Transcript (L7-8): Pubic Reason-Practical Foundation 3

華東師範大學 教育管理學系
教育管理与教育治理的实践基础 工作坊
第七、八講
公共合理性：教育管理与治理的实践基础（三）
Public Reason: Practical Foundation of
Educational Management & Governance (3)
1
The Possibility of Social Choice:
From Rationality to Public Reason
 Amartya Sen, the Nobel laureate in economics in
1998, in his Nobel Prize Lecture entitle The
Possibility of Social Choice, defines social choice as
“the choice ‘of the people, by the people, for the
people’.” (Sen, 2002, P. 66)
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The Possibility of Social Choice:
From Rationality to Public Reason
 The impossibility of social choice: The conventional
view in economics about social choice has been
dominated by Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
Kenneth Arrow, another Nobel Laureate in
economics in 1972, indicates that it is practically
impossible to arrive at a unanimous consensus on
social-preference ordering among a human
aggregate in rational, autonomous and democratic
fashion. (Arrow, 1950)
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The Possibility of Social Choice:
From Rationality to Public Reason
 The impossibility of social choice: ….
Therefore, he stipulates that “If we exclude the
possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility,
then the only methods of passing from individual
tastes to social preferences which will be defined for
a wide range of sets of individual orderings are
either imposed or dictatorial.” (1950, P. 342)
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The Possibility of Social Choice:
From Rationality to Public Reason
 The possibility of social choice: In his Nobel Prize
Lecture, Sen reviews his career-long stance of
taking issue with the Arrow impossible theorem.
That is, he asserts that social choice is possible.
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The Possibility of Social Choice:
From Rationality to Public Reason
 He defines his enquiry of social choice in three
related questions (Sen, 2002, P. 66)
“How can it be possible to arrive at cogent aggregative
judgments about the society (for example, about ‘social
welfare,’ or ‘the public interest,’ or aggregate poverty’),
given the diversity of preferences, concerns, and
predicaments of the different individuals within the
society?”
“How can we find any rational basis for making such
aggregative judgment as ‘the society prefers this to that,’ or
‘the society should choose this over that,’ or ‘this is socially
right’?
“Is reasonable social choice at all possible, especially
since…there are ‘as many preferences as there are
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people’?”
Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
John Rawls’s distinction between reasonable
persons and rational persons
“Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect
when, among equals say, they are ready to
propose principles and standards as fair terms of
cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given
the assurance that others will likewise do so.
….The reasonable is an element of the idea of
society as a system of fair cooperation and that
its fair terms be reasonable for all to accept is
part of its idea of reciprocity.” (1993, 49-50)
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
John Rawls’s distinction …
 “The rational is, however, a distinct idea from the
reasonable and applied to a single, unified agent
(either an individual or corporate person) with the
powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking
ends and interests peculiarly its own. The ration
applies to how these ends and interests are
adopted and affirmed, as well as to how they are
given priority. It also applies to the choice of means,
in which case it is guided by such familiar
principles as: to adopt the most effective means to
ends, or to select the most probable alternative,
other things equal.” (1993, p. 50)
10
Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
John Rawls’s distinction …
 More specifically, “what rational agents lack is the
particular form of moral sensibility that underlies
the desire to engage in fair cooperation. …Rational
agents approach being psychopathic when their
interests are solely in benefits to themselves.”
(1993, p. 51) As in everyday speech, we may
characterize rational agents that “their proposal
was perfectly rational given their strong bargaining
position, but it was nevertheless highly
unreasonable.” (1993, 48)
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
John Rawls’s distinction …
In light of Rawls’ distinction, practical reason can
then be construed as reasons that reasoning
agents attributed to their actions. It goes beyond
the principle of rationality and means-end
calculation. It conforms to the principle of
reciprocity and fairness, which members of a given
community mutually accepted.
12
Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
John Rawls’s distinction …
Accordingly, practical reason can be defined as
human capacity to attribute their actions to
The principle of rationality,
The principle of reciprocity, and/or even
The principle of fairness
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Amartya Sen’s distinction between rationality
and reason
From economics point of view, Amartya Sen has
made a more specific distinction between the
rational person and reasonable persons. He
underlines that in mainstream economics, rational
persons is “characterized by intelligent pursuit of
self-interest”. More specifically, “it has … been
assumed that they must also be the detached from
others, so that they are completely unaffected by
the well-being or achievement of others.” (Sen,
2009, P. 188)
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Amartya Sen’s distinction between rationality
and reason
In his article entitled “Rational Fools: A Critique of
the Behavioural Foundations of Economic
Theory”, (1977) he stipulates that human can
make choice and action not in accordance with
the self-interest pursuant rationality. He suggests
that human may choice and act on the bases of
“sympathy” or “commitment”.
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Amartya Sen’s distinction between rationality
and reason
….
 By sympathy, It “refers to one person’s welfare
being affected by the position of others’ (for
example, a person can feel depressed at the sight
of misery of others)” (Sen, 2009, P. 188)
 By commitment, it is “concerned with breaking the
tight link between individual welfare and the choice
of action”. That is doing what can be done to
remove the misery of others without considering
one’s own welfare, …”that is a clear departure from
self-interest behavious.” (Sen, 2009, P. 188-89)
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Amartya Sen’s distinction …
Furthermore, Sen underlines that “Adam Smith, the
father of modern economics…is often wrongly thought
to be a proponent of the assumption of the exclusive
pursuit of self-interest, in the form of the so-called
‘economic man’.” (Sen, 2009, P. 185) Sen points out that
it is only in explaining “the motivation for economic
exchange in the market” that Smith underscored
human’s predisposition of self-interest pursuit. In fact,
Smith has distinguished clearly reasons other than
egoistic self-interest pursuit in explaining human’s
choice and action, for example, sympathy, generosity
and public spirit. (Sen, 2009, P. 185)
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Amartya Sen’s distinction between rationality
and reason
In contrast to narrow-minded self-interest pursuant
rationality, Sen agrees with Rawls that humans are
capable of reasoning in wider context and with
variety of criteria (not confine to egoistic selfinterest), to scrutinize one’s thoughts and action as
objectively and impartially as possible, and ready to
submit one’s erroneous decision or act to stronger
evidence and/or better arguments. In his own words,
…
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Amartya Sen’s distinction between rationality
and reason
….
In his own words, he characterizes “reasonable
persons” as “capable of being reasonable through
being open-minded about welcoming information and
through reflecting on argument coming from different
quarters, along with undertaking interactive
deliberations and debates on how the underlying
issues should be seen.” (Sen, 2009, P. 43)
Fair & Reciprocal
Deliberative & Reflective
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Elinor Ostrom, Nobel Laureate in economics in
2009, also examines the behavioral base of
rational choice and collective action from a
different methodological and theoretical
perspective.
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Elinor Ostrom….
 In her presidential address, American Political
Science Association, 1997, entitled “A Behavioral
Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective
Action’” (2014/1997), Ostrom presents her evidences
accumulated from decades of laboratory experiments
on game theory. And to up with the conclusion that in
social dilemmas, such as the prisoners’ dilemma,
reasonable persons may find the solution to escape
from the loss-loss situation and arrive at mutual
beneficial solution.
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Elinor Ostrom….
 Ostrom categorizes her theory as the secondgeneration models of rationality:
 She indicates that in the first-generation model of
rational choice, theorists simply accept as given the
fact that “individual are boundedly rational, they do not
calculate a complete set of strategies for every
situation they face.” It is because they cannot have
obtained complete information on all potential actions,
all outcomes, and all strategies of their partners.
(Strom, 2014, P. 136)
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Elinor Ostrom….
 Ostrom ….second-generation models of rationality:
 Learnt heuristics: Ostrom underlines that “in field
situations (such as laboratory experiments),
individuals tend to use heuristics─rules of thumb─that
they have learned over time regarding responses that
tend to give them good outcomes in particular kinds of
situation.” (Ostrom, 2014, P. 136) In short, individuals
will reason out and “learn heuristics that approach
best-response strategies.” (P. 137)
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Elinor Ostrom….
 Ostrom ….second-generation models of rationality:
 Internalized norms: Furthermore, these learnt
instrumental heuristics may sediment into norms and
values in repeated situations over time. Ostrom
suggests that “by norm I mean that the individual
attaches an internal valuation─positive or negative─to
taking particular types of action.” (Ostrom, 2014, P.
137) Within a particular societal and physical milieu, a
set of prominent norms and values will sediment into
culture and they will be socialized and internalized
from generations to generations.
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Elinor Ostrom….
 Ostrom ….second-generation models of rationality:
 Institutionalized rules: “By rule I mean that a group of
individuals has developed shared understandings that
certain actions in particular situations must , must not,
or may be undertaken and that sanction will be taken
against those who do not conform.” (P. 137) As a
result, strategic situations of social dilemma will be
institutionalized into typified course of actions and
routines, which expected outcomes can be taken
granted.
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Elinor Ostrom….
 Ostrom ….second-generation models of rationality:
 Reciprocity: With refers to human’s capability to learn
heuristics, to internalize norms and to institutionalize
rules, human beings can maintain a state of reciprocity
with their fellow humans. By reciprocity, Ostrom refers
to “a family of strategies that can be used in social
dilemmas involving (1) an effort to identify who else is
involved, (2) an assessment of the likelihood that
others are conditional cooperators, (3) a decision to
cooperate initially with others if others are trusted to
be conditional cooperators, (4) a refusal to cooperate
with those who do not reciprocate, and punishment of
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those who betray trust.” (Ostrom, 2014, P. 138)
Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Elinor Ostrom….
 Ostrom ….second-generation models of rationality:
…
Taken together, Ostrom has built a model of core
relationship in collective action as follow
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(Source: Ostrom, 2014, P.144)
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Distinction between Rational and
Reasonable Persons
Elinor Ostrom….
 Ostrom ….second-generation models of rationality:
…
To incorporate some of the exogenous variables into
the core-relationship model, the model can be
elaborated as follows
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(Source: Ostrom, 2014, P.144)
Is Social Choice or Public Reason Possible?
A Matter of How
Arrow’s
Rational &
Autonomous
man
Sen’s
Deliberative,
Reflective &
Impartial
man
Rawls
‘Reasonable,
Fair and
Reciprocal man
Social Choice
or Public
Reason is
Possible
Ostrom’s
Trusting &
Rrustworthy
man
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Substantive Theories of Practical
Reason and Public Reason
In the previous section we have explicated
some main theses explaining “how” social
choice of preferences and rational choice of
collective action are possible. In this section,
we will explicate the substantive choices and
actions actually taken by human aggregate or
societies. That is to review some prominent
theses which attempt to vindicate what should
be the preferable, desirable, morally right and/or
political legitimate “choices” that a society
should choose in a particular public-policy
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domain.
Substantive Theories of Practical
Reason and Public Reason
Levels of evaluation: The substantive contents
of social choice, especially choice among
different value stances i.e. evaluation, may be
differentiated into three levels of evaluation.
Ronald Dworkin has made a distinction between
three levels of value. …..
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Substantive Theories of Practical
Reason and Public Reason
Levels of evaluation:
….Ronal Dworkin …..suggests that “ethnics
studies how people best manage their
responsibility to live well, and personal morality
what each as an individual owes other people.
Political morality, in contrast, studies what we
all together owe others as individuals when we
act in and on behalf of that artificial collective
person.” (Dworkin, 2011, Pp. 327-8)
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Substantive Theories of Practical
Reason and Public Reason
Levels of evaluation:
…… Accordingly, evaluation may be categorized
into
Ethical evaluation: It refers to desirable traits and
features attributed to human behaviors, actions, and
conducts at individual level. It concerns questions
such as, What is a righteous character? What is a
virtuous person? What is the worth in life? What is an
ethical conduct? …
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Substantive Theories of Practical
Reason and Public Reason
Levels of evaluation:
…… Accordingly, evaluation may be categorized
into
…
Moral evaluation: It refers to desirable traits and
features attributed to human interactions and
relationships among fellows humans. It concerns
questions such as, What is a fair deal? What is worth
in friendship? What is good husband and/or wife?
What is good teacher and/or student?
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Substantive Theories of Practical
Reason and Public Reason
Levels of evaluation:
…
Political values: It refers to the ethical and moral
values taken by a given society as of prominent
importance that they should be imposed onto all
members of that society coercively. Accordingly,
discourse of political value entails the legitimacy of a
public authority (the modern state) in substantiating
those prominent values onto the civil society which
falls under its sovereignty. More specifically, it
relates to sound and legitimate public policies in
various public domains, such as education, social
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welfare, health care, etc.
Substantive Theories of Practical
Reason and Public Reason
In the field of moral and political philosophy,
there are varieties of perspectives trying to
vindicate the substantive content of “good” at
individual ethnical level, social moral level, and
public political level. For examples,
Emotivism or libertarianism
Consequentialism or utilitarianism
Deontological perspective
Perspective of virtue ethics
Perspective of historical institutionalism
Perspective of realization-focused comparison
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John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
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John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
The backgrounds and significance of Rawls’
theory of justice:
John Rawls’s book A Theory of Justice has been
characterized as a deontological perspective of
practical reasoning. More specifically, his
formulations have been categorized as a Kantian
approach to the question of what is good society.
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John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
The backgrounds
Kant’s concept of categorical imperative
Kant stipulates that in a course of action, “I ought never to
act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim
should become a universal law.” (Kant, 1996, p. 57)
‘Universal’ here means “an action is morally permissible if
you would be willing to have everyone act as you are
proposing to act. An action is morally wrong if you are not
willing to have everyone act as you are proposing to act.”
(Rogerson, 1991, p. 108)
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John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
The backgrounds
G.A. Cohen, one of the outright critics of Rawls’
theory of justice, underlines that
44
John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
The backgrounds
G.A. Cohen, …
“The publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in
1971 was a watershed. …Before A Theory of Justice
appeared, political philosophy was dominant by
utilitarianism, the theory that sound social policy
aims at the maximization of welfare. Rawls found two
features of utilitarianism repugnant. He objected,
first, to its aggregative character, its unconcern
about the pattern of distribution of welfare, which
means that inequality in its distribution calls for no
justification. ……
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John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
The backgrounds
G.A. Cohen…….
….But, more pertinently… Rawls also objected to the
utilitarian assumption that welfare is the aspect of a
person’s condition which commands normative
attention. He recommended normative evaluation
with new arguments (goods instead of welfare
quanta) and new function (equality instead of
aggregation) from those arguments to values.”
(Cohen, 2011, P. 44; see also, Cohen, 2008, Pp. 11-14)
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John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
 Conception of Justice as Fairness : John Rawls
formulate his theory of justice from the idea of “Justice
as Fairness”, which was published in the form of a
journal article in Philosophical Review, vol. 64, no. 1, Pp.
164-194 in 1958. He wrote in the paper that
47
John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
 Conception of Justice as Fairness: John Rawls
formulate his theory of justice from the idea of “Justice
as Fairness”, which was published in the form of a
journal article in Philosophical Review, vol. 64, no. 1, Pp.
164-194 in 1958. He wrote in the paper that
“It might seem at the first sight that the concepts of justice
and fairness are the same, and that there is no reason to
distinguish them, or to say that one is fundamental than
the other. I think that this impression is mistaken. In this
paper I wish to show that fundamental idea in the concept
of justice is fairness; and I wish to offer an analysis of the
concept of justice from this point of view.” (Rawls,
1999[1958], p. 42)
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John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
 Justice as fairness: ….
The meaning of fairness: “Fundamental to justice is the
concept of fairness which relates to right dealing
between persons who are cooperating with or competing
against one another, as when one speak of fair games,
fair competition, and fair bargains. The question of
fairness arises when free persons, who have no authority
over one another, are engaging in a joint activity and
among themselves settling or acknowledging the rules
which define it and which determine the respective
shares in its benefits and burdens. ….
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John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
 Justice as fairness: ….
The meaning of fairness:
“….. A practice will strike the parties as fair if none feels
that, by participating in it, they or any of the others are
taken advantage of, or forced to give in to claims which
they do not regard as legitimate. This implies that each
has a conception of legitimate claims which he thinks it
reasonable for others as well as himself to acknowledge.
…A practice is just or fair, then, when it satisfies the
principles which those who participate in it could
propose to one another for mutual acceptance under
aforementioned circumstances.” (Rawls, 1999[1958], p.
59)
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John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
 The idea of original position
In reality, most of the situations in which humans enter
into cooperation or competition are not in fair terms.
That is they are not in equal footings when engage in a
bargain and one of the parties may has an upper hand
over their partners. The worst scenario the parties
found themselves in a situation where they have to
strike a balance not in the most favorable terms of
both parties. In other words, “the best that each can do
for himself may be a condition of lesser justice rather
than of greater good. …It is at this point that the
conception of the original position embodies features
peculiar to moral theory.” (Rawls, 1971, p. 120)
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John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
 The idea of original position
 Accordingly, the conception of original position is a
conceptual device initiated by Rawls to “insure that
fundamental agreement reach in it are fair” and yield
the name of “justice as fairness”. (Rawls, p. 17)
“The original position is defined in such a way that it is a
status quo in which agreements reach are fair. It is a
state of affairs in which the partners are equally
represented as moral persons and the outcome is not
conditioned by arbitrary contingencies or the relative
balances of social forces. Thus justice as fairness is
able to use the idea of pure procedural justice from the
beginning.” (Rawls, 1971, p. 120)
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John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
 The conception of the veil of ignorance
“The idea of the original position is to set up a fair
procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just.
The aim is to use the notion of pure procedural justice
as a basis of theory. Somehow we must nullify the
effects of specific contingencies which put men at odd
and tempt them to exploit social and natural
circumstances to their own advantage. Now in order to
do this I assume that the parties are situated behind a
veil of ignorance.” (Rawls, 1971, p. 136)
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John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
 The conception of the veil of ignorance
“It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know
certain kinds of particular facts.
First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class
position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in
the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does
anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars
of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of
his psychology such as aversion to risk or liability to
optimism or pessimism.
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John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
 The conception of the veil of ignorance
“It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know
certain kinds of particular facts.
…
More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the
particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they
do not know its economic or political situation, or the level
of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The
persons in the original position have no information as to
which generation they belong.” (Rawls 1971, p. 137)
55
John Rawls’ Theory of Justice
 Two Principles of Justice: Based on the idea of justice
as fairness, Rawls stipulates right at the beginning of
his book A Theory of Justice that “justice is the first
virtue of social institution” (P.3) and “the primacy of
justice” over other social values. Hence, he assets that
the basic structure of a just society is to be constituted
in accordance with “the two principles of justice”.
“First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to
the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties
compatible with similar system of liberty for all.
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John Rawls’ Theory of Justice
 Two Principles of Justice:
“….
“Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are
to be arranged so that they are both
to the greatest benefits of the least advantaged, …and
attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunities.” (Rawls, 1971, p.
302)
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John Rawls’ Theory of Justice
 Applications of the principles: “These principles
primarily apply …to the basic structure of society.
They are to govern the assignment of rights and duties
and to regulate the distribution of social and economic
advantages….These principles presuppose that the
social structure can be divided into two more or less
distinct parts.” (Rawls, 1871, p. 61),
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John Rawls’ Theory of Justice
 Applications of the principles: ….
The First Principle applies to those distinct “aspects of
the social system that define and secure the equal
liberties of citizenship. …The basic liberties of citizens
are, roughly speaking, political liberty (right to vote and
to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of
speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and
freedom of thought; freedom of person along with right
to hold (personal) property; freedom from arbitrary
arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule
of law. These liberties are all required to be equal…,
since citizens of just society are to have the same basic
rights.” (p.61)
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John Rawls’ Theory of Justice
 Applications of the principles: ….
The Second Principle applies to those aspects of social
system “that specify and establish social and economic
inequalities.” More specifically, it “applies…to the
distribution of income and wealth and to the design of
organizations that make use of differences in authority
and responsibility, or chains of command.” (p. 61)
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John Rawls’ Theory of Justice
 Interpretation of the second principle
Rawls qualifies that the two constituent phrases in the
Second Principle, namely to “everyone’s advantage”
and “equally open to all” need further interpretation.
Rawls interprets the two phrases as follows (Rawls,
1971, p. 65)
John Rawls’ Theory of Justice
“Everyone’s advantage”
“Equally open”
Principle of efficiency
Difference principle
Equality as careers
open to talent
System of Natural
Liberty
Natural Aristocracy
Equality as equality
of fair opportunity
Liberty Equality
Democratic Equality
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John Rawls’ Theory of Justice
 Priority and lexical orders between principles of justice
The priority of liberty: The First Principle, namely the
principle of liberty) has lexical priority over the Second
Principle: This ordering means that a departure from the
institutions of equal liberty require by the first principle
cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by greater
social and economic advantages.” (p. 61)
The priority of democratic equality over the other three
systems, in other words, the priority of difference
principle and equality as equality of fair opportunity over
principle of efficiency and equality as careers open to
talent.
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Criticism on Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
Since its publication in 1971, John Rawls’ A Theory of
Justice has received numerous criticisms. These
criticisms and discussions have waged on for more than
forty years. As a result, the idea of justice or more general
the field of practical reason and public reason have been
proliferated substantially, both in terms of theory and
method.
These criticisms and discussions will be sketchily
explored in three aspects:
Criticism on the original position and its deontologicalliberal stance
Criticism on its transcendental-institutional approach
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Criticism on the materials of justice: Equality of what?
65
Criticism on the Original Position and its
Deontological-Liberal Stance
 Critiques on the Liberal Assumptions underlying
Rawls’ concept of Original Position in Theory of
Justice (Mulhall and Swift, 1996, P. 1-33)
The misconception of the conception of person qua
person: In Rawls’ original position a person is but a
chooser of no conception of ends and good of life; of
no identity, lived experiences and lifeworld; and of no
origins, history and tradition.
Misconception of asocial individualism: In Rawls’
original position, person but a chooser located in a
game situation, in which she is totally independent of
any social affiliations, social roles, social
responsibilities, social identity, and conceptions of
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common goods.
67
Criticism on the Original Position and its
Deontological-Liberal Stance
 Critiques on the liberal assumptions …
Misconception of ahistorical universalism: The decision
emerged from the original position, i.e. principles of
justice, is assumed to be universally applicable across
human cultures and social institutions.
Misconception of aempirical subjectivism: The decision
arrived at by rational choosers in original position is
assumed be based purely on their subjective
preferences, totally in disregard of the empirical
grounds, in which this decisions are supposed to unfold
and to be implemented.
68
Criticism on the Original Position and its
Deontological-Liberal Stance
 Sandel’s communitarian critiques on Rawls’
deontological liberalism
Rawls’ flaws on the conception of the person
Voluntaristic connection between a person’s plans of life
and the self: On Rawls’ conception of the person, one can
always voluntaristically make choices among plans of life
and conceptions of good. However, to the communitarians,
“establishing one’s own end is not a matter of choosing
from a menu of available possibilities, but one of
discovering what one’s end really are or ought to be.”
(Mulhall and Swift, 1996, P. 50) And this discovery process
is deeply embedded in the sociocultural milieu which one
is born with and/or has to live with.
69
70
Criticism on the Original Position and its
Deontological-Liberal Stance
 Sandel’s communitarian critiques ….
Rawls’ flaws on the conception of the person
Disconnection between a person’s plans of life and
identity: In connection to Rawls’ voluntaristic conception
of choices of one’s end and/or plan of life, such choices
can hardly be a constitutive part of one identity, that is,
these ends and plans of life could not have been owned
permanently and continuously by oneself because they are
subject to changes in accordance with one’s preferences
or desires. However, to Sandel or communitarians in
general, the process of personal identification is in
essence a social interacting process. It is a balance,
negotiation or even conflict between one’s self-aspirations
and the social obligation to family, tribe, social class,
nation, or any social bondage to which one belong.
71
Criticism on the Original Position and its
Deontological-Liberal Stance
 Sandel’s communitarian critiques ….
Rawls’ flaws on the conception of the person
Disconnection between personal identity and sense of
community and common good: Accordingly, “Rawls’
conception of the self commits him to an impoverished
understanding of political community. …On Rawls’ view a
sense of community describe a possible aim of
antecedently individuated selves, not an ingredient of their
identity. Essentially communal goods thereby find their
place only as one type of contender amongst many.”
(Mulhall and Swift, 1996, P. 52) To the communitarians, a
community can be conceived as a home in which one can
attach one’s sense of belonging, attribute one’s vocation
for life and one’s meaning of existence.
72
Criticism on the Original Position and its
Deontological-Liberal Stance
 Sandel’s communitarian critiques ….
Rawls’ flaws on the conception of community
A society is but a field of cooperation between
antecedently individuated rational choosers of ends based
primarily on their independent preferences and personal
desires.
The value of society is defined simply by its capacity to
guarantee individual freedom in realization of personal
preferences and desires
Apart from the fulfillment of individual freedom, a society
is excluded from any possibility of constituting any forms
of common good, such as fraternity, trust and care.
73
Criticism on the TranscendentalInstitutional (or Deontological) Approach
 Amartya Sen, in his book The Idea of Justice (2009),
suggests in the introductory chapter of the book that
“there are two basic, and divergent, lines of reasoning
about justice among leading philosophy.” (P.5) “The
distance between the two approaches, transcendental
institutionalism, on the one hand, and realizationfocused comparison, on the other, is quite
momentous.” (P. 7)
74
75
Criticism on the TranscendentalInstitutional (or Deontological) Approach
 Transcendental institutionalism:
By Transcendental institutionalism, it refers to the
approach in political philosophy “led by the work of
Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, and
followed in different ways by such outstanding
thinkers as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, concentrated on
identifying just institutional arrangements for society.
This approach…has two distinct features.” (Sen, 2009,
P. 5)
76
Criticism on the TranscendentalInstitutional (or Deontological) Approach
 Transcendental institutionalism:
“First, it concentrates its attention on what it identifies
as perfect justice, rather than on relative comparisons of
justice and injustice. …The inquiry is aimed at
identifying the nature of ‘the just’, rather than finding
some criteria for an alternative being ‘less unjust’ than
another.” (PP. 5-6)
77
Criticism on the TranscendentalInstitutional (or Deontological) Approach
 Transcendental institutionalism:
“Second, in searching for perfection, transcendental
institutionalism concentrate primary on getting the
institutions right, and it is not directly focused on actual
societies that would ultimately emerge. …It is important …to
note here that transcendental institutionalists in search of
perfectly just institutions have sometime also presented
deeply illuminating analyses of moral and political
imperative regarding socially appropriate behavior. This
applies particularly to Immanuel Kant and John Rawls, both
of whom have participated in transcendental institutional
investigation, but have also provide far-reaching analyses
of requirements of behavioural norms.” (P. 6-7)
78
Criticism on the TranscendentalInstitutional (or Deontological) Approach
 Transcendental institutionalism:
“Second….
According to Sen’s characterization, John Rawls is one of the
recent exemplar figure of the transcendental institutionalist
approach to the studies of justice. (Sen, P. 6-7; and also Pp.
52-74)
79
Criticism on the TranscendentalInstitutional (or Deontological) Approach
 Realization-focused comparison:
By Realization-focused comparison, it refer to
“comparative approaches that were concerned with social
realization (resulting from actual institutions, actual
behavior and other influences). …They were all involved in
comparisons of societies that already existed or could
feasibly emerge, rather than confining their analyses on
transcendental searches for a perfectly just society. Those
focusing on realization-focused comparisons were often
interested primarily in the removal of manifest injustice
from the world that they saw.” (Sen, 2009, P. 7)
80
Criticism on the TranscendentalInstitutional (or Deontological) Approach
 Realization-focused comparison:
Sen has categorically alleged his work with the perspective
of realization-based comparison. In his own words, “this
book (i.e. The Idea of Justice) is an attempt to investigate
realization-based comparisons that focus on the
advancement or retreat of justice. It is, in this respect, not
in line with the strong and more philosophically celebrated
tradition of transcendental institutionalism that emerged in
the Enlightenment period (led by Hobbes and developed by
Locke, Rousseau and Kant, among others), but more the
‘other’ tradition that also took shape in about the same
period or just after (pursued in various way by Smith,
Condorcet, Wollstonecraft, Bentham, Marx, Mill, among
others) (Sen, 2009, P. 8-9)
81
Criticism on the TranscendentalInstitutional (or Deontological) Approach
 Realization-focused comparison:
Sen specifically underlines the reasons why he prefers
realization-focused comparative approach to
transcendental institutionalist approach. It is because
opting for the realization-focused comparative approach
has “dual effect, first, of taking the comparative rather than
transcendental route, and second, of focusing on actual
realizations in the societies involved, rather than only on
institutions and rules.” (Sen, 2009, P. 9)
82
Criticism on the TranscendentalInstitutional (or Deontological) Approach
 Realization-focused comparison:
More specifically, Sen underlines there are two
endogenous flaws in the transcendental institutionalist
approach:
Transcendentalism: Sen suggests that taking the
transcendentalist stance entails two problems.
• Problem of feasibility: “There may be no reasoned agreement at all,
even under strict conditions of impartiality and open-minded
scrutiny (for example, as identified by Rawls in his ‘original
position’) on the nature of the ‘just society’: this is the issue of the
feasibility of finding an agreed transcendental solution.” (Sen, 2009,
P. 9)
83
Criticism on the TranscendentalInstitutional (or Deontological) Approach
 Realization-focused comparison:
More specifically, Sen underlines there are two
endogenous flaws in the transcendental institutionalist
approach:…
Transcendentalism: …. entails two problems….
• Problem of redundancy: “An exercise of practical reason that
involve an actual choice demands a framework for comparison of
justice for choosing among feasible alternatives and not an
identification of a available perfect situation that could not be
transcended: this is the issue of redundancy of the search for a
transcendental solution.” (Sen, 2009, P.9)
84
Criticism on the TranscendentalInstitutional (or Deontological) Approach
 Realization-focused comparison:
More specifically, Sen underlines there are two
endogenous flaws in the transcendental institutionalist
approach:….
Institutionalism: Sen queries whether we should focus “only
on the establishment of what are identified as the right
institutions and rule”. Instead, he ask, “should we not also
have to examine what emerges in the society, including the
kind of lives that people can actually lead, given the
institutions and rules, but also other influences, including
actual behaviour, that would inescapably affect human lives?”
(Sen, 2009, P. 10)
85
Criticism on the Materials of Justice:
Equality of What?
 Criticism on good-based distributive justice:
Sen begins his critique on Rawls’ theory of justice by
taking issue with Rawls’ focusing his two principles of
justice solely on fair distributions of primary goods. In a
lecture delivered in 1979 entitled “Equality of What?” Sen
argues that “there is, in fact, an element of ‘fetishism’ in
the Rawlsian framework. Rawls takes primary goods as
the embodiment of advantage.” Sen underlines that
“judging advantage purely in terms of primary goods
leads to a partially blind morality.” (Sen, 1980, P. 216)
86
Criticism on the Materials of Justice:
Equality of What?
 Criticism on good-based distributive justice:
In relation to Rawls’ first principle of justice, which sets
priority to the fair distribution of basic liberty, Sen writes
recently that “it has argue that the total priority of liberty is
too extreme. Why should we regard hunger, starvation and
medical neglect to be invariably less important that the
violation of any kind of personal liberty? …It is indeed
possible to accept that liberty must have some kind of
priority, but total unrestrained priority is almost certainly
an overkill. There are, for example, many different types of
weighting schemes that can give partial priority to one
concern over another.” (Sen, 2009, P. 65)
87
Criticism on the Materials of Justice:
Equality of What?
 Criticism on good-based distributive justice:
As in connection with the second principle of justice and
more specifically difference principle, Rawls’ problem of
focusing mainly on the fair distribution outcomes of primary
goods for the benefits of the least advantaged is much more
evident. Sen suggests that “in the difference principle,
Rawls judges the opportunities that people have through
the means they possess, without taking into account the
wide variations they have in being able to convert primary
goods into good living. For example, a disable person can
do far less with the same level of income and other primary
goods than can an able bodied human being. A pregnant
woman needs, among other things, more nutritional support
than another person who is not bearing a child.
88
Criticism on the Materials of Justice:
Equality of What?
 Criticism on good-based distributive justice:
As in connection with the second principle ….
The conversion of primary goods into the capability to do
various things that a person may value doing can vary
enormously with differing inborn characteristics (for
example, propensities to suffer from some inherited
diseases), as well as disparate acquired features or the
divergent effects of varying environmental surroundings
(for example, living in a neighbourhood with endemic
presence, or frequent outbreaks, of infectious diseases).
There is, thus, a strong case for moving from focusing on
primary goods to actual assessment of freedoms and
capabilities.” (Sen, 2009, P. 65-66)
89
Criticism on the Materials of Justice:
Equality of What?
 Conceptualization of capability:
A shift of the informational focus of studies of justice: Sen
begins his construction of the capability approach to justice with
his conception of “informational focus”. He suggests that “ Any
substantive theory of ethics and political philosophy, particularly
any theory of justice, has to choose an informational focus, that
is, it has to decide which features of the world we should
concentrate on in judging a society and in assessing justice and
injustice.” (Sen, 2009, P. 231) Sen points out that there have been
various informational focuses at work in the studies of justice,
for examples utilitarianism focuses on utility and its entailed
satisfaction, Rawls focuses on the holdings of primary goods,
and Dworkin focuses on resource holdings with reference to
“liberal equality”, etc. (Sen, 1993, p. 30) Instead, Sen bases his
theory of justice on the informational focus of capabilities and
90
freedoms.
Criticism on the Materials of Justice:
Equality of What?
 Conceptualization of capability:
The conception of “functioning”: Sen underlines that the most
primitive notion in the capability approach is the idea of
“functionings”. He conceptualizes that “functionings represent
parts of the state of a person─in particular the various things that
he or she manages to do or be in leading a life. …Some
functionings are very elementary, such as being adequately
nourished, being in good health, etc., and may be strongly valued
by all, for obvious reasons. Others may be more complex, but
still widely valued, such as achieving self or being socially
integrated. Individual may, however, differ a good deal from each
other in the weights they attach to these different functionings.”
(Sen, 1993, P. 31)
91
Criticism on the Materials of Justice:
Equality of What?
 Conceptualization of capability:
The conception of capability: Accordingly, “the capability of a
person reflects the alternative combinations of fuctionings the
person can achieve, and from which he or she choose one
collection.” (Sen, 1993, P. 31) In short, “capability is our ability to
achieve various combinations of functionings that we can
compare and judge against each other in terms of what we have
reason to value.” (Sen, 2009, P. 233)
92
Criticism on the Materials of Justice:
Equality of What?
 Conceptualization of capability:
Distinction between well-being and agency: …. Accordingly, the
idea of capability can be conceptualized into capability of
“agency achievement” and capability of “well-being
achievement” (Sen, 1993, P. 37) Sen has specifically given
priority to the former over the latter. It is because “overall agency
goals” would usually include promotion of one’s well-being.
Moreover, in some critical situations, human agents may choose
the achievement of their agency goals at the expanses of their
well-beings. For example, under foreign invasion, civil soldiers
may willing to risk their lives in defending their country. Hence,
to provide the freedom and capability for a person to achieve his
or her agency goal is more fundamental than providing him or
her the capability of maintaining his or her well-being.
93
Criticism on the Materials of Justice:
Equality of What?
 Conceptualization of capability:
Distinction between achievement and freedom to achieve: Sen
has further conceptualized the idea of capability with another
conceptual distinction, that is, the distinction between the
capability of actually attain something and the capability of being
free to attain the thing valued. (Sen 2009, P. 235-238) Once again
has assigned the priority to the latter over the former. Sen
underlines that such a distinction and prioritization is important
to the capability approach because “it is oriented towards
freedom and opportunities, that is, the actual ability of people to
chose to live different kinds of lives within their reach, rather
than confining attention only to what may be described as the
culmination ─ or aftermath ─ of choice.” (Sen, 2009, P. 237)
94
Criticism on the Materials of Justice:
Equality of What?
 Conceptualization of capability:
In summary, the conceptualization of the idea of capability
in Sen capability approach to justice can be presented in
the follow table.
Well-being
Achievement
Agency
Achievement
Actual
Achievement
Well-being
Achievement
Agency
Achievement
Freedom to
achieve
Well-being
Freedom
Agency Freedom
95
Capability-based Justice in
Communitarian vs. Liberal Debate
 Capability, society and public reasoning: Having rested
the concept of capability on the “agency-freedom”
footing, Sen further points out the dilemma between the
individualism and communitarianism built in his concept
of capability. That is, within the “agency-freedom” based
concept of capability, we have to decide whether the
capability should rest primarily on individual or on
community. To resolve this dilemma, Sen has provided
the following two additional qualifications to his
capability approach to justice.
96
Capability-based Justice in
Communitarian vs. Liberal Debate
 Capability and society: Sen has specifically underlines
that “identifying the capability approach as
methodological individualism would be significant
mistake.” (Sen, 2009, P. 244) He goes on indicating that
“It is hard…to envision cogently how persons in society
can think, choose or act without being influenced in one
way or another by the nature and working of the world
around them. …To note the role of ‘thinking, choosing
and doing’ by individuals is just the beginning of
recognizing what actually does happen, …but we cannot
end there without an appreciation of the deep and
pervasive influence of society on our ‘thinking, choosing
and doing’. ….
97
Capability-based Justice in
Communitarian vs. Liberal Debate
 Capability and society: …
When someone thinks and chooses and does something, it
is, for sure, that person─and not someone else─who is
doing these things. But it would be hard to understand
why and how he or she undertakes these activities
without some comprehension of his or her societal
relations.” (Sen, 2009, P. 245) Hence, Sen has explicated
at length how the concept of capability should be
construed in correspondence with the concept of
identity, which in Sen’s conceptualization is pluralistic,
multiple and diverse in nature. (Sen, 2009, P. 247; Sen,
2006)
98
Capability-based Justice in
Communitarian vs. Liberal Debate
 Capability and Capability and public reasoning: Having
located the concept capacity at the social rather than
individual level, Sen are facing yet another problem. That
is can a consensus be researched by a society at a given
point in time the conception of capabilities and their
ranking? Though Sen has categorically refuted to work
out “some fixed list of relevant capabilities,” (Sen, 2009,
P. 242) yet he does compromise that “the approach of
capability is entirely consistent with a reliance on partial
rankings and on limited agreements. …The main task is
to get things right on the comparative judgments that
can be reached through personal and public reasoning,
rather than to feel compelled to opine on every possible
99
comparison that could be considered.”…
Capability-based Justice in
Communitarian vs. Liberal Debate
 Capability and Capability and public reasoning: …
Hence, Sen believes that it is only through what he called
“interactive public reasoning” that we may be able to
obtain “a better understanding of the role, reach, and
significance of particular functionings and their
combination.” (Sen, 2009, P. 242)
100
Capability-based Justice in
Communitarian vs. Liberal Debate
 Objectivity and impartiality in public reasoning: Having
substantiated the capability-based concept of justice in
communitarian perspective, Sen has come to one of the
most difficult topic in substantive theory of practical
reasoning, how to arbitrary a specific ethical, moral
and/or political choice, preference or even action is
correct? What is the criterion for the judgment?
101
Capability-based Justice in
Communitarian vs. Liberal Debate
 Objectivity and impartiality in public reasoning:
Three concepts of objectivity: The concept of objectivity
can imply different meanings between theoretical and
practical science, especially between natural sciences and
practical sciences.
Objectivity of things: It refers to the state of existence of a
physical object independent of human mind. In enquiries in
natural science, a proposition can be verified by means of
seeking corresponding state of existence in respective things,
objects or phenomena. Based on this so-called
correspondence principle, a scientific proposition can claim
its objectivity by referring to the existence of the respective
things or affairs. Furthermore, the repeatability of the
occurrence the phenomena under study could increase the
objectivity of the proposition and its verification.
102
Capability-based Justice in
Communitarian vs. Liberal Debate
Three concepts of objectivity: …
Objectivity of meanings: It refers to the state existence of
shared meanings among a group of interpreters.
Conventionally, it is claimed that human believes, utterance,
expression, written texts, work of art etc. all bear subjectivity
of the speakers or authors. However, as these expressions of
subjectivity have been objectivated into written text, historical
accounts and/or work of art. They will obtain their own
existence alienated from its makers. As the texts, accounts
and work are read and interpreted by large numbers of
humans. They may generate shared meanings, feelings,
believes or even convictions. As a result, the meanings
embedded in the texts, accounts and work will have obtained
their objectivity. Sen has characterized this type of objectivity
as objectivity of comprehension and communication (Sen,
103
2009, P. 118)
Capability-based Justice in
Communitarian vs. Liberal Debate
Three concepts of objectivity: …
Objectivity of practical reasoning: Sen argues that in ethical,
moral and public reasoning, in short practical reasoning,
objectivity can be generated by means of constant and critical
scrutiny among a group of reasonable persons. He
approvingly quoted Rawls argument that “The first essential
is that a conception of objectivity must establish a public
framework of thought sufficient for the concept of judgement
to apply and for conclusions to be reached on the basis of
reasons and evidence after discussion and due reflection.
….To say that a political conviction is objective is to say that
there are reasons, specified by a reasonable and mutually
recognizable political conception, sufficient to convince all
reasonable persons that it is reasonable.” (Rawls, 1993,
Quoted in Sen, 2009, P. 42)
104
Capability-based Justice in
Communitarian vs. Liberal Debate
 Objectivity and impartiality in public reasoning:
The concept of impartiality: Based on the objectivity of
practical objectivity, Sen further proposes the concept of
impartiality as the most fundamental base for realization of
the idea of justice. Sen points out that the concept of
impartiality has been commonly applied by several
philosophers as the building block of the idea of justice.
For examples
In Immanuel Kant oft-quoted “categorical imperative” in
practical reason, he specifies “Act always on such a maxim as
thou canst at the same time will to be a universal law” (Kant,
1907; Quoted in Sen, 2009, P. 117-8)
105
Capability-based Justice in
Communitarian vs. Liberal Debate
 Objectivity and impartiality in public reasoning:
The concept of impartiality: …. For examples…
Henry Sidgwick in his book The Method of Ethnics
paraphrases Kant’s maxim in the following words, “That
whatever is right for me must be right for all persons in
similar circumstances ─ which as the form in which I accept
the Kantian maxim ─ seemed to me to be certainly
fundamental, certainly true, and not without practical
importance.” (Sidgwick, 1966; Quoted in Sen, 2009, P. 118)
John Rawls in his book Political Liberalism in 1993 has
replaced his thesis of original position with the thesis that
“reasonable” and “impartial persons” can arrive at reciprocal
and mutual beneficial conclusion on the principles of justice
in political domain. (Rawls, 1993)
106
Capability-based Justice in
Communitarian vs. Liberal Debate
 Objectivity and impartiality in public reasoning:
The concept of impartiality: …. For examples…
Finally, Adam Smith invokes the idea of the ‘impartial
spectator’. He proposes in The Theory of Moral Sentiments
that “when judging one’s own conduct, to examine it as we
imagine an impartial spectator would examine it’, or as he
elaborate in a later edition of the same book: ‘to examine out
own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial
spectator would examine it’.” (Sen, 2009, P. 124)
With references to these perspectives, Sen concludes that
“The place of impartiality in the evaluation of social justice
and societal arrangements is central to the understanding
of justice.” (Sen, 2009, P. 223)
Capability-based Justice in
Communitarian vs. Liberal Debate
 Objectivity and impartiality in public reasoning:
Two domains of impartiality: Sen suggests that “there is
…a basic distinction between two quite different ways of
invoking impartiality. …I shall calls respectively ‘open’ and
‘closed’ impartiality.” (P. 123)
Closed impartiality: “With, ‘closed impartiality’ the procedure
of making impartial judgements invokes only the members of
a given society or nation (or what John Rawls calls a given
‘people’) to whom the judgements are made.” (Sen, 2009, P.
123)
108
Capability-based Justice in
Communitarian vs. Liberal Debate
 Objectivity and impartiality in public reasoning:
Two domains of impartiality: …
Open impartiality: “In the case of ‘open impartiality’, the
procedure of making impartial assessments can (and in some
cases, must) invoke judgements , among others, from outside
the focal group, to avoid parochial bias. In Adam Smith’s
famous use of the device of the ‘impartial spectator’, the
requirement of impartiality requires…the invoking of
disinterested judgement of ‘any fair and impartial spectator’,
not necessarily (indeed sometimes ideally not) belonging to
the focal group.’” (Sen, 2009, P. 123)
109
In Search of the Just Educational
Governance Model
From the excursion of the discourse on justice
in the past fifty year, we may not yet obtain an
encompassing framework of justice. However,
we are at least bettter equipped then before
with some essential conceptual tools and
analytical instruments that may illuminate our
trail in searching for a just educational
governance model for mainland for the 21st
century.
110
In Search of the Just Educational
Governance Model
 The approach to justice: Between the transcendental
institutionalism and realization-based comparison
approach, I would suggest we should adopt the more
realistic and pragmatic approach of realization-based
comparison approach in reviewing and designing
educational policy and educational governance models.
Within a modern society, attaining global equality and
justice among all educational sectors across all children
from diversity backgrounds is simply impossible. ...
111
In Search of the Just Educational
Governance Model
 The approach to justice:
….. As James S. Coleman once say in reviewing his lifelong strive for equality of educational opportunities for
the US schooling system, he specifies that he has not
been working for attaining equality in the US schooling
system, and instead what he has been striving is to
lessen the inequality existing in the system. Coleman’s
view echoes exactly Sen’s conception of realizationbased comparison approach to justice.
112
In Search of the Just Educational
Governance Model
 The materials of justice: One of most contested domains
within the perspective of distributive justice has been on
the issue of what is to be distributed justly. From
utilitarian’s total utility, Rawls’ good-based justice,
Dworkin’s resource-based justice to Sen’s capabilitybased justice, students of distributive justice have been
wrestling with these conflicting perspectives for more
than a century. …
113
In Search of the Just Educational
Governance Model
 The materials of justice:
…. As we apply the debates to the designing educational
policy and administrative measures, my choice will be for
Sen’s capability-based justice, more specifically, the
“agency-freedom” capability-based justice. The
assumption behind this choice is a simple believe that all
humans are born with a particular potentials, which
should be given genuine opportunities to develop to the
full, according to their own free will, reasons and choice.
114
In Search of the Just Educational
Governance Model
 The players in the distributive game: Another focus of
contention in the field of justice is the characterization of
the participants in the distributive games. We have
witnessed a line of characters, ranging from egoistic
individuals rationally pursuing one’s own self-interest to
the maximum, reasonable, fair and reciprocal persons,
trusting and trustworthy commons, to deliberative,
reflective and impartial spectators. However, as these
spectrum of characterizations are applied to the context
of education system, it seems unrealistic as well as
impossible to homogenize all participants into one
typification. ….
115
In Search of the Just Educational
Governance Model
 The players in the distributive game:
… For example, parents will strive hard to get the best for
their children (especially simple child); school teachers
may treat the students in her class equally or even
impartially, but it is common findings in teacher career
adjustment study that teachers will seek satisfactory
working environments in terms of student ability,
ethnicity, social classes and varieties of other
backgrounds; School administrators, especially schoolheads may be idealized as openly impartial educators,
who would admit whatever children, who happen to
appear at the school door step. …
116
In Search of the Just Educational
Governance Model
 The players in the distributive game:
….But in reality, under the perfromative pressure of schoolleague-table ranking, quality-assurance inspection, and
failing-school label and shut-down, school administers
could easily fall into the egoistic trap of adopting
administrative measures of self-interest for the school.
Even governmental officials, who are responsible for
designing and implementation of educational policy for
the who nation, may face hard choices or even social
dilemma in allocating limited supply of resources and/or
personnel and have to abandon the global-impartial ideal
in educating the future citizens of the nations.
117
In Search of the Just Educational
Governance Model
 The optimal mechanism: Last but less, when it comes to
the design (not to mention passage and implementation)
of the substantive policy and/or measures in concrete
educational domains, we are once again back to the
choice Elinor Ostrom advocates in her Nobel Prize
Lecture that there is only quick-fix solution (such as
market or hierarchy) by to fall back to polycentric
governance. Nevertheless, we may begin the complex
and polycentric discourse of distributive justice of
education via Sen’s conceptions of impartiality and
ethical objectivity.
118
Approach to
Justice
- Transcendental institutionalism;
-Realization-based comparison approach;
Material of Justice - Gross-Total Utility;
- Good-based Justice;
- Resource-based Justice;
- Capability-based Justice;
Players in the
- Egoistic self-interest maximizes;
Distributive Game - Reasonable, fair, & reciprocal persons;
- Trusting & Trustworthy persons;
- Deliberative, Reflective & Impartial Spectators;
The Optimal
Mechanism
Polycentric Discourse of Complexity by Ethical Objectivity & Impartiality
119
3rd Order
Hierarchy
Market
Capacities of constituting common values,
norms & principles for legitimation
Network
Community Network
Professional Network
Intergovernmental
Network
Producer Network
Issue Network
Approach to
Justice
- Transcendental institutionalism;
-Realization-based comparison
approach;
Material of
Justice
- Gross-Total Utility;
- Good-based Justice;
- Resource-based Justice;
- Capability-based Justice;
Players in the
Distributive
Game
- Egoistic self-interest maximizes;
- Reasonable, fair, & reciprocal persons;
- Trusting & Trustworthy persons;
- Deliberative, Reflective & Impartial
Spectators;
The Optimal
Mechanism
Polycentric Discourse of Complexity by
Ethical - Objectivity & Impartiality
Metagovernance
Interactive
Governance
Polycentric
Governance
New Public Service
120
第七、八講
公共合理性：教育管理与治理的实践基础（三）
END