Transcript PSC 300.302, Global Human Rights

Transnational Politics
Drug trafficking: The power of network analysis
Today
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Columbian drug cartels: a myth?
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The ‘kingpins’ and ‘drug lords’: How to frame and mobilize for a ‘war
on drugs’
What can the study of NGOs and TANs (Keck/Sikkink)
contribute to our understanding of drug trafficking?
Readings:
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From the bottom-up: Michael Kenney, ‘The Architecture of Drug
Trafficking: network Forms of Organization in the Colombian
Cocaine Trade’
From the top-down: World Drug Report, 2007
Hans Peter Schmitz
Wednesday, 2/13/2008
The Cartel: a myth?
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Key argument: Not vertically organized
‘cartels,’ but small, independent and
networked suppliers dominate the drug
trade.
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Myth of powerful, coordinated price-fixing and strategic
planning.
Method: Interviews with law enforcement/traffickers.
Hans Peter Schmitz
Wednesday, 2/13/2008
Four sections
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Kenney, p. 236
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First section: Literature on criminal networks
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Second section: Empirical example of the Columbian
case
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Wheel and chain networks
Third section: Rules of drug trafficking
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Organizational/social network analysis
Routines and experience
Fourth section: Individual participation in the networks
Hans Peter Schmitz
Wednesday, 2/13/2008
1. Theory: Network analysis
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Shared norms and customs.
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Fluid networks based on kinship, not hierarchy or formal
organization (see Keck/Sikkink).
Social network analysis.
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Focus on individuals’ relational ties.
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Leads to more transnational ties across societies.
Increased connectivity: decreased costs of communication.
Organizational network analysis.
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Focus on groups and cooperation across organizations.
Hans Peter Schmitz
Wednesday, 2/13/2008
Individuals and groups
Compare Kenney to Keck/Sikkink:
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Social network analysis: explains why
individuals participate in networks (shared
norms; K/S: who is part of a TAN?).
Organizational network analysis: explains how
groups cooperate (K/S: how does a TAN
produce a campaign?)
Hans Peter Schmitz
Wednesday, 2/13/2008
2. Empirical case: Columbian networks
The dilemma (241): Information-sharing is
necessary, but increases the risk of exposure (to
competitors and law enforcement).
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Why networks do better (than hierarchies and
markets) in addressing this dilemma:
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Better than hierarchies: looser structure,
decentralized decision-making, better chances of
survival.
Better than markets: more enforcement power and
control based on family and other ties.
Hans Peter Schmitz
Wednesday, 2/13/2008
What integrates networks?
Shared experiences, communication, and trust (242):
TANs: principles such as human rights.
Illicit networks: Economic gain, social ties.
Inter-group networks: producers > processors >
exporters > distributors > money launders > etc.
Inter-personal networks: create trust and
reciprocity, lower chances of ‘free-riding,’ sharing
of knowledge.
Hans Peter Schmitz
Wednesday, 2/13/2008
Wheel and chain networks
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Organizational analysis
Wheel (hub, star) networks, 243: A core group has
superior capabilities and control. Mode: contract out
services.
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Advantage: better coordination and more power to corrupt
officials.
 Disadvantage: vulnerable to ‘head hunting’
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Chain networks, 244: No core group and coordination
from a center.
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Advantage: greater insulation of individual groups.
 Disadvantage: less powerful and less capable to deal with
internal dissent.
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Hans Peter Schmitz
Wednesday, 2/13/2008
3. The Rules of Drug Trafficking
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p. 249: How do ‘flat’ networks actually work?
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Illicit networks, just like TANs, frequently operate in
hostile environments.
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Rules are significant tools to regulate behavior, but
rarely written down.
Inter-subjective understandings (compare to def. of
norms)
Information politics (K/S): Expertise matters.
Symbolic politics (K/S): Without written rules,
symbols, stories, and social interaction dominate
networks.
Hans Peter Schmitz
Wednesday, 2/13/2008
4. Individual participation
Secrecy requires steady supply of new participants.
 How individuals get involved:
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Based on family or other social ties.
Gradual inclusion based on reciprocity and trust.
Based on experience in trafficking in a non-drug related
field.
How to get out (p. 255)
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Retirement.
Involuntary expulsion.
Arrest and death.
Hans Peter Schmitz
Wednesday, 2/13/2008
Conclusions: An answer?
If the ‘kingpin’ strategy has failed, what is Kenney’s
recommendations in dealing with illicit drugs as a
transnational problem?
If Kenney’s analysis is correct, what does this mean for U.S.
foreign and domestic drug policies?
Looking ahead to the presentations:
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Supply vs. demand-driven approaches to illicit drugs.
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Pros and cons of legalization.
Hans Peter Schmitz
Wednesday, 2/13/2008