Lecture # 8 on Leaders and Decision
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Transcript Lecture # 8 on Leaders and Decision
Lecture #8
Foreign Policy Decision Making
Part I: Leaders’ Beliefs and Personal
Characteristics
Introduction
• Models that focus on regime types, power distributions, and
other structural forces identify important causal factors in IR
• But individual human beings (particularly elite decisionmakers such as presidents, prime ministers, kings, and
dictators) can sometimes have an important impact on foreign
policy and IR:
• Leaders’ beliefs and personalities may affect policy
• Psychological biases that affect all humans will affect these
key decision-makers and may shape outcomes in IR
(Misperceptions, Groupthink, etc.)
Conditions When Leader’s
Personality Impact International
Relations Greatly
Conditions under which leaders’ beliefs/personalities
are more likely to influence foreign policy
• Leader has an interest/expertise in foreign policy
(Bush 41 vs. Clinton)
• Dramatic means of assuming power
• Ambiguous external situation (leaders must
define the situation and in the absence of
compelling evidence they rely on their
preconceptions to do so)
Conditions under which leaders’ beliefs/personalities
are more likely to influence foreign policy
• Crisis situations (short decision time, high threat,
surprise): decision-making authority contracts
upward to a small group of leaders
• Greater institutional authority over foreign
policy (e.g., presidential vs. parliamentary
systems)
• Foreign policy bureaucracy is less developed
Types of beliefs and personal characteristics
that may affect foreign policy decision-making
• Operational Codes (Holsti, Walker)
• Images (Herrmann)
• Problem Representations (Sylvan)
• Conceptual/Integrative Complexity (Hermann, Tetlock, Suedfeld)
• Locus of Control
• Motives: need for power, achievement, affiliation
• Orientation Toward Constraints (Keller): “constraint challengers”
vs. “constraint respecters”
Operational Codes
History of Operational Codes
• The term was first coined by Nathan Leites in his two now
classic works, The Operational Code of the Politburo (1951) and
A Study of Bolshevism (1953).
• Leites conceptualized the responses of the Politburo to political
decisions as a series of decision-making rules and axioms that
constituted their worldview.
• He then drew on psychoanalytic theory and social psychology
to account for this worldview and analyze the primary
motivations and goals of Soviet leaders.
Operational Codes
• The Operational Code does not encompass all the beliefs that influence the
behavior of a given individual.
• It is instead a subset of political beliefs that are especially relevant in the context
of political decision making.
• It is divided these beliefs into the:
• Philosophical Beliefs: general assumptions regarding the fundamental
nature of politics, conflict, and the individual---the nature of world politics
and character of one’s adversaries
• Instrumental Beliefs: more specific beliefs concerning the methods leaders
should use to attain the ends they desire---which policy instruments and
approaches are most effective
The Operational Code Questions:
Philosophical
P-1: What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict?
What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?
P-2: What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations?
Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what
respects the one and/or the other?
P-3: Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
P-4: How much control or mastery can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in moving and
shaping history in the desired direction?
P-5: What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?
Instrumental
I-1: What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? I-2: How are the goals of action
pursued most effectively?
I-3: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? I-4: What is the best timing of action
to advance one’s interest?
I-5: What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests? Source: George 1969.
Operational Code
Implications:
•These beliefs structure and order reality for
decision makers and help them to sort the signals
in their environment from the noise.
• They exert a tremendous influence on how leaders
interpret information, perceive the social
environment, and make decisions
Example
• The foreign policy operational code of George W. Bush (GWB) over four distinct
time periods:
• (1) pre-presidential beliefs,
• The transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2 represents a change in GWB’s political role from
governor and presidential candidate to president and thus allows us to examine whether
beliefs change when one’s role changes substantially
• (2) pre–September 11th beliefs,
• (3) post–September 11th beliefs,
• The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, are representative of a second class of belief-changing event: the
traumatic shock.
• The third class of potential belief-changing event is one that can be termed the ‘‘learning in offi ’ model of
belief change.
• (4) end-of-term presidency beliefs.
• In this case, we can see the effect of roughly six years of time spent as president of the
United States and examine how belief change might occur in the absence of sudden shocks
or role changes
Images
Images
• The psychological theory is connected to a set of
assumptions drawn from International Relations theory
that suggest perceived strategic relationships can be
conceived of as a function:
• of perceived relative power,
• perceived culture,
• and the perceived threat or perceived opportunity
that a subject believes another actor represents.
• Images (Herrmann)
• 3 Dimensions:
• Threat/opportunity,
• Relative power
• Relative culture
• Resulting Images:
• Ally,
• Enemy,
• Colony,
• Degenerate,
• Imperial,
• Barbarian,
• Rogue
• Each image is associated with a specific “script” of likely
policy actions
Group-Share
•Using your knowledge of World History,
American History, and current events, identify
examples for ONE OF THE DIFFERENT
DIMENSIONS OF IMAGES.
•Then identify examples for at least FOUR OF
THE DIFFERENT RESULTING IMAGES.
•This will go in the Examples Column of your
notes.
Problem Representations and
Misperceptions/Selective
Perceptions
Students Note:
•Pages 129-131 of Supplemental Reading
•Make sure to add to the graphic organizer
sections from the reading!
•Problem Representations (Sylvan)
•World view shapes problem
representation
•Which in turn determines which
options are generated as viable
•Do not see the whole picture and
leads to overlooking important
factors
Misperceptions and Selective Perceptions
• Taking in only some kinds of information when they compile information on the
likely consequences of their choices.
• Decision-making processes must reduce and filter the incoming information on
which a decision is based; the problem is that such filtration often is biased
• Information screens are subconscious filters through which people put the
information coming in about the world around them.
• Often they simply ignore any information that does not fit their expectations.
• Information is also screened out as it passes from one person to another in the
decision- making process.
• Foreign policies often deviate from rationality as a result of the misperceptions and biases
of decision makers and populations.
• Here, in 2012, North Korea’s new dictator Kim Jong-Un rides a roller coaster that could
symbolize the West’s efforts to curtail his country’s nuclear weapons program.
• These weapons will pose a much greater threat if Kim, who took over in 2011, is an
irrational madman than if he turns out to be a shrewdly rational actor.
• Both individual misperception and group psychology encourage
overconfidence and excessive optimism among decision makers.
• This general tendency in every government especially marked the period of
the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
• Here, President Bush declares victory on an aircraft carrier, May 2003.
Locus of Control
•Locus of Control:
• The extent to which a person believes they have
power over their successes and/or failures in life.
•Affects risk-taking propensity
Locus of Control
The extent to which a person believes they have power
over their successes and/or failures in tasks.
Internal Locus of Control
External Locus of Control
• Believes his or her
successes are due to
factors within their own
control.
• Believes his or her
successes or failures are
due to factors outside of
their own control.
• Behavior is guided by
his/her personal decisions
and efforts.
• Behavior is guided by fate,
luck, or other external
circumstance.
Motives
•Motives: need for power,
achievement, affiliation
•Affect reliance on:
• cooperative vs. competitive
strategies
• arms control
•use of force, etc.
Group-Share
•Using your knowledge of World History, American
History, and current events, identify examples for
the different types of motives.
•This will go in the Examples Column of your notes.
Orientation Toward
Constraints
•Orientation Toward Constraints (Keller):
•“constraint challengers” vs. “constraint
respecters”
•“constraint respecters” tend to
internalize potential constraints
•“constraint challengers” are more likely
to view them as obstacles to be
overcome
Examples
• President Kennedy---a “constraint
respecter” during international crises
• President Reagan---a “constraint
challenger” during international crises
Group-Share—Goes in Example Column
• Using your knowledge of World History, American History, and current events,
think of examples for:
• When did the chief decision maker in the country dominate the decisionmaking process and refused to listen to opposition?
• To what extent can this behavior be attributed to the leader’s personality
as opposed to situational factors?
• Did the exhibited decision style depend on the issue under consideration?
Explain.
• When the chief decision maker in the country exhibit a more inclusive,
participatory decision-making process?
• To what extent can this behavior be attributed to the leader’s personality
as opposed to situational factors?
• Did the exhibited decision style depend on the issue under consideration?
Explain.
Conceptual/Integrative
Complexity
• Conceptual/Integrative Complexity (Hermann, Tetlock, Suedfeld)
• Is a research psychometric that refers to the degree to which
thinking and reasoning involve the recognition and integration
of multiple perspectives and possibilities and their interrelated
contingencies.
• Refers to the extent to which individuals demonstrate two
inclinations when they consider events and issues.
• The first dimension, differentiation, relates to the capacity of
individuals to adopt and to apply a variety of perspectives to
appreciate an issue.
• The second dimension, integration, refers to the capacity of
individuals to recognize connections and similarities across
divergent perspectives.
• Hence, when integrative complexity is low, individuals tend to form
simple and rigid attitudes and perceptions (Suedfeld, Tetlock, &
Streufert, 1992).
• Affects openness to information and deliberativeness
Example
• Aggression
• In general, when integrative complexity is low, aggression and
hostility often prevail (Bruch, McCann, & Harvey, 1991&
Winter. 1993).
• As Winter (1993) showed, for example, if police officers do not
exhibit integrative complexity, they are more inclined to act
violently in stressful contexts.
• Conceivably, when integrative complexity is low, other options
to solve problems are less likely to be considered.
Example
• Political Preferences
• Many studies in this literature have examined the relationship between political
preferences and integrative complexity (Tetlock, 1983, 1984& Tetlock, Hannum, &
Micheletti, 1984).
• In general, these studies show that liberal or moderate politicians exhibit
complex rather than simple thinking styles.
• That is, their integrative complexity is elevated, relative to their more
conservative and extreme counterparts.
• To explain this pattern of observations, Tetlock (1983, 1986) argues that
individuals who do not engage in complex thinking feel threatened by the
prospect of a dynamic, changing, and chaotic society.
• They will, therefore, espouse political principles that attempt to stifle this change.
Factors That Affect Conceptual/Integrative
Complexity
• Stress
• Several studies have shown how life events, especially stressful episodes,
can affect the integrative complexity of individuals.
• Showed that stressful life events can reduce integrative complexity.
• Indeed, many studies have shown that stressful events can undermine
integrative complexity.
• Events such as war, economic decline, impending death, and international
tension can reduce this form of complexity (Porter & Suedfeld, 1981&
Suedfeld, Corteen, & McCormick, 1986& Suedfeld & Garanstein, 1995).
Factors That Affect Conceptual/Integrative
Complexity
• Personality
• Tetlock, Peterson, and Berry (1993) examined the association between
personality and integrative complexity.
• As self report measures indicated, complex individuals report elevated scores on
openness, but low scores on compliance and conscientiousness.
• However, as ratings of observers indicated, these individuals also seemed
antagonistic and even narcissistic.
• Nevertheless, they also showed more initiative, as rated by managers, and more
motivation to seek power, as gauged by a projective test called the PSE (see also
Coren & Suedfeld, 1995).
Factors That Affect Conceptual/Integrative
Complexity
• Multicultural Engagement
• When some people travel or work in other nations, they actively engage in other
cultures, called multicultural engagement.
• For example, they strive purposefully to learn about the customs, traditions,
values and beliefs of other cultures.
• In addition, they adapt their behavior to align closely with these cultures.
• As Maddux, Bivolaru, Hafenbrack, Tadmor, and Galinsky (2013) showed, this
cultural engagement tends to enhance integrative complexity, ultimately
improving the future job prospects of individuals.
Hermann’s Final Analysis: Two Main
Orientations
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• Independent Leader
Leaders with strong nationalism
Leaders with strong belief in their own
ability to control events
Leaders with a strong need for power
Leaders with low levels of Conceptual
Complexity
Leaders with high levels of distrust of
others
Develop an independent orientation
towards foreign policy
Example: Tony Blair, former Prime
Minister of Great Britain, and his policy
towards Iraq War
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• Participatory Leader
Leaders with low levels of nationalism
Leaders with little belief in their ability to
control events
Leaders with a high level of affiliation
Leaders with high levels of Conceptual
Complexity
Leaders with low levels of distrust
Develop a more participatory orientation
towards foreign policy
Example: Jimmy Carter, former American
President, and how he handled the
Iranian Hostage Crisis
Group Activity
•For the Example of Conceptual/Integrative
Complexity, we are going to examine the
controversial Latin American leader Hugo
Chavez.
•This will be done through a YouTube Clip
and short reading.
•See Lesson Plan!