions when evaluating
the well-being of a depressed middle class father, an
elderly single woman with fragile bones, or a
community struggling with unemployment
Dominant affective states matter
• Hawkins: Affect matters because of the way it
influences our evaluative outlook. The person with
extremely low affect has a low sense of self-worth and
can find very little of value in his world.
• Dominantly low affective state destroys a person’s
natural valuing capacities. It distorts a person’s
perception of their own worth, either absolutely or in
relation to others.
• E.g. People who are depressed feel worthless, and by
extension tend to devalue their own projects,
commitments, contributions to relationships etc.
• Policy implication: mental health treatment
Positive causal networks matter
• Bishop: “Felicity is in a happy and fulfilling committed relationship,
she has close and caring friends, she keeps fit by playing tennis, a
sport she enjoys, and her professional life is both successful and
satisfying.”
• The states that comprise Felicity’s well-being are not an accidental
conglomeration of happy facts. They build upon and foster one
another, forming a kind of causal web or network. Take any fact that
is part of Felicity’s well-being. It is likely to be both cause and effect
of other facts that make up her well-being.
• You are able to appreciate and engage with life when you’re stuck in
a self-maintaining cycle of positive feelings, attitudes, traits and
accomplishments.
• Policy implication: supportive relationships, autonomous work,
leisure time, etc.
Conclusion
• According to an instrumental theory of wellbeing, well-being policy is legitimate.
• Well-being is a primary good: something that
enables citizens to appreciate and engage with
life - to pursue their own conception of the good.
• Well-being policy should promote:
–
–
–
–
multiple dimensions
that vary by context,
have a positive impact on one’s affective state
and are causally connected with each other