Transcript We - The Heartland Institute`s International Conferences on Climate

Changing the Rules:
Ditching the Article II Treaty
Process for Kyoto II
Christopher C. Horner
Heartland Climate Conference
NYC, 9th March 2009
“The Perfect Enemy”
Talk about a No Spin Zone
• "New enemies therefore have to be identified.
New strategies imagined, new weapons devised
• …In searching for a new enemy to unite us, we
came up with the idea that pollution, the
threat of global warming, water shortages,
famine and the like would fit the bill.”
– The Club of Rome
“The First Global Revolution”
1991, page 104
How to fight that
enemy at the gates?
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Through climate non-aggression pacts!
Kyoto is a “global treaty” covering a handful of
industrial titans: Iceland, Belgium, Luxembourg,
Slovenia and Slovakia…you get the point
But not China, India, Mexico, South Korea,
Indonesia, Brazil – all “top 15” emitters, which
would matter, if it were really about emissions –
as well as 150 other free-riding countries
None of whom are the point of Kyoto.
We were the point, the main if not sole target
who had to be brought under control by ceding
authority over energy-use (economic) decisions
Then-EU Environment
Commissioner Margot Wallström
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Cry for help: Kyoto “is not about whether
scientists agree, it is about economy,
about leveling the playing field for big
businesses worldwide.”
-- Quoted in The Independent, March 19, 2000 (since
“disappeared”, electronically)
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BTW, that’s a confession we should now heed:
socialism doesn’t work, she admitted
Who killed Kyoto?
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These factors doomed Kyoto here once
The fairness argument, combined with
economy and now – aided by inter alia the
EU’s failure and memories of energy price
spikes – will do so again
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And now apparently Kyotophiles have a
problem with the established process
UN Administration
UN Reform
and Budget
Ambassador A. Peter Burleigh
Chargé d'affaires, a.i. of the United States Mission to the United Nations
Statement on Signing of the Protocol to the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol)
November 12, 1998
USUN PRESS RELEASE #206 (98)
November 12, 1998
CHECK TEXT AGAINST DELIVERY
Statement by Ambassador A. Peter Burleigh, Chargé d'affaires, a.i. of the United States Mission to the United Nations, on
Signing of the Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Kyoto Protocol), at the United Nations,
Nov. 12, 1998.
On behalf of the United States, I have just signed the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. By signing the Protocol, the U.S. Government reaffirms its commitment to work with countries from around the world to
meet the challenge of global warming. We are guided by the firm belief that signing will serve our environmental, economic, and
national security goals.
We recognize that further work needs to be done in a number of areas, including participation by key developing countries and
defining the rules and guidelines of measures such as international trading and the clean development mechanism. By signing
the Protocol, we ensure our ability to continue playing a strong role in completing the work in these important areas.
Yesterday in Buenos Aires, Argentina announced that it would voluntarily take on a binding emissions target in the same time
frame as the United States and other developed countries. We applaud Argentina's leadership as the first developing nation to
make such a pledge.
If you have further questions, I would refer you to the delegation in Buenos Aires, headed by Undersecretary of State Stuart
Eizenstat.
Thank you.
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Kyoto’s history, reviewed
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Unanimous Senate “advice” (unsolicited, not
wanted) given in July 1997 to not agree to Kyoto
December 11, 1997, Gore announces agreement
November 12, 1998, U.S. signs Kyoto
Neither President Clinton nor Bush sought Senate
ratification, and no senator has pushed the issue
by either seeking such a request or testing the
protocol of waiting for “transmittal”
Why? Because it will never get 2/3 approval
So some people are looking for ways around it
Here’s their constitutional impediment
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Section 2. The President …shall have
power, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, to make treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur;
Summary of the Problem
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U.S. Senate unanimously said “don’t” (Art. II, Sec. 2)
Executive ignored: agreed (12/11/97), & signed (11/12/98)
Never unsigned, never voted to ratify
Nor would this or any Senate ratify these details
So, some see the need to find a way around it
“Too important to be left to democracy!”
“Kyoto” is now the vehicle for an entire movement
Surely The Constitution’s language is nothing
Pressure to legislate before treaty is key factor
Quick Reminder
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Clinton-Gore sought to pressure Congress, failed
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UN Green Chief: "The lack of communication between
the Senate and the administration around the time of
Kyoto [1997] was an error we cannot allow to be
repeated. It is necessary to pay very close attention to
what Congress has to say“ (Oh. Um, how was that Bush’s fault again…?)
Obama vows to reverse that process
Says will pressure Europeans/UN instead with law
UN et al. initially cheered: “US consensus first!”
Nervous about such a bill’s domestic odds now
just want rhetoric or statement of policy first
Key Q on the table: which will drive which?
The always reliable Connie
Hedegaard just weighed in
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Denmark's climate minister kindly concedes that
"it's up to the Americans to decide if they need to
link the two or not“ – a domestic law and treaty
Adding, "The president and his administration have
adopted a high profile on the issue and I don't
want to speculate on what will happen if (the
domestic law) doesn't work.
We have to keep up the (international) pressure.
Because, if we miss this opportunity, who can say
if there will be another chance in 2010 or 2011?“
I can. There won’t. Sky won’t fall. Skepticism rising
Which is why today’s topic is what it is
See, e.g., “Just for this one issue…”
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In Red Hot Lies I detail the increasing
number of opinion leaders insisting that –
just for this one issue – we suspend
arcane notions of democracy, and
individual and economic liberties.
Because that’s the only way to impose this
But “just this one issue” is energy,
meaning economy, national security…
Here’s their suggested end-run…
Former Clinton-Gore State aide
Brookings’ Nigel Purvis, in RFF Paper
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“The United States should classify new international treaties
to protect the Earth’s climate system as executive
agreements rather than treaties”. And, why?
“The treaty clause has never worked as the framers of the
Constitution intended.” Or rather, it’s become inconvenient:
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“The treaty process created by the framers of the
Constitution requires an exceptional degree of national
consensus that is no longer reasonable given the
frequency and importance of international cooperation
today.”
Translation: that’s so 18th century, we’ve “moved on”.
“What ‘Constitution’?”
You say treaty, I say congressional-executive agreement
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“Under international law, those two types of
instruments are indistinguishable …‘the supreme
law of the land’…
Very importantly, however, the domestic
processes the United States uses to negotiate,
review, and approve treaties and executive
agreements are quite different…
[NB: Translation – one’s easier]
The United States may deem an international
agreement as an ‘executive agreement’ for
purposes of its domestic review, even though
the international community may decide to call
the pact a ‘treaty’”.
Curious rationale…
or is it rationalization?
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“We must not cling to preconceived notions of how our
country negotiates and reviews international climate
agreements”, because
“The treaty process has harmed the credibility of the
United States: in the eyes of the world, we are an
unreliable treaty partner.”
Specifically why? Because the Senate instructed the
executive not to agree to Kyoto and he did anyway.
Got that? The Senate provided the parameters, they
were ignored, so we’re flakes who need to…take the
Senate out of the equation. Says Purvis:
“unilateral Presidential leadership may prove necessary if
Congress refuses to act”
How would this work?
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A three-tiered bill
Non-binding “guidance” on pact’s content
Authority to negotiate, promising a vote
No amendment, no filibuster, up-or-down,
simple bicameral 50-plus-1 majority
Waives Art. II Sec. 2 “consent” because
jointly agree it isn’t really a treaty (wink)
Lays out successive (deeper) implementation
Straw Men
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“But… NAFTA was a cong’l-exec agreement!”
However you like NAFTA, this is not NAFTA
Not 3 nations agreeing to reduce trade barriers
It’s 190+ countries, all “indispensible” Parties to
the pact…just not all covered (just wealth transferees)
With rigged baselines etc., targets U.S. energy use
This also gets around Kyoto’s Medellin problem:
That is, no escape hatch of Congress refusing to
implement: it’s a done deal ab initio
More Purvis
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“the courts would be highly likely to
uphold the agreement”
Because it is a “mere historical tendency”
of ours to call such international
entanglements “treaties”
In fact it appears if Congress/Obama opt
for this course Purvis could be right: we’ve
only one sure opportunity to block it
Demand No Kyoto II ‘Fast Track’
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They’re already looking to ram the domestic tax
scheme needed to implement this pact through on
the filibuster-proof budget process (similar to a C-E stunt)
Block the request for the Kyoto II “C-E” authority
Do not let it get to the Fast Track vote
Do not let it get to the courts
Expose this now
If exposure fails, demand filibuster of the request
Remember: The Constitution – like a free-market –
isn’t perfect…
But it’s a whole lot better than what we have now