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Agro-Terrorism
Overview of Risks, Liabilities, and
Assets
Richie Farmer Commissioner
Dr. Ed Hall
Assistant Director of Animal Health
Kentucky Department of Agriculture
This presentation is designed
to help you better get
acquainted with us at the
Kentucky Department of
Agriculture.
Agroterrorism and Bioterrorism
 Is there a difference between the two?
– Agroterrorism is included as a part of
Bioterrorism.
– From an agriculture standpoint we are more
interested in Agroterrorism.
Agroterroism vs Bioterrorism
 Agroterrorism - agents are primarily aimed at
disrupting agriculture with human disease impact
being secondary.
 Bioterrorism - agents are primarily aimed at
causing human disease, sickness, and/or death,
with agricultural impact being secondary.
 The ideal disease provides the worst of both
worlds.
Bioterrorism
 Many of the bioterrorism diseases are
zoonotic but they have to be weaponized to
be used in attacks.
– Examples: Anthrax, brucellosis, Glanders,
Plague, Q fever, Tularemia, Venezuelan
Equine Encephalitis
– All have occurred naturally in animal
populations and is where the disease was
isolated.
 We have developed good control measures to
combat the naturally occurring animal diseases.
Bioterrorism Agents
 Bacterial Agents
– Anthrax
 Vaccine available for animals.
– Brucellosis
 Vaccine available for animals.
– Glanders and Melioidosis
 Antibiotics available
– Plague
 Antibiotics available for animals
– Q Fever
 Antibiotics available
– Tularemia
 Antibiotics available
Bioterrorism Agents
 Viral
– Small Pox
– Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis
 Vaccine available for horses
– Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
Bioterrorism Agents
 Biological Toxins
– Botulinum
– Ricin
– Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B
– T-2 Mycotoxins
Human-Animal Relationships
 With some bioterrorism agents we may see
a disease in animals prior to human
disease.
– Anthrax: The death of exposed cattle and sheep
could happen 2 days prior to human deaths.
– West Nile: Although the outbreak is not seen as
a terrorist attack the disease showed up in birds
and horses first and then in people.
Human-Animal Relationships
 It is possible for a veterinary diagnostic lab
to identify an agent before a human
diagnosis.
– Veterinary Diagnostic Labs still routinely look for
diseases that are not commonly looked for in
humans anymore.
 Example: Brucellosis
– Because of 9/11, both Veterinarians and
Physicians are getting refresher courses in
bioterrorism agents.
Essential Elements of
Agroterrorism
 Need a target
– economically important plants or animals
 Need a group capable of attack who:
– must select the appropriate agent
– must acquire the agent
– must be able to disseminate the agent
 Need a group willing to carry out the attack.
– they have have desire to use an agent
Agent Selection
 Should be highly contagious to many
species
– transmitted by casual contact or aerosol
 Should have a long incubation period
– Animal will be carrying and/or shedding the
disease and look totally normal
 Should induce a high rate of sickness
low rate of death
– Diseases that kill too quick usually don’t
spread as fast.
Agent Selection
 Should be capable of severe socioeconomic losses
– loss of product into the marketplace
– loss of export markets
– loss of consumer base
Agent Acquisition
 Many 3rd world countries have some
technology provided by the World Health
Organization to make vaccines for human
and animal diseases.
 In general to make a vaccine to a specific
disease you need to have a seed stock of
that disease.
– That seed stock is a likely source
Agent Acquisition
 Many 3rd world countries still have many of
the bioterrorism diseases occurring naturally
in the animal population.
– Example: Pakistan has FMD
 Some rudimentary veterinary knowledge
and you could acquire a wild strain.
– Blood collection tube, centrifuge, freezer,
insulation, and an airplane ticket.
Those Who Would Attack Us
 Single issue groups
– Animal rights advocates
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National Separatist
Religious
Lone offenders
Rogue regimes
State supported
Motivations
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Revenge/Retaliation
Promote nationalist or separatist objectives
Protest government policies
Create a lack of confidence in the
governments ability to protect and provide
 Apocalyptic prophecy
 Promote a social cause
Higher Probability of Attack
 Single issue groups like the animal rights
activist are an ongoing threat.
– Believe animals have “rights”
– Agenda set on influencing production
agriculture or laboratory testing.
– In some cases resort to criminal activity to
release captive animals.
 ALF has released mink on several occasions.
Higher Probability of Attack
 State Sponsored and Rogue Regime
– Primary or secondary attack bent on destroying
the agricultural infrastructure to try to:
 Cause widespread economic losses especially to the
10% who produce food for consumers.
 Decrease the amount of food available in the food
chain.
 Cause panic
What do we risk
to lose!
Two Types of Risk
 We have the combined risk of:
– Accidental Introduction
 Regulatory policies mediate this risk, more on this
later!
– Deliberate Introduction
 Let’s concentrate on this for a while…...
– You can’t totally eliminate either risk!
Risk in Kentucky
 Broken into three categories
– Physical
– Economic
– Psychological
Physical Risks
 Movement of crops
– Most of our crops are exported to
processing facilities or utilized as animal
feeds.
– Grain elevators are concentration points for
marketed products
Economic Risk
 Loss of revenue from export markets
– 405 million dollars from soybeans
– 456 million dollars from corn
– 2,226 billion dollars live livestock
– 680 million dollars (eggs and poultry)
– 3.5 billion dollars total commodities
Psychological Risks
 Loss of confidence in a safe food supply
– Example: If people even thought that the meat
or milk supply was tainted, people would stop
buying those products.
 Loss of confidence in the governments
ability to protect the food supply.
Psychological Attacks
 Increased feelings of being vulnerable and
less secure.
– Look at the sniper incident and it’s effects on the local
economy and peoples quality of life
 Perceived shortage of food
– Could lead to a run on stores and hoarding of food.
– Look at what 9/11 did for gas, a run on the gas stations
not to mention the price gouging that took place!
Agroterrorism
Liabilities
Liabilities
 Successful disease eradication programs
– makes us more vulnerable to reintroduction
– no immunity left in the animal population
 Large concentrations of animals.
– Some accessible from the road
 Large concentration of crops.
– Easily accessible from the road
Liabilities
 Extensive movement of animals into and out
of the state.
– For breeding, feeding and slaughter
 Extensive movement of products into and
out of the state.
– Corn, Soybeans, Milk, and Meat
Liabilities
 Animal Concentration Points
– 38 Sale Barns in the State of Kentucky
 Usually have 1 sale a week
 Little to no biosecurity
– State and County Fairs
 109 Kentucky counties have one
 Varying levels of biosecurity
– 189 Grain Elevators
 Little to no biosecurity
My 2 cents!
 10% of the US population is providing food
for the other 90%. That makes food security
a national priority.
 In general we have become so comfortable
in life and feel so secure that we are not
near as self sufficient as we used to be.
Benefits of Rural Living
 Better equipped to weather hard times by
having tools to be self sufficient.
 They have done it in the past
– They have the land to produce food
– They may lose some markets but they could still
eat
– Could go back to a barter system if necessary
The Trouble With Cities
 Have a 5 day supply of food in stores
 Many do not have many of the resources to
be self sufficient.
 Many don’t know where their food comes
from much less how to process a chicken or
can vegetables.
Assets to Fight
Agroterrorism
Assets
 Disease eradication programs
– Procedures to prevent are written down for the
diseases we have eradicated
 Multi-agency disease response plans
– Plans are developed to deal with animal
disease disasters
 850+ Veterinarians in Kentucky
Assets
 Majority of poultry and swine are inside
 Swine and poultry producers practice good
biosecuirty.
 Producers are pretty vigilant
– generally know when a stranger is in the
neighborhood
Assets
 Producers use of veterinarians
– This helps with quick diagnosis of disease
 We have the farming infrastructure to be
self-sufficient if needed.
– We could shut down imports and still have an
adequate food supply
Assets
 Disease Surveillance and Detection
Programs
– Help speed up detection of disease.
 Good diagnostic labs
– Lab infrastructure is available to help diagnosis
diseases.
 National Animal Disease Center and
National Veterinary Services Laboratory in
Ames
Basic Disease
Information
Some Quick History
 Over the last 100 years States and the Federal
Government have worked to eradicate the most
dangerous human and animal diseases.
– After we eradicate an animal diseases they are
labeled Foreign Animal Diseases or FADs
 The success in eradication of diseases leaves
us vulnerable to reintroduction.
Small pox ring a bell?
Disease Categories
 Animal Diseases: Infect animals with little to no
public health significance.
 Foot and Mouth Disease, Hog cholera(classical swine fever)
 Human Diseases: Infect humans with little to no
animal health significance.
 Small pox, Polio
 Zoonotic Diseases: Infect both humans and
animals.
 Anthrax, Influenza
Diseases We Worry About?
 There are many highly infectious animal
diseases and each of them falls into one
of the previous 3 categories.
 Highly Infectious Animal Diseases
– includes many of the foreign animal diseases
but also includes diseases that have yet to
be eradicated from the United States.
Highly Infectious Animal
Diseases
 There is an international
group, the Office of
International Epizootic
(OIE) that maintains a
list of highly infectious
animal diseases.
http://www.oie.int
 They define these
diseases as List A
diseases
OIE definition:List A Diseases
Transmissible diseases that
have the potential for very
serious and rapid spread,
irrespective of national
borders, that are of serious
socio-economic or public
health consequence and that
are of major importance in the
international trade of animals
and animal products.
Foreign Animal Diseases
 Diseases that are not currently in the United
States because they have been eradicated or
have never been diagnosed in the United
States.
– Foot and Mouth Disease, Classical Swine Fever
(Hog Cholera)
 Not all foreign animal diseases fall in the
highly infectious category.
– However, they most likely have economic
repercussions so we don’t want them here in the
U.S.
Reportable Diseases
 Every state has a list of diseases that are
reportable by law to the State
Veterinarian’s office.
– Usually includes all list A diseases
– Diseases that are significant to the state
 West Nile and Pseudorabies
– Not all diseases are reportable
 common livestock diseases are excluded
Foreign Animal Diseases
 From an economic standpoint we fear these
diseases because they would cause us to
lose our international export markets.
 From a disease standpoint many of these
disease are controllable and only a few
would be extremely difficult to eradicate
– Foot and Mouth would be the best example
– Many of these diseases would not require a
multi-agency response.
Foreign Animal Diseases
 Vesicular diseases:
– Foot and Mouth Disease
– Vesicular Stomatitis
– Swine Vesicular Disease
– Vesicular Exanthema of Swine
 Classical Swine Fever (Hog Cholera) and
African Swine Fever
Foreign Animal Diseases
 Capripox Virus Diseases
 Rinderpest and Peste des Petits Ruminants
 Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia
Highly Infectious Disease that
are not FAD’s
 These disease affect our export markets on
a state basis.
– Avian influenza
– Newcastles disease
Plant Diseases
 Rice Blast
 Stem Rust
– Wheat Stem Rust
The role of the USDA
and the Kentucky
Department of
Agriculture
Role of the USDA
 Protects the national agriculture through
regulatory activities.
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Regulations for importing animals and products
Eradication Programs
Surveillance Programs
Disease Diagnostics
Disease Research
Food safety
Role of Kentucky Department of
Agriculture
 Protects Kentucky’s agriculture through
regulatory activities.
– Kentucky Department of Agriculture is
responsible for safeguarding animal health.
Kentucky Department of Agriculture
 Develops rules for Kentucky covering
animals and animal health.
 Administers Regulatory Programs
– Disease Eradication Programs, Pet Store, Sale
Barn, and Boarding Inspections
 Ensures Regulatory Compliance
 Disease Investigations
 Disease Surveillance and Detection
State Vets Office Assets
 People
– State and Deputy State Veterinarian.
– 2 Field Service Vets.
 1 Foreign Animal Disease Veterinarian.
– 18 State Livestock Inspectors.
– 3 Branch Managers & 7 Supervisors
– 9 Compliance Investigators.
 Small stockpile of equipment,
disinfectant and PPE.
Animal Movement
In General
 The USDA and State Departments of
Agriculture try to work together as much as
possible on animal health issues for each
state.
– The State sets the animal health regulations
and intrastate movement rules that are to be
followed.
– The USDA sets foreign import regulations,
international and interstate movement rules that
are to be followed.
Background
 Each State has a current health status when
it comes to most animal diseases.
– This status is usually known or can easily be
found out with a phone call.
– The states animal health status determines
what regulations other states will put on them
when animals are being imported.
– Health status can change over night
 Example: CWD
Animal Movement
 Goals
– Prevent the spread of disease
 ensures only healthy animals are imported
– Establish a “paper trail” of movement
 vitally important when investigating disease
outbreaks.
Rules of Movement
 There are rules of movement for each
species of animal moving into Kentucky.
– As law enforcement you don’t need to know the
rules just remember that the veterinarian who
issued a health paper is responsible for making
sure the rules are followed.
Foreign Imports
 Importing Animals into the United States
– Regulated by Animal Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS)
 Primary role is to prevent diseases from entering into
the United States.
– All animals entering the US have to meet health
requirements for that species.
– Involves long periods of quarantine
– Expensive and time consuming for the exporter
and importer.
Reasons for Movement in
Kentucky
 Producer to producer with a change of
ownership.
 Producer to a Sale Barn
– Sale barn to Slaughter
– Sale barn to New Producer
 Producer to slaughter
Foreign Animal Disease
Investigations
Disease Investigations
 Done by a Foreign Animal Disease
Diagnostician (FADD)
– A Veterinarian that has gone to a special
school to receive training in investigating
possible Foreign Animal Disease
outbreaks.
 Training includes work with animals infected
with the most devastating Foreign Animal
Diseases.
 This training is provided by the Federal
government on Plum Island at a federal facility
which is off the coast of Long Island, New York
Disease Investigations
 General Outline
– The producer or veterinary practitioner calls the
State Vets office and/or the AVIC and reports a
disease syndrome.
– The State Veterinarian and AVIC will discuss the
case and dispatch a FADD to the site to
investigate.
– At that point the FADD acts as the incident
commander for this particular incident.
Disease Investigations
 General Outline
– The FADD reports the findings back to the State
Veterinarian and AVIC who then make a
decision as to what action to take.
– There is a verbal quarantine issued followed by
a written copy of that quarantine.
 Producers cannot move animals on to or off of the
premises.
– Some form of biosecurity is established
Disease Investigations
 General Outline
– Tracing starts which determines the
movement of animals on and off the
premises over a specified time period.
– Tracing will also include the movement of
people on and off of the premises over a
specified period of time.
Disease Investigations
 General Outline
– Producers are asked not to discuss the
investigation and to follow all the rules and
regulation placed on them and the premises
– Most producers comply with little to no
objections
Disease Investigations
 Take home Message
– Kentucky does 20 to 30 FAD investigations per
year, as do other states.
– In general the producer is cooperative and
information in kept private.
Surveillance Activities
 Surveillance
– KDA constantly monitors the health status
of other states and countries.
 When necessary we can change rules
regarding movement of animals from other
states or countries.
– .KDA monitors livestock congregation
points
– KDA inspects sale barns
– Investigators monitor road movement of
animals
Programs and Educational
Activities
 Programs
– KDA has developed and participated in
multiple programs for the eradication of
certain economically important diseases.
 Pseudorabies is an excellent example of a
successful program.
 Education
– KDA has developed educational programs
for producers and veterinarians to discuss
important animal health issues.
Communication
 KDA communicates with producers,
veterinarians, federal counterparts and the
general public to help provide reliable and
accurate information as it relates to animal
health issues.
State Plan Overview
In the Past
 Prevention has been the main focus
because for the most part the United
States is free of Foreign Animal
Diseases.
 The Federal Government has
developed response plans to certain
foreign animal diseases that are
updated periodically.
 Up to a year ago most states had not
developed a response plan to Foreign
Kentucky’s Response and
Recovery Plan
 Why is a plan important?
– Kentucky did not have any plan that dealt with
animal disease disasters resulting from highly
infectious diseases like FMD.
– The quicker Kentucky could react to a Foreign
Animal Disease the better. A comprehensive
plan will decrease reaction time.
A Successful Plan Would Allow
For:
 Rapid detection
– The faster the better!
 Rapid containment and eradication
– Intense biosecurity and intense surveillance!
 Rapid recovery
– Limits socioeconomic losses
Planning Accomplishments
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FMD Response and Recovery Plan
FMD Operations Manual
Dairy Industry Response Plan
IRVIN (Kentucky Rapid Veterinary
Information Network)
 Training Modules
 Education
Foot and Mouth Disease
Response and Recovery Plan
 Defines the trigger points that would be
used to determine the level of response to
an FMD outbreak.
 The plan is being rolled into an Infectious
Animal Disease Disaster Plan.
FMD Operations Manual
 Contains the Protocols and SOPs that would
be used by IDALS in an FMD outbreak. For
example:
– Quarantine protocols, euthanasia protocols,
cleaning & disinfecting protocols, animal
movement regulations, animal product
regulations, communication pathways.
 Correlates to other agencies plans in the
event of an outbreak.
Milk Industry Response Plan
 Plan was developed with the dairy industry
to address the special problems that FMD
would present to the industry.
 The plan describes SOPs and protocols that
would come into play during an FMD
outbreak to reduce the risk of spread of the
FMD virus and continue to ensure milk
safety.
Kentucky’s Rapid Veterinary
Information Network (IRVIN)
 It was determined that IDALS needed a way
to quickly communicate information to
Kentucky’s veterinarians during an FMD
outbreak.
 IRVIN uses burst e-mail technology to
communicate with veterinarians who are on
a list server maintained by IDALS on the
ICN.
Training for Veterinarians
 4 Continuing Education Meetings were
offered to all Kentucky licensed
veterinarians
– Approximately 250 vets attended
 More are planned for next year
– We are hoping to continue to offer them on a
yearly basis
Training For Other Agencies
 Training modules must be developed to
educate other state agencies that would
respond to an infectious animal disease
disaster.
Education is being provided for:
 Producers
 Producer Advocacy Groups
 Industry
Next on the list!
 Veterinary Response Teams
– Veterinary Response Teams made up of private
practitioners should be developed and trained.
– Teams would be trained in biosecurity,
euthanasia, surveillance and inspection.
– These teams will decrease the response time to
an animal disease disaster, which will be
essential for containment.
Quick Overview of the Kentucky
FMD Response and Recovery
Plan
 The state plan outlines who is responsible
for what and when they are to act!
– Each state agency involved has been assigned
responsibilities to the Plan
– Each agency then determines how they will
meet their responsibilities to the plan
Who is Involved in Planning?
 Governors Office, IDALS, IEMD, IDNR,
IDOT, IDPS, IDPH, DPD/Guard.
 Industry Groups
 Kentucky University College of Veterinary
Medicine
Foot and Mouth Disease Virus
Why should we worry?
 It affects the most number of
economically important species.
 It can spread by direct contact, indirect
contact and aerosol.
 100% of susceptible animals exposed will
become infected.
There are 4 Action Levels that
Could Activate the State Plan
 Action Level 4: FMD in North America but not
Kentucky
 Action Level 3: Presumptive Positive case of
FMD in Kentucky
 Action Level 2: Confirmed Positive FMD case
of FMD in Kentucky, local resources are
sufficient
 Action Level 1: Same as 2, but local
resources are exhausted
Some Key Responsibilities
 IDALS - Lead state agency
 EMD - Communication pathways,
resource location and allocation
 DNR - Wildlife risk assessment,
identification of disposal location
 DOT - Burial equipment, organizes
private contractors, enforces movement
restrictions
 DPS - Perimeter security, conflict
Federal Interface
 The State Veterinarian and the Federal Area
Veterinarian in Charge would work together
to determine a course of action during an
outbreak.
 Federal resources would be available
eventually, but states should be prepared to
handle the first couple of cases using state
resources.
Action Level 4
FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky
 What will happen first!
– The Kentucky Secretary of Agriculture will notify
the Governor of a Foot and Mouth Disease
outbreak.
– The Kentucky Secretary of Agriculture will
request a proclamation of disaster emergency.
 This will clear the way to allow an expansion of state
powers to enforce an embargo.
Action Level 4
FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky
 Initial investigation!
– The philosophy is to be tough in the
beginning and lift restrictions later. Initially,
you can’t be too careful when dealing with
FMD.
 The initial investigation may take in excess of two
weeks!
 All animal movement will either stop or be
accounted for!
 Don’t be surprised if there is a national shut
down.
Action Level 4
FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky
 Determining the restricted area!
– Infected state and the contiguous states.
 If FMD was found in North Carolina then North
Carolina and bordering states would become a
restricted area.
 Embargo would include all animals, animal
products and equipment coming into the state.
– Kentucky will begin tracing to see if
animals have entered the state from the
restricted areas.
 Veterinarians can help with this process by
notifying the State Vet of knowledge of any
movement.
Action Level 4
FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky
 Major concerns during the initial
investigation (prior to permit system)!
– Animals and animal products already on the
road to Kentucky.
 This should not be a concern after the first 48 hours.
– Tracing of animals and animal products that
have entered Kentucky in the last 30 days.
 Especially movement from the restricted areas.
Action Level 4
FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky
 Animals and animal products already on the
road to Kentucky!
– IDALS would work with DOT and DPS to control
movement.
 There will be a need for veterinarians and inspectors
to provide support to DOT and DPS to help
determine origin and destination of animals.
Action Level 4
FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky
 Animals and animal products already on
the road to Kentucky!
– If origin is from a non-restricted area then
there are two options.
 1. If destination is not Kentucky, then the vehicle
will be given a permit to pass through Kentucky.
 2. If destination is Kentucky, the vehicle will be
given a permit to deliver. Any premises receiving
animals will be under a 30 day movement and
inspection quarantine.
Action Level 4
FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky
 Tracing of animals and animal products that
have entered Kentucky in the last 30 days!
– Premises that have received animals from the
restricted area will be quarantined and be
placed on the State Inspection List.
– Premises that received animals from the nonrestricted areas will have a 30 day movement
quarantine.
Action Level 4
FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky
 Controlling movement of animals and animal
products into the State!
– A permit system will be implemented requiring
permits for movement of all animals, animal
products, and agricultural equipment into the
State
 Origin must be from the non-restricted areas or
permit will be denied.
Action Level 4
FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky
 Controlling movement of animals and animal
products within the State.
– Unless specifically quarantined, movement of
livestock will be as normal.
– Movement should be limited to welfare reasons.
 Example: From a swine nursery to a grower.
Action Level 3
Presumptive Positive in Kentucky
 Declaration will be based on:
– Epidemiology
– Serology
– FADD Investigation
 Duration of action level 3 will be short
– Virus Isolation is Positive = Action Level 2
– Virus Isolation is Negative = Action Level 4
Action Level 3
Presumptive Positive in Kentucky
 Behind the scenes!
– Unified command notified.
– Farm is quarantined.
 Tracing starts
 Contiguous premises determined, notified,
investigated and given biosecurity instructions.
 High risk zone, buffer zone determined.
Action Level 3
Presumptive Positive in Kentucky
 Behind the scenes!
– Gather necessary equipment.
– Notify the players for IDALS responsibilities.
 Appraisers
 Euthanasia teams
 C&D teams
 Veterinarians
Action Level 2
Confirmed Positive in Kentucky
 Viral isolation is positive for FMD!
– Preparation work done prior to virus
isolation during Action Level 3 is initiated.
– Shut Down
 Animal concentration points
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Sale Barns
Buying Stations
Fairs
Zoo’s
So what would happen if we got
FMD?
 FMD in another State
– Embargo the infected state. No movement
of animals to Kentucky.
– Initially embargo the contiguous states
around the infected state.
– Trace any animal movement into Kentucky
from embargoed areas.
 Any animals that were exposed to FMD will be
humanely euthanitized.
What if we had FMD in
Kentucky?
 FMD in Kentucky
– Close all sale barns, fair, livestock
concentration points.
– Suspend A.I. and Embryo Transfer
– Initially stop all movement of susceptible
animals, then institute a permit system to
control movement.
– Set up quarantine zones
 Humanely euthanize all exposed susceptible
animals
– Trace animal movements
Containment
 Trace, Trace, Trace
– We must know if movement of animals,
equipment and people have exposed other
premises.
 Tracing will be the most difficult and
time consuming task!
– If any premises are determined to be
exposed then the Quarantine Zone will be
set up.
Scenario
The Scenario: October 1st & 2nd
 It’s late fall 2002, temperatures have been in
the upper 50’s, lows in the upper 30’s and
rainfall has been normal.
 Kentucky’s State Vet’s office is busy with
normal activities when a call comes to Dr.
Schiltz from his counter part in North
Carolina.
 The State Vet in North Carolina tells Dr .
Schiltz that some swine samples sent
into the Foreign Animal Disease
Diagnostic Laboratory in Plum Island
have presumptively tested positive for
FMD!
 North Carolina has decided to activate
their FMD Plan and is issuing a press
release.
 About the same time Kentucky’s
Federal Area Veterinarian in Charge
 Dr. Schiltz notifies the Secretary of
Agriculture as to the situation.
 A meeting is held with the State Vet,
AVIC and the Secretary to discuss
options.
 It is decided that the risk warrants
notification of the Governor.
 Kentucky’s Secretary of Agriculture
requests a Proclamation of Disaster
Emergency which activates the State
Plan to Action Level 4.
 The Unified Command is notified of the
situation.
 The Animal Health Emergency
Response Teams are notified.
– Industry, producer groups, veterinary
organizations.
 The State Vets office begins intense
tracing procedures to determine animal
movements from North Carolina for the
last 30 days.
October 2nd and 3rd
 An embargo is placed on all live animals
coming into Kentucky from North Carolina
and contiguous states around it.
 The DOT and Law Enforcement are
asked to stop all vehicles carrying
livestock to determine origin and species.
 Kentucky’s Milk Industry Response Plan
is activated.
 Kentucky Rapid Veterinary Information
Network is activated and a notice is sent
out detailing the situation to Kentucky
Veterinarians.
 Press releases are sent out to detail the
situation to the public.
Meanwhile Back in Washington
 After the appropriate declarations by the
Secretary of Agriculture of the United States,
there is a 72 hour moratorium on all animal
movement across the United States.
 Activation of the Regional Emergency
Animal Disease Eradication Organization
(READEO)is underway.
October 2nd -3rd
 During a trace of swine moving from
North Carolina, it is determined that
1000 feeder pigs came into Kentucky 5
days ago from the same production
facility that is quarantined in N.C.
 The feeder pigs ended up in a facility in
Chickasaw County outside of New
Hampton.
 The production facility is called by the
State Vet and told of the situation. A
verbal quarantine is issued and a
Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician
(FADD) is sent to the premises.
 The FADD examines the pigs and
determines that some have clinical
signs consistent with FMD. Samples are
taken and are sent to Plum Island.
 Veterinary inspections of contiguous
premises is initiated.
 The farm is officially quarantined,
secured, and biosecurity protocols are
put in place.
 IDALS starts trace outs on anyone who
has come in contact with that farm.
 With all the evidence available from the
FADD, the State Vet, AVIC and
Secretary of Agriculture agree that the
State should proceed to action Level 3.
 Unified command and AHERT are
notified
October 3rd - 5th
 DNR is given the 911 address and legal
description of the premises.
 DNR initiates a wildlife assessment of area.
 Entry points and decontamination stations
are determined and set up on the infected
premises.
 Perspective quarantine zone is determined
and communicated to EMD.
Entry/Exit for Infected or
Contiguous Premises
 Local sheriff’s office is briefed on the
situation.
 Sheriff is asked to prepare to set up a
perimeter 6.2 miles out from the infected
premises.
– All roads that bisect the perimeter must be
shut down and entry/ exit points are
established
 Law enforcement is asked to prepare to
stop vehicles moving live animals in that
county.
 Requests are put out to local fire and
HAZMAT to prepare to set up
 Location of all necessary equipment for
euthanasia, burial and disposal is
determined.
 Personnel responsible for those
functions are notified.
 Rules and regulations are prepared to
be implemented and communicated to
the Unified Command and AHERT
 Tracing continues for more live animal
shipments into Kentucky.
October 5th-6th
 A confirmed positive case of FMD from
the production facility in North Carolina
is reported by Plum Island.
 The State Vet, AVIC and Secretary of
Agriculture agree, based on the
evidence, that the state should progress
to Action Level 2.
 All Level 3 preparations are
implemented.
 Susceptible animals on the presumptive
Kentucky farm are depopulated….why?
Rationale For Depopulation
 North Carolina had a confirmed case.
 The pigs that entered Kentucky from
N.C. came from the same facility and
had signs consistent with FMD.
 Those animals are at an extreme high
risk for having FMD.
 During the time between Action Level 3
and 2 the following will be happening.
– DNR has used the GPS to locate a suitable
burial site in the depopulation zone.
– DNR has mobilized personnel to the site to
do a burial assessment.
– DNR should have finished a wildlife
assessment for the quarantine area.
– IDALS , EMD, DOT and DNR will be
communicating to get the needed burial
equipment to the site.
– Access to the site will involve strict
biosecurity procedures in and out of the
 During the time between Action Level 3
and 2 the following will be happening.
– Local law enforcement should have set up
the perimeter and be providing personnel
to man entry/exit
– Local law enforcement should be stopping
all vehicles carrying animals and checking
health papers
– Local law enforcement should be available
to mediate conflict resolutions between
producers and State Officials
 Expected biosecurity procedures.
– There is only one entry to a premises.
– Vehicles will remain off premises unless
approved by IDALS.
– A change of clothes into disposable
coveralls prior to entering the premises.
– Absolutely no contact with animals or
areas where animals are housed.
– Don’t bring on anything that can’t be
dipped in disinfectant.
 Watches, hearing aids, palm pilots etc.
 Cell phones can be placed in plastic bags.
 Biosecurity procedures
– When personnel are done with their
assigned tasks they will go to the
decontamination station on the premises.
– After decontamination, personnel will not
be allowed to come into contact with
susceptible animals for 1 week, unless
they are sent to another confirmed positive
premises.
Disinfectants
 The primary disinfectants that will be used
are:
– Citric acid at 1% or less dilution
– Virkon S at a 2% or less dilution
– Oxysept 333 (paracetic acid)
– Sodium Hydroxide
– Bleach
Back to the Scenario
October 5th and 6th
 Action Level 2 declared.
– All sale barns, fairs, animal collection points,
breeding facilities are closed and inspected by
veterinarians.
– All zoo’s, parks and animal attractions are
closed and inspected by veterinarians.
– All movement of animals in Kentucky stops
unless movement is approved by IDALS, people
caught moving livestock with out permission will
be penalized.
 Tracing from the Kentucky premises
determines that a feed truck,
veterinarian, and one hired individual all
were on the farm in the last 5 days.
– All premises with susceptible animals that
were visited by the feed truck, veterinarian
and hired hand are now quarantined and
investigated.
– If proper biosecurity was not maintained by
any of the above people. Any farms with
susceptible animals will be depopulated
and the process starts all over again.
Scenario October 6th - 7th
 Kentucky results are positive for FMD.
– Veterinarians will be inspecting premises in
the quarantine zone on a regular basis to
look for FMD.
– Any farm that has susceptible animals
showing clinical signs of FMD will be
depopulated.
– Once a farm is depopulated, a
decontamination team will disinfect the
farm and it will sit empty for 30 days or
more.
Scenario October 6th - 7th
Continued
 Veterinary inspection, of a 300 head
feedlot 10 miles down wind from the
infected swine facility, determines that
the cattle have clinical signs consistent
with FMD.
 The veterinarian calls in the premises to
be depopulated
 Unified Command is notified and the
whole process starts over again……….
Comments
 Implementation of new vaccines, new
differential tests and new diagnostic tools
will change the way we handle FMD in the
future.
 Until those methods are validated and
available we will have to rely on what we
currently have planned.
Conclusion
 You can see how FMD could spread very
rapidly!
 If Kentucky got FMD our best chance to stop
it is early in the infection.
 If FMD gets a foot hold, our resources will
quickly dwindle.
 Lets hope we never have to use the plan!
The Quarantine Zone
Plan Changes
 Initially we came up with the definitions for
our zones, however as other state, regional
and federal plans develop the definitions are
going to change in order to provide
continuity across all plans.
 Rather that focus on names I want to
address common concepts that will apply to
all animal disease disasters.
Overview
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Legal authority
Flow of information
Quarantine Zone
Zone Security
Incident command structure
Cleaning and Disinfecting
Personal Protective Gear
Legal Authority
 The question of quarantine?
– According to the Code of Kentucky, IDALS
already has the ability to control the movement
of animals and agricultural products.
– The quarantine of people to their premises is a
little more complicated.
 We believe that after the Governor signs the
proclamation of disaster emergency the ability to
control the movement of people exists.
Flow of information
 Two major routes of information
– Directly from the Department of Agriculture
officials.
 Incident commander
 Forward command post
 Veterinarian on the premises
– Via EMD and the EM 2000 system
 Will help coordinate all activities of all involved state
agencies
Quarantine Zone
 Will be one of the only consistent
features of any animal disease disaster
that activates the state plan.
 No two diseases are alike so:
– Size will be variable.
– Level of security will be variable.
– Level of cleaning and disinfecting will be
variable.
 Within a Quarantine Zone there will be a
perimeter set up.
QZ: The Perimeter
 Focused area of security
– Designated entry and exit points.
– C&D units present at all entry/exits.
– Entry and Exit by permission only.
 Strict Movement Restrictions!
– All animal movement by permit only.
– Movement for Animal Welfare reasons only.
QZ: Security
 The perimeter will have entry/exit
points.
 Once the perimeter is set up, patrols
inside the premises should not be
needed.
– Established entry/exit points will control the
movement of people, animals and vehicles.
 Outside of the perimeter patrols may be
needed to make sure movement rules
are being followed.
QZ: Security
 The DOT made mention of being able to
provide ID’s for those involved in response.
 In the first few days verbal approval will
have to be sought until the ID system is
implemented.
Incident Command Structure
 The USDA has decided to use this during
disease disasters.
 All Federal and State veterinary officials will
eventually be trained in ICS.
 My next goal is to try to break down all of
this planning into ICS verbiage.
Incident Command Structure
 Based on the ICS model local law
enforcement will be utilized first then
regional, then state, then possibly the
National Guard.
 The fact is we won’t have enough people to
enforce all the rules, so we have to
prioritize.
 Best illustrated via an example.
The Incident
 An FADD is tripped to a farm where a Foreign
Animal Disease my be present.
– At this point the FADD is the Incident Commander
– In most cases the incident will be resolved without
involvement from other state agencies
– If it is highly likely there is a disease like FMD present
then things change.
The Incident
 Note!
– If for some reason in your normal duties you are
the first to end up on a premises where there is
a suspected animal disease outbreak, do not
leave that premises.
– The State Veterinarians Office should be
contacted a soon as possible. (515-281-5305)
– The State Veterinarian will advise you on what
steps need to be taken.
The Incident
 With activation of the State Plan the
following should happen.
– EMD or the State Veterinarian will contact the
county sheriff to ask for assistance.
– Information detailing the Incident will be given
out along with instructions
– At this point we will have a presumed positive
case
The Incident
 The infected premises
– This is the first premises secured. In most cases
a law enforcement person will not be needed,
but it is a possibility.
The Incident
 If you are tripped to the infected premises.
– Do not park on the farm, park on the road.
– Do not walk on to the farm wait for the FADD to
give you instructions.
– If it is a distress call then you can enter the
premises. We can always disinfect you if we
have to!
The Incident
 The Contiguous Premises
– The second premises secured
– Again, you may not be needed to secure this
premises.
– Same rules of entry apply to the contiguous
premises
The Incident
 Setting up a Perimeter in the Quarantine
Zone
– This will be the most likely activity that you will
be asked to do.
– We will rely heavily on your expertise. You will
have input.
– Our major requirement will be that the perimeter
must be a certain minimum distance from the
incident depending on the disease.
The Incident
 For example:
– There is a farm in Story County that is suspect
for FMD.
– We would need a perimeter at least 6.2 miles
from the Incident
 All roads that enter the perimeter must be blocked
off and entry/exit points established.
The Incident
 Inside the perimeter, the movement of
animals, animal products and wastes will be
severely restricted.
– This area should not have to be patrolled
 Outside of the perimeter there will be
movement restrictions. Nothing will move
without permission and documentation.
– Patrols would have to help enforce movement
bans
The Incident
 Trucks hauling animals without
documentation will be sent back to the
premises of origin.
 That person should be reported to IDALS so
we can put a quarantine on the premises.
 If the movement infraction is serious enough
the producer could face a loss of indemity
on their animals.
The Incident
 Once a forward command is established the
Incident Commander will change.
 The Veterinarian on the premises will still be
in charge of activities on that particular
premises.
Conflict Resolution
 Obviously, if we are going to destroy the
livelihood of a producer tensions may run
high.
– In England, officials were periodically
threatened with guns or violence.
 The same skills that you have now for
resolving conflict may be required.
– The only difference is you may have to be
decontaminated after the problem is resolved.
Cleaning and Disinfecting
 There will be C&D at each entry and exit
point on the perimeter.
– Provided by the local fire department or
HAZMAT crew
 There will be C&D on every infected
premises, contiguous premises and contact
exposed premises.
Cleaning and Disinfecting
 If you have to go on a premises to
investigate.
– We will provide you with protective wear.
– Don’t wear anything that can’t be dipped in
disinfectant.
 Watches, electronics, wallets, papers.
 Radios and cell phones can be put into plastic bags
Cleaning and Disinfecting
 Once you are done, you will be cleaned and
disinfected on the premises.
 You will not come into contact with
susceptible animals or clean premises for 5
to 7 days.
– However you may be utilized on other infected
premises.
Personal Protective Gear
 Depending on the disease present, you will
be provided with necessary protective gear.
 I don’t predict that the majority of deputies
will have direct contact with disease agents.
 If direct contact is necessary then we will
provide what you will need.
– Coveralls, respirators (if necessary), gloves,
protective eyeware.
Investigations
 In the event it is determined that the disease
introduction is deliberate, an investigation is
warranted.
– Investigators will be briefed on the disease,
biosecurity requirements and given personal
protective gear by the FADD or other
designated veterinary official.
Chain of evidence
 Samples that are taken by the FADD can be
used a evidence for that particular farm.
 Any other evidence that investigators want
can be taken but must be disinfected prior to
leaving
– Example: You want to take a document, then
you place it in an evidence bag and the
evidence bag is disinfected.
When in doubt
 The best resource for you out in the field is
the veterinarian.
 Don’t hesitate to utilize them for all your
questions on a situation.