Transcript National Grid Power Point template

EU Workgroup – Mod 500
WG(4) – 16th September 2014
Surrender Cash Flows
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CMP cash flows for
Surrender & LT UIOLI - Proposal
 Surrendered and LT UIOLI offered in an auction will
have their own quantity holders in the Gemini system.
 This means revenue received from Surrenders/LT
UIOLI can be identified and treated separately from
standard baseline or incremental revenue sales.
 Same principles applied to CMP surrender and LT
UIOLI as are applied to TnT.
 Costs/Revenues will not be counted in National Grid’s
SO or TO actual or maximum allowed revenue.
 Also will not be included in Constraint Mgt Incentive.
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CMP cash flows for
Surrender & LT UIOLI - Proposal
 Debit paid by a User will be a relevant revenue to capacity
neutrality.
 Credit received by a User will be a relevant cost for capacity
neutrality.
 User Debit ≥ User credit  zero impact or net revenue to
neutrality.
 Any net revenue will be redistributed to community via
neutrality mechanism.
 This means net revenue from an Exit transaction will be
redistributed through neutrality (based on entry holdings).
 NG will always be cost/revenue neutral.
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 NG will monitor Exit costs/revenues going through neutrality.
Surrender Price
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Slide presented to WG(1)
 Auction results come back from PRISMA.
- Bundled bid demand
- Unbundled bid demand
 Allocate bundled results first:
 Unsold > Surrenders > LT UIOLI > Oversubscription
 Then allocate unbundled results:
 Remaining unsold > remaining surrenders > remaining LT UIOLI >
remaining oversubscription
 This way all unsold must be used before re-allocating surrenders; all
surrenders before LT UIOLI; and all LT UIOLI before non-ob.
unsold
Surrender
LT UIOLI
Non-Ob
U
S
L
O
For 1:2 situations
unsold
Surrender
LT UIOLI
Non-Ob
U
S
L
O
- Bundled bid demand – bundled auction A (5p)
- Bundled bid demand – bundled auction B (3p)
 There are 2 possible clearing prices for the bundled
auctions.
 This means that, if the Surrender is re-allocated to meet
demand from a bundled auction, there are 2 possible
prices that can be credited to the surrendering shipper,.7
Surrender - minimum quantities
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Minimum Surrenders – PRISMA feedback
 Fundamental functional changes
 New ‘conditionally available’ type of auction and process for handling the
surrenders would have to be developed.
 Enhanced Surrender functionality (and possibility of PRISMA storing
Surrender data).
 Auction publishing would be amended
 Process would need a lot of multi-lateral discussion e.g. Impact on
adjacent TSO if Available capacity dropped.
 Would auctions be re-run without conditional amount, if the minimum
amount is not met. Could impact timetable for auctions.
 Long term auction could jump from undersell back to oversell if a
Surrender offer dropped out.
 Non-competing auctions could move into competition.
 Competition tree algorithm is already complex
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LT UIOLI Guidance Document
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LT UIOLI Guidance Document v2.0 draft
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Contingency
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Background - Existing Arrangements
 Section U – UK Link
 U 6.1.1 b) – Code Contingency is specifically defined as
an event or circumstance affecting UK Link.
 PRISMA not part of UK Link
 Where a Code Contingency continues for a certain
period of time then it may be a Class A Contingency
 Under Class A Contingency then standard
arrangements under TPD may be amended.
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Class A Contingency (existing) - Capacity
 Section B 2.16
 2.16 a) Where…no capacity allocations of Daily NTS
Entry Capacity in respect of a relevant Day are
made…the System Entry Overrun Charge payable by
Users…will not apply.
 2.16 b) and c) relate to Contingency Arrangements for
relevant processes (Registration, Surrender, Trading).
NG still require system (Gemini) access to enact these
arrangements on behalf of shippers.
 PRISMA is a web based system so not possible for NG
to have system access if other parties do not.
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Contingency Arrangements
 Wait and See approach initially;
 Do not declare contingency unless outage is prolonged.
 If Gemini offline, and Code Contingency declared:
 NG can manually upload available capacity to PRISMA.
 From shipper perspective auctions will continue.
 If PRISMA offline:
 Long term auctions will be held when system back online.
 Short term auctions will recommence when system back
online.
 Existing Class A Contingency under 2.16 a) to be applied if
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outage is prolonged.
Recap
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Summary of Topics covered so far
 Long Term Auctions – Ascending Clock (WG1 & 3)
 Short Term Auctions – Uniform Price (WG1 &3)
 CAM auction products (WG1 & 3)
 Joint Booking Platform – PRISMA (WG1 & 3)
 1:2 situations & Competition (WG1 & 3)
 Available Capacity & Bundling (WG1)
 CMP: Surrender (WG1 & 3)
 CMP: LT UIOLI (WG1)
 Transfers (WG1 & 3))
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Summary of Topics covered so far (2)
 Scalebacks & buybacks (WG2)
 Voluntary Bundling (WG2)
 Transitional Arrangements (WG2)
 Mod 3.13 – Further References in UNC (WG2)
 Tariff Arrangements – (WG4)
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Summary Changes to UNC Modification Proposal 0500
section in mod
description
2 - Why change
3.1 - New Terms
3.1 - New Terms
removed some of the repetition between sections 1 and 2
3.1 - New Terms
3.1 - New Terms
definition of unbundled capacity changed to '…not bundled'
revised definition of Large Price Steps and Small Price Steps.
3.1 - New Terms
added definition for 'Oversell'
added rules on with-holding Technical Capacity
sharing factor will not be stated in UNC (except for default rule)
3.2 - General
3.2 - General
3.2 - General
3.3.8 - Ascending Clock
3.3 - Ascending Clock
3.3 - Competing Auctions
3.3.24 - Ascending Clock
3.4.3 - Uniform Price Algorithm
3.4.5 - Uniform Price Algorithm
3.4.13 - Uniform Price Algorithm
deleted part of definiton relating to unbundled capacity
definition of NTS IP Capacity simplified
conversion from kWh/d to kWh/h shall be 1/24th for all auctions
added volume bid rules following First Time Undersell
extra information about setting Price Step removed, not required in UNC.
Section largely redrafted to add clarity to process
added rule on auction time out
added rule on automatic roll forward of bids for day ahead auction
added rule on minimum bid price
paragraphs 13) and 14) amalgamated
3.4.15 - Uniform Price Algorithm
amended to cover scenario where some available capacity remains, but can't be allocated as doesn't meet min quantities
3.4.1.6 - Day Ahead IP Auction
added rule on automatic roll forward of bids
3.5 - Surrender
3.5 - Surrender
deleted 'next' for Annual Quarterly and Rolling Monthly auctions
added wording to allow NG to process Surrender in event that adjacent TSO does not use PRISMA process
3.5 - Surrender
3.5 - Surrender
3.5.12 - Surrender
extended negative entitlement check
allocation is bundled first; unbundled second
3.7 - Scaleback
clarified that last in is first out in event of scaleback
various
min bid quantity for kWh/h added to Asending Clock, Uniform Price and Surrenders. (100,000/24 = 4,167)
added rule about supremacy of gemini data
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