Transcript Conflict in the South China Sea

Conflict in the South China Sea
SOSC 228
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A. Background on South China Sea
Islands and Why Care?
B. Competing Claims
C. Points of Conflict
D. ASEAN Views and Efforts
E. China’s Statements and Activities
F. Roots of Chinese actions?
G. External forces
H. How big a threat to regional peace?
I. Potential Solutions
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A. Background on South China
Sea Islands and Why Care?
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two island groups, Paracels and Spratlys,
Paracels firmly in Chinese hands since
January 1974, when China seized islands
from South Vietnamese government.
little land, huge area of water, nations
cannot easily station troops
need for blue water navy, aircraft that refuel
in the air.
Resources: natural gas, oil, fishing
Important shipping lanes with 15% of
world’s trade passing through these sea
lanes.
End of Cold War created a power vacuum in
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the region
B. Competing Claims
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Six governments—Philippines, China, Taiwan,
Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei have claims, very
overlapping.
China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim all the
islands—Malaysia, Brunei, and Philippines claim
some of them.
Dobson and Fravel--China’s claims ambiguous,
refusing to draw clear “exclusive economic zones”
(EEZ) to maximize flexibility in negotiations.
China’s claim based on history, artifacts, Zeng Ho
voyages.
goes back to 1930s, but bolstered by March 1992
NPC territorial law affirming China’s claim to the
Spratly Islands and authoring the PLAN to use
force to protect its sovereignty.
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C. Points of Conflict
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Dispute began after UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea guaranteed exploitation
rights of undersea resources to state’s
adjacent waters, so pushed state’s to
make public claims to offshore islands.
Law of Sea set 200 mile offshore area as
exclusive economic zones (EEZs).
Also gave states sovereign rights over
continental shelf.
Before this, China and Vietnam had fought
over the Paracel Islands in 1974.
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D. ASEAN Views and Efforts
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ASEAN hesitancy to air dispute in public and
confront China, although several members feel
threatened.
Indonesia sought to carry out “confidence building
measures” after 1991 to keep dispute from
exploding but these efforts have had limited
success
1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea
called on all states to settle disputes peacefully
and support regional cooperation.
Philippines (and Vietnam) as most strenuous
resistor of China’s efforts
1995, President Ramos went on public television to
challenge China in Mischief Reef.
In 1998, Philippines took journalists to see China’s
building of naval platforms at Mischief Reef, well
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inside Philippines 200 mile zone.
D. ASEAN Views and Efforts (con’t)
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Philippines feels unable to defend itself due to
weaker military,
Vietnam fought with China in 1988 and lost 6
islands. Major conflict with China over oil
exploration.
Vietnamese problems seen in isolation by ASEAN,
until China took Mischief Reef (Philippine’s claim)
and until Vietnam joined ASEAN.
Now, as member of ASEAN, Vietnam tries to use
ASEAN to defend its interests in the SCS, but
receives only limited support. Feels it must
“bandwagon” on this issue.
Critical role of Hangzhou meeting in April 1995,
where ASEAN criticized China behind closed doors.
ASEAN maintains somewhat united front versus
China and before the Asian Crisis was buying lots
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of weapons.
E. China’s Statements and Activities
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Took Paracels by force in 1974 from South
Vietnamese government.
Paracels as key base for military support in
Spratlys.
China professes conciliatory policy but most
aggressive in pursuing military solutions.
1990, Li Peng offered to resolve conflict
peacefully
Defense Chief, in 1993, Chi Haotian promised
that China would not use force.
July 1995, Qian Qichen told ASEAN that China
would insure freedom of navigation.
May 1996, China ratified the Law of the Sea
Convention
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F. Roots of Chinese actions?
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Garver sees PLAN pushing south, based on bureaucratic
energies—bases in Zhanjiang—that cannot be
constrained by the central government.
Could also increase PLAN demand for funding.
Dobson and Fravel call this a “talk and take” policy, and
see it due to bureaucratic conflict between PLA Navy
(PLAN) and the MOFA.
also see PLAN independence on Spratlys as pay-off to
PLA for supporting CCP in Tiananmen crackdown.
Sovereignty issues, relating to “century of
humiliation,” —creates support for claims for Taiwan as
well, which also appeal to nationalism—key source of
CCP legitimacy.
In meeting in Shanghai, retired military leaders took
hard-line position, that they could not give up territories
that might be claimed by the next generation of Chinese.
China keeps issue off multilateral agendas, preferring
bilateral discussions.
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G. External forces
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Philippines pulls in U.S., while most ASEAN
powers want to keep the external powers out of
the dispute.
U.S. as hegemon, feels need to prevent conflict
and insure right of passage for all vesels.
U.S. Defense Dept. in 1995 said the U.S. would
insure free navigation by escorting ships
through the South China Sea if conflicts broke
out.
Japanese enhanced security agreement with
U.S. could get them more involved in
minesweeping and other support activity.
Vietnam tried to pull U.S. in by giving oil
concessions to U.S. oil companies.
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H. How big a threat to regional peace?
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Dobson and Fravel do not see the South
China Sea becoming “a Chinese lake.”
Much activity to date is establishing claims,
outposts and then threatening other
country’s citizens who come too close to
claimed territories.
Conflict limited by China’s limited
capabilities--”even if China were the
hegemon some believe it to be, its military
is incapable of filling a hegemon’s shoes.”
(p. 261).
China has no aircraft carrier, but it does
have power to refuel in the air.
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I. Potential Solutions
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Track II negotiations underway under Indonesian
lead since 1990, leading to establishment of
working groups on resource assessment and
development, marine scientific research,
environmental protection, biodiversity research,
and legal matters.
concept of joint exploration, setting aside
territorial claims, put forward by Li Peng in 1990
but quite unclear what “joint exploration” means
in practise.
Valencia’s solution of a Spratly Management
Authority (SMA) to administer the region, with
countries holding shares in the authority and
getting profits from resources.
current debate in 1999 to establish a “code of
conduct” for states in the region.
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