Transcript Latin America Topic Lecture - Emory National Debate Institute 2013

Latin America Topic Lecture
Resolved: The United States federal
government should substantially
increase its economic engagement
toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela.
I. INTRODUCTION
• Why did we choose this topic?
• When was the last time we debated Latin
America?
• What are the core questions of the
resolution?
Core Questions
1. Should the US engage more in these
countries, or leave them alone?
2. Is Latin America important ? [economically or
politically]
3. Is enough enough for Cuba?
4. Is there anything else we could do for
Mexico?
5. Chavez is gone, what now?
II. Economic Engagement
What is it?
Deliberately expanding economic ties – the goal of changing behavior and
improve relations
Kahler & Kastner 04 Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies University of California,
San Diego & Department of Government and Politics University of Maryland [Kahler, Miles and Scott Kastner. Strategic
Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies in South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.
<www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/kastner/KahlerKastner.doc>]
Economic engagement—a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary
in order to change the behavior of the target state and effect an improvement in bilateral
political relations—is the subject of growing, but still limited, interest in the international relations literature. The bulk of the work on economic statecraft continues to
focus on coercive policies such as economic sanctions. The emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and welldocumented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa 1994; Pollins
no
database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno 2003).
Furthermore, beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies in this
regard have focused on policies adopted by great powers. But engagement policies adopted by South Korea and the other two
1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how widespread strategies of economic engagement actually are: scholars disagree on this point, in part because
states examined in this study, Singapore and Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics; instead, it may be more widespread than
previously recognized.
Engagement is explicitly a POSITIVE inducement. Distinguishes
from being broad and confusing
HAASS & O’SULLIVAN 00 a. VP & Director of Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, b. Fellow in the Foreign Policy
Studies Program at Brookings [Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to
Punitive Policies 113, Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 113–35]
The United States and its principal allies in both Europe and Asia have long differed over the best strategies for dealing
with recalcitrant regimes. European countries and Japan, to differing degrees, have argued that the preservation of
commercial and diplomatic contacts is critical in maintaining leverage over countries with which they have foreignpolicy and national-security disputes. In contrast, until very recently, the US has tenaciously clung to the position that
policies of economic and political isolation are both morally and practically the right course to follow when dealing with
so-called ‘rogue’ states. Although there has been occasional convergence, the friction that these two perspectives have
caused has been far more notable than any points of accord. This dissonance is one of several important factors that
have spurred the current debate in the United States, and to a lesser extent among America’s allies, over the relative
merits of containment strategies versus engagement policies. Because of the prominence of punitive policies – such as
sanctions and military force – in the foreign-policy repertoire of the US, this debate draws upon many of the lessons
extracted from past cases in which policies of punishment were employed. However, strategies of engagement have
thus far been subject to much less stringent evaluation, highlighting the need to identify the most favourable
circumstances and strategies for employing incentives or rewards to shape the conduct of problem regimes.1
The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy
of ‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in
the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors
all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’ must refer
to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreignpolicy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, it does
not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice,
there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a
positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the
extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important
disagreements.
Economic engagement includes credits, investments, access to
tech, loans, or aid. It includes removing embargoes or tariffs.
Distinct from Political, Military, and Civil-Society engagement
HAASS & O’SULLIVAN 00 a. VP & Director of Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, b. Fellow in the
Foreign Policy Studies Program at Brookings [Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Terms of
Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies 113, Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 113–35]
Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic
engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion,
access to technology, loans or economic aid.3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the
removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded
economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the global
economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s
global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to
regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination
of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military-educational
training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s
armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign
military officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions,
cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of
students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible
incentives used in this form of engagement.
Export Credits
• In other words, loans, insurance, and other support for
exporters to a country
http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/about.htm
Governments provide officially supported export credits
through Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) in support of national
exporters competing for overseas sales. Such support can take
the form either of “official financing support”, such as direct
credits to foreign buyers, refinancing or interest-rate support,
or of “pure cover support”, such as export credits insurance or
guarantee cover for credits provided by private financial
institutions. ECAs can be government institutions or private
companies operating on behalf of governments.
Investment Insurance
Programs for providing financial cover to companies deciding to invest
in a foreign country
Catalog of Foreign Domestic Assistance
[https://www.cfda.gov/?s=program&mode=form&tab=step1&id=7619
dff6f3c7c709f7e378fe5dd97fbf]
To insure investments of eligible U.S. investors in developing countries
and emerging markets, against the political risks of inconvertibility,
expropriation, and political violence. Special programs include insuring
(l)contractors and exporters against arbitrary drawings of letters of
credit posted as bid, performance or advance payment guaranties,
(2)petroleum exploration, development and production (3)leasing
operations, and (4) debt financials, including securities.
Economic Aid
• This includes just about anything – giving
another country aid with their economy.
• Here is a good chart - http://www.vaughns-1pagers.com/politics/us-foreign-aid.htm
• Can basically do just about anything, making
the topic “resolved: interact with the economy
of one of these countries.”
• We give a ton right now to lots of countries.
Not many Latin ones though.
Examples of things the US is doing via Economic Engagement
OCC 09 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism [Country Reports on Terrorism 2008,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2009/c-rprt-terrorism_2008-05-7.htm]
The U.S. strategy of Total Economic Engagement pursues economic reform, rule of law, and global
economic integration, in countries with predominantly Muslim populations. Total Economic
Engagement includes:
• Regular bilateral discussions on these topics with host government officials, with both U.S. Embassy
officials and officials from a wide range of U.S. agencies participating;
• Formal structured dialogues, high-level Economic Dialogues, and Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) Councils;
• U.S. bilateral and multilateral assistance programs for economic reform, trade capacity-building,
and rule of law managed chiefly through USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and
the State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). Programs are often
complemented with technical assistance provided by specialized U.S. agencies and offices;
• Coordinated multilateral policies and assistance strategies to advance reform goals by working with
such international organizations as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World
Trade Organization, and OECD (MENA-OECD Investment), and other multilateral donors; and
• Working with NGOs, such as Transparency International, and U.S. and foreign business associations,
such as American Chambers of Commerce and Business Councils, to advance reform issues of
mutual concern.
Removal of Penalites
• Domestic Penalties for not “buying america”
• The Cuban Embargo
• Tariffs for products and other acts of
protectionism.
Other Categories
• Investment Promotion: A company/NGO/law
that promotes investment.
• Access to Technology: Selling an item [medical
equipment], allowing the sell of an item [cuba
telecomm], or focusing on developing a sector.
• Economic Loans: Here’s some cash, pay us
back later, with interest.
• Facilitated Entry into an International Financial
Organization: WTO, etc.
III. Advantages to Engaging
US Legitimacy/Image
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“Soft Power”
Losing the Hemisphere to others
Anti-Americanism wins elections
Doesn’t care about its neighbors
North/South Gap
Helps us do other things we want
‘merica
Soft Power defined and made relevant to Latin America
Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the
State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation
for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]
Traditionally the U.S. has projected its influence by using varying combinations of hard and soft power. It
has been a long time since the United States last sponsored or supported military action in Latin
America, and although highly context-dependent, it is very likely that Latin American citizens and their
governments would view any overt display of American hard power in the region negatively. n3 One can
only imagine the fodder an American military excursion into Latin America would provide for a leader
like Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales of Bolivia. Soft power, on the other hand, can win over
people and governments without resorting to coercion, but is limited by other factors.
The key to soft power is not simply a strong military, though having one helps, but rather an enduring
sense of legitimacy that can then be projected across the globe to advance particular policies. The key
to this legitimacy is a good image and a reputation as a responsible actor on the global and regional
stage. A good reputation and image can go a long way toward generating goodwill, which ultimately will
help the U.S. when it tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in the region. n4
In order to effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its image by going on a
diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's leaders, but also the Latin American
people, of the important relationship between the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the problems facing
Latin America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation. Working
with other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up legitimacy, earn respect, and
repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on Cuba, every country in Latin America
is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen its existing relationships in the region,
but also win over new allies, who look to us for "ideas and solutions, not lectures." n5
US-Latin American Relations
• Related to image
• Unchallenged by our neighbors – Brooks and
Wohlforth 2002
(Stephen G., Assistant Professor, William C., Associate Professor in the
Department of Government at Dartmouth College July/August, Foreign Affairs l/n)
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Environment
Economic Security
Energy Access
Proliferation
Economic Growth
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Need Trading Partners
Import Growth
Export Growth
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Energy Security
Immigration
Trade
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NAFTA
Bilateral Free Trade Agreements
FTAA
Protectionism
WTO
China
US-Latin America relations are key to stop Chinese expansion in the region
Lovelace 07 Ph.D., Director of the Strategic Studies Institute [Douglas, FOREWORD:
CHINA’S EXPANSION INTO AND U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM ARGENTINA’S
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SPACE INDUSTRIES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY,” Strategic Studies Institute, September,
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=806]
The U.S. Government is waking up to China's growing presence in Latin America. For the
last several years as U.S. policymakers' attention and resources, largely diverted from Latin America, have been focused on the
Middle East, China has pursued a policy of economic engagment with the region. Sino-Latin American
trade has sky-rocketed, and Chinese investment in the region is picking up. In this monograph, Ms. Janie
Hulse, a Latin American specialist based in Buenos Aires, Argentina, argues that increased Chinese investment in regional
telecommunications and space industries has implications for U.S. national security. She believes that globalization , advances
in information technology and China's growing capacity and interest in information
warfare make the United States particularly vulnerable. Ms. Hulse details China's expansion into the U.S.
withdrawal from these intelligence-related industries in Argentina and highlights associated risks for the United States. The author calls for the
U.S. government to react to this current trend by increasing its engagement in regional
strategic industries and bettering relations with its southern neighbors.
US-Chinese Relations
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Messing with our neighborhood
Staging Grounds
Economic Competition
Energy Security Issues
Neo-Con Fears
Democracy
• Credible Message
• Beacons of Democracy
• Economic Engagement is pro Democracy
Amash 12 International Relations at UC San Diego [Brandon Amash,
Evaluating the Cuban Embargo, Prospect: Journal of International Affairs at
UCSD, http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cubanembargo/]
Lifting economic sanctions will improve economic growth in Cuba, which
correlates to democratization. Empirical evidence shows that a strong
economy is correlated to democracy. According to the Modernization Theory
of democratization, this correlation is a causal link: economic growth directly
leads to democratization. Lifting the current economic sanctions on Cuba and
working together to improve economic situations in the state will allow their
economy to grow, increasing the likelihood of democracy in the state, and
thus promoting greater freedom of expression, opinion and dissent.
Energy & Environment
• Ultra-Diverse
• Oil
• NAFTA manufacturing concerns
Indigenous Populations
• Section of the topic paper dedicated to
minority population groups in these countries.
• Each of them has diverse histories and groups
that are currently struggling for, or previously
struggled for, independence.
IV. Disadvantages to Engaging
Appeasement
“a diplomatic policy of making political or
material concessions”
*Signal to other powers
*Pretty silly for Mexico
*Pretty silly in general
Capitalism/Growth Bad
• Engagement suggests we have something to
teach them about the economy.
• Fundamental question of the resolution.
• Hands off / top-down / bottom-up
• Environment
• Poverty / Inequality
Relations/Legitimacy Bad
• Soft Power is only good if the person who has
it isn’t evil.
• Negative things we would get Latin America to
do
• Chinese Influence/Growth good
• Hegemony is bad
Budget
• Does Economic Engagement cost money?
• If yes, then spending money is bad.
• If no, then who cares, and why spend any?
Politics
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The only disad
Why fix their problems
Buy America
Cuban Nationals
Immigration/Remittances fears
Venezuela is friends with Iran
V. Philosophical Questions
• Capitalism/Neoliberalism - “a term of
condemnation employed by critics of
liberalizing economic tendencies” Profit &
Greed
• Western Model Bad – Development, Human
Rights, Trojan-Horse for our values.
• Foreign Policy flaws – Security, Indict of
Foreign Policy Assumptions.
VI. Cuba
Current Demographics
• Officially The “Republic of Cuba”
• 2010 census says 11m people.
• 2.2m in Havana, no more than 500k in any
other single city.
• Low population growth rate – 1.43 per
woman.
Political History 1.0
• Populated by Native American groups: Taíno & the Ciboney.
• Columbus landed there in 1492. 1511 became a Spanish
protectorate. [1511-1898].
• Remained Spanish far later La Siempre Fidelísima Isla ("The
Always Most Faithful Island“ – concern for slave revolts,
fear of U.S., pirates. Cuban-Chinese slaves.
• 1868 - Carlos Manuel de Céspedes. Freed his slaves to
fight for a revolt. Freed all slaves who would join the fight.
• 1878 – ended the battle, Spain agreed to increased
autonomy.
• Spanish-American war – Treaty of Paris [1898]. Gave up
Guam, Puerto Rico, the Phillipines, and Cuba.
Political History 1.1
• May 20, 1902 – Cuban independence from U.S. control.
• Platt Amendment
• Fulgencio Batista was democratically elected President in the
elections of 1940
• Batista outlawed the Cuban Communist Party in 1952.
• 1956 – group left Mexico planning to establish military rebellion.
Batista claimed to have killed the leaders.
• Castro was alive and covered by the NYT.
• 1959 – Castro has claimed Havana. US sends support for the “free
of communism” government.
• 1960 – communist rule.
• 1961 – Soviet Union, Emigration, Bay of Pigs.
• 1962 - Embargo
Political History 1.2
• Still the embargo, no really.
• Helms-Burton - The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996.
• Everyone hates it. Everyone.
• Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act of 2000 (TRSA) – agriculture
• 2009 – Travel & Remittances for family members
• Jan. 16, 2013 Obama waived the right to suit
businesses.
Cuba’s Economy
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Centrally planned
2000 – 23% private employed.
1981 – 8% private employed.
Difficult to know for sure
No use of the ‘dollar’
Netherlands is their top trading partner
U.S. Cuban Relations
• What relations?
• The Embargo started on 2/7/1962.
• Obama has a list of requirements: transaction
fees, telecommunication, political prisoners,
improved human rights record.
Cuba & Debate
• Great Aff Evidence
• Tons of recent literature – the political winds
are shifting
• PICS
• Everyone talks about Cuba
• Recently found some oil
• Smaller affs
VII. Mexico
Current Demographic Facts
• Technically, “The United Mexican States”
made of 31 states and a federal district.
• 113 million people makes it the 11th most
populous in the world. Largest Spanish
speaking in the world. What’s the only Latin
American country with more people?
• Highly touristed – 10th most visited in the
world. 22.5 million visitors annually.
Political History 1.0
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Human remains 23,000 years ago.
Cultivation of Maize.
Earliest complex civilizations: Olmec, Mayan, Zapotec.
1519 Spanish began a conquest over the Aztecs, whose
leader was Moctezuma II.
Smallpox killed more than 3m, many Spanish were
immune. Made the Christianity popular.
1821 – Independence from Spain
1824 – calls for independence. Including Texas.
1846 – Mexican-American war.
Political History 1.1
• 1848 - Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Peace treaty to end
the war. $15m to Mexico. Got Rio Grande border for Texas,
California, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and parts of
Wyoming & Colorado. Bought some more for 10m.
• Given an option to stay in the U.S. as full citizens. 90%
stayed.
• 1910 – Mexican Revolution. Election fraud concerns.
• 1940-1980 – major economic growth, oil prices, U.S.
economic ties. But, large inequalities.
• 1/1/94 – NAFTA. Zapatista Rebellion.
• 1994 Economy collapses. Huge US financial stimulus
package. Rebounded by 1999.
Political History 1.2
• 1917 constitution – representative democracy.
• Congress, Executive, Judicial branches.
• National Action Party: a right-wing conservative
party founded in 1939
• Institutional Revolutionary Party: a center-left
party and member of Socialist International
• Party of the Democratic Revolution: a left-wing
party,[86] founded in 1989 as the successor of
the coalition of socialists and liberal parties
Mexico’s Economy
• 14th largest GDP in the world.
• Economists, like Goldman Sachs, predict it will become the
5th largest by 2050.
• Population Growth, Improving Infrastructure, developing
economics.
• 46% are living in poverty • infant mortality in Mexico is three times higher than the
average among OECD nations
• U.S. & Canada are 50% of its imports and exports.
• Remittances from the U.S. are .2% of its entire GDP.
• Largest auto producer in North America – Ford, Chrysler,
and GM
[http://thecatalist.org/2010/03/mexico-2050-the-world%C2%B4s-fifth-largest-economy/]
NAFTA
• North American Free Trade Agreement.
• January 1, 1994 between U.S., Canada, and
Mexico.
• Eliminated Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution
– protection of Indigenous Indians.
• Started the Zapatista rebellions. Still ongoing.
• Agricultural dumping.
• Industry Migration.
U.S. Mexican Relations
• Foreign relations directed by the President of Mexico.
• Friendly with the U.S. with the exception of the
support for the Cuban government.
• 1 million U.S. citizens reside in Mexico.
• Provided Relief Aid multiple times: Katrina & 9/11
• Rejected the War on Terror.
• We trade – A LOT. We’re #1 for them, #3 for us.
• Wal-Mart is the largest private employer in Mexico.
• War on Drugs
• Immigration
Mexico & Debate
• We’re doing a lot of economic engagement
now
• Advantages won’t be as good as Cuba, but the
disads won’t be as good either
• Immigration
• War on Drugs
• International Organizations
VIII. Venezuela
Current Demographic Facts
• Officially called the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
• Population is roughly 29 million people.
• “Extremely High Biodiversity” including the Amazon
River Forest Basin.
• Highly Urbanized. Most live in the cities in the North.
• Capital is Caracas.
• Divided into 23 states, the capital, and federal districts.
• Speaks Spanish but recognizes over 30 indigenous
languages.
Political History
• Colonized by Spain in 1522, secured full
independence in 1830. [Spanish diseases killed
off a huge percentage of indigenous people]
• Impeached President Carlos Andres Perez for
embezzlement of public funds in 1993.
• 1998 Election of military official Hugo Chavez.
• Started the Bolivarian Revolution, rewriting the
constitution. Died on March 5th.
• March 8, 2013 elected Nicolas Maduro. First since
Chavez and the revolution.
Venezuela’s Economy
• Per capita GDP for 2009 was US$13,000,
ranking 85th in the world.
• Currency is the bolívar.
• Leading exporter of oil. Citgo is owned and
fueled by Venezuela.
• Largest known reserves of oil. 297 billion. Up
from 99 billion in 2007.
U.S. Venezuelan Relations
• 2002 the US recognized Pedro Carmona in a coup
attempt – allegedly. Chavez told people he had
proof of a US planned invasion.
• Sept. 2008 officially broke off relations with the
U.S, re-established in June 2009.
• In Russia, during a political speech Chavez said,
“"the greatest terrorist in world history.”
• Despite political tensions, trade & economic
interactions remain high. 40.4b in 2005.
• It is an interesting and unsettled time in the
history of Venezuela.
Venezuela & Debate
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Not as much literature
Ever changing post Chavez
But, Oil. Sweet sweet oil.
Like finding cards?