Transcript Commentary & Extensions: Sugiyama

Commentary & Extensions:
Sugiyama’s “Orchestra of Treaties”
Conference “Post-2012 Climate Policy Options: European
Perspectives”, 04-05 Sept. 2003, HWWA, Hamburg
Detlef Sprinz
PIK - Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research &
University of Potsdam
http://www.sprinz.org
Overview
Sugiyama’s Perspective
Extensions
Conclusions
Sugiyama’s Perspective
“Kyoto Plus” is not Feasible
Main argument: Adversarial negotiations
Main Proposal
Leaders shall lead
Specialized treaties for committed countries
only
Sugiyama’s Perspective
Commentary
Q: Why Are There No Unconditional Frontrunners?
Three options
• Resign yourself to infeasibility of substantial
improvement over business-as-usual
• Optimize Kyoto setup
– Small negotiation setting with delegated decision-making
authority (not like the EU in The Hague)
– Binding agreements with strong sanctioning system
– Real penalties that do not violate endogeneity
challenges
– Overall: Coordinated transition to low carbon future
• “Overcome” Kyoto
– Orchestra of treaties -> Sugiyama and others
Extensions
Two Options
Top-Down
• Agree among core countries on ambitious version of
Art. 2 UNFCCC in general policy equilibrium
• Negotiations on distribution of burdens (and rights)
between countries and over time – both mitigation and
adaptation, using, e.g. cost minimum with side-payments
• Strong sanctioning mechanisms with pre-delegated
assets at risk of no-nonsense judicial procedure
Extensions
Bottom-Up
• Compose a map of political and economically
feasible contributions to emission reduction and
adaptation efforts across time, countries, and
political sub-units
• Use iterative procedure of repositioning in view
of full information regime (incl. uncertainties)
• No external sanctioning needed, all sanctioning
is within political jurisdictions (e.g., EU,
Germany, Japan, India)
Extensions
Additional Options: What We Should Know
More About
Frontier of Country Commitments (see “bottom
up”)
Likely outcome of negotiations given actual
positions
• Modeling political decisions (use actual positions)
– Replicate past agreements
– Predict foreseeable future (e.g., Art. 2 UNFCCC)
– Simulate alternatives to Kyoto Protocol (e.g., some of the
“orchestra” members)
Extensions
Build a Long-Term Insurance Fund
• Stabilize policy in Annex II countries
– Expenses for mitigation and adaptation projects
• Provide compensation for unavoided actual
damages
Conclusions
Kyoto Protocol May Have Been the Only
Show in The Hague, But the Venue Has
Changed
Wide Array of Options for Further
Development of Global Climate Regime
Decentralized Options Are a Clear
Candidate, But May Lead to Amorphous
Picture
Additional Information
Webpage:
http://www.sprinz.org
Luterbacher, Urs, and Detlef F. Sprinz, eds. 2001.
International Relations and Global Climate Change.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Sprinz, Detlef. 2001. Climate Change After
Marrakech: The Role of Europe in the Global
Arena. German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, 2(6).
Jaeger, Carlo C., Detlef F. Sprinz, and Klaus
Hasselmann. 2003. Wer soll das bezahlen? [Who
Shall Pay For It?]. Die Zeit 8/2003.