Transcript The Yalta and Potsdam Conference

The Yalta and Potsdam Conferences
Contention and Cooperation amongst the Titans
The start of Operation Barbarossa;
the Wolf enters the Bear’s Den
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Invasion of the Soviet Union was not only
inevitable, but imminent by June 1941.
There was sufficient evidence, warnings,
and leaks to confirm the fact that Hitler
was planning a massive operation in the
east, but despite the warnings and
messages from his allies, German
defectors, and his own spies (Richard
Sorge operating in Tokyo) Stalin refused to
acknowledge the threat of invasion and
dismissed them all as an “elaborate
provocation” (Nation 120).
Stalin’s refusal to acknowledge the
impending war, his purging of the Red
Army Officer Corps between 1937-38
(Kennedy-Pipe 43), and the relative
unpreparedness (for Blitzkrieg tactics), lack
of training and experience of the Red Army,
as well as possessing outdated vehicles,
tanks and airplanes at the start of the war,
all led to initial sweeping victories for the
Nazi War Machine in the Soviet Union
during the first few months of the war
(Nation 118-19).
The Red Bear awakens . . .
eventually
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When news of the invasion reached Stalin, he still firmly believed that disaster could be averted
through negotiations, and he staunchly refused to allow artillery crews to open fire on the
advancing Germans (Kitchen 78).
When Stalin finally realized how critical the situation had become, he became traumatized and
suffered a nervous breakdown: “The Dictator’s behaviour in the wake of the initial attack has
been well documented. Gromyko recalls that Stalin was convinced that Hitler would honour the
treaty. This view is reinforced by others, who also tell of Stalin’s shock and breakdown at the
timing, if not the substance, of the German ‘betrayal’” (Kennedy-Pipe 49).
It wasn’t until July 3rd that Stalin finally addressed the Soviet people of the current state of affairs
resulting from Hitler’s treachery. His speech involved nationalist rhetoric, calling for the
destruction of the fascist invaders, implementation of ‘scorched-earth’ policy, and the creation of
a partisan unit to guard and defend the motherland; despite his temporary lapse and breakdown,
Stalin had awakened and transformed into the national leader that the Russian people could
empathize and appeal to, someone who could assure them of victory (Kitchen 79).
Regardless of the initial success of Operation Barbarossa in the first few months of the invasion, it
was ultimately a failure by the end of 1941: the Germans ground to a halt just outside the gates
of Moscow by November of the same year, and despite the better judgment and wisdom of his
experienced generals and officers, Hitler was against a blitzkrieg strike at Moscow, instead, he
ordered all three armies to “advance simultaneously, giving priority to a breakthrough in the
south” (Nation 127).
The loss of initiative against Moscow, combined with the onset of winter, the arrival of Zhukov to
organize and coordinate the defense of the Russian capitol, and the failure to get Japan involved
in the war against the Soviet Union, made Operation Barbarossa a failure (Donaldson and Nogee
66).
1943: The Tide Turns
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By 1943 the war in the Eastern front had changed: The Red Army
was more experienced, better equipped, and highly motivated to
halt and crush the German invaders.
The Battle of Stalingrad which ended with the surrender of the
German Sixth army, and the first German field marshal of the war
(Friedrich Paulus) on January 31st 1943, was the first turning point
for the Red Army (Adair 32).
However, while the destruction and surrender of the Sixth army was
a severe loss, it was in no way a fatal blow to the Wehrmacht: as
‘Operation Citadel’ would show, the Germans were still capable of
mounting large scale offensives across the vast Russian landscape
(Adair 33).
Approximately six months later, the Germans launched Operation
Citadel to overwhelm the Kursk salient, and the largest ground battle
in history began. Having received intelligence reports from allies, the
Soviets were well prepared this time, and they entrenched
themselves to meet the Germans head on: “The salient, an area
about half the size of England, was stuffed with armour and infantry
and awaited the next move” (Kitchen 239-40).
On July 5th 1943, the 9th army and 4th Panzer division spearheaded
the assault, thinking they could overwhelm the Soviet defenses with
another blitzkrieg strike. Instead, they were met with fierce
resistance in the form of tank traps, entrenched anti-tank infantry
divisions, improved T-34 tanks, and Russian reserves ready to be
called in for counter-attacks. After suffering countless setbacks, Op.
Citadel was abandoned on July 13th, and the Wehrmacht suffered its
most costly and severe defeat:
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“The Battle of Kursk, the ‘greatest tank battle of all time’, was an appalling
bloodbath, veteran soldiers insisting that it was the most brutal
engagement of the war . . . The decisive factor was that the Germans had
been defeated at the game they knew best. Their elite armoured units,
equipped with the latest Panzer models and manned by fresh troops, had
been smashed, and the Soviets had finally won the strategic initiative.
Kursk, not Stalingrad, was the turning point of the war on the Eastern
Front (Kitchen 341).
Operation Bagration; The
Backbreaker
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The Byelorussian offensive in the summer of 1944
was arguably the most important and decisive
engagement of WWII (in the European theatre).
Its success was a combination of strategic planning
and the use of deceptive tactics (maskirovka) to
fool the German High Command, and mask the real
objectives and scale of the offensive that was to be
brought to bear against Army Group Centre (Adair
58-60).
“The Soviet success depended upon the secret
deployment of three armies, 6th Guards and 28th on
the north and south flanks, and 5th Guards Tank as
the Stavka reserve. The defeat of Army Group
Centre resulted in the destruction of about 30
divisions” (Adair 171).
The actual number of casualties from both sides is
still debated, and figures for Germany vary between
275,000 – 350,000 dead, and approximately
150,000 German prisoners of war. On the Soviet
side, approximately 178,000 died in the offensive,
which was roughly 8% of the forces involved in the
engagement (Adair 171).
Two senior German staff officers recognized the
significance of the offensive, and commented that
“the loss of Army Group Centre greatly accelerated
the collapse of the German State” (Adair 171).
With German forces effectively out of the Soviet
Union, the Red Army pushed forward and kept the
Germans on the defensive all the way to Berlin.
The Yalta Conference: Feb. 4-11,
1945
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Meeting of the Big Three for discussion and cooperation over the future of Europe
following the defeat of Nazi Germany.
At the time of the conference, the Red Army was within 40 miles of Berlin, while the
Allied forces in the west were recovering from the ‘Battle of the Bulge’ in the
Ardennes. Roosevelt himself informed Stalin that Eisenhower did not intend to cross
the Rhine until March (Kennedy-Pipe 69).
Stalin actually made it clear to Zhukov that he wanted Berlin taken as quickly as
possible in February; however, on February 6, Stalin cancelled the demand, having
received assurances from Churchill and Roosevelt that the Soviet Union would be
guaranteed its own occupation zone in Germany after the war (Kennedy-Pipe 72).
The main concerns and points of interest throughout the Yalta conference can be
broken down into three categories:
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The Polish Question
The future of Germany and the “Declaration on Liberated Europe”
The conditions for the entry of the Soviet Union into war with Japan
The creation of the United Nations Organization was also discussed at the Yalta
conference, but its importance was relatively low in comparison with the other three
points, especially the future of Poland and Germany. Furthermore, the issue was
generally agreed upon, with Stalin accepting the veto mechanism and reducing his
demand of the number of general assembly seats for the Soviet Union from 15 to 3
(Nation 153).
Yalta cont’d
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The issue of Poland was of crucial significance for all
three powers. Poland was, after all, the reason why
France and England declared war on Germany, and as
such, it was a crucial point of interest between the two
sides in the conference. Out of the eight meetings in the
Yalta conference, seven of them involved the question of
Poland, and four key aspects were discussed:
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A formula for establishing a single provisional government for
Poland.
How and when to hold free elections
Possible solutions to the future of Poland’s frontiers, both in the
east and the west
Steps designed to safeguard the security of the Soviet rear
(Petro and Rubinstein 48)
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Why was Poland such a significant point of conflict between the two sides?
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For Stalin, Poland was a vital security interest that would act as an essential
buffer zone in the event of another invasion from the West. For Stalin and the
Russian people, the Second World War had left a permanent scar on their
outlook of life, especially considering the unprecedented figures and costs that
the war had exacted on the Soviet Union (LaFeber 20).
For Roosevelt, the future of Poland was a crucial factor for the future of Eastern
and Central Europe, and Harriman (American ambassador to Russia) warned
Roosevelt that “Stalin must not be allowed to establish “Totalitarianism” in
Soviet-occupied territories,” and that unless they were willing to live in a Sovietdominated world, they should do everything they can to economically assist
states that were naturally friendly to them (LaFeber 17).
Regarding Germany, the Big Three discussed the nature of how Germany
should be dealt with after their unconditional surrender (which was agreed
upon by all three heads) and how it would be partitioned to allow for a free
and democratic Europe. Points of conflict were raised regarding the form of
reparations that were to be paid out to the Soviet Union, and the inclusion
of France into the partition system.
Stalin was angered by the notion of France joining in the partition of
Germany because of their poor performance in resisting and fighting
Germany throughout the war. As for reparations, Stalin wanted to either
destroy or relocate German industry to prevent them from dominating
Europe in the future. He argued two points: that 80% of Germany’s
industrial capacity should be dismantled, leaving the rest in control of the
Allies; and that Germany would pay back the Soviet Union in reparations for
the devastation that it caused during the war (Kennedy-Pipe 73).
The Far East: the secret protocol
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The American delegation was also concerned with the entrance of the Soviet Union
into the war with Japan.
Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan under certain conditions:
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The preservation of the status quo in the Mongolian People’s Republic
The return of lost territories and rights that Russia had lost to Japan after the war of 1904-5,
namely the return of Southern Sakhalin and the annexation of the Kurile Islands
The restoration of former Russian economic privileges in Manchuria
The internationalization of the commercial port of Dairen and the lease of Port Arthur as a
naval base of the Soviet Union restored (Petro and Rubinstein 49).
Roosevelt, with the advice and influence from Admirals Nimitz and King, and Generals
Marshall and McArthur, accepted the conditions under which Stalin proposed he
would enter into war against Japan. The reasoning behind the need for Soviet
entrance into the war was that it would take another eighteen months to defeat
Japan after the defeat of Germany, and that the invasion of mainland Japan would
cost America dearly in terms of casualties and resources (Petro and Rubinstein 49).
These concessions gave the Soviet Union a greater commanding presence in the far
east, greater than what they originally had prior to 1904. Ironically enough, three
months after the defeat of Germany, the U.S.A. found itself in a position capable of
bringing Japan to its knees without the aid or assistance of the Soviet Union (Petro
and Rubinstein 49).
The results of Yalta: success or
failure?
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On the question of Poland, Stalin was resolute and unshakable in his insistence of its strategic
importance to the Soviet Union, and the maintenance of the pro-communist Lublin committee as
the de facto government of Poland. Despite minor concessions and compromises made by Stalin to
appease Roosevelt and Churchill on incorporating some pro-Western Poles in the government, the
fact remained that Poland was securely within the Soviet sphere of influence; “the agreement was
so elastic the Russians could stretch it from Yalta to Washington without breaking it” (LaFeber 16).
Even when Roosevelt attempted to decrease the ‘elasticity’ of the compromise in Poland through
his “Declaration of a Liberated Europe” it was amended by Stalin and eventually accepted by
Roosevelt himself (LaFeber 16).
Despite the gains that Stalin was able to pull out from the Yalta conference, there were still some
issues and demands that were either compromised or rejected. The issue of reparations from
Germany was left unresolved; a Reparation Committee was established, but there was no
unanimous decision amongst the big three as to what the exact sum of reparations was to be set
at (Nation 152).
Furthermore, Stalin had to accept the role of France in post-war Germany as a concession to
Churchill for giving him Poland as a buffer zone. Churchill argued that ‘France was as important to
Great Britain as Poland was to the USSR (Nation 152).
The Americans achieved their goals of getting the Soviet Union involved in the war against Japan,
as well as setting up the basic foundations for the United Nations and the voting methods to be
used in the Security Council (Petro and Rubinstein 48).
In the end, the big three made compromises that would ensure mutual cooperation until the end
of the war, and set the stage for a post-war peace following the defeat of Japan.
The results of the Yalta conference can be seen as a success to an extent, in the form of
cooperation between the three heads of the most powerful states in the world. It is especially
impressive considering the fact that cooperation was achieved despite their opposing ideological
interests:
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“The Yalta negotiators confronted numerous conflicts of interest, but a mutual willingness to compromise
ultimately allowed the vital concerns of all participants to be accommodated” (Nation 152).
The Controversy behind Yalta
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The results of the Yalta conference have sparked many debates and theories regarding a variety
of issues, ranging from the division of Europe to the treachery of the Soviet Union in failing to
uphold its end of the bargain. Some claim that Eastern and Central Europe, along with parts of
the far East, were sold out to Stalin, in return for recognition of American and British interests in
Western Europe and Asia.
This theory, however, ultimately fails. The agreements that were made concerning the control and
influence over certain parts of Eastern and Central Europe were a reflection of the reality of the
situation that encompassed the area following the Soviet thrusts into Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary
and Poland throughout the course of the war: “if anything, what happened at Yalta was an
attempt by the West to mitigate the reality of the Soviet control in the East” (Kennedy-Pipe 69).
The reality of Yalta was both an affirmation of regional power politics and self-interested goals, as
well as the desire to establish a peaceful and stable post-war setting that would accommodate all
three powers: “what occurred at Yalta was a classic negotiating process characterized by hardbargaining and mutual concessions . . . An encounter in which they prized agreement by
traditional negotiation as preferable to unilateral action which might undermine the international
stability” (Nation 153).
When the Soviet Union intervened in the political affairs of Rumania two weeks after the Yalta
conference, Roosevelt alleged that Stalin had fallen back on his word regarding the ‘Declaration of
Liberated Europe.’ However, the case for Rumania was easily ripped apart by Molotov, and despite
American dissatisfaction, the fact remained that Rumania was an integral part of the Soviet
sphere of influence over Eastern Europe (LaFeber 17). Moreover, Churchill himself turned a blind
eye to the events occurring in Rumania in return for Stalin’s non-intervention in Greece.
These would inevitably affect the policies and politics that would be discussed at the conference
in Potsdam in July 1945, following the defeat of Nazi Germany.
The Potsdam Conference: July 17
– August 1, 1945
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Occurring five months after the Yalta conference, the meetings in Potsdam
revolved around some similar issues, but the context of the conference,
and the actors, had changed dramatically.
Germany had been defeated, Roosevelt was dead and replaced by
Truman, the policies and concessions of Yalta were being questioned, and
the successful testing of the atomic bomb would ultimately change the
fate of the post-war world.
Objectives of Potsdam
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The primary goals of the conference was to come to terms over three important
issues that were left unresolved from Yalta; the fate of former Nazi satellite states
(especially Italy), the borders of Poland, and the question of reparations, which was
the subject of much debate and contestation between all three sides (Yergin 114).
The issue of reparations was contested between the two sides when the Americans
and British argued that payments were to be made first to the creditors (American
and British bankers), while Molotov argued that the Soviets required initial payments
to offset the huge scale of destruction and devastation Germany had caused to the
Soviet Union (Yergin 114).
On matters of former satellite states there was also a failure of negotiations: when
asked if Stalin would normalize relations with Italy, Stalin responded by basically
asking Truman and the American government to normalize relations with Bulgaria,
Rumania and Hungary. As Byrnes noted, however, Truman could not recognize the
three Eastern European states, not with their current governments at least (Yergin
114).
Finally, on the question of Poland’s frontiers, there too existed conflict. The American
delegation in particular, feared that by giving more land to Poland, they were
effectively constraining and damaging Germany’s potential economic and industrial
rebirth (Yergin 115).
Despite a complete failure of negotiations in the initial phase of the Potsdam
conference, Yergin argues that there would eventually be renewed, and successful,
attempts at resolving these disputes in the near future, thanks in part to the
successful testing of the most destructive weapon invented by man.
The Atom Bomb and its political
impact on post-war Europe and the
world
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The atom bomb fundamentally changed the outlook, ambitions and goals of
the American delegation at the conference in Potsdam. The fact that
America possessed a weapon more powerful than anything ever invented
by man gave Truman an undeniable sense of superiority, and greater
impatience, throughout the rest of the proceedings following successful
confirmation of the bombs testing (Yergin 115).
However, despite the change in attitude, Truman, and Byrnes in particular,
pressed for a quick end to the conference by proposing a package deal that
would serve the interests of the Soviet Union, Britain and America. A
solution was offered on the issue of reparations, and Byrnes noted that if
Stalin accepted the compromise on reparations, than the West would accept
concessions on matters of territorial interest for the Soviet Union in the
East, so long as interests over Italy and the West were respected by Stalin
(Yergin 117).
The logic behind a quick end to the conference was based on the strategic
importance of constraining Soviet expansion and ambition in the far East,
especially in Japan. With the Atom Bomb, America no longer needed Soviet
assistance to crush Japan because an invasion was no longer necessary
(Yergin 116).
The Atom Bomb cont’d
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Why did the bomb suddenly change the ambitions and goals for Truman
and allow the American delegation to make concessions for the Soviet
Union that were, up until that point, inconceivable? The answer lies in a
statement made by General McArthur in response to the Atomic Bomb:
“Well, this changes warfare!” Indeed, as Yergin notes, the leap in
technological warfare “was a dismal promise to make geography
meaningless” (Yergin 120).
Before the bomb, concerns for the security of Eastern and Central Europe
were dependant on conventional methods of warfare. The Bomb practically
eliminated those barriers by making it possible to impose security on any
location in the globe.
Thus, while it could be argued that the bomb was an important factor that
allowed the Big Three to make compromises and concessions that served
their self-interests, the fact remains that the bomb inevitably resulted in a
deep sense of insecurity (Yergin 120).
When Truman first hinted to Stalin on July 24th that America possess a
weapon of unimaginable power, Stalin responded, in an unflinching manner,
that he hoped they would use it to its full potential against Japan (Nation
162).
Results of the Potsdam
Conference: success or failure?
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Compromise was made to increase the frontiers of Poland, pushing it westward up to
the Oder-Neisse line. In return, a demand for a fixed sum compensation out of
Germany’s industry was dropped by Stalin. Instead, it was agreed upon by the Big
Three that reparations would be extracted out of their own occupation zones, with
the Soviet Union being allowed an additional 15% of ‘unnecessary’ capital equipment
out of Western zones in return for raw materials and foodstuffs from the East, and an
additional 10% with no exchange (Yergin 117-18).
Regarding the spheres of influence over Europe, the common approach was to let
each side retain their separate interests in their own zones, for lack of a better
approach: “Because they could not agree on how to govern Europe, they began to
divide it” (Yergin 118).
Thus, the fate of Eastern Europe was left in the hands of the Soviet Union, while Italy
remained in the hands of the Western powers (Yergin 118).
Like Yalta, the Potsdam conference can be seen as a success in the form of mutual
cooperation between the two emerging superpowers of the world. Despite their
radically polarized perspectives and ambitions, Truman and Stalin, with the help of
their aides and advisors, were able to hammer out a post-war environment that left
both sides relatively satisfied.
However, like Yalta, Potsdam can also be seen as a failure due to some of the
controversies that arose shortly after its conclusion. The weight of the Atomic Bomb
had cast an uncertain future for the balance of power in not only Europe, but of the
world.
Conclusion: the stage is set for the
Cold War
The conferences held at Yalta and Potsdam can be argued to
have laid the foundations for the end of the Second World
War and the beginning of the Cold War. The short-term
considerations that were achieved at both conferences
reflected the self-interested objectives that the Big Three
had in mind for their respective spheres of influence. The
principle factor that guided the conferences was based on
mutual cooperation to end the war, and the desire for
peaceful co-existence in the post-war period. By Yalta, the
Soviet Union stood as a military superpower that was more
than capable of finishing Germany off on her own. The
concessions made by Churchill and Roosevelt was a
reflection of this reality. Consequently, Truman and the
American delegation, fearful of the threat that the Soviets
posed on all of Europe, were determined to take a hard-line
approach to curtail Soviet interests and ambitions, at least
until the advent of the bomb. And while the Cold War was
practically inevitable with the introduction of the bomb, it
seemed, for a short while, that diplomacy and co-existence
was possible, and that after witnessing the most destructive,
costly, horrific, and inhumane war in history, peace was
perhaps somewhat plausible. The use of the bomb in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however, shattered that vision, and
the consequent political and ideological struggles of the
following year between the two superpowers made the Cold
War an inevitable consequence.
Works Cited:
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Adair, Paul. Hitler’s Greatest Defeat: Disaster on the Eastern Front. London:
Rigel Publications, 1994.
Donaldson, Robert. H and Nogee, Joseph. L. The Foreign Policy of Russia:
Changing Systems,
Enduring Interests. New York: Sharpe Publishing,
2005.
Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline. Russia and the World 1917-1991. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998.
Kitchen, Martin. A World in Flames: a short history of the Second World War
in Europe and Asia, 1939-1945. London: Longman Group UK Limited, 1990.
LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006. New York:
McGraw Hill, 2008.
Nation, Craig. R. Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy,
1917-1991. Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1992.
Petro, Nicolai. N. and Rubinstein. Alvin. Z. Russian Foreign Policy: from
empire to nation-state. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, inc, 1997.
Yergin, Daniel. H. Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the
National Security State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978.