Transcript UNICEF Social Protection Work an overview Show and Tell on

UNICEF Social Protection Work
an overview
Show and Tell on Social Protection
Bonn, 2011
“Social Protection for Families
and Children”
Tuesday, May 20, 2014
David Stewart
Child Poverty and Social Protection Unit, UNICEF
General Overview
1. UNICEF’s work and the UNICEF
approach
2. The impacts of social protection
3. The reasons behind reluctance
A quick reminder of the need for social prot.
A quick reminder of the need for social prot.
47%
33%
% of children in the
population
% of children among the
extreme income poor
A quick reminder of why
47%
33%
% of children in the
population
% of children among the
extreme income poor
UNICEF’s work
and approach to
Social Protection
6
UNICEF Social Protection Framework
1.Progressive
realization
2.National ownership
3.Moving towards
systems
UNICEF’s definition
“Social protection is the set of public and
private policies and programmes aimed
at preventing, reducing and eliminating
economic and social vulnerabilities to
poverty and deprivation.”
UNICEF’s work on Social Protection
- UNICEF supports social protection in 104 countries (71
cash transfer programs in 52 countries) reaching about 12
million households
UNICEF’s work on Social Protection
UNICEF’s work on Social Protection
The impacts (of
cash transfers!)
12
Cost or the need to work for not attending school
Evidence of SP impact on Nutrition
Food expenditure
Country
Bangladesh
Programme
Nutrition outcomes
Impact
Chars Livelihood
Over 99% of beneficiaries of the Chars Livelihoods Programme
Programme/Cash
reported spending money earned from the programme on food.
-for-work
Brazil
Bolsa Família/CCT
Rural households on the Bolsa Familia scheme were found to
spend as much as 88% of the cash received on food.
Colombia
Familias en
Acción/CCT
Average increase of 0.58 kg for newborns in urban areas
attributed to better nutrition during pregnancy.
South Africa
Old Age
Pension/CSG
Female pension eligibility results in an increase of 0.6 standard
deviations in young girls’ weight-for-height z-scores.
CGP/ UCT
Increased the weight for height of 0.196 z-scores among children
ages 3 to 5 years and increased infant and young child feeding by
22 percentage points.
Zambia
Evidence of SP impact on Health
Utilisation
Country
Health outcomes
Programme
Impact
Afghanistan
User fee removal
400% increase in health centre utilisation.
Bangladesh
Vouchers for
maternal health
Institutional delivieries from 2% to 18%, antenatal care from
42% to 89%
Brazil
Bolsa Familia
Probability that all vaccines delivered increased by 12-15
percentage points.
Colombia
CCT
Diarrhoea decreased from 32.6% to 22%. Probability of
immunization compliance increased.
Malawi
UCT
Reported incidence of illness dropped by 23% points
Evidence of SP impact on Education
Enrolment and attendance
Country
Programme
Outcomes
?
Impact
Cambodia
CCT
Enrolment and attendance of girls up by 30-43% percentage
points.
China
CCT
High school drop out rate reduced by 60%
Brazil and
others
Many
Significant increase in enrolment and/or attendance
Kenya
OVC-CT
8% point increase in enrolment
Peru
CCT
Positive impact on secondary school transition
Evidence of SP impact on Child protection
?
Child Labour
Country
Programme
Violence
?
Impact
Brazil
CT and after
school
Children worked 50% less
Ethiopia
Cash for work
Reduction in child wage employment
Pakistan
CCT
Girls labour force participation down, age at marriage up
Panama
CCT
Reduction in child labour among 12-15 years olds by 15.8%
Malawi
CT/UCT
Decline in sexual activity among adolescent girls, drop in
marriage (40%) and pregnancy rates (30%)
SP in times of crisis: example from Malawi
Length of time that food stores are projected to last by household
(“intervention” households receive a cash transfer under the Mchinji Social Cash
Transfer Pilot; “control” households do not)
Cost or the need to work for not attending school
Impact of abolishing school fees on enrolment
Social protection is not a silver bullet…
Social protection is not a silver bullet…
The supply side matters (Uganda)
70%
65%
56%
32%
Teachers
in place
CDOs
Health Effective
post filled health
posts
The reasons
behind reluctance
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What the bottlenecks and what can we do?
1- What are the three main blockages to bring
the social protection agenda forward at national
level?
2- What are the key changes at the
global/regional level that could help unlock
some of these national blockages?
Design and implementation issues
Design and implementation issues

Conditionality
• HH decision makers lack information or knowledge.
• Address norms that can harm children
• Political support
Design and implementation issues

Conditionality
X
Conditionality
• HH decision makers lack information or knowledge.
• Address norms that can harm children
• Political support
•
HH ability to make most rational choice
• Implementation
• Marginalize the most vulnerable
Design and implementation issues

Conditionality
X
Conditionality
• HH decision makers lack information or knowledge.
• Address norms that can harm children
• Political support
•
HH ability to make most rational choice
• Implementation
• Marginalize the most vulnerable
? Conditional vs. Unconditional
Reasons behind reluctance
Dependency – a hand up, not a hand out
Reasons behind reluctance
Dependency – a hand up, not a hand out
Reasons behind reluctance
Dependency – a hand up, not a hand out
• Long term effects of
improved human capital
• Address market failure
(lack of access to credit,
insurance)
• Reduce burden on social
networks
• Infusion of cash can lead to
multiplier effects in local
village economy
Households invest in livelihood activities—
though impact varies by country
Zambia
Malawi
Kenya
Lesotho
Ghana
---
++
+++
NS
NS
NS
NS
++(1)
NS
Agricultural inputs
+++
Agricultural tools
+++
Agricultural production
+++
Home production of
food
NS
+++
+++
Livestock ownership
All types
All types
Small
Non farm enterprise
(NFE)
+++
NS
+++
1) Maize and garden
plot vegetables
2) Pigs
Stronger impact
NS
++(2)
NS
NS
NS
Mixed impact
Less impact
Reasons behind reluctance
It’s too expensive!
Subsidy vs SP spending
SSN/GDP %, current
Energy Subs/ GDP, %
8.8%
1.2%1.5%
Sub-Saharan
Africa
2.0%
1.5%
0.4%0.8%
1.3%
0.7%
East Asia & Pacific Europe & Central Latin America &
Asia
Caribbean
1.8%
1.1%
0.3%
Middle East &
North Africa
South Asia
Source: Fiszbein, Kanbur and Yemtsov (2013): “Social Protection, Poverty and the Post-2015 Agenda,” The World Bank
34
In summary…
1. Children are overrepresented among the poor
2. For UNICEF: progressive realization, national
ownership and a move towards systems.
3. The evidence clearly shows SP makes a
difference for children.
4. We need to listen and understand the
reluctance to expand programmes, and how
to address these concerns.
UNICEF Social Protection Work
an overview
Show and Tell on Social Protection
Bonn, 2011
Thank you!
Contacts:
[email protected]
For more information…
• UNICEF Social Protection Strategic Framework:
http://www.unicef.org/socialprotection/framework/
• Transfer project :
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/transfer
• Protection to Production project :
http://www.fao.org/economic/ptop/home/en/
What the bottlenecks and what can we do?
1- What are the three main blockages to bring
the social protection agenda forward at national
level?
2- What are the key changes at the
global/regional level that could help unlock
some of these national blockages?
The time to invest in children is now
Pre-school
Intervention
Brain
Growth
Schooling
Job Training
Human Capital Rates
of Return
Pre-school
School
Post-School
Age
Addressing the drivers of child poverty
• Household monetary poverty
• Inequitable access to quality services
• Child and household characteristics that may
increase the likelihood of discrimination or
disadvantage
 Design and implementation matter
Programme scale (BOE)
Subsidy vs SP spending
SSN/GDP %, current
Energy Subs/ GDP, %
8.8%
1.2%1.5%
Sub-Saharan
Africa
2.0%
1.5%
0.4%0.8%
1.3%
0.7%
East Asia & Pacific Europe & Central Latin America &
Asia
Caribbean
1.8%
1.1%
0.3%
Middle East &
North Africa
South Asia
Source: Fiszbein, Kanbur and Yemtsov (2013): “Social Protection, Poverty and the Post-2015 Agenda,” The World Bank
42
Evidence of SP impact on nutrition: the “critical window”
South Africa’s Child Support Grant (CSG) is closely linked to improvements in nutrition. The CSG is an unconditional cash transfer (paid
out to mothers) which began in 1998 and now reaches 11 million children.
However, the age at which children begin receiving the CSG determines how large the impact of the program on height-for-age
(HA) will be. The impact is positive when treatment started at the youngest age but decreases as age of initial treatment rises. There
is a critical window of opportunity for SP to have an impact on long-term nutritional outcomes.
Heterogenous Treatment Effects by Age of Treatment
Design &
Implementation
issues
44
Design and implementation considerations
~ There is no one-size-fits-all in SP design and implementation. ~
•
•
•
Size of the transfer : should reflect the cost of a nutritious diet and adjust to price increases.
(Rule of thumb of 20 % of mean consumption)
Frequency of the transfer: Delivery needs to be predictable, timely and convenient to allow
planning and consumption smoothing. Frequent transfers increase the probability that
money is spend on food and health.
Age at enrollment of the beneficiary: the sooner the higher the impact on nutrition
outcomes and child development (critical window 0-2 y.) Recipient of the transfer: Benefits
paid to women significally increase the proportion of household expenditures that go to food
Type of transfer: depending on the context and the preferences of beneficiaries, also on the
availability of the necessary food items in that particular region/country.
UNICEF’S position on key design issues:
•
•
•
Conditionalities should not be assumed to be most effective in all contexts (little evidence
that it is more effective, added cost, risks of reducing access, increased strain on
beneficiaries, etc.)
Targeting: human rights, political, resource and capacity considerations
SP design should be inclusive of socially vulnerable groups and child-sensitive:
- consider intra-household distribution issues
- critical window of opportunity in child’s development
Social cash transfers targeted to poorest of the
poor can have productive impacts
• Long term effects of improved human capital
– Nutritional and health status; educational
attainment
– Labor productivity and employability
• Transfers can relax some of constraints brought on
by market failure (lack of access to credit, insurance)
– Helping households manage risk
– Providing households with liquidity
• Transfers can reduce burden on social
networks and informal insurance mechanisms
• Infusion of cash can lead to multiplier effects in
local village economy
Impact on productive assets and local
economy:
•
Kenya:
– CT-OVC programme had a significant impact on the accumulation of some productive assets,
especially among some subgroups within the evaluation sample.
– Receipt of the CT-OVC led to a 15 and six percentage point increase respectively in the share
of smaller and female-headed households owning small animals.
– Moreover, the CT-OVC transfer was associated with a seven percentage point increase in
household participation in a non-farm enterprise for female headed households, and a similar
decrease was recorded for maleheaded households.
•
Lesotho :
– By stimulating demand for locally supplied goods and services, cash transfers have productive
impacts. These effects are found primarily in households ineligible for the transfers. This
finding is not surprising given that the eligibility criteria for the CGP favour asset and labourpoor households.
– Recipient households receive the direct benefit of the transfer plus a small spillover effect of
LSL 0.15 per LSL 1.0 loti transferred. Their total income increases by LSL 3.79 million (LSL 3.42
million in real terms). The ineligible households benefit from spillovers amounting to an
increase in income of LSL 3.59 million (LSL 1.08 million in real terms) with each transfer.
– The productive impacts vary by sector. The cash transfers stimulate the production of crops
and livestock by LSL 0.19 and LSL 0.28 per loti transferred. The largest positive effect is on
retail,
Impact on productive assets and local
economy: (2)
• Ghana LEAP:
– Increase in non consumption expenditure: increasing savings, reducing
indebtedness, asset disinvestment and re-engaging with social
networks increasing savings, drawing down indebtedness, increasing
gifts, and investment in some productive activities
– LEAP has a positive impact on some aspects of productive activity,
particularly among smaller households, supplied both more own male
farm labour, as well as hired in more male farm labour—an impact
evident in the qualitative work as well.
– The qualitative work also found that the transfer in some cases
provided working capital for income earning activities, ranging from
petty trading to increase on-farm productivity.
– The use of negative livelihood coping strategies, such as working as
kaaya-yei porters in the south, was also reported to have been
reduced.
Impact on productive assets and local
economy: (3)
•
•
•
•
•
Zambia
significant impact on the accumulation of livestock and agricultural implements.
Large effects were found on both the share of households (21 percentage points)
owning animals and on the number of animals owned, especially for larger sized
households
positive impact on agricultural activity. Receipt of the CGP led to an 18 percent
increase in the area of worked land as well as an increase in the use of agricultural
inputs, including seeds, fertilizers and hired labour.
led to increased production – approximately a 37 percent increase in the value of
overall production. The increase in production appeared to be primarily sold rather
than consumed on farm; the CGP led to a 12 percentage point increase (from a 23
percent base) in the share of households selling their harvest.
Finally, in term of labour supply, receipt of the CGP transfer led family members to
reduce participation in, and intensity of, agricultural wage labour. The impact was
particularly strong for women – a 17 percentage point reduction in participation
and 12 fewer days a year. Both males and females increased time spent in family
agricultural and nonagricultural businesses
Shift from casual wage labor to on farm
and family productive activities
adults
Zambia
Kenya
Malawi
Lesotho
Ghana
Agricultural/casual wage
labor
---
---
---
--
NS
Family farm
+++
+++
+++
NS
+++
Non farm business (NFE)
+++
+++
NS
NS
Non agricultural wage labor
+++
NS
NS
NS
NS
Wage labor
NS
NS
---
NS
NS
Family farm
NS
- - - (1)
+++
NS
NS
children
1) Particularly older boys
No clear picture on child labor (but
positive impacts on schooling)
Shift from casual wage labour to
family business—consistently
reported in qualitative fieldwork
Improved ability to manage risk
Zambia
Kenya
Negative risk coping
Malawi
Ghana
---
Pay off debt
+++
Borrowing
---
Purchase on credit
NS
Savings
+++
NS
+++
Lesotho
---
+++
NS
---
NS
NS
NS
+++
Give informal transfers
NS
+++
+++
Receive informal transfers
---
NS
+++
• Reduction in negative risk
coping strategies
• Increase in savings, paying
off debt and credit
worthiness
Strengthened social networks
• In all countries, re-engagement with
social networks of reciprocity—
informal safety net
• Allow households to participate,
to “mingle” again
3
Cash transfers lead to income
multipliers
Every 1 Birr transferred can
across the region generate 2.52 Birr of income
2.5
If constraints are
binding, may be
as low as 1.84
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Kenya (Nyanza)
Ethiopia (AbiAdi)
Zimbabwe
Zambia
Nominal multiplier
Kenya (Garissa)
Real multiplier
Lesotho
Ghana
Ethiopia
(Hintalo)
Production constraints can
limit local supply response,
which may lead to higher
prices and a lower multiplier
Nearly all the spillover goes
to non-beneficiary households
Recent Evidence: SP stimulates local growth,
education, health and job creation
•
•
Stimulating local economies. SP can have significant multiplicative effects on others
in the local economy. In Malawi, a cash transfer program generated up to US$2.45 in
local communities for every dollar provided to beneficiaries. In Lesotho and Mexico,
similar programs are estimated to have, respectively, a multiplier effect of US$2.23
and up to US$2.60 per dollar distributed.
Promoting better job opportunities in the future. Oportunidades reaching 6.5 m. HH
sparked demand for higher-level education and improved job prospects. Recent
evaluations show that former beneficiaries are more likely to enter middle-class
occupations than non-beneficiaries. This result is particularly significant for
indigenous women who had participated in Oportunidades. On average, their share
in better-paying jobs was about 25 percentage points higher than their peers who did
not benefit from the program.
Addressing the drivers of child poverty
• Household monetary poverty
• Inequitable access to quality services
• Child and household characteristics that
may increase the likelihood of
discrimination or disadvantage