Transcript Test Title HERE

Ukraine
Business outlook 2015-19
Quarterly update – November 2015
by Dr Daniel Thorniley
Content
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Executive summary
Debt restructuring
How senior executives see things
Some assumptions
Business outlook
Human resources and salaries
Bad blood?
Where do you put Ukraine in your structure?
Economic outlook
Inflation and interest rate outlook
Currency outlook
Statistics
Executive summary (1)
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Business is still very tough in Ukraine
But there has been an upward surge in expectations in the market for hryvnia sales growth
in 2016 compared with 2015
What is striking is that much of the positive shift has taken place in the last 2-3 months
For example, those predicting double-digit growth 2 months ago numbered 16% and now
this figure has risen to 31% while those bracketed in single digits have increased from 25% to
36% now.
This may stem from recent economic stabilisation or the perception that the economic
bottom has been hit and a slow recovery will now proceed.
GDP growth is expected to turn positive around Q1-Q2 of next year
At least two factors have provided some recent light:
1. A 20% write-down and extended repayment terms remove some (only a bit) of the total
debt load (and the implementation of the deal may prove tricky)
2. The macro-economic numbers have started the slow process of stabilising and we can
expect some month on month and quarter on quarter GDP growth in early 2016
Executive summary (2)
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We would also point out (and repeat) that very curiously, while fully 85-90% of companies
are struggling badly in the Ukraine market, there is a “strange” scattered number of
companies across sectors (pharmaceutical, consumer goods, engineering) who are selling
very well in hryvnia and even in dollars and Euros (we examine why this may be so below)
The recent debt agreement may also have improved the mood as well as the sense that the
worst may also be over in eastern Ukraine.
The 2016 budgets now appear much stronger than 6-7 weeks ago and much better than
excepted 2015 results and this applies to a lot more companies
But 2015 is going to be a tougher/worse year than 2014 because it will not have the relatively
good/moderate start that 2014 experienced: in fact just the opposite as the first half of 2015
will be worse than the second half
And we are seeing this now as the bottom seems to have been hit for a number of indicators
in the mid-summer or late spring period
After a slump of -10.5% this year, we GDP ticking up mildly to +0.8% in 2016
We then see GDP trending later at 4% (or just under) in 2017-2020
Executive summary (3)
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Top-line Inflation surged to over 61% in April after the currency collapse and as gas prices
were liberalised (by 800% in April) but the September figure decelerated to 52%
Top-line inflation will average 50% this year and be down to 18% in 2016
High inflation and weak currency fed off each other with blow-back effects on the economy
If there is further compromise militarily, then there is always the possibility even of some
strong positive upside on the FX rate which would run through positively into business
results. But this seems unlikely for now
Our earlier currency estimates for 2015-16 still seem about right averaging to the US dollar at
about 22-24
We see the hryvnia somewhat weaker at about 26 to the dollar by year-end 2016
Risks and volatility could be large both to the up or more to the downside
Total merchandise export levels fell from $65bn in 2013 to $55bn last year and to about
$41bn this year and given growth trends eastwards and westwards we see only a slow trade
recovery and Ukrainian exporters not fully able to benefit from the weak currency
Some Russian regulations are blocking Ukrainian exports into Russia while some western
companies are no longer supplying Ukraine from Russia. This is by no means a complete
freeze on this cross border trade but does indicate that the trend is in the wrong direction
Debt restructuring (1)
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On 11 March the IMF approved a 4-year assistance program of $17.5bn under the so-called
Extended Fund Facility (EEF). The new program replaces an earlier two-year program of
$17bn (of which some $5bn were disbursed)
In fact $15bn of the $40bn package is predicted to be saved (by 2018) in on-going debt
negotiations: so 40% of the total support is presumed to come from debt restructuring which
as we noted several months ago was extremely optimistic or fanciful
The more recent deal reached with private creditors in September is a step in the right
direction and has boosted the economic and corporate mood
In brief summary the deal to restructure external liabilities meant creditors agreed to a 20%
haircut of principal, coupons were adjusted higher and the maturity was extended by 4 years.
And in addition the government provided “value recovery” instruments/warrants that are
linked to future GDP growth
There is short-term benefit in the deal for Ukraine and for the creditors especially if the
Ukraine economy starts to report moderate GDP growth over the next 5 years
But the smooth implementation of the deal may prove tricky in the closing months of 2015
Debt restructuring (2)
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There is still some lingering question mark about the proportion of creditors who have
accepted the deal in order to make it legitimate (75% of creditors)
The principal sticking point remains the $3bn Eurobond due to be paid to Russia in December
2015
If the IMF were to adopt a rigid interpretation of what type of debt this Eurobond entails,
then Ukraine could be plunged into official default and IMF funding would have to be halted
on technical grounds as the Fund is not eligible to lend “into arrears”
The IMF ought to redefine its terms so that it can lend into arrears of public debt (which is
what this Eurobond is) as well as private debt
The bottom line in our opinion is a strong one that the IMF will continue lending though the
full term of its existing program and the Russian Eurobond issue will prove a temporary
distraction
How senior executives see things (1)
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The local MD of a major consumer product firm: “We were seeing a further 50% drop in the
Euro top-line and some weeks ago I thought it would be worse but the currency stabilisation
has helped a little. But the numbers are still very bad”
Another MD in the same sector confirmed: “We could see top-line sales fall by 10-25% this year
and any consumer resilience could collapse this year compared with some relative support in
2014. I am also seeing the start of a collapse in premium products (which is not surprising) but
the speed of the move to value and discounts is extreme now. We and other companies are
losing share now to the discounters as the Ukrainian consumers move en masse to the bottom.”
But not is all bad news
The regional director of a global apparel brand stated last week in Moscow that: “Our Ukraine
business is remarkable. We are up 70-80% in hryvnia which means of course that we are solid in
FX when we combine that with some price rises. To be able to stay steady in FX when the
currency collapsed and inflation shot through the roof is quite special”.
The regional MD of one industrial conglomerate also noted: “Our sales are up 50% in local
currency and somehow our customers find money somewhere. They have been able to protect
their previous FX earnings and not turn them into hryvnia. To be honest I don’t ask them where
they get the Euros and we continue a reasonable business against this frightening background”
How senior executives see things (2)
The CEE MD of one western service company spoke for non-attribution how they were
approached by a large investor in Ukraine to provide support services
“This is a very large operation and a senior manager came to Vienna to discuss with so their
needs. These were extensive and aimed at improving the company’s operational efficiency and
staffing. The project is very sizeable by Ukraine standards and indeed a big project for us almost
anywhere in the CEE region. I asked how his business was developing and he replied, “Very well”.
When I said I presumed this was based purely on export growth, he contradicted me and replied
that, “Our domestic sales are going very strong as well as export sales”. To be honest I was simply
very happily surprised and don't have a full explanation why they are doing so well. Suffice it to
say they re doing well, they have money and want to spend it in us!”
Some assumptions (1)
We stick with the following features of our central scenario:
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Crimea has seceded de facto from Ukraine
This will not be accepted by Ukraine or the West and will remain a frozen conflict
The conflict with Russia will not escalate or worsen from here
The entire Donetsk and Lugansk regions (not just separatist bits) are 18% of Ukrainian GDP
and 23% of industrial output. But the separatist parts are smaller than this
Any eventual agreement will not prevent a future poisoned atmosphere remaining
IMF/EU funding will have to be increased in order to rebalance the debt profile
Ukraine will have to restructure or write-off part of its sovereign debt in 2015 (and did so)
But any variant of the IMF program will entail structural reforms which in the short-term will
hurt GDP growth, consumption patterns and western business results
The key to success is for any new regime to tackle genuinely and seriously endemic
institutionalised and socialised corruption and malpractice
Yanukovich’s kleptocracy has destroyed the commercial fibre of the country
Some assumptions (2)
Our economic assumptions for 2016 include:
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GDP grows by 0.8%
Consumer prices rise on average by 18% (after 50% in 2015)
High inflation will mean real wages are still negative by -4.8% (after -33% in 2015)
Consumer spending will rise by 1.3%
Investment will decline by 2.0% (after a fall of -18% in 2015)
The currency is following the path we predicated i.e. deep crash and with IMF support some
stabilisation. It is just possible that the very worst may be over on the currency front as well
as on the inflation side of things
Business outlook (1)
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Ukraine is the worst performing market in the CEEMEA region in 2015 excluding only Syria
Many companies were surprised that they survived the first 6-7 months of 2014 in
reasonably good shape as consumers stocked up, “buying against future inflation” and
“investing in products” rather than holding on to cash and these were wise measures
But by the autumn 2014 harsh reality had sunk in for the huge majority of companies
Executives turned very pessimistic in early 2015 but became more optimistic this autumn and
we can see from the budgeted figures below that many companies now forecast a rebound in
hryvnia sales in 2016
In 2016 it will “look” a lot better but much of this will be bounce back form depressed levels
Business results will depend on the FX rate and that will depend in part on inflation and the
sovereign debt outlook and the extent of EU/IMF support. This was very bleak/disastrous in
February-March. But we have seen the first signs of some potentially solid stabilisation
There is a growing East-West division in sales with more companies reporting relatively
better sales in Kiev and the western regions compared with weak current and future sales
outlook in the East and South of the country.
Business outlook (2) – 2015 sales projections
Latest 2015 sales projections main CIS markets (in local currencies)
Growth of 10%+
Growth of 5-10%
Growth of 1-5%
Zero growth
Decline 1-10%
Decline of 10%+
Russia
35%
20%
14%
9%
11%
9%
Ukraine
18%
8%
7%
14%
31%
22%
Source: Business Russia/CIS Group Surveys
Kazakhstan
27%
28%
11%
23%
11%
0%
Belarus
27%
16%
11%
28%
16%
1%
Business outlook (3) – 2016 sales projections
Latest 2016 sales projections main CIS markets (in local currencies)
Growth of 10%+
Growth of 5-10%
Growth of 1-5%
Zero growth
Decline 1-10%
Decline of 10%+
Russia
46
30
8
9
5
2
Ukraine
33
22
14
23
10
0
Source: Business Russia/CIS Group Surveys
Kazakhstan
30
33
8
18
10
0
Belarus
22
29
14
32
4
0
Business outlook (4)
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Ukraine: there has been an upward surge in expectations in the market for hryvnia sales
growth in 2016 compared with 2015
What is striking is that much of the positive shift has taken place in the last 2-3 months
For example, those predicting double-digit growth just 3 months ago numbered 16% and
now (mid-October) this number has risen to 33% while those bracketed in single digits have
increased from 25% some 3 months ago to 36% now.
This may stem from recent economic stabilisation or the perception that the bottom has
been hit and a slow recovery will now proceed. The recent debt agreement may also have
improved the mood as well as the sense that the worst may also be over in eastern Ukraine.
The 2016 budgets now appear much stronger than 6-12 weeks ago and much better than
excepted 2015 results.
Human resources and salaries (1)
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Generally companies are/were trying to retain staff and keep salaries in tight control
MDs are assessing their 2016 budgets and apparently see some possible market
improvement
We think this may mean that more companies will now NOT take an axe to headcount which
was a probable scenario if the economy had continued to plummet along with the currency
At least 50-60% of companies have already made cuts to headcount but surprisingly (or not)
many of these have not been brutal
Some local mangers face of course demands from headquarters for profit stabilisation or
even profit growth, and then face the choice of deeper and accelerated staff cuts
One CEE regional MD noted: “We have been able to retain nearly all staff in Ukraine and just
a bit of natural attrition. I could keep this situation going for a 12-15 month period after the
Crimea incident last March. But now annual numbers are kicking in and there is no place to
hide. Regrettably, we will have to let 20-40% of the staff go as there is simply no or very little
business”
However, as we say, the recent relative economical and business improvement could
make managers think again before engaging in deeper cut backs
Human resources and salaries (2)
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Another regional MD of a B2B company echoed this: “We will be obliged to let 20 people go
in the coming weeks. There is a bit of mini-recovery but it’s tiny and at hugely deflated levels.
I am, for what it’s worth, telling our local team to inform people that they should stay in
touch and hopefully in 9-15 months we could be hiring again”.
Most companies (79%) are now not making any salary increases to compensate for the
hryvnia depreciation. In 2016, with the longevity of the recession, companies will ensure that
any salary increases remain below inflation
Of course if the hryvnia continues to stabilise (or to avoid further deep crashes) and inflation
as an average stabilises or even falls, then local staff will feel much better-off but in the
coming 6 months the salary outlook is very tough for employees in western companies, in
Ukrainian ones and within the civil service and state sector
Then again, many will be glad to hold on to their job with a western company and be willing
to wait for a rally in 2016
Bad blood?
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There are no moral, value judgments in the following remarks, just business analysis
There are mixed messages from companies regarding bad feelings and break downs within
teams among Ukrainian and Russian staff
Several western managing directors told me last week that, “We are seeing serious tensions
and break downs of relationships among our Russian and Ukrainian staff and this is a real
tragedy”
A few companies have started to take Ukrainians out of Moscow offices and Russians out of
Kiev at the request of their staff; no one is being obliged to transfer
The numbers from our survey are as follows:
– 59% of companies spot heightened tension and 41% do not
– 80% are NOT transferring staff while 20% are transferring some
All this has consequences for promotion and succession planning and could turn into a
serious medium-term HR problem
Conversely several western executives told me recently that, “Tensions are actually quite
minor (or below the surface)”
So in summary, some disconcerting trends for sure but also not exclusively bad news. But
also quite sad and depressing
Where do you put Ukraine in your structure?
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Firstly, whereas in the past many companies had structural links between their Kiev and
Moscow offices or dotted lines even when formal links were detached, this will “presumably”
disappear as Ukraine is detached organisationally from Moscow
But many companies have a vested interest in keeping a CIS structure including Ukraine and
do not want to disrupt a working structure which is also convenient
In our latest survey (surprisingly to me), 40% of companies are retaining a CIS structure with
Ukraine while another 15% do so with Ukraine “more autonomous”
“Only” 45% are taking or have taken Ukraine out of the CIS structure
One MD for the CIS region explained the commercial reasons why Ukraine should remain in
the structure include trade ties, customs regulations, legislation, practicality, synergies etc.
But conversely an executive replied: “There were many synergies but frankly many of these
are disappearing” We are also witnessing increasing pressure from Ukrainian-based
executives demanding to be detached from any structure which contains Russia
Our assumption is that with a cease-fire in place that as “things calm down” , then companies
will not tamper with their structures and leave things alone
On the other hand, pressures from the Ukrainian business community should ensure that at
least some companies start to detach Ukraine from their CIS structure
Economic outlook (1) - GDP
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GDP has declined in every quarter of the year since Q3 2012 with the one exception of the
last quarter of 2013
GDP will trend negative until the end of 2015 but should start to run positive in the first or
second quarter of 2016
But the depth of the existing recession means that our estimates for 2015 and 2016 are
tweaked downwards a little since our last quarterly report. But the downgrade is not massive
We now see 2015 GDP at -10.5% (instead of -9.4%) and for next year we expect GDP growth
of 0.8% (instead of 1.4%)
Risks are evenly divided to the up and down in 2016
We presume no further escalation in eastern Ukraine and perhaps some lessening of tension
in 2016 and we also presume continued IMF and international financial support
Further out we anticipate GDP growth of 2.8% in 2017 with an average of around 4% in
subsequent years
Investment and exports seems currently to be relatively stronger but some key consumer
indicators are also improving
For example fixed investment, judged quarter on quarter, actually rose in Q2 by 4.5%
compared with a drop in Q1 of -7.4%
Economic outlook (2) - GDP
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Similarly industrial output hit a bottom of -22.5% in February but has improved fairly well to
“only” -5.1% in September. On this basis industrial output should be turning positive in the
next 2-3 months
We estimate that investment will finish this year at -18.0% and rally to +2.0% in 2016 and
climb to 4.0% by 2018
Industry ought to recover a little faster from a slump of -16.0% this year to + 3.0% next year
and then average close to 5% expansion in subsequent years
For comparative purposes the worst industrial number in the last 25 years was recorded in
2009 when output was down -37%
Thanks to those shifts in investment and industrial output and with some relative currency
stability, industrial confidence is also getting better:
This averaged a level of 120 in 2010 to 2013 but declined to 100 by January 2014; in the Q1
of 2015 it reached a recent low point of 83 but by Q3 this year the indicator was back to a
level of 100. So while the indictor is not absolutely good, it is on a recovery trajectory
The construction sector in the first 9 months of this year is down -23%
Cargo transportation was down by -9% last year but has recently shrunk by -14.3% in the first
9 months of 2015
The trends for construction and cargo transport are both better than in spring this year
Economic outlook (3) - GDP
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In theory the falling hryvnia ought to help Ukrainian exports but there will be little help from
a recessionary Russia and a still weak (but improving) Eurozone
Exports collapsed -23% in 2014 and still look set to decline a further -15 to -20% this year
before recovering by 5.0% in 2016; imports fell -30% last year and will be still negative this
year by at least -18% and then increase by 5.5% in 2016
Gas prices are set to rise by 1,000%+ over the next two years and this will inevitably hit
consumers and corporations, but we also know that there is scope for better efficiency in
energy usage so there is some compensation here
While the trends are in the right direction, the recovery will be hard: the global business
environment is not helping; the Eurozone is under-going a recovery but a sub-par one; and
trading relations with Russia are tense and other CIS markets are struggling or below par
But with spiking inflation and tumbling real wages and hryvnia, there are estimates that GDP
per capita will fall to just $1,500 from $4,000 in 2012 (denominated in dollars of course)
We think that a resilient business sector will continue to improve though the next 12 months
thanks to some elements of import substitution as well as benefiting eventually from the
competitive exchange rate which will apply to Ukrainian exporters especially those based in
the eastern part of the country
Economic outlook (4) – consumers
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Household spending this year will still be -11.8% before climbing back to 1.3% in 2016 and
then trending at 3-4% in subsequent years
Getting a precise handle on consumer sector related numbers is tricky given that about 35%
of economic activity takes place in the grey/black economy and many/most people receive
extra remuneration in addition to any official resources. This helps explain why consumer
spending is not more deeply ravaged given trends in real wages
Real wages in 2015 will be negative by -33% which is a colossal, negative number and reflects
a war-time economy
Essentially this means that inflation is averaging about 50% with nominal wages up by about
17% and thus we arrive at the approximate -33% negative number
We anticipate a fall in prices in 2016 while nominal wages will remain around 15-17% and
thus real wages will improve to about -5% in 2016 and finally turn positive by about +5% in
2017 and later years
These are bleak numbers and take a toll on consumer confidence indicators:
This indicator (consumer confidence) reached an all time low of 40 in 2009 after averaging
about 100 in 2001-08
Economic outlook (5) – consumers
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The figure then averaged around 80 in the period 2010 to March 2014 (with a downward blip at
the end of 2010)
But after Crimea the indictor quickly fell to 60 in July 2014 and 40 in January 2015 (equal to its
worst number); by end of October the number was slightly up to 45
So this important indicator is better than the start of the year but only marginally and still close to a
record low level
It seems it will take a lot more military stability and economic recovery before confidence levels
rise
And this insecurity is reflected in retail sales which recently actually touched an all-time low level,
worse than in 2009
Retail sales were unsustainably high during the period mid-2010/end 2013 bubble economy
increasing by more than 15% per annum
They then decelerated to 4-5% growth just prior to Crimea and by July 2014 were negative -10%
and then slumped to an all-time low of -30% in March 2015 (in 2009 the level reached “just” -20%)
Since then we have witnessed a mild recovery to -24% in June and -16% in September and we
expect this figure to run slightly positive year-on-year at the end of this year comparing like months
with like months
Unemployment averaged 10.5% last year and we think this could tick up to 12% this year as
companies make tougher decisions
Economic outlook (6) – consumers/wages
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Nominal wage growth and real wage growth (after inflation) in 2010-2012 were among the
highest in the world and certainly the highest in Europe
But these were already trending downwards from +20% in 2010 to +17% in 2011, +15% in
2012 and +7.9% in 2013
But real wages have faced a catastrophic collapse in 2014 and through into 2015
As inflation jumped to “only” an average of 12% last year, real wages fell by -4% as nominal
wages started to soften
But with nominal wages fluctuating in a range of 8-13% last year and 13-17% this year as
inflation leaps to 50-60%, then real wages are been destroyed by -33% this year, one of the
worst figures in recent global history
It seems the peak of inflation may have been hit in April at 60.9% and as prices decelerate,
then real wages in 2016 will improve but still be in negative territory at minus -4.8% before
turning positive by +3.0% in 2017
Real wage trends will hurt consumer confidence and ensure that retail and household
expenditure will sink this year
Inflation and interest rate outlook
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We expect the National Bank to continue interest rate cuts on the back of a stabilise currency
and declining inflation
The Bank did announce a rate cut shortly after the debt-restructuring deal on 27 August
when the central rate was cut from 30% to 27%
Inflation ticked down to 51.9% in September down from a recent high of 60.9% in April and
28.5% at the start of this year
Core inflation (excluding all food and energy cost) feel to 14.3% in August compared with a
peak of almost 40% in March
The back-drop to this is that inflation was at close to zero for most of 2012-2013 and inflation
started January 2014 at zero but climbed to 20% by October 2015
The recent improvement in prices this autumn is related to lower food prices, a more stable
currency picture and a favourable base inflation rate compared with last year when tariffs
were jacked up
Presuming a mild economic scenario and maintained currency stability, we expect inflation to
average 50% this year and then dip to an average of 18% in 2016 and then to continue this
fall to 8.6% in 2017
Currency outlook (1)
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In the second half of 2013 the hryvnia was stable against the dollar at 7.87 and averaged 11.0
to the Euro in the first half of 2014. It then moved as follows:
Dollar
Euro
1 Jan 2014
8.03
11.0
16 March
9.03
12.77
12 October
12.7
16.1
1 January 2015
15.6
18.9
1 March 2015
28.6
32.3
8 July
20.7
23.2
30 October
22.8
25.0
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The February free float caused the currency collapse but then we witnessed some moderate
recovery thanks to 1) some FX controls 2) some stabilisation in eastern Ukraine and 3) and
the announcement of the IMF program and proposed and then successful negotiations with
private creditors
Currency outlook (2)
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The background is that the currency was pegged to the dollar through 2010 to 2014 at 7.87
By April 2014 this crept up though the 10 level and in February 2015 prior to the Crimean
incursion stood just over 20
The currency hit a recent low of 33 to the US dollar in March this year and since then
stabilised to 23 in April and it has fluctuated around that number until end October 2015
FX reserves continued to rise in Q3 to $12.6bn and this was largely thanks to the
disbursement of $1.7bn under the FF program and support from other international financial
institutions
Moreover the National Bank was able to establish some swap lines with China and Sweden
which helped raise reserves by some $1bn
These stable reserves and presuming no escalation in eastern Ukraine combined with the
continued IMF support after the Russian Eurobond resolution, ought to ensure some
stabilisation of the currency especially as inflation ticks downwards
We share the consensus view that the hryvnia should average 23-24 in 2015 and then stay
close to that figure as an average about 25-26 in 2016
This is the central scenario with mild risk on the down/worse side
Currency outlook (3)
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(But the official numbers for the exchange rate do not reflect the entire reality and for
companies and citizens, even when they can exchange hryvnia, the effective rate is often 1520% worse than the official figure)
In subsequent years with still moderately high inflation and with the need for several years
to build up FX reserves, we except some mild downward pressure on the currency each year
of about 3-5% especially given the probability of emerging market volatility in the next 18
months
Equally any stronger/better political resolution in eastern Ukraine could entail a
5-15%+ appreciation in the currency
We think that capital contrails (imposed in Q1 this year) will be kept in place until next year
but then removed as the current account balance improves and FX reserves build up again
Presuming further currency and inflation stability by then, we do not anticipate a currency
collapse whenever such controls ae removed
Ukraine - economic outlook: statistics
GDP
Fixed investment
Industrial output
Household spending
Government spending
Real wages
Retail sales
Consumer prices (average)
Budget deficit (% GDP)
Current account (% GDP)
Exports
Imports
Hryvnia/Euro (average)
Hryvnia/dollar (average)
Unemployment (%)
2013
0.0
-6.6
-4.3
7.8
2.7
7.9
8.0
-0.3
-4.4
-9.3
-8.0
-6.0
10.7
8.1
8.7
Note: Real annual % change unless stated
2014
-6.8
-23.0
-11.0
-9.6
-5.0
-4.0
-9.5
12.5
-4.6
-3.8
-23.0
-34.0
15.7
11.9
10.5
2015
-10.5
-18.0
-16.0
-11.8
-4.0
-33.0
-17.0
50.0
-4.4
-1.3
-15.0
-20.0
25.5
23.0
12.0
2016
0.8
2.0
3.0
1.3
0.8
-4.8
3.0
18.0
-3.7
-1.4
5.5
7.0
27.5
25.0
11.0
2017
2.8
5.2
4.5
3.0
1.4
4.5
3.7
8.6
-2.8
-1.6
8.0
7.2
31.0
27.0
9.8
2018
4.0
5.8
5.8
3.7
1.4
3.2
4.7
7.5
-2.8
-2.2
8.2
7.8
32.5
28.5
8.5
2019
3.9
5.6
5.9
3.8
1.3
3.0
4.3
6.9
-2.6
-2.0
7.5
7.2
32.5
29.8
8.3
Disclaimer
© 2015 CEEMEA Business Group*
*a joint venture between
DT-Global Business Consulting GmbH, Address: Keinergasse 8/33, 1030 Vienna, Austria,
Company registration: FN 331137t
and GSA Global Success Advisors GmbH, Hoffeldstraße 1 , 2522 Oberwaltersdorf, Austria
Company registration: FN 331082k
Source: DT-Global Business Consulting GmbH and CEEMEA Business Group research
Basic data sources come from central banks, own intelligence network, CEEMEA Business Group corporate survey,
governments and other public sources. Interpretation, views, forecasts, business quotes and business outlooks by DTGlobal Business Consulting GmbH and CEEMEA Business Group.
This material is provided for information purposes only. It is not a recommendation or advice of any investment or
commercial activity whatsoever. The CEEMEA Business Group accepts no liability for any commercial losses incurred by
any party acting on information in these materials.
Contact: Dr Daniel Thorniley, President, DT-Global Business Consulting GmbH
M: +43 676 534 6852 / E: [email protected] / W: www.ceemeabusinessgroup.com