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The Emerging Global Identity & Tracking System October 28, 2004 Barry Steinhardt Director, Technology & Liberty Project American Civil Liberties Union “Policy Laundering” Cycling policies through international bodies that can’t be enacted directly at home Biometric Passports • Required by US Congress • Standards created by ICAO Biometric Passports • Face-Recognition set as the standard • RFID chips included too • Standards allow for optional use of other biometrics RFID Chips • Can be read at a distance (20m in tests) – see http://tinyurl.com/46vml • No encryption • Could enable tracking Face Recognition • Highly unreliable biometric • Allows tracking-at-a-distance Once created, biometric passports will: • Become gold standard of identity verification around the world • Become template for domestic National ID systems • Increasingly be demanded for more and more purposes, abroad and domestically • Be subject to private sector “piggybacking” • Eventually they may become practical necessities Expansion is inevitable Once created, passports are likely to: • Be used for more and more purposes • Contain ever-more information • Incorporate more biometrics, such as fingerprints and iris scans Passports won’t exist in a vacuum • National Identity systems • Immigration database systems • Passenger profiling systems “Policy Laundering” • National ID proposals failed in US • US sets standards for allies • US prods international body (ICAO) to set standards • US complies with international standards NGO input could have improved the product • Biometrics can be implemented in ways that prevent use for surveillance or tracking • Local storage • 1-1 checks • biometric systems related to physical characteristics which do not leave traces (e.g. shape of the hand but not fingerprints) Attempts to participate were rebuffed NGOs Ignored Passenger Screening August 2004 “Secure Flight” CAPPS version 3.0: Watch lists, commercial data August 2003 CAPPS II (version 2.0) Commercial data, Red light/Green light, February 2002: CAPPS II (version 1.0) Data mining, wide sharing, the works Secure Flight Compared to CAPPS II Program Elements CAPPS II Secure Flight Provides no protection against terrorists with Fake IDs √ √ Provides no meaningful way for individuals to challenge their security designation √ √ √ Centers around reliance on secret, inaccurate government terrorist watch lists Checks personal information against private databases √ √ Requires collection of personal information from travelers making reservations √ √ Expands program beyond terrorists √ √ * * Uses computer algorithms to rate individuals’ “threat to aviation” Passenger Screening Foisted On Canada & EU • Must be international to work • EU-US agreement reached over parliamentary objection – Canada too • International agreements reached while domestic program still embattled For More Information: www.aclu.org/privacy