Transcript The study of media psychology

Development of Media
Psychology Theory
Early history
Mass culture
• Individuals unprotected from propaganda
• Propaganda able to move masses, leads to
radical action
• Media powerful and broad-based, leading to a
number of negative social outcomes
The new propaganda war
• The Nazi Party in Germany, in its attempt to
gain power and to spread its ideology, applied
propaganda techniques from WWI as well as a
new set of techniques
• Seemed to have spectacular success in the
latter 1930s, capturing the government and
fomenting widespread hatred toward a
number of groups--especially Jews
Characteristics of the mass
• Great numbers
• Aggregates of men widely dispersed over the face of
the earth
• Heterogeneous members
• Anonymous individuals
• No common customs or traditions
– Open to suggestions
– Behavior is “capricious and unpredictable”
• Consists of unattached individuals
– Do not play roles in a group
Other research and theory that supported
powerful effects
• Robert Merton (a major figure in American
sociology) studied a radio program with Kate
Smith that was very successful in getting
people to buy war bonds
– Concluded that Smith’s celebrity status and image
as patriotic were crucial to success.
Then, in 1938 . . .
• An event that seemed to prove all the worst
fears people had about the startling power of
the media.
War of the Worlds
• An accidental occurrence seemed to validate
some of the worst fears about mass society
and the power of the newest mass medium,
the radio
• Orson Welles’ Mercury Theater of the Air’s
broadcast of an adaptation of H.G. Wells’ War
of the Worlds on Halloween eve, 1938
Research on the broadcast
• The invasion from Mars: A study in the
psychology of panic (1940: Princeton
University)
– Cantril, Gaudet, Herzog
The invasion from Mars: Radio panics
America
• Hadley Cantril (1940)
• Personal interviews, scientific surveys,
analysis of newspaper accounts and mail
• Attempts were made to answer:
• 1. What was the extent of the panic?
• 2. What about this specific broadcast was so
frightening?
• 3. why did it frighten some people and not
others?
Two questions (p. 67)
• Note: “Even this broadcast did not affect more
than a small minority of listeners.”
• Why did this broadcast frighten some people
when other fantastic broadcasts do not?
• Why did this broadcast frighten some people
but not others?
Why were people frightened?
• Realism of the program
– “sheer dramatic excellence” of the program
– Use of ‘experts’
– Use of real places
– early parts of the broadcast “fell within the
existing standards of judgment of the listeners”
– “If a stimulus fits into the area of interpretation
covered by a standard of judgment and does not
contradict it, then it is likely to be believed.”
Standards
• “Radio as accepted vehicle for important
announcements.”
• “Prestige of speakers.”
– astronomers
– military men
– Secretary of the Interior
• “Specific incidents understood.”
– colloquial English/bureaucratese
– real places, buildings, highways
Standards
• “Everybody baffled.”
– on-air personalities claim bewilderment
• “The total experience.”
– projected environment
– “experienced as a unit”
• individual features of broadcast not adequate to
explain reaction
Tuning in late
• CBS survey found that 42% of audience
tuned in late
– after intro
– strong relationship to belief that broadcast was
news report rather than play
• “Contagion the excitement created”
– Someone suggested respondent tune in after
show had begun [21% in AIPO survey; 19% in
CBS survey]
Effect of late tune-in
80
70
60
50
40
News
Play
30
20
10
0
From the beginning
(n=269)
After beginning
(n=191)
Personal characteristics
Not paying attention to first
announcements
• “widespread habit”
– station IDs and advertising
• accounted for about 10% of those who
misinterpreted the broadcast
– actual n quite small (10% of 54 people who
thought it was news reports)
Personal characteristics of listeners
• Possession of ‘critical ability’
• Strong religious beliefs
• Personality factors such as emotional
insecurity, phobic personality, lack of self
confidence, fatalism
Not paying attention to first
announcements
• most were casually scanning for something to
listen to--not looking for Mercury Theater
• Competing with Charlie McCarthy
– vastly more popular than Mercury Theater
• (34.7 to 3.6)
– 18% of McCarthy listeners said they heard WOW,
of which 62% said they changed after the first act
(“Eddie Cantor effect”)
Classifying listeners
• Researchers chose following scheme from
among a wide array of possible classifications:
• Those who analyzed the internal evidence of the
program and knew it could not be true.
• Those who checked up successfully to learn that it
was a play.
• Those who checked up unsuccessfully and
continued to believe it was a news broadcast.
• Those who made no attempt to check the
authenticity of the broadcast.
Checked internal evidence
• Did not remain frightened
• 1. “Specific information they possessed and
were able to project into the situation”
– knew it was Mercury Theater
– recognized Orson Welles
– knew that time changes were too fast
– knew that there weren’t three regiments of
infantry in area
– just recognized the events as too fantastic
Successfully checked the broadcast
against other information
• Checked other stations (most common)
– “I turned to WOR to see if they had the same thing on and
they didn’t so I knew it must be a fake.”
• Looked up program in newspaper
– “I tuned in and heard that the meteor had fallen. Then
when they talked about monsters, I thought something was
the matter. So I looked in the newspaper to see what
program was supposed to be on and discovered it was only
a play.
• Asked friend, looked out window
– (1 respondent each)
Unsuccessfully checked broadcast
against other information
• “Difficult to determine from interviews why
these people wanted to check anyway”
– seemed to be checking whether they were in
personal danger yet rather than whether reports
were authentic
• Type of checking behavior was “singularly
ineffective and unreliable”
Unsuccessful checks
• Methods
– Look out window or go outdoors (employed by
2/3 of this group)
– Called friends or ran to consult neighbors
– Telephoned police or newspapers
– “Only one turned his radio dial. Only one
consulted a newspaper.”
Reasons checks were unsuccessful
• New information only verified their
interpretation
– “I looked out of the window and everything
looked the same as usual so I thought it hadn’t
reached our section yet.”
– “I went outside to look at the stars. I saw a clear
sky but somehow was not reassured.”
Reasons checks were unsuccessful
• Observed data were interpreted as additional
evidence that the broadcast was true
– “We looked out of the window and Wyoming
Avenue was black with cars. People were rushing
away, I figured.”
– “We tuned in to another station and heard some
church music. I was sure a lot of people were
worshiping God while waiting for their death.”
• “I looked out of my window and saw a
greenish-eerie light which I was sure came
from a monster. Later on it proved to be the
lights in the maid’s car.”
• Others felt unable to trust their own
observation, believing others knew more
about the situation than they did.
– Trusted the announcer on the radio as a source
– “My son came home during the excitement and I
sent him out to find one of the elders in the church
to see what it was all about.”
Made no attempt to check
the broadcast
• “Over half of the people in this group were so
frightened that they either stopped listening,
ran around in a frenzy or exhibited behavior
that can only be described as paralyzed.”
Reasons for not checking
• So frightened they never thought of checking
– “We didn’t try to do anything to see if it were
really true. I guess we were too frightened.”
• Adopted an attitude of complete resignation
– “I didn’t do anything. I just kept listening. I
thought if this is the real thing you only die once-why get excited?”
Reasons for not checking
• Some felt they needed to take action. They
prepared immediately for escape or death.
– “My husband said we were here for God’s glory
and honor and it was for Him to decide when
we should die. We should prepare ourselves.”
– “I couldn’t stand it so I turned it off. I don’t
remember when, but everything was coming
closer. My husband wanted to put it back on
but I told him we’d better do something instead
of just listen, so we started to pack.
Some remained constantly tuned in to
see how to escape
The establishment of the ‘limited
effects’ paradigm
End of the ‘powerful effects’ model
of media influence
Limited effects model
• Beginning in the mid-1940s and lasting until
the mid-1960s a very different view of media
effects came to prevail—one that assigned a
much more limited impact to the mass media
– The American Soldier
– Mr. Biggott studies
– The People’s Choice and Voting
– Klapper’s Effects of Mass Communication
Persuasion
• Persuasion studies are really propaganda
research that tends to take an effects
approach
– Persuasion really could be considered propaganda
– Varies from single exposure individual effects
studies to time-based campaign studies of
population change
WWII American Soldier studies
• Part of a large-scale social science investigation of
American soldiers recruited or drafted for service in
WWII
• This part especially interested in the effects of Frank
Capra’s propaganda films on the morale of new
recruits/draftees
– Why We Fight
– Documentary explanation of the buildup to and early years
of the war
WWII American Soldier studies
• Part of a large-scale social science investigation of
American soldiers recruited or drafted for service in
WWII
• This part especially interested in the effects of films
developed to prepare soldiers for military duty
– Why We Fight
• Directed by Frank Capra
– Documentary explanation of the buildup to, and early
years of the war
Hovland
• Experiments on mass communication: Persuading the
American soldier in World War II
– Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield (1949)
• Studied the impact of showing Frank Capra’s
propaganda films in “Why We Fight” series to
American soldiers in a training camp
– Many were draftees and did not want to fight
Films were intended to foster:
• A firm belief in the right of the cause for which we fight
• A realization that we are up against a tough job
• A determined confidence in our own ability and the abilities
of our comrades and leaders to do the job that must be done
• A feeling of confidence, insofar as possible under the
circumstance, in the integrity and fighting ability of our Allies
• A resentment, based on knowledge of the facts, against our
enemies who have made it necessary to fight
• A belief that through military victory, the political
achievement of a better world order is possible
Episodes taken from Why We Fight
• Prelude to War
• The Nazis Strike
• Divide and Conquer
• The Battle of Britain
Method
• Show groups of soldiers different treatments,
ask questions before and after to see if
exposure led to change
– Manipulated exposure, type of media used, movie
with and without additional content presentation,
etc.
• Before-after control-group design
• Interested in learning of information, change
in attitudes and change in interest in fighting
Channel
• The main study here tends to indicate that
interpersonal channels are more effective at
changing attitudes than are mass media
channels.
Performance by medium
Avg % Correct
60%
50%
40%
30%
Avg % Correct
20%
10%
0%
Control Group
Movie Group
Filmstrip Group
In-person presentation and
movie effectiveness
Avg % Correct
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Control Group
Movie Only
Movie and
Introduction
Avg % Correct
Movie and Review
Battle of Britain
• Men in two camps--some exposed to film,
some not
– 2100 in one camp (before/after control group)
– 900 in another camp (before/after control group)
– 1200 (after-only control group)
– Sampling by company units
• Units matched on several demographic variables
Battle of Britain
• Before and after questionnaires were slightly
different
– Tried to distract men from wondering why
answering twice by writing “revised” on the
questionnaire
• One week between exposure and after
measure
• Anonymity was assured
Results
• The movies had a significant impact on factual
knowledge
• Ex. Why weren’t the Germans “successful at
bombing British planes on the ground”?
• Ans. “because the British kept their planes
scattered at the edge of the field”
• Experimental group:
78% correct
• Control group:
21% correct
Results: Learning from films
60
50
40
30
Test Score
20
10
0
Grade School
High School
College
Battle of Britain
• Men in two camps--some exposed to film,
some not
– 2100 in one camp (before/after control group)
– 900 in another camp (before/after control group)
– 1200 (after-only control group)
– Sampling by company units
• Units matched on several demographic variables
Battle of Britain
• Before and after questionnaires were slightly
different
– Tried to distract men from wondering why
answering twice by writing “revised” on the
questionnaire
• One week between exposure and after
measure
• Anonymity was assured
Results
• The movies had a significant impact on factual
knowledge
• Ex. Why weren’t the Germans “successful at
bombing British planes on the ground”?
• Ans. “because the British kept their planes
scattered at the edge of the field”
% of answers correct
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Experimental Group
% of answers correct
Control Group
Results: Opinions and interpretations
• Effects were not as great
• “the heavy bombing attacks on Britain were
an attempt by the Nazis to . . .”
• Answer: “invade and conquer England”
Opinions and interpretations
% of answers "correct"
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Experimental Group
% of answers "correct"
Control Group
Results: General attitudes
• Effects on general attitudes were slight
• “Do you feel that the British are doing all they
can to help win the war?”
– Experimental group 7% greater than control
– On several measures, only 2-3% positive
difference was found
Results: Overall morale
• The series was ineffective
– Question concerning whether trainees would
prefer military duty in the U.S. or overseas
Overall morale
% preferring overseas deployment
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Experimental Group
Control Group
Results: Attitudes
• Subjects were asked whether unconditional
surrender by Nazis was an important war aim
Attitudes
% Saying unconditional surrender by Nazis was an
important war aim
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Experimental Group
Control Group
Results: “Sleeper effect”
• 9 weeks after exposure
– Factual material was forgotten
• Retained only about 50% of factual items that 1-week groups
remembered
– On 1/3 of opinion issues, the long-term group showed less
change
– However, on more than half of the fifteen issues under
study, the long term group showed greater change than
the short-term group
Yale School
• Hovland et al. set up Yale School of research
on persuasion
• Studied the effect of:
– Source characteristics
– Message characteristics
– Order of presentation
– Psychological characteristics of audience
Hovland et al.
• Set up Yale school research on persuasion
1946-1961 under Hovland's direction
• Analyzed interpersonal communication,
speeches
• Study the effect of:
– Source characteristics
– Message characteristics
– Order of presentation
– Psychological characteristics of audience
Source characteristics
• Credibility
– Topic: Atomic submarines
• Sources: J. Robert Oppenheimer/Pravda
– Topic: Future of Movie Theaters
• Sources: Fortune magazine/A woman movie gossip
columnist
– Greater persuasion with more credible source
• However, after 4 weeks difference had disappeared
High Credibility Source
Low Credibility Source
Should antihistamine drugs New England Journal of
continue to be sold
Medicine
without a prescription?
Magazine A (a mass
circulation monthly
pictorial magazine)
Can a practicable atomicpowered submarine be
built at the present time?
J. Robert Oppenheimer
Pravda
Is the steel industry to
blame for the current
shortage of steel?
Bulletin of National
Resources Planning Board
Writer A (an anti-labor,
“rightist” newspaper
columnist)
As a result of television,
Fortune magazine
with there be a decrease in
the number of movie
theaters in operation in
1955?
Writer B (A woman moviegossip columnist)
Percent rating author as ‘fair’
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Antihistamines
Atomic submarines
High Credibility
Steel shortage
Low Credibility
Future of movies
Percent rating author as ‘justified’
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Antihistamines
Atomic submarines
High Credibility
Steel shortage
Low Credibility
Future of movies
Net change of opinion
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
Antihistamines
Atomic submarines
Steel shortage
-10%
High Credibility
Low Credibility
Future of movies
Content
• Fear appeals
– The greater the fearfulness, the greater the effect
on interest, tension
– The less fearful messages had a greater effect on
intention to change behavior
– Fear appeals were thought to invoke some sort of
interference
Message: Fear Appeals
• Janis and Feshbach (1954) used three different
versions of a lecture on dental hygiene. The strong
appeal provoked the most tension in the audience,
but the greatest change in behavior in conformity
with the message was produced by the minimal
appeal to fear.
• Suggested that when people feel they can do nothing
about the threat then they are not likely to change
their behavior.
Fear appeal effectiveness
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Strong fear
Moderate fear
Increased Conformity
Minimal fear
Decreased Conformity
Control
No Change
Credibility
• As research proceeded, foun that credibility
tended to be connected with
– Trustworthiness
• Homophily
• Perceived self-interest
– Likeability
• Homophily
• Attractiveness
– Expertise
• Formal position
Content
• Fear appeals
– Greater fear, greater effect on interest, tension
– Lesser fear, greater effect on intension to change
behavior
– Thought to invoke some sort of interference
• Drawing an explicit conclusion
– Significantly greater effect if communicator drew
an explicit conclusion
Message: Fear Appeals
• Janis and Feshbach (1954) used three different versions of a
lecture on dental hygiene. The strong appeal provoked the
most tension in the audience, but the greatest change in
behavior in conformity with the message was produced by the
minimal appeal to fear.
• Suggested that when people feel they can do nothing about
the threat then they are not likely to change their behavior.
Message presentation
• One-sided and two-sided presentations that
USSR would not soon be able to develop a
nuclear bomb were equally effective
• However, when exposed to opposing view,
those that had earlier been presented with
two-sided version retained new opinion more
than one-sided audience
One-sided v. two-sided argument
• Radio presentation saying war would be
lengthy
– Presented either as one-sided argument or with
additional 4 minutes discussing view that it would
be short
– Before/after with control group
Results
• One-sided argument more effective with soldiers
who:
– Initially supported the idea that it would be a lengthy war
– Had not completed high school
• Two-sided arguments more effective with soldiers
who:
– initially felt the war would be short
– had a high school degree education or greater
Message factors: Drawing an explicit
conclusion
• Though the results are somewhat ambiguous,
Hovland tends to assume that you should
draw the conclusions for your audience where
complex issues are involved. He also seems to
believe that it depends on your assessment of
the audience's intelligence.
Inoculation
• It is possible to inoculate audiences against
certain views. If you present them with a
weakened version of the arguments against
your case, then they are likely to be resistant
to stronger versions of those arguments that
they may come across later. By giving them a
weakened version, you allow them to
formulate negative cognitive responses.
Message factors: Order effects
• Order effects
– This question of ordering revolves around what is
known as primacy and recency effects. The adage
that 'first impressions count' states that the
primacy effect is likely to dominate, whereas
“whatever I heard last is what I believe” seems to
say recency is dominant
• Findings are mixed here
Channel
• The main study here tends to indicate that
interpersonal channels are more effective at
changing attitudes than are mass media
channels.
Audience factors
• Scouts who valued group membership highly
were least influenced by speaker who
criticized wood craft learning
Personality
Personality variables such as self-esteem,
anxiety and depression have an influence on
persuasibility. Janis's research suggests that
people with low self-esteem are likely to be
relatively easily persuaded.
Overall conclusions
• Mass media are not as overwhelmingly
persuasive as the propaganda theorists
considered them
• Persuasive effectiveness varied by source of
the message, format of the message, audience
factors such as personality and channel of
communication
Columbia School
Paul Felix Lazarsfeld emigrated from
Austria to the U.S. in the 1930s.
A mathematician
Interested in the application of mathematics,
especially the new statistics, to study of social
problems
• Set up research programs at Princeton (Radio Research
Bureau) and at Columbia (Bureau of Applied Social Research)
that combine study of practical problems with academic
methods of research
• Some of his first studies focused on audience size, reactions to
and use of radio programming
Features of the approach
• Interested in individual knowledge, attitudes and
behavior resulting from exposure to media messages
and campaigns
• Focus groups and/or surveys were the most common
methods of study
• Lazarsfeld could predict with 76% accuracy which
candidate someone would vote for based on his
demographics. That was better than the people
themselves could predict.
– Prediction is taken as the criterion of validity
– "Cross-Pressures"
• Opinion Leaders (21%)
– ("Have you tried to influence someone on a political issue
recently?"; "Has anyone asked your advice recently on a
political issue?")
– opinion leaders were thought to be a relatively small group
of influential people
• Lacked evidence of actual influence
The People’s Choice
• Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet
• Went to Rockefeller foundation, Roper agency
(provided money and interviewing), Life
magazine (had money)
• May be the most influential single research
piece in media studies
• Longitudinal analysis of campaign and election
of 1940
– Roosevelt v. Willkie
• Erie County, Ohio -- 43,000
•
mix of urban and rural voters--no really big cities, not
many poor, minorities
•
Sandusky, the main city, and Ohio both Republican
•
1 strongly Republican newspaper, 1 neutral, 1 mildly and
belatedly Democratic, Cleveland Plain Dealer endorsed Willkie
•
Radio stations came in from other places
•
National publications--Time, Life, Townsend farm journals
•
Stable politically
•
Relative lack of interest groups
•
Content Analysis:
Research Questions
1. How do people decide to vote as they do?
2. What were the major influences on them?
• "Social characteristics determine political
preference."
Method
•
•
•
•
Innovative panel design
Special analysis of changers
Demographics
Media use
• Innovative Panel Design
•
May
June
October November
• 600 (Panel) 600
600
600
• 600 (Control A)600
600
• 600 (B)
600
600
• 600 (C)
600
600
• 600 (D)
600
600
• 3000
3000
600
3000
July
August September
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
1200
1200
1200
1200
1940 results
Country still overwhelmingly for Roosevelt, but less than in 1936
• Vote overwhelmingly by SES, religion
• SES:
Hi
71% GOP
•
Lo
35% GOP
• Religion:
Protestant
60% GOP
Catholic23% GOP
• Rural
• Urban
• Respondent’s Level of Interest in October strongly predictive of
voting.
Findings
• Lazarsfeld could predict with 76% accuracy which
candidate the person would vote for by his/her
demographics. That was better than the people
themselves could predict.
– Prediction is taken as criterion of validity of theory.
– "Cross-Pressures"
Political predisposition
(SES, Protestant or Catholic and rural/urban)
Voted Democrat
Voted Republican
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly
Rep
Moderately Slightly Rep Slightly Dem Moderately
Rep
Dem
Strongly
Dem
Looked at cross-over voters
Criteria:
1) Had to vote for FDR in 1936
2) Had to vote for Willkie in 1940
3) Had to think Roosevelt had done a good job
4) Had to delay decision until after nominations
Found only 15 people
Only 9 recalled issue
Only 6 mentioned 3rd term issue
(very stringent requirements to find issue importance)
Conclusion: Issues do not show much power in voter decision
Political interest
• “The more interested people are in the
election, the more opinions they have on
political issues, the more actively they
participate in a campaign, and the more they
expose themselves to campaign propaganda.
Political interest
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Voted
Non-voters
Great interest
Medium interest
No interest
Opinion Leaders
• Opinion leaders tend to be upscale
• Opinion Leaders 21%
– ("Have you tried to influence someone on a
political issue recently?"; "Has anyone asked your
advice recently on a political issue?")
– opinion leaders thought to be a rather small group
of influential people, although influence not
actually shown
• Opinion leaders tended to be upscale
Opinion leader media use
25
20
15
Newspaper
Radio
Magazine
10
5
0
Great
Interest
OLs
Others
Less
Interest
OLs
Others
When did they choose?
• 1/2 made up their minds before May
• Once they knew the nomination, another 1/4
made up their mind
• 1/4 made up their mind between nomination
and election
Time of Final Decision
• Interested/informed decide early
• Cross-pressures lead to later decision
• Columbia did another study in 1948, then got
out of campaign studies
– Voting, by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee
Media influence
Whenever a person in the sample changed his/her vote
intention, the interviewer asked why:
• Democrats mentioned radio most often
– (30% vs. 20% for newspapers)
• Republicans mentioned newspapers
– (31% vs. 17% for radio).
• Over half the voters said the media had the
most important impact, 2/3 said news media
were helpful
• “Two-step flow”
• Conclusion--interpersonal communication
most important
Major effects of media campaign
• Activation of latent predispositions
– Propaganda arouses interest
– Increased interest brings increased exposure
– Increased attention causes the voter to select
information
– Votes crystallize
• Reinforcement
• Conversion (rare)
Percent intending to vote Republican
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
White collar
40%
Union labor
30%
20%
10%
0%
June
August
October
November
Percent intending to vote Republican
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
Protestant
40%
Catholic
30%
20%
10%
0%
June
August
October
November
The Four Steps of Activation
• 1. Propagada arouses interest
– interest increases as campaign gains momentum,
propaganda increases in volume
• 2. Increased interest brings increased
exposure
• 3. Attention is selective
– “his predispositions come into play”
• Votes crystallize
• Over half the voters media most important,
2/3 news media helpful
• Two-step flow
• Conclusion--interpersonal communication
most important
Other research
• Prejudice studies
– Prejudiced and non-prejudiced individuals read
anti-racist cartoons
• Information campaigns
– Cincinnati United Nations campaign
• Persuasion studies
• Political effects surveys
Katz and Lazarsfeld
• Personal influence: The two-step flow of
communication
– Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955)
• Decatur study of opinion leaders conducted by
the Bureau of Applied Social Research at
Columbia
Assessing opinion leaders’ role in four areas of
influence:
–
–
–
–
1. marketing
2. fashion
3. public affairs
4. film choice
• Talked to women in Decatur about where they went
to get advice on the topics
Personal Influence
• Delineated the characteristics of opinion
leaders
– position in the life cycle, SES, social contacts
• Marketing—middle-aged women, especially with
families
• Fashion—younger and single women
• Public affairs—older and more educated
• Film choice—younger and single
• An excellent example of this is provided by
Kendall and Woolf's analysis of reactions to
anti-racist cartoons. The cartoons featured Mr
Biggott whose absurdly racist ideas were
intended to discredit bigotry. In fact 31% failed
to recognise that Mr Biggott was racially
prejudiced or that the cartoons were intended
to be anti-racist (Kendall & Wolff (1949) in
Curran (1990)).
• Kendall and Woolf's (1949) analysis of
reactions to anti-racist cartoons. The cartoons
featured Mr Biggott whose absurdly racist
ideas were intended to discredit bigotry. In
fact 31% failed to recognise that Mr Biggott
was racially prejudiced or that the cartoons
were intended to be anti-racist (cited in
Curran (1990)).
• Hastorf and Cantril (1954). Subjects were showed
film of a particularly dirty football match between
Princeton and Dartmouth and asked to log the
number of infractions of the rules by either side. The
Princeton students concluded that the Dartmouth
players committed over twice as many fouls as their
team. The Dartmouth students concluded that both
sides were about equally at fault.
• Curran suggests it might be more accurate to say
'believing is seeing' rather than 'seeing is believing'.
Research on information campaigns
• Cincinnati United Nations campaign
– Star & Hughes (1950)
• Large-scale information campaign to generate
knowledge of and support for UN
• Very little effect on knowledge or support
• Effects that did occur were concentrated among the
already informed rather than those targeted by the
campaign
Some reasons why information
campaigns fail
• Hyman and Sheatsley’s (1947) review of findings
from several surveys conducted by the National
Opinion Research Center
• Psychological barriers to information dissemination
– The Chronic “Know-Nothing’s” in relation to information
campaigns
– The role of interest in increasing exposure
– Selective exposure produced by prior attitudes
– Selective interpretation following exposure
– Differential changes in attitudes after exposure
Klapper’s Five Generalizations
• 1. Mass communication ordinarily does not
serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of
audience effects, but rather functions among
and through a nexus of mediating factors and
influences.
Limited effects
• Although people are exposed to propaganda and
other forms of persuasive communication, their
opinions are not often or significantly changed
– They selectively expose themselves to media so that
they do not often confront challenging content
– They selectively perceive content with challenging
messages so that they only remember the supportive
parts of the message or even distort the oppositional
content to be supportive
– The selectively recall the messages so that over
time even content that was challenging at first
gradually comes to be remembered as supportive
• Much of what people know is not taken
directly from the media but filtered through
opinion leaders and interpersonal networks
– Opinion leaders tend to be more knowledgeable
on topics and less easily swayed than their less
knowledgeable friends and acquaintances
• People just don’t change their minds all that
easily
– They have stable attitudes that flow from their
socialization and experience
• Can predict attitudes from demographics