Wages and Employment in a Single Labour Market
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Transcript Wages and Employment in a Single Labour Market
Chapter Seven
Wages and Employment
in a Single Labour
Market
Created by: Erica Morrill, M.Ed
Fanshawe College
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-1
Chapter Focus
Equilibrium
in a single labour market
Imperfect competition
Payroll taxes
Monopsony
Minimum wage
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-2
Competitive Firm’s Demand
Assumptions :
homogeneous type of labour
price taker and wage taker
Supply is perfectly elastic (horizontal) at the
wage rate
Firms can employ all the labour they need at
the market wage rate
Market wage rate is set by the aggregate
labour market
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-3
Figure 7.1
Competitive Product and
Labour Markets
W
W
W0
S1
Wc
W
W0
S2
Wc
S
Wc
D=Di
N01 N1
Firm 1
N
N02
N2
Firm 2
N
N
Ni
Aggregate Labour Market
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-4
Short-Run
A firm may have to raise its wages to
attract additional workers
dynamic
monopsony
Short-run labour supply curve is
upward sloping
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-5
Figure 7.2
in
demand
leads to
higher
wages
The Labour Market in the
Short Run and Long Run
SS
S’S Supply of
workers
increase
S1 depressing
the high short
run wage
WS
Wc
Wage
D’
D
0
Labour
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-6
Short-run and Long-run
Labour Supply
Long
run
Temporary
wage increases above norm
are consistent with the firm being a
competitive buyer of labour
Short-run
wage increases can be a
market signal
ensures
that market forces operate in the
longer run
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-7
Equilibrium in a Competitive
Market
Market-clearing
model (neoclassical)
for markets with homogeneous workers
and homogeneous jobs wages will be
equalized across workers
absences of “involuntary unemployment”
no queues for jobs or rationing of jobs
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-8
In Reality….
The market-clearing model is not entirely true
Wages do not adjust quickly to clear the market
Involuntary unemployment is frequent
Large wage differentials exist across
homogeneous workers and jobs.
However, it still serves as a useful
approximation of market theory
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-9
Imperfect Competition
Monopoly
is
the industry
Effects
of hiring more labour
marginal
physical product of labour falls
marginal revenue falls
Sells more output only by lowering the
product price
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-10
Monopolist Versus
Competitive Demand for Labour
Figure 7.3
W*
DC = MPPN X PQ= VMPN
DM = MPPN X MRQ= MRPN
0
NM*
NC*
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
N
Chapter 7-11
Product Market Structure and
Departure from Market Wages
Monopolist
earns
higher profits and labour may be
able to appropriate some of these profits
may be less cost conscious and may yield
to wage demands
sensitive to public image pay higher wages
to buy good image
large firms pay higher wages
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-12
Oligopoly in the Product
Market
Few firms
Similar products
Action of one firm affects the others
May depart from Market wages because;
earn above normal profits which may be captured
by workers
larger firms and may pay above-market wages for
reasons related to size
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-13
Monopolistic Competition in
the Product Market
Many
small firms with differentiated
products giving the firm some discretion
in price setting
competitive
in the labour market
paying market wages
no economic rents (high profits yielding
higher wages)
no large size factors leading to higher
wages
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-14
Working with Supply and
Demand
Simulating
the effects of a policy
change on equilibrium
Incidence of a unit payroll tax
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Chapter 7-15
Unit Payroll Tax
Tax
levied on employers
Proportional to the firm’s payroll
CPP/QPP
Workers’
compensation
unemployment insurance
health insurance
Often
considered “job killers”
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-16
Figure 7.5
The Effect of a Payroll Tax on
Employment and Wages
NS
D
W0
A
C
B
W1
T
ND(W)
ND(W+T)
N1
N0
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-17
Characteristics of a
Monopsony
Large
relative to the size of the labour
market
Influences wage
Raises wages to attract labour
Will not lose all of its work force if
decreases wages
Upward-sloping labour supply schedule
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-18
Monopsony
Average
cost is the wage rate
Marginal cost is the new wage plus the
cost of paying the higher wage to
existing workers
Marginal cost is higher than average
cost
Profit Maximization when MC=VMP
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-19
Figure 7.6
Monopsony
Wage
MC
VMPM
WC
WM
S=AC
VM
SM
S0
0
VMPN=MPPnPQ
NM
NC
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-20
Implications of a Monopsony
Employment
is lower than a competitive
situation
Restricts employment because hiring
additional labour is costly
Higher wages must be paid to
intramarginal workers
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-21
Characteristics of Monopsonists
Some inelasticity of supply of labour
Most firms have an element of monopsony power in
short run
Long run costly problems of recruitment, turnover
and morale issues
Examples of monopsony in long run:
would be a one industry town in an isolated region
if workers have specialized skills that are useful mainly in a
specific firm
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-22
Perfect Monopsonistic Wage
Differentiation
Existing
workers receive wages greater
when a monopsony raises the wage
rate
seller’s
surplus or economic rent
Monopsonist
may try to retain some of
this seller’s surplus by differentiating it’s
work force
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-23
Perfect Monopsonistic Wage
Differentiation
Supply
schedule equal to the average
cost and marginal cost
Does not have to pay existing workers
any more than their reservation wage
Monopsonists may try to conceal higher
wages or use nonwage mechanisms to
attract additional labour
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-24
Imperfect Monopsonistic
Wage Differentiation
Monopsonists
differentiate between
groups of workers
different
types of labour can be separated
there are different supply elasticities
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-25
Minimum Wage Legislation: Impact
on Competitive Labour Market
Adverse employment effect
Firms employ less labour at a higher cost
Higher wage encourages more people to
seek work
Magnitude of adverse employment effect
depends on the elasticity of the demand for
labour
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-26
Minimum Wage: Offsetting
Factors
Labour
could increase…
if
there is exogenous increase in demand
for output
if there is an increase in the demand for
labour substitutes
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-27
Minimum Wage Legislation:
Impact on Monopsony
minimum
wage (or other form of price
fixing) may increase employment
reduces monopsony profits
depends on the extent to which
monopsony is associated with workers who
are paid below minimum wage
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-28
Figure 7.9
Monopsony and
Minimum Wage
MC
MC1
VMP0
S=AC
W1
W0
VMP
N0
N1
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-29
Minimum Wage
Reduces employment in competitive labour
markets
Increases employment in monopsonistic
labour market
Theory
Short-run effects are small
Disemployment effects are higher in long-run
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-30
End of Chapter Seven
© 2002 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.
Chapter 7-31