Transcript Objections
The Identity Theory of Mind Hypothesis Hypothesis Pain is the firing of C-fibres Hypothesis Pain is the firing of C-fibres lightning is an electrical discharge Hypothesis Pain is the firing of C-fibres lightning is an electrical discharge genes are segments of DNA Justifications Justifications The world can be understood in purely physical terms Justifications The world can be understood in purely physical terms Behaviourism won’t work for some mental events Justifications The world can be understood in purely physical terms Behaviourism won’t work for some mental events Brains and minds are related Justifications The world can be understood in purely physical terms Behaviourism won’t work for some mental events Brains and minds are related Mental terms are defined by their causes and effects Commentary Commentary Identity Commentary Identity Not an identity of ‘meaning’ Commentary Identity Not an identity of ‘meaning’ Intension and extension Commentary Identity Not an identity of ‘meaning’ Intension and extension Synthetic and analytic Commentary Identity Not an identity of ‘meaning’ Intension and extension Synthetic and analytic A priori and a posteriori Commentary Types and tokens Commentary Types and tokens Type Commentary Types and tokens Type Token Commentary Types and tokens Token-token identity? Commentary Types and tokens Token-token identity? Any particular coloured thing is a shaped thing Commentary Types and tokens Token-token identity? Any particular coloured thing is a shaped thing Type-type identity? Commentary Types and tokens Token-token identity? Any particular coloured thing is a shaped thing Type-type identity? Water is H2O Objections Objections Location Objections Location A pain in the foot isn’t in the brain Objections Location A pain in the foot isn’t in the brain Objections Semantics Objections Semantics Can brain processes be about things? Objections Semantics Can brain processes be about things? Objections Semantics Can brain processes be about things? = “pain” Objections Epistemological Problems Objections Epistemological Problems Introspection Objections Epistemological Problems Introspection P1: I ‘know’ mental items are part of my consciousness Objections Epistemological Problems Introspection P1: I ‘know’ mental items are part of my consciousness P2: I don’t ‘know’ that about brain processes Objections Epistemological Problems Introspection P1: I ‘know’ mental items are part of my consciousness P2: I don’t ‘know’ that about brain processes -------------------------------------------------------------------C: Brain processes are not part of my consciousness Objections Epistemological Problems Introspection Objections Epistemological Problems Introspection P1: John knows the morning star is Venus Objections Epistemological Problems Introspection P1: John knows the morning star is Venus P2: John doesn’t know the evening star is Venus Objections Epistemological Problems Introspection P1: John knows the morning star is Venus P2: John doesn’t know the evening star is Venus -------------------------------------------------------------------C: The evening star is not the morning star Objections Epistemological Problems Introspection Differential Knowledge Objections Phenomenological Problems Objections Phenomenological Problems Can brain processes be ‘sharp’, ‘dull’, ‘throbbing’, …? Objections Chauvinism Objections Chauvinism No creature without C-fibres can feel pain Objections Chauvinism No creature without C-fibres can feel pain