Transcript AS207_02_The European Theater WWII

The European Theater
in World War II
The Use of Airpower in
Europe: An Overview
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US enters the war -- background
Allied strategy for winning WW II
The role of airpower in European Theater
and lessons learned
North African campaign
Strategic bombing of Germany
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US Enters WW II -Background
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Relations between US and Germany
deteriorate -- US destroyer sunk in Oct ‘41
Relations with Japan worsened in 1941
• Japan continues Asian aggression
• Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in US and
halts all American trade with Japan -- Jul ‘41
• Japan attacks Pearl Harbor -- Dec 7, 1941
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Allied Strategy for
Winning World War II
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Priority One -- Safeguard Britain and US
Priority Two -- Fight a decisive air
offensive against the Axis powers in
Europe and fight defensively in Asia
Priority Three -- Sustained air offensive
against Japan after the Axis powers were
defeated in Europe
• Use land forces when, and if, necessary
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US First Offensive Action
of WW II North Africa
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First use of US ground forces against the
Germans
Provided valuable combat experience for
ground and air forces
Opportunity for British and US to fight a
combined arms campaign
First defeat of the German forces since
1930
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North Africa
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US learned some valuable lessons
concerning the employment of airpower in
tactical situations
Initial problems experienced by the Allies
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Air units were split among ground units
Ground commanders didn’t share aircraft
Airpower was used defensively
Airpower was fragmented and inflexible
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North Africa (Cont)
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Allied airpower was reorganized in 1942
• Command of the air forces went to airmen
• The air officer decided the missions and allocated
forces
• Missions became offensive in nature
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Flexibility of Allied airpower was restored and
air superiority was attained
Allies achieve victory in North Africa in May
‘43
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US Strategic Bombing
of Germany
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Heavily influenced by ACTS and
bomber advocates
• Some felt strategic bombing alone would
defeat Germany
• Others believed strategic bombing would
weaken Germany and a ground invasion
would be required for her surrender
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US Bombing Strategy
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Committed to high-altitude, daylight precision bombing
Belief heavy bombers, flying in formation, could fight their
way to the target and back
• Fighter escorts were not necessary
Targets identified by AWPD were best hit in day time
Strategy ignored weather conditions, target obstruction,
fighter opposition and anti-aircraft artillery
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Strategic Bombing of
Germany Early Efforts
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Strategic bombing of Europe was responsibility of
the 8th Air Force
First raid were against marshaling yards in France
• little effect
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Late ‘42 and early ‘43 -- 8th attacked small targets
in Europe -- good experience, little effect
Casablanca Conference (Jan ‘43) established
strategic bombing (destruction of German
industry) as a major objective
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Strategic Bombing of
Schweinfurt Germany
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8th Air Force bomb the ball-bearing plants at
Schweinfurt in Summer 1943
• Aug ‘43 -- 8th inflicts heavy damage but lost 36 B-17s
and 360 crewmen
• Oct ‘43 -- AAF lost 60 bombers, had 138 aircraft
damaged and 600 men lost
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Losses were unacceptable
No fighter escorts - bombers vulnerable to
enemy fighters and anti-aircraft artillery
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Strategic Bombing
in Europe: Ploesti
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Aug ‘43 -- USSAF launch attacks against oil
refineries at Ploesti, Romania
• 180 aircraft launched, 55 aircraft lost
• Raids were costly but needed to shorten the war
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Attacks were designed to reduce Germany’s
oil and lubricant production
• Generally ineffective and deliveries increased
until ‘44 when attacks resumed
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Strategic Bombing
in Europe (Cont)
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Long-range fighter escorts arrived in theater in
Dec ‘43
• Took significant toll on German aircraft and their
experienced pilot force
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8th resumed raids into Germany in Feb ‘44
• Launched a 1000 plane raid by end of Feb ‘44
• Attacked Berlin in Mar ‘44
• German POL production was reduced to 25% capacity
by Sep ‘44
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Strategic Bombing
in Europe: Lessons Learned
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Target list was not what it should have been
• Attacks on sub-pens and ball bearing plants were
ineffective
• Best targets were the POL production facilities and
sources of electrical power
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Terror bombing of civilians was ineffective and
did little to lower morale
Bombers needed fighter escorts to and from the
target
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