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The International
Climate Change Regime:
An Overview
COST Workshop
November 2009
Meinhard Doelle
Marine & Environmental Law Institute
Dalhousie Law School
UN Treaty Neg. Process
• Binding treaties are first negotiated for
content
• There is usually a clause in the treaty
that identifies how many states have to
“ratify” to bring it into force
• Once “agreement” on content, open for
signature
• Once states have signed, they can ratify
UN Treaty Neg. Process
• Once enough states have ratified,
comes into force
• Then binding on states who have
ratified
• States who have signed but not ratified,
are not bound, but can’t circumvent
objectives of agreement
• States who have not signed are free to
do as they please unless content
becomes customary international law
UN “MEA” Negotiations
• MEA’s “usually” start with Framework
Convention to deal with principles, process
issues, and general objectives
• This is then followed with Protocols that have
specific targets and measures to get there
• Only states who have ratified the Framework
Convention can participate in the
negotiations of Protocols
• Only parties to a Protocol can negotiate its
amendment
UN MEA Negotiations
• Any UN member state can participate
– In case of climate change this means those who
contribute the most and those who suffer the most
• Agreement is by consensus unless otherwise
•
•
•
•
agreed (which requires consensus)
On rare occasions, power is delegated (OLD)
Achieving consensus takes time and can lead to
lowest common denominator agreements
In theory a small country can hold up consensus
In practice, small countries have little influence
unless they build alliances
UN MEA Negotiations
• G-77 a product of this dynamic, goes well
beyond climate change negotiations, and
includes AOSIS, OPEC, African, Asian and
S. American developing countries
• EU tends to negotiate as a group
• UG (a less formal alliance)
• Other alliances on an issue by issue basis,
such as Environmental Integrity Group,
etc
The Science is Complex
Slide showing energy flux
through atmosphere
There are many complex interactions and
feedbacks within the global climate system
Chain of Consequences
• Start with Global Average Temperature
• Change in Precipitation Patterns
• Global, Regional, Local Climate Systems
– Wind patterns, ocean currents, sea level,
ice…
• Impacts on ecosystems, agriculture,
forests, fisheries, …
• Social, economic, cultural impacts
The IPCC is the principal source of advice on
climate change science
Cautious
1990
1992
First Report
Second Report
1995
1997
Increasing
Confidence
Third Report
2001
2007
Fourth Report
UN General Assembly Resolutions
•1988
•Recognizes climate change as a common concern
of mankind
•Establishes the IPCC
•1989
•Supports UNEP proposal to prepare for
negotiations of a FCCC
•Decides to convene UNCED in Rio in 1992
•1990
-Establishes the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee for the FCCC
No signs of integration so far
… negotiations eventually led to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) with the following key elements:
Principles
Objectives
Institutions
Process
Int’l Climate Change Regime
UNFCCC
Preamble
•Reference to relative per capita emissions and
contribution to GHG emissions to date
•Reference to Developed Countries going first
But:
•No explicit reference to integrated solutions
•No reference to links to biodiversity
Int’l Climate Change Regime
(UNFCCC)
Article 2: Goal
•The goal of this convention is the stabilization of GHG
concentrations at levels that:
•prevent dangerous human interference with climate
system,
•ensure that rate of change allows nature to adapt,
•do not threaten food production, and
•allow sustainable development to take place.
Future CO2 Levels Depend on What We Do
1000
Projected CO2 Concentrations to 2100
900
BAU
800
Modest Effort
700
600
500
400
High Effort
300
1975
2000
2025
2050
Year
2075
2100
UNFCCC
• Article 3: Principles
•Equity for present and future generations of
humans,
•Common but differentiated responsibilities,
•Precautionary approach to be adopted.
•No principle of integration, no formal
encouragement of linkages, could read into
equity, responsibility, precaution
UNFCCC
• Article 4
•Reporting/national inventories of emissions
for all Parties
•Cooperate in finding solutions to Climate
Change
•Consider needs of developing countries
UNFCCC
Article 4.2
• Identifies starting point of returning to 1990
levels of emissions by 2000
•Developed countries only
•Voluntary (ie no direct consequences)
•Did not work:
•Not enough
•Very low compliance rate
UNFCCC
Process of identifying what needs to be done
to achieve objectives of Convention
• IPCC to advise on the science
• UNFCCC secretariat to provide administrative support
• COP to meet annually to address substantive issues and
develop agreements on how to meet objectives of
UNFCCC
• Kyoto the first product of this process, took from 1994
to 1997
Bottom Line: UNFCCC allows but does not
encourage integration
Kyoto Protocol: Broad Overview
• Developed Country Targets (Art 3.1, 3.7)
•Absolute emission limits
•6 GHGs and comprehensive coverage of sources
•Focus on total emissions/country
• Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms
• Emissions Trading (Art 17, 4, 3.10-13)
• Clean Development Mechanism (Art 12)
• Joint Implementation (Art 6)
Kyoto Protocol: Broad Overview
• Sinks to offset emissions (Art 3.3, 3.4)
• Estimate, report and verify emissions, sinks
and credits (Art. 5, 7, 8)
• Ensure compliance (Art 18)
• Developing country issues (Art 2, 3, 10, 11)
• Entry Into Force (Art 25)
Bottom Line: KP allows but does not
encourage integration
Kyoto Emission Reduction Obligations
Party
Per cent reduction
from 1990 levels
European Union
-8
Switzerland
-8
United States
-7
Canada
-6
Japan
-6
Russian and FSU countries
0
Australia
+8
Overall reduction for all Annex I Parties combined is 5.2%
Kyoto Emission
Reduction Obligations
800
Business-As-Usual
750
GHG
700
Emissions
(Megatonnes
of CO2
650
equivalent)
748
703
671
600
550
1990 Baseline
599 Mt
Kyoto target
563 Mt
500
450
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
25
Kyoto – Marrakech
Role of Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms
•Offset domestic emissions through other means
•Different types:
• Trade with parties that have their own targets (ET)
• Joint projects with parties that have their own targets (JI)
• Projects in parties that have no targets (CDM)
• Offset emissions with efforts to take GHG out of
atmosphere (ie Sinks)
•Marrakech Accords set the rules for all this
Kyoto – Marrakech: CDM
• Clean Development Mechanism (Art 12)
•
•
•
•
•
Baselines
Additionality
Sustainable development test
Small scale projects
Process Issues (certify project, verify credits)
•Executive Board
•National Entities (SD test, Host Party approval)
•Operational Entities (works for EB)
Kyoto – Marrakech: ET
• Emissions Trading (Art 17)
•What can you trade?
• Is a ton = a ton = a ton? Legally yes, but
• What about leakage (Gen, SINKS, CDM)
• What about impact on trading, value of the credit?
•Who is liable?
• Seller or buyer liability, impact on integrity of
environmental objective and impact on carbon credit
market
• Commitment Period Reserve, the compromise
•How much can you trade? (Supplementarity)
Kyoto – Marrakech: JI
• Joint Implementation (Art 6)
•Project track
• Compare to CDM
• Less concern about additionality, as host has GHG limit
• Otherwise similar to CDM
• Available even when host has reporting problems under
Articles 5, 7, 8
•Non-Project (Trading track)
• Compare to ET
• Only available if host in compliance with Art 5,7, 8
• Can still be project related, but no need to establish
baseline and certify, due to impact on host party target
Kyoto – Marrakech: SINKS
• Sinks (Art 3.3)
• Covers change in land use re
forests (+&-, mandatory)
• Developed Countries (AI)
• Credit for Reforestation (1990)
• Credit for Afforestation (50 yrs)
• Debit for Deforestation
•Harvesting cycles not a land use
change
Kyoto – Marrakech: SINKS
Sinks (Art 3.4)
• Voluntary, in developed countries (AI)
• Land use change other than forests
• Management to increase carbon storage
• Forest management
• Crop land management
• Graze land management)
• Human induced versus natural
• Verification, permanence
• Biodiversity impacts
Kyoto – Marrakech: SINKS
• Sinks (Art 12)
•Sinks in CDM
•Applies to sinks projects in developing
countries (NAI)
•General CDM rules apply
•Credit for afforestation
•Credit for reforestation
•No debit for deforestation
•No credit for avoided deforestation
•Permanence, accountability beyond 1st com
period key challenges
Forest Land-use Change (3.3)
• Article 3.3: The net changes in greenhouse
gas emissions by sources and removals by
sinks resulting from direct human-induced
land-use change and forestry activities,
limited to afforestation, reforestation and
deforestation since 1990, measured as
verifiable changes in carbon stocks in each
commitment period, shall be used to meet
the commitments under this Article of each
Party included in Annex I. …
Forest Land Use Change (3.3)
• Key Implementation Issues
– What is a forest (tree crown cover of more than 1030% with trees that can reach 2-5 meters in height)
– How to deal with the harvesting cycle (not
considered deforestation, but in case of
afforestation and reforestation will affect the credits
granted)
– Credits for harvested wood products? No
Forest Management (3.4)
• Article 3.4 The COP shall […] decide upon
modalities, rules and guidelines as to how,
and which, additional human-induced
activities related to changes in greenhouse
gas emissions by sources and removals by
sinks in the […] and forestry categories shall
be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned
amounts for Parties included in Annex I,
taking into account uncertainties,
transparency in reporting, verifiability …
Current Forest Management Rules
• Accounting for carbon stock from forest
management is voluntary
• Once you invoke Article 3.4 for a certain area
of forest, you have to permanently account for
the change in carbon stock of that forest
• Currently no separation of natural & human
induced change, just credit limits for the 1st CP,
#’s loosely based on assumption that 85% of
carbon uptake is natural (for Canada limit is 60
MT Carbon)
Future of Forest Management
• What role should the following play?
– Reward efforts to actually increase carbon
storage in forests through change in forest
management?
– Fully account for change in carbon stock from
forests over time, regardless of cause
– Motivate action where there are synergies
between carbon storage & biodiversity
– Motivate action where there are synergies
between carbon storage & forestry
Future of Forest Management
• Some Options
– Continue with current rules, which are voluntary,
& assume a certain mix of natural & human
induced
– Country specific baselines for BAU change in
carbon stock (bottom up or top down?)
– Mandatory accounting for change in carbon stock
– Exemption for natural disturbances
– Credits limited to carbon stock in natural forests
Forest Management,
Comprehensive or Selective
• Proposed focus by some ENGOs arguing
for selective approach:
– Debit reduction in forest biomass
– Debit conversion from forests to
plantations
– Debit conversion from primary forest
to modified natural forests
– Credit new carbon stock in degraded
forests
Forest Management,
Comprehensive or Selective
• Selective can be good if parties select
aspects that encourage integrated solutions
• Concern with selective:
– Parties will only select what is easy and
cheap to get credits for
– Parties will leave out what is expensive &
likely lead to debits
Comprehensive Forest Management
• Accountable for all changes in carbon
stock of all forests within state, human
and natural
• Accountable for all carbon taken out of
forest (fuel, pulp for paper, other wood
products
• Debit if carbon returns to atmosphere,
credit if used in a way that stores the
carbon long term
Forest Management,
Comprehensive or Selective
• Concerns with comprehensive:
–Complexity,
–Risk of unforeseen consequences
on GHG emission reduction,
–Risk of sinks becoming a
competing land use rather than
complementing biodiversity
protection and SD
Forest Management Choices
• Whether to continue with voluntary
approach for forest management or go
mandatory
• How to account for harvested wood
products
– Harvesting cycle can be positive from
carbon storage perspective, but is a
threat to biodiversity
• Whether to exempt “natural disturbances”
Forest Management Choices
• Whether to set individual baselines for forest
management (bottom up or top down), ie what
change in carbon stock is deemed “natural”
• The baseline would reflect the characteristics of the
forest just before the beginning of the commitment
period. This would include :
• age class structure,
• growth rates,
• decomposition rates and
• other factors that affect carbon dynamics and
GHG emissions.
Biodiversity Implications for
Forests
• Use of forests as sinks is a potentially
•
competing, potentially complementary land use
Rules could be changed to further discourage or
encourage activities that are a threat to:
–
–
–
–
Biodiversity
Sustainable resource management
Traditional use of forests
Other potential uses/benefits of forests
Bottom Line: Current Rules do not encourage
integration
Kyoto – Marrakech:
The Fine Print (Art. 5,7,8)
• Articles 5, 7, 8 (estimate, report, verify)
•All about tracking credits and emissions
•Different Credits: AAU, ERU, CER, RMU
•What to do with the credits?
•Issue Credits (verify and certify)
•Trading/Transferring Credits
•Retiring Credits (used to meet parties’
obligations)
•Canceling credits (eliminated from use)
•Recycling credits
•Banking credits
Kyoto – Marrakech:
The Fine Print (5,7,8)
• Articles 5, 7, 8
•Tracking the credits held by each party at the end of
the first commitment period
•ET, JI
•Sinks Credits (adjusting AAUs)
•CDM Credits
•Trades tracked through Transaction Log
•Tracking emissions 2008 - 2012
•Estimate (5), report (7), verify (8)
•Expert Review team process (conservative adjust)
•True up period
Meeting Emission Reduction
Obligations
800
Business-As-Usual
750
GHG
700
Emissions
(Megatonnes
of CO2
650
equivalent)
703
671
Domestic Emission
Reductions
600
550
748
1990 Baseline
599 Mt
Credits
Needed for
Compliance
Kyoto target
563 Mt
500
450
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
48
Compliance System Overview
• The Compliance Process
•Referral by Expert Review Team, or any Party
•Plenary ((Rules of Proc, Annual Rep to COP…)
•Bureau (determines which branch, EB or FB, both?)
•Facilitative Branch (all commitments, but no
enforcement powers)
•Enforcement Branch (focus on Article 3.1, 5, 7, 8)
•Composition of each branch: 1 from each of five
regions, 2 A I, 2 Non-A I, 1 small island states
Compliance through Enforcement
• Tools of the Enforcement Branch
•Compliance Action Plan
•Ton Restoration in 2nd Commitment Period
with 1.3 Multiplier (without 2nd period target)
•Loss of Eligibility to Sell
•Credibility of the Market
•Reputation
•Integrity of International Rules
Work of the Enforcement Branch
Case against Greece
– Case involved national system for
estimating emissions
– Responsibility for maintaining system
was in transition from one to another
consultant
– Case came to EB from ERT report
– Greece not eligible to use mechanisms
until matter resolved in Nov 2008
Work of the Enforcement Branch
Case against Canada
– Canada failed to have its national registry up
and running by deadline
– National registry is key to tracking credits by
Annex I parties, linked to ITL
– Canada got its registry up and running by
hearing date
– Finding of past non-compliance, but did not
proceed further
Role of Facilitative Branch
•Early detection of problem, advice, assistance
•Provision of advice
•Facilitation of financial and technical
assistance, including technology transfer and
capacity building
•Formulation of recommendations to a party on
what could be done to help a parties comply
with its obligations
•Only triggered by ERT or a Party
Work of the Facilitative Branch
1 Case, brought by SA on behalf of G-77
– Dealt with failure of many Annex I countries to
submit report on “demonstrable progress”
– FB split on whether the case was brought properly
before it by a “Party”
– Annex I members opposed taking case on
– Case could not proceed
– Plenty of other matters have come up (Canada),
but not brought before FB by ERT or a Party
Concluding Thoughts on
The Current Regime
•UNFCCC & Kyoto just initial steps along a
long path of negotiating and implementing
climate regime
• Science suggests 25-40% by 2020, ~ 90 %
by 2050 needed in AI
•KP signals the start of a carbon constrained
world
•There has been meaningful action in EU,
Japan
•There have been some efforts in developing
countries
From Kyoto to Copenhagen
•Is the basic architecture of the UNFCCC/KP sound?
•What are its limitations?
•What needs to change post 2012?
•Role of ET, CDM, JI, Sinks?
•New targets for developed countries?
•Targets for developing countries?
•Better help for developing countries?
•Alternative approaches?
•Will new regime spur innovation?
•Will new regime be better integrated with other
issues?
The Post 2012 Negotiations
The Process
• The Bali Mandate 2007
• From Poznan to Copenhagen
• The LCA AWG
• The KP AWG
The Bali Mandate (2007)
• Formalized a two year process on two tracks to
•
•
•
•
negotiate the post 2012 regime
Raised status of technology and finance to the
level of mitigation and adaptation (From 2 - 4
Pillars)
Small but potentially significant movement from G77 on mitigation: China, Brazil, South Africa
Some signs of acceptance of the IPCC AR4 science
on adequacy: 2 C, 400 ppm, 10 yr peak, 80% by
2050
Gradual recognition of the interdependence of
developed and developing countries on climate
change
The Post 2012 Negotiations
From Poznan to Copenhagen
• Little progress made from Bali to Poznan
due to US election
• At least five negotiating sessions between
Poznan and Copenhagen
• Last two were Bangkok in early October,
and Barcelona in early November
• Comprehensive binding agreement seems
increasingly unlikely
The Post 2012 Negotiations
Track 1: The LCA AWG
• Trying to find a place for the US, otherwise
not dealing with mitigation by developed
countries
• Trying to deal with mitigation in developing
countries & assistance needed
• Also dealing with adaptation, finance,
technology and shared vision (i.e. long term
targets)
The Post 2012 Negotiations
Track 2: The KP AWG
• Negotiations under the KP
• US not a party
• Limited to post 2012 mitigation efforts of
developed countries (other than US)
• New targets + CDM, JI, ET, SINKS
• Separation of KP & LCA is making
negotiations very difficult
The Post 2012 Negotiations
The Substance (LCA & KP AWGs)
• Shared Vision
• Adaptation
• Mitigation
• Finance
• Technology
The Post 2012 Negotiations
Shared Vision (LCA)
• What is the ultimate goal? GHG
Concentrations, Temperature, Global
Emission Reductions (2050)
• How should the overall long term
responsibility be allocated?
– AI, NAI?
– Further differentiation?
The Post 2012 Negotiations
Adaptation (LCA)
• Mainly about adaptation in developing
countries
• Sources of funding?
• How much?
• Who will have access?
• Under what conditions?
• Role of National Adaptation Plans
The Post 2012 Negotiations
Mitigation (LCA&KP)
• Mitigation by AI - comparability, MRV,
compliance (including new sinks rules)
• Mitigation by NAI – NAMA & support, MRV,
NAMA mechanisms
• REDD plus – relation to NAMAs, meaning of
“plus”, indigenous rights, conversion on
natural forests…
The Post 2012 Negotiations
Mitigation (LCA&KP)
• Sectoral approaches – Bunker & aviation
fuels, agriculture
• Cost effectiveness of mitigation – Role of
markets, ET, CDM, JI, new mechanisms
• Consequences of response measures –
Minimize and/or compensate, help all NAI or
just LDCs, what about OPEC? Trade measures
to protect domestic industries?
The Post 2012 Negotiations
Finance: Sources of Funding (LCA)
– Private (i.e. CDM) versus public
– Pledge based or levies?
– Bunker & aviation levy?
– Global Levy on GHG emissions ($2 /ton)
– Auctioning of AAUs (or levy)
– Role of ODA
– Which Parties contribute?
– How much?
The Post 2012 Negotiations
• Finance (cont’d) (LCA)
– Who has access (All NAI? EITs?)
– Under what conditions (Compliance Link?)
– For what purpose (mitigation, adaptation,
technology, capacity building, REDD?)
– What institution administers (GEF, Multilateral
Fund under COP, other?)
– Reporting, verification, compliance
• Compliance, Articles 578, MRV?
• Facilitation and/or sanctions?
• Contributions v. use of funds
The Post 2012 Negotiations
Technology (LCA)
• What technologies will be included?
– About access to wind, solar, efficiency &
other technologies
– What about CCS, Nuclear, Large Scale Hydro?
• Facilitating tech transfer to NAI (EITs?)
• Institutional arrangements? (central or de...)
• Private and/or public funding
• What other measures can be taken?
– Changes to Intellectual Property rules???
Legal Architecture
• Amend Kyoto Protocol plus new Protocol
for US & Developing Countries
• Single new Protocol for everyone
• Amend Kyoto Protocol plus COP
decisions
• COP decisions only
• COP decisions now, new Protocol(s)
later
State of the Negotiations
• No agreement on targets for developed
nations (though some promising signs from
Norway, Japan…)
• US a real challenge to bring back in, may
finally announce a target
• Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Russia
seem reluctant participants, EU not leading
as it used to
• All this allows developing countries to resist
action, though some have moved
Things to look out for:
• On what terms does the US re-engage?
• Is inequity of positions of States who are
blocking progress being exposed?
• What is the negotiating capacity of NonAnnex I (other than China, OPEC)?
• Bilateral cooperation (i.e. EU–G-77, EU–US,
US- China ... )
• LCA and KP processes have moved forward
in parallel, will they come together?
Key Challenges
• US a late comer to mitigation & reluctance to
accept international oversight
• Preventing Canada, Japan, Australia, NZ, EU
from following US out of Kyoto
• Inadequate mitigation efforts in many
developed countries to date
• Adequate finance in current economic climate
• Bringing developing countries on board in a fair
and meaningful way
EU Ambassador to US
Recent Quote
• `'The rest of the world cannot be expected to
sit around the negotiating table in Copenhagen
twiddling their thumbs, waiting for the Senate
of one country (however big) to deal with other
business. And developing countries will not be
willing to agree to restrictions on their
economic growth in the name of climate
change if the United States has not
demonstrated that it is prepared to join them.
Final Thoughts
• We now live in a carbon constrained world
• This means we will either be forced to
reduce/eliminate emissions or pay
• The cost of emitting will go up
• The economic opportunities in finding
solutions will grow
• Future of international regime very much up
in the air at the moment
• Time for integrated solutions is running out