Transcript Community conservancies and payments for wildlife

Community conservancies and payments for wildlife
conservation (PWC) as a coping strategy under different
conservancy institutional arrangements
Regina Birner and Philip Osano
Enabling Livestock Based Economies in Kenya to Adapt to Climate Change: A Review of PES from Wildlife
Tourism as a Climate Change Adaptation Option, ILRI, Nairobi, 15 February 2012
Presentation Outline
1. Climate Change and Conservancies
2. Criteria for case studies
3. Institutional Arrangements
4. Climate Change Adaptation: Pastoral
Coping and Management Strategies
5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and
Trade-offs
6.Concluding Reflections
1. Climate Change and Conservancies
Temperature Change (1970-2025)
Lodwar
#
#
Marsabit
N
#
#
Isiolo
Nanyuki
#
#
Narok
#
Garissa
NAIROBI
Conservancies
Temperature change
<+0.5 C
<+0.7 C
<+0.9 C
(+ or -) +1.1 C
<+1.3 C
200
#
0
200
Mombasa
400 Kilometers
1. Climate Change and Conservancies
Precipitation change (1970-2025)
Lodwar
#
#
#
#
Marsabit
Isiolo
Nanyuki
#
#
Narok
#
Garissa
NAIROBI
Conservancies
Precipitation change
< -150mm
< -100mm
< -50mm
+ or -50mm
< +50mm
#
Mombasa
1. Criteria for case studies
Land Tenure
Payment
arrangements
Kitengela
(WLP)
Private
Public funding
Environmental
conditions
Governance
Intermediary:
NGO (The
Wildlife
Foundation)
Landuse
regulations
Restrictions
on sale,
subdivision,
fencing
Mara (OOC and
Naboisho)
Private
Market funding
(private investors)
Ol Kiramatian
Group Ranch
Communal
Market funding
Intermediaries
(OOC):
Private company
(Ol Purkel Ltd)
and Land
Committee
Restriction on
settlements,
grazing
Group Ranch
Committee
Land zonation
(irrigated crops,
wildlife and
grazing)
2. Criteria for case studies
Narok
Kajiado
Olare Orok &
Naboisho
Ol Kiramatian
Taita
Taveta
Kitengela
3. Institutional arrangements
Introduction
Payment for Environmental Services (PES)
• Payment for Environmental Services (PES)
 Paying farmers or livestock for services such as
conserving biological diversity or reducing soil erosion
 Increasingly important strategy to reach environmental
and development goals
 Market-based instrument that offers “win-win” solutions
• Challenges of PES schemes
 Transaction costs involved in reaching large number of
smallholder farmers or livestock keepers
 Need for smallholders to organize
 Collective action problems and “elite capture”
 Bargaining power of smallholders
 Organization (collective bargaining)
 What is a “fair price” for environmental services?
Research Tool: “Net-Map”
(Influence-Network-Mapping)
• Participatory mapping method
 Invented by E. Schiffer, further developed by IFPRI
Governance Team
• Goal is to visualize
 Actors
 Relations / networks between actors
 Influence of different actors on specified outcomes –
power relations between actors
 Governance challenges
• Qualitative and quantitative analyses possible
 Social network analysis
• Tool can also be used to facilitate participatory
processes
Using
Net-Map in
different contexts
http://netmap.ifpriblog.org/
Step 1: Identifying actors and their
linkages
• Actors, as identified by respondents, are marked with
“sticky” notes on a large sheet of paper
• Linkages are drawn on the paper
Types of linkages
• Membership
• Contracts
• Licenses
• Flow of funds
Step 2: Identifying the influence level of
different actors
 Checkers‘ game pieces are used to visualize influence
level of actors (three-dimensional map)
 Influence perceived by respondent
Influence on specified
outcome:
Well-managed
conservances that meet
both environmental
andcommunity goals
Step 3: Using the map to discuss
governance issues
 What is the source of influence of different actors?
 How can disadvantaged actors be empowered?
 What governance challenges, such as elite capture
and leakages may
occur?
How can they be
addressed?

Ministry of
Tourism and
Wildlife
Insurance
companies
Tourists
Tour
operators (5)
NEMA
Naibosho Tourism
Partners Company
Other offices
issuing licenses
(~10)
Narok County
Council
Manco
Naboisho
Conservation
Ltd.
Maasai Mara
Reservie
Auditor
Private banks
Enkutotos
(customary)
Seyia
Ltd.
Naboisho
Landholding
Company
Executive
Board (5)
Board of
members (23)
Lands
Office
Base Camp
Foundation
Land owners
(518)
Funds
Contracts
Licenses
Membership
Local
administration
incl. police
Donors
Kenya
Wildlife
Service
Community
projects
Outside
Landowners
Project
benefits
Fines
Ministry of
Tourism and
Wildlife
Insurance
companies
Tourists
Tour
operators (5)
NEMA
4
Naibosho Tourism
Partners Company
Other offices
issuing licenses
(~10)
Narok County
Council
6
Manco
Naibosho
Conservation
Ltd.
Maasai Mara
Reservie
Auditor
Private banks
Enkutotos
(customary)
4
4
Base Camp
Foundation
Board of
members (23)
5
Local
administration
incl. police
Seyia
Ltd.
Donors
2
Naibosho
Landholding
Company
Executive
Board (5)
“Balance
of power”
1
Community
projects
x
Lands
Office
Land owners
(518)
Outside
Landowners
Kenya
Wildlife
Service
Perceived
influence
on outcome
(Scale 0-6)
Ministry of
Tourism and
Wildlife
Insurance
companies
Tourists
Tour
operators (5)
NEMA
Tusk
Trust
Other offices
issuing licenses
(~10)
Narok County
Council
Orpunkel
Ltd.
(5 directors)
Maasai Mara
Reservie
O.C.C.
Trust
Donors
Board of
Trustees
Kenya
Wildlife
Service
Private banks
Lands
Office
Northern
Rangelands
Trust
Motorogi
Conservancy
Ltd.
O.C.C.
Ltd.
Motorogi
land owners
(119)
O.C.C. Land
owners
(157)
Guiding
School
Community
projects
Outside
Landowners
Research
Insurance
companies
Ministry of
Tourism and
Wildlife
NEMA
Tourists
Northern
Rangelands
Trust
Tour
operators (5)
2
2
Other offices
issuing licenses
(~10)
Narok County
Council
1
6
O.C.C.
Trust
Orpunkel
Ltd.
(5 directors)
Tusk
Trust
4
Donors
Board of
Trustees
Maasai Mara
Reservie
1
Private banks
Lands
Office
Motorogi
Conservancy
Ltd.
O.C.C.
Ltd.
Motorogi
land owners
(119)
O.C.C. Land
owners
(157)
6
Guiding
School
Research
Community
projects
Outside
Landowners
Kenya
Wildlife
Service
x
Perceived
influence
on outcome
(Scale 0-6)
Why is a “balance of power” possible?
• ... in spite of unequal basic conditions of tourism
operators and pastoralists
 In terms of capital, formal education, etc.
• Secure land rights of the pastoralists
 They are the formal owners of the land.
 Tourism operations not possible without their consent
• Collective bargaining
 Organization of the land owners in a landholding company
 Makes it possible for them to speak with one voice
(in spite of considerable heterogeneity)
• In case of Naibosho: Joint company by land owners and
tourism operators
 Outsourcing of management tasks to private operator (who
is in charge of “unpopular measures”, e.g., demanding
fines)
Questions for discussion
• How important is the role of private foundations /
indvidiuals to make these arrangements work?
 How sustainable are the arrangements in the absence of
committed indvidiuals?
• How dependent is the system on funds from
donations vis-a-vis the income generated from
tourism?
 What is the relation between profits and donations?
 What share do the land owners get?
 What share do the community members without land in
the community conservancy get?
 How is the risk distributed – ultimately?
 Is there a need to improve transparency?
Questions for discussion
• Is the institutional design too complex?
 What are the transaction costs involved?
 Is there a trade-off between complexity and balance of
power?
 Are there gains from moving to larger units? For
examples, having one Trust Fund for an entire region?
• Does the state play an adequate facilitating role?
 Analysis suggests that role of the state is mainly
regulatory – issuing licenses.
 Could the licenses system be streamlined (one-stopshop)?
 Will the government start to tax the new income streams
generated? (e.g., payments to farmers)?
 What is the danger of “state capture”?
Questions for discussion
• Are there missing links?
 Is there a need to have strongter links with the
management of the Maasai Mara Reserve?
 Should community conservancies play a role in
addressing the management challenges of the
Reserve?
 How strong are the links to the institutions
providing support services to livestock keepers
(e.g., veterinary services, livestock extension
services?)
 What is the role of customary authorities? What
role can they play in addressing current and future
challenges, e.g., of organizing inclusive collective
action?
Questions for discussion
• How inclusive are the institutional arrangements?
 Strong voice for land owners,
 but low share of female land owners (approx. 5 %).
 Idea to make both spouses members of the respective
institutions?
 Question of how funds are distributed within the
households, if women lose income, say from milk.
 How about non-land owners?
 They benefit from community projects.
 But how strong is their voice in the selection and
management of the projects
 Idea to have them represented in the Trust Funds?
 To what extent are the community projects in any
case tasks that the government needs to support?
(e.g., schools, drinking water).
How do the institutional arrangements influence
opportunities to use PES for climate adaptation?
• Key features of the institutional design
 Livestock owners have individual property rights to plots of
land.
 Community conservancies are the outcome of voluntary
collective bargaining.
• Key question: How does climate change affect
 ...the economic opportunities of pastoralists and tourism
operators (in absolute terms, and relative to each other)?
 ... the bargaining power of the parties concerned?
 What role do other factors play (such as globally
increasing land values)?
• Does climate change affect the parties differently?
 Might create incentives to withdraw if alternative uses
of land become more profitable under climate change
Strategies to make PES in conservancies
“climate-smart”
• Including adaptation to climate change in
community projects (Task of the Trust Funds)
 Would require stronger link to agricultural/livestock
research and extension (current focus is on social
projects).
 Some examples, however, already exist: Fodder bank
 Explore the possibilities to raise additional funds from
climate mitigation financing opportunities.
• Adjusting income streams to buffer variation in
other income sources
 Should this be left to the land owners - using the existing
banking and insurance system?
 Should it be part of the contracts – considering that the
tourism operators already have access to the banking
and insurance system?
4. Coping and risk management strategy
Climate Change Adaptation
Herd related
1) Mobility
(negotiations)
2) Species
composition
3) Stocking levels
4) Livestock market
participation
5) Breeding/feeding
Herd related
6) Investments in water
infrastructure
7) Social networks
8) Insurance
9) Buying/selling/leasing
land
10) Diversification
•Salaries
•Remittances
•PES
•Crops
11) Savings and other
assets
•Human capital
•Collateral for loans
•Political capital
13) Exiting pastoralism
5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and
Trade-offs
Social
Income
Land management
•Cultural heritage
•Amount
•
Land sales
•social cohesion
and conflicts
•Stability
•
Restrictions
•Empowerment
•Community
projects
•Gender
•Intergenerational
Ecosystem
Services
•Wildlife
•Tourism
•Biomass supply
•Carbon storage
•Security
1. Grazing
•Predictability
2. Settlements
•Distribution
3. Firewood
collection
•Access to
financial
institutions
•Market
creation/access
4. Water
5. Fencing
6. Crops
7. Mining
8. Access
9. Burning
5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and
Trade-offs
Synergy: Fencing and mobility
5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and
Trade-offs
Synergy: storage and market creation
5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and
Trade-offs
Trade-off: cropping and diversification
http://www.pbase.com/image/41391886
Types of
institutions
Public (State)
Private (Market)
Civic (civil
society)
Government
agencies (local,
national and
global levels)
Service
organisations
Membership
organisations
Private business
Co-operatives
6. Concluding reflections
NGO’s
PES “Users”
/Buyers
PES
Intermediary
Households
(participants, nonparticipants and exparticipants)
1. The Global Environmental
Facility/World Bank
2. Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS)
3. The Nature Conservancy (TNC)
The Wildlife Foundation (TWF)
Public
Civil society
Individual
land owners