Transcript A Patent Policy for Global Diseases

The Global Patent System
and the Availability of Pharmaceuticals
in Poor Countries
Jean O. Lanjouw
February, 2003
There is widespread disagreement about
the international framework for patent
rights (TRIPS) as it applies to
pharmaceuticals.
• What global patent system would
best promote welfare?
• What system could end the fighting?
Patents embody a tradeoff between
two public health goals:
access to existing products
&
the creation of new ones
There are two extremely different and
identifiable types of drug markets
• Some diseases are specific, with almost their
entire market in the developing world
(Malaria).
• Many others are global. They are important
worldwide, and their therapies have global
markets (Cancer).
Developing country-specific products
The policy problem is to increase research
effort.
Cannot have access without products.
To this end there are good arguments for
• private sector involvement
• a role for patents in poor countries.
Global disease products
Cancer, heart disease and diabetes
together cause 16% of the total disease
burden in poorer countries.
This is 4 times the loss due to Malaria
However, poor countries hardly figure in
the worldwide market for global products
Poor countries with 46% of the world’s
population represent less than 2% of
spending on cardiovascular drugs.
Because the benefits of extending
protection to include poor countries differ
for global & non-global products,
the optimal global system would treat
innovations differently in accordance with
their very different world markets.
Problems with Current Process
• Uncertainty - Patents can do no Good
• Procedural knots limit entry in poorer
markets
• Huge cost in time and effort
• Conflict over patents impedes
coordination to resolve other problems
General Thoughts about
a Lasting Solution
Required characteristics:
• Clarity
• Fairness
• Lack of firm discretion
A Specific Proposal
Very structured, and in such a way
that protection evolves as a country
develops and with changes in disease
incidence.
Protects markets as they become
important to firms.
Everything happens automatically
A Specific Proposal
Implemented through rich country
legislation
Essentially, rich country patentees
promise not to enforce patents according
to structure just described.
Inventors in poor countries have full
protection, supporting development of
their R&D capacity.
For Details See:
www.cgdev.org/fellows/lanjouw.html
Not a solution but nonetheless useful
firm effort:
Voluntary Differential Licensing
• Pharmacia (soon Pfizer)
•Zero royalty on selected drug in set of
countries.
• NGO as intermediary for quality control.
• Described in the most recent version of the
journal Lancet