Transcript Air Corp Act of 1926

Airpower:
End of WW I
Through WW II
1
Overview
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Background—The 1920s
General Mitchell’s Crusade
The Air Corps Act of 1926
Air Corps Tactical School
Move To Autonomy in the 1930s
WWII Begins
The Battle of Britain
The United States Prepares for War
The Army Air Forces
2
Overview (cont’d)
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The US Enters the Second World War
America and its Allies Plan Strategy
The United States on the Offensive
US Strategic Bombing Effort Against Germany
The Air War Against Japan
Tactical Airpower in the Pacific
Strategic Airpower in the Pacific
The End of the Second World War
Review CFD Model
3
THE INTERWAR
YEARS
4
Background to the Interwar Years
• Following WW I, the United States returned to
isolationism
• Army Air Service reduced from 190K men in
• in 1918 to 10K in 1920 (Officers: 20,000 in 1918 to 200 in 1919)
• Civilian aviation boomed; military budgets
were cut
• Air service sought to develop an air doctrine
• Period marked by organizational changes and
personality clashes
• Few saw the potential of the airplane
5
Military Airpower Advocates
Italy – General Giulio Douhet
– In future wars armies & navies serve as defensive
holding grounds
– Bombers deliver massive attacks on enemy cities
– Civilian morale would crack & war would end
quickly
Britain – Sir Hugh Trenchard
– Britain’s Chief of Air Staff
– Bombing of cities was the central plank in British
air strategy
6
Gen William “Billy” Mitchell
• Deputy Chief of Air Service in 1919
• Believed the airplane would change
the defense establishment
• Believed the air service was an
offensive force equal to the Army
and Navy
• The Army and Navy strongly
opposed these views
• Americans wanted no part of a
service that looked offensive in
nature
7
Billy Mitchell (cont’d)
• A visionary, fanatic, and prophet
• Alienated many due to constant
attacks and need for 100% support
• Technology not capable of meeting his
expectations—cost him credibility
9
Creation of Army Air Service
• President Woodrow Wilson used his executive powers
to create the Army Air Service in May 1918
– Army left the Signal Corps and became a combat arm
– Congress made it into law with the Army
Reorganization Act of 1920
– Army Air Service became its own branch within Army
10
Army Reorganization Act
• Passed by Congress in 1920
– Air Service raised in stature equal
to the Infantry, Artillery, etc.
– Air Service granted procurement,
research, and training autonomy
– Air Service units assigned to
ground control (opposed by
General Mitchell)
– Army aircraft coastal defense
mission specified and limited
11
Gen Mitchell vs. Navy
• Claimed the battleship was obsolete
• Replaced by more effective
and economical airplane
• Air Service planes bombed
and sank three ships
– Infuriated the Navy leadership
– Sparked interservice feuding
• Air Service still not given the
mission of coastal defense
12
Mitchell’s Last Campaign
• 1922-1924—General Mitchell
concentrated on developing doctrine;
advocated strategic bombardment
• 1925—Demoted to colonel because of his
unrelenting support for a separate air force
• After the crash of the dirigible
“Shenandoah,” he accused military leaders
of “incompetence and criminal
negligence”
• Court-martial began on October 28, 1925
13
Mitchell’s Legacy
• Focused attention on airpower
• Forced acceptance of the potential of
airpower
• Mentored many aviators who would carry
on his work—some became instructors at
the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS)
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Air Corp Act of 1926
• Can be thought of as being
triggered by General Mitchell
• Army Air Service became Army
Air Corps
• Additional Assistant Secretary of
War appointed to oversee air units
• Air sections authorized in
General Staff divisions
• Flying units to be commanded by
rated officers
15
Air Corp Tactical School (ACTS)
• Founded in 1920 at Langley
Field, Virginia
• Renamed Air Corps
Tactical School in 1926
• Moved to Maxwell Field,
Alabama in 1931
• Original mission to teach
air strategy and tactics
• Mission changed to developing
and teaching air doctrine
(principles and philosophy)
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ACTS (cont’d)
• Future wars would be decided by airpower
• Airplane would be the primary offensive
weapon of modern forces
• High-altitude, strategic, daylight bombing
could paralyze and defeat an industrialized
enemy without heavy losses
17
ACTS (cont’d)
• Preoccupation with bombers and their
missions overwhelmed other
teachings
– Claire Chennault
• Led the Flying Tigers in WW II
• Taught pursuit aviation—advocated
escorting bombers and strafing enemy
rear areas
– George Kenney
• Commanded the Pacific Air Force in WW II
• Taught attack aviation—strafing attacks on
enemy troops and behind enemy lines
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Chennault Video
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Organizational Changes
• Army Reorganization Act of 1920
– Air Service gained autonomy in R&D, procurement,
personnel, supply, and training
• Air Corps Act of 1926
– Changed the name of the Air Service to Air Corps; implied
the Air Corps was capable of independent operations
• Establishment of General Headquarters (GHQ) Air
Force in 1935
– Placed all tactical units under the Commander, GHQ
– Recognized an independent aviation branch within the
Army
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The German Blitzkrieg
• 1 Sep 1939—Germany attacks
Poland
– Luftwaffe aircraft were employed:
• To gain air superiority
• Cut supply lines
• Support ground forces
• Germany then easily conquered
Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands,
Belgium, and France
21
Battle of Britain
• June 1940—Britain stands
alone against German
aggression
• Germany attacks in four
phases
– Attacks against shipping lines
– Day and night bombing of RAF
airfields
– Daytime bombing of the cities
– Nighttime bombing of the cities
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Phase I (10 July to 7 Aug)
The Luftwaffe concentrated on offensive
reconnaissance in Phase I. Specific actions
included:
• Attacks on convoys in the English Channel
• Attacks on air defense, especially radar
(radio detection and ranging) stations
• Attacks on coastal towns in the planned
invasion area
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Phase II (8 Aug to 6 Sept)
Having tested and reconnoitered the
defenses, the overall strategy was to focus
on destroying aircraft of Britain’s Fighter
Command, both on the ground and in the
air.
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Phase III (7 Sept-5 Oct)
• Massed attacks began against London
and other major cities, as well as
aircraft factories and other strategic
targets
• When British fighters were successful
against the day raids, the Germans
switched to night bombing.
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Phase IV (6-31 Oct 1940)
Heavy night bombing raids against cities
continued, while Luftwaffe fighterbombers attacked airfields, coastal towns,
and other strategically-significant targets.
 As the winter weather approached, the raids
became less numerous and produced less
damage. By November it was apparent that
the offensive had failed.
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Reasons for Luftwaffe’s Defeat
• Luftwaffe not trained or equipped to
conduct strategic bombing
• British had excellent command, control, and
communication systems in place
• Luftwaffe had poor intelligence capabilities
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Spaatz Video
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Col Carl Spaatz’ Observations
• The Luftwaffe
– Primarily a ground-supporting air force
– Tactically ill prepared for strategic bombing
– Lacked a strategic bombing doctrine
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United States Prepares for War
• Army Air Corps was expanded
– July 1940—Air Corps expands to 54 combat
groups to include 14 heavy bomb groups
– March 1941—Air Corps expands to 84 combat
groups to include 24 heavy bomb groups
• Emphasis placed on bombers, not escort
aircraft—hurts US bombing efforts
B-17
B-24
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Air War Plans Division Plan # 1
• Formulated in response to Roosevelt's call
for American air doctrine
• Established independent operating
objectives for the Air Corps
• Called for precision bombing of German
industry and economy
• Flawed because it did not provide for longrange fighter escort
P-51
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AWPD 1—Target List
• Emphasized the offensive nature of the
mission
• Ground support missions were secondary
• Four major targets were…
– Electrical power facilities
– Transportation assets and structures
– Synthetic petroleum production plants
– Aircraft industry facilities
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Forming the Army Air Force (AAF)
• Army Air Corps and GHQ Air Force merged in
June 1941 to form AAF
• Merger resulted from decentralization of the War
Department General Staff begun by General
George Marshall in 1940
• General Hap Arnold named commander
• One step from full independence as a separate
service
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The United States Enters WW II
• Relations between the United States and
Germany deteriorate—USS Reuben
James sunk in October 1941
• Relations with Japan worsened in 1941
–Japan continues Asian aggression
–July 1941—Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in
U.S. and halts all American trade with Japan
–7 Dec 1941—Japan attacks Pearl
Harbor
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Allied Strategy for Winning World War II
• Priority One: Safeguard Britain and United
States
• Priority Two: Fight a decisive air offensive
against the Axis powers in Europe and fight
defensively in Asia
• Priority Three: Sustained air offensive against
Japan after the Axis powers were defeated in
Europe
– Use land forces when, and if, necessary
I + II + III = Victory
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First US Offensive Action of
WW II—North Africa
• First use of US Ground forces against
the Germans
• Provided valuable combat experience
for ground and air forces
• Opportunity for British and US
to fight a combined arms
campaign
• First defeat of the German
forces since 1930
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North Africa (cont’d)
• United States learned valuable lessons
concerning the employment of airpower
in tactical situations
• Initial problems experienced by the
Allies
– Air units were split among ground units
– Ground commanders didn’t share aircraft
– Airpower used defensively
– Airpower employment fragmented and
inflexible
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North Africa (cont’d)
• Allied airpower reorganized in 1942
– Command of the air forces went to Airmen
– The air officer decided the missions and allocated forces
– Missions became offensive in nature
• Flexibility of Allied airpower was restored and air
superiority was attained
• Tactical missions followed
and techniques refined
• Allies achieve victory in
North Africa in May 1943
38
North Africa (cont’d)
“Anyone who has to fight, even with the
most modern weapons, against an
enemy in complete command of the air,
fights like a savage against modern
European troops, under the same
handicaps and with the same chances of
success.”
~ Field Marshal Erwin Rommell
39
Davis Video
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US Strategic Bombing of Germany
• Heavily influenced by ACTS and bomber
advocates
– Some felt strategic bombing alone would defeat
Germany
– Others believed strategic bombing would
weaken Germany and a ground invasion would
be required for her surrender
41
US Bombing Strategy
• United States committed to high-altitude,
daylight precision bombing
• Believed heavy bombers, flying in formation,
could fight their way to the target and back
– Fighter escorts not necessary
• Targets identified by AWPD-1 best hit in day
time
• US strategy ignored weather conditions, target
obstruction, fighter opposition, and antiaircraft
artillery
42
Strategic Bombing of
Germany—Early Efforts
• Strategic bombing of Europe was Eighth Air
Force responsibility
• First raids were against marshaling yards in
France—little effect
• Late 1942 and early 1943: Eighth AF
attacked small targets in Europe—good
experience, little effect
43
Strategic Bombing Becomes
a Major Objective
• Casablanca Conference (Jan 1943) established
strategic bombing as a major objective
– Destruction and dislocation of the German military,
industrial, and economic system
– Undermining of morale of the German people
– German aircraft industry was
the top priority target
– The ball bearing industry was
a complementary target
– Destruction of enemy aircraft
industry would help achieve
Air Superiority
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Strategic Bombing of
Schweinfurt Germany
• Eighth AF bombs the ball bearing plants at
Schweinfurt in Summer 1943
– Aug 1943—Eighth AF inflicts heavy damage but loses 36
B-17s and 360 crewmen
– Oct 1943—AAF loses 60 bombers and has 138 aircraft
damaged and 600 men lost
• Losses were unacceptable
• No fighter escorts left bombers
vulnerable to enemy fighters
and antiaircraft artillery
45
Strategic Bombing of Ploesti
• Aug 1943—AAF launches attacks
against oil refineries at Ploesti, Romania
– 180 aircraft launched—55 lost
– Raids were costly but needed to shorten
the war
• Attacks were designed to
reduce Germany’s oil and
lubricant production
– Generally ineffective and
deliveries increased until attacks
were resumed in 1944
46
Strategic Bombing in Europe (cont’d)
• Long-range fighter escorts arrived in
theater December 1943
– Took significant toll on German aircraft
and their experienced pilot force
• Eighth AF resumed raids into Germany
in February 1944
– Launched a 1000-plane raid by end of
February 1944
– Attacked Berlin in March 1944
– German POL production was reduced to
25% capacity by September 1944
47
European Strategic Bombing:
Lessons Learned
• Target list was not what it should have been
– Attacks on sub pens and ball bearing plants were
ineffective
– Best targets were the POL production facilities and
sources of electrical power
• Terror bombing of civilians
was ineffective and did little
to lower morale
• Bombers needed fighter
escorts to and from the target
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Pacific Theater in World War II
“In our victory over Japan, airpower was unquestionably
decisive. That the planned invasion of the Japanese
Home islands was unnecessary is clear evidence that
airpower has evolved into a force co-equal with land and
sea power, decisive in its own right, and worthy of the
faith of its prophets.”
~ General Carl A. Spaatz
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Japanese Objectives
• Territorial expansion to reduce overcrowding
at home and gain raw materials
• Fill the power vacuum in the Southwest
Pacific created by German aggression in
Europe
• Keep the U.S. out of the war for two years
with a knockout blow at Pearl Harbor
– Underestimated American resolve and anger
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Tunner Video
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Allied Strategy to Defeat Japan
• China-Burma-India—Japan’s back door
– Campaign to re-supply troops in
China and recapture Southeast
Asia
– AAF flew the “hump”—Supply
route over the Himalayas—A
logistics triumph
• South Pacific Offensive—Islandhopping campaign led by General
MacArthur
• Central Pacific Offensive—Islandhopping campaign led by Admiral
Nimitz
C-47 Skytrain
52
Tactical Airpower in the Pacific
• Far East Air Force (FEAF)—
formed to support the South
Pacific campaign
– Made up of the Fifth and
Thirteenth Air Forces
– Used innovative techniques, such
as fragmentation bombs, to
interdict enemy positions and
troops
– Employed fighters and medium
bombers; P-38 was a huge
success
– Won air superiority through a war
of attrition
P-38 Lightning
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Doolittle Video
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Strategic Airpower in the Pacific
• 18 April 1942—First strategic raid
– Jimmy Doolittle led flight of 16
bombers from the deck of the aircraft
carrier USS Hornet
– 600-mile flight did little damage, but
boosted morale of US forces and
shocked the Japanese
• Twentieth Air Force formed in 1944
specifically to bomb Japan
– Initial results were poor due to high
altitude bombing techniques
55
LeMay Video
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Strategic Airpower in
the Pacific (cont’d)
• January 1945—General Arnold
put Gen Curtis LeMay in charge
of strategic bombing
– Changed tactics to use
incendiary bombs
– Lowered bombing altitude to
improve B-29s’ accuracy
– 9 March 1945—Launched
first firebomb attack of Tokyo
• 279 B-29s participated
• Burned 16 square miles, destroyed
267,000 buildings, and killed 85,000
people
57
End of the War
• President Truman authorizes nuclear
strikes against Japan
– 6 Aug 1945: Hiroshima bombed—70,000
killed
– 9 Aug 1945: Nagasaki bombed—40,000
killed
• Japan surrendered 15 August 1945
• WW II ended formally with ceremonies on
the USS Missouri on 2 September 1945
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Review of CFD Model
• Distinctive Capabilities: Air and space
expertise, capabilities, and technological
know-how that produces superior military
capabilities
• Functions: Broad, fundamental, and
continuing activities of air and space power
• Doctrine: Fundamental principles that guide
the actions of military forces in support of
national objectives
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CFD Model
Distinctive
Capabilities
Time Period
Functions
(missions)
Doctrinal Emphasis
PreWW I
 Information Superiority
 Surveillance & Reconnaissance
 Artillery Spotting
 Gathering Military
Info to support land
forces
Post
WW I
 Information Superiority
 Precision Engagement
 Surveillance & Reconnaissance
 Counter Air
 Strategic Attack
 Theater Attack
on military targets
PreWW II
 Precision Engagement
 Information Superiority
 Limited Air Superiority




Surveillance & Reconnaissance
Counter Air
Strategic Attack
Airlift
 Strategic Attack on
enemy homeland (enemy
war machine)
Post
WW II








Surveillance & Reconnaissance
Counter Air/Land
Strategic Attack
Airlift/Special Operations
 Strategic Attack
Precision Engagement
Information Superiority
Air Superiority
Agile Combat Support
60
Current USAF Functions
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
Strategic Attack
Air Refueling
Counterair
Spacelift
Counterspace
Special Operations
Counterland
Intelligence
Countersea
Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
k. Information
Operations (IO)
l. Combat Search and
Rescue (CSAR)
m. Combat Support
n. Navigation and
Positioning
o. Command and Control
(C2)
p. Weather Services
q. Airlift
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Summary
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Background—The 1920s
General Mitchell’s Crusade
The Air Corps Act of 1926
Air Corps Tactical School
Move To Autonomy in the 1930s
WWII Begins
The Battle of Britain
The United States Prepares for
War
• The Army Air Forces
62
Summary (cont’d)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The US Enters the Second World War
America and its Allies Plan Strategy
The United States on the Offensive
US Strategic Bombing Effort Against
Germany
The Air War Against Japan
Tactical Airpower in the Pacific
Strategic Airpower in the Pacific
The End of the Second World War
Review CFD Model
63