Transcript When Do Dissidents Challenge the State?

Political Mobilization and Government Targeting: When Do
Dissidents Challenge the State?
Idean Salehyan, University of Texas at Dallas
Brandon Stewart, University of North Texas
Background
Activist groups face a number of strategic
challenges when pursuing social change.
Among the most important of these is selecting
the appropriate target for protest activity. Yet,
scholars have typically focused on dissidentgovernment interactions, rather than the entire
range of potential targets. Why then do
dissidents choose to target the state rather than
other social actors such as firms, rival ethnic
groups, the press, and so on?
Theory and Hypotheses
We argue that dissident target choice is
shaped the interaction of dissident demands
and regime characteristics. When the state is
highly central in generating particular
grievances, dissidents will be more likely to
target the state; however, this also depends
on the degree of state responsiveness to
opposition movements. In particular we
highlight how state control over the economy
shapes economic protest, how democracy
conditions political protest, and how ethnic
discrimination discourages anti-state protest.
Hypothesis 1: As state involvement in the
economy increases, social conflicts about
economic issues are more likely to target the
government.
Hypothesis 2: In more democratic regimes,
social conflicts about political issues are
less likely to target the government.
Results
Logit Models With Fixed and Random Effects
Economic issue
Govt. Share GDP
Econ issue * GovtShareGDP
Political issue
Democracy
Political issue * Democracy
Ethnic issue
% Discriminated
Ethnic issue * % Discriminated
Protest
Strike
Hypothesis 3: In more discriminatory
regimes, social conflicts about ethnic issues
are less likely to target the government.
Hypothesis 4: Social conflicts are less likely
to target the government when the state is
highly abusive.
Human Rights
Observations
Number of countries
Fixed
Random
Fixed
Random
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
Std. Err.
Std. Err.
Std. Err.
Std. Err.
1.019***
0.692***
1.007***
0.726***
-0.092
-0.141
-0.092
-0.142
-0.01
-0.013
0.005
0.003
-0.009
-0.009
-0.012
-0.012
--
0.029***
--
0.024**
--
-0.011
--
-0.011
1.372***
1.485***
1.360***
1.480***
-0.068
-0.072
-0.068
-0.072
-0.049***
-0.022**
-0.056***
-0.027**
-0.01
-0.011
-0.011
-0.012
--
-0.076***
--
-0.079***
--
-0.012
--
-0.012
-.330***
-0.205*
-.336***
-0.209*
-0.111
-0.124
-0.111
-0.124
-0.457
-0.309
-0.564
-0.455
-0.488
-0.499
-0.53
-0.543
--
-2.544**
--
-2.538**
--
-1.219
--
-1.22
1.167***
1.158***
1.174***
1.167***
-0.07
-0.071
-0.07
-0.071
1.340***
1.324***
1.322***
1.308***
-0.104
-0.104
-0.104
-0.105
-0.03
-0.033
-0.032
-0.033
-0.023
-0.024
-0.024
-0.024
6,780
6,780
6,778
6,778
58
58
57
57
Government Targeting for Economic Issues
Conclusions
Empirically, we find that greater state involvement in
the economy leads to more protest against the state
regarding economic issues; democracy makes political
unrest less likely to target the state; and ethnic
discrimination means that ethnic unrest is less likely to
target the government. Yet, we do not find support for
our claim that a high degree of human rights abuse
produces a chilling effect on all anti-state protest. Such
a deterrent effect may be reserved for only the most
egregious human rights violators such as North Korea or
Libya under Qaddafi, although this conjecture requires
further investigation.