State of the Exploit
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Transcript State of the Exploit
Trust
Boundary
Exploitation
State of the Exploit
Matt Miller / [email protected]
Vulnerability
What is the state of the exploit?
Where do generic exploitation techniques
stand in 2008?
Formidable
mitigations exist (ASLR, NX, GS)
Many techniques impractical or impossible
Exploits are more reliant on vuln-specific qualities
How can we evaluate the relevance &
feasibility of current & future techniques?
Exploitability
analysis
Exploitability analysis
Studying the qualities that influence
exploitation
If a vulnerability exists, how exploitable would it be?
Research directions
Exploitation properties
Simulating exploitation
Exploitation
Properties
What are exploitation properties?
Specific qualities that enable or inhibit
exploitation techniques
Objectively
derived from a program
Vulnerability independent
Intuitively known, but not formally defined
Exploits
have always relied on exploitation
properties
Relating to exploitation techniques
Exploitation techniques have pre-conditions
that must be satisfied
SEH
overwrite must be able to overwrite EH
record
Exploitation properties help determine the
satisfiability of those pre-conditions
Function
called in EH scope == TRUE
Examples of exploitation properties
Processor
supports
NX
T
Function
called in
EH scope
F
Execute code
from NX region
T
Function
uses GS
F
SEH overwrite
Inhibits
Enables
T
F
Return address
overwrite
Deriving exploitation property values
Dynamic analysis
Hardware
properties (NX supported?)
Operating system properties (ASLR supported?)
Process properties (NX enabled?)
Static analysis
Binary
module properties (Relocateable?)
Function properties (GS enabled?)
Case study: MS07-017 (ANI)
Animated cursor vulnerability found by
Alexander Sotirov in late 2006
Stack-based
buffer overflow
First highly exploitable issue to affect Vista
Why was it so exploitable?
MS07-017 vulnerability details
01: int LoadAniIcon(struct MappedFile* file, ...) {
02:
struct ANIChunk chunk;
03:
struct ANIHeader header; // 36 byte structure
04:
while (1) {
05:
// read the first 8 bytes of the chunk
06:
ReadTag(file, &chunk);
07:
switch (chunk.tag) {
08:
case ’anih’:
09:
// read chunk.size bytes into header
10:
ReadChunk(file, &chunk, &header);
Credit to Sotirov for the pseudo-code
Exploitation properties of MS07-017
Inhibitors
OS properties
ASLR present
SafeSEH present
Enablers
Function properties
GS not present
Called in EH scope
Partial overwrite is feasible
Hardware properties
NX supported
Process properties
NX support disabled
Statically detecting MS07-017
MS07-017 could have been found with the help
of exploitability analysis
Find instances of code enabling reliable
exploitation techniques
No GS, EH scope, partial overwrite feasible, etc
Resultant set would include the function
containing the ANI vulnerability
Vulnerability analysis can narrow this set
Automatically assessing exploitability
Recap
Exploitation
techniques have pre-conditions that
must be satisfied
Exploitation properties provide objective values
for these pre-conditions
How can we better assess exploitability with
this information?
Simulated
Exploitation
Simulating exploitation
Consider exploitation as a state machine
Abstract execution states
Exploitation techniques are transitions
Exploitability is derived from the degree to
which pre-conditions are satisfied
Simulating exploitation
Vulnerability side-effects represent the preconditions of the initial state
Extent of
memory corruption
Pattern of memory corruption
Precision can vary
Memory
corruption of a stack buffer
256 byte overwrite at &local with pattern A-Z
High-level exploitation NFA
Coalesce NxN
Memory Corruption
Overwrite
Exception Handler
Overwrite
Frame Pointer
Overwrite
Function Pointer
Control of Frame
Pointer
Control of
Instruction Pointer
Instruction pointer from
Frame pointer
Control of Code
Execution
Code execution from
Instruction pointer
Overwrite
Return Address
Exploitation technique pre-conditions
- Region of corruption = Stack
Memory Corruption
- Range of corruption intersects with the
address of a return address
Overwrite
return address
Control of
Instruction Pointer
Code execution
from
instruction pointer
Control of Code
Execution
- Guard stack presence = FALSE
- ASLR presence = FALSE
- NX presence = FALSE if instruction pointer
in non-executable region
- Address of useful code is known
Conclusion
Uses for exploitability analysis
Identify regions of code that may be highly
exploitable given the presence of a vulnerability
Program risk assessment
Evaluate the effectiveness of exploitation
techniques & mitigations
Automatic exploit generation using postconditions from simulated exploitation
Unlikely to compete with human talent
Future work
Research additional exploitation properties
Further develop analysis tools
Dynamic
analysis of hardware, OS, and process
state
Further develop exploitation simulator
Basic
exploit generator using post-conditions
Thanks!
Trust
Boundary
Exploitation
Vulnerability
Additional reading on exploitation properties
http://uninformed.org/?v=9&a=4