Group 3 - Energy
Download
Report
Transcript Group 3 - Energy
GTAP-E
Incorporating Energy Substitution into
the GTAP Model
Introduction to GTAP-E
Why do we care about representing CO2 in a CGE?
CO2 emissions are “well-mixed” gases creating a
global problem.
Reducing CO2 will have region and sector specific
economic impacts because of the increasing cost of
energy.
Economic effects of reductions will be felt to various
extent world wide no matter who reduces emissions.
CGE modeling useful in breaking out complex
interactions between countries and sectors emitting
CO2 emissions.
Introduction to GTAP-E
Two major types of instruments: Tax and Capand-Trade
Trade off between unilateral vs. international
trading system.
Production Structure: GTAP-E
= GTAP + energy substitution (inter-KE and inter-fuel)
Output
Output
Value Added
Intermediate goods
(energy, non-energy)
Skilled Unskilled Capital
Lab.
Lab.
Land
Nat.
Resources
Value Added
Intermediate goods
(non-energy)
Skilled Unskilled Capital-Energy Land
Nat.
Lab.
Lab.
Resources
Capital
Energy
Electricity
GTAP
Non-Electricity
Coal
GTAP-E
Non-Coal
Oil Gas Petroleum
prods
Macro relationships in GTAP-E (USA)
VA > KE
-0.64
KE VA
(1) pK S
KE
KE
KESE + VASK
KE
E
-1.0
-0.64 +0.02
(2) iR pK pI
+0.12
-0.04
+0.19
+0.01
(3) qS qC G pC G qS
p
+9.5
E
tCO 2
Macro relationships in GTAP-E (USA)
-0.08
+0.11
+0.02 +0.21
(4) cR g R pG pC
-0.04
0
0
0
0
-0.04
(5) yR SL l SK k SN n SNR nr a
-0.04
-0.08
-1.0
+0.11
(6) yR SC cR SI iR SG g R SX xR SM mR
+0.22
-1.1
Macro relationships in GTAP-E (USA)
-0.03
-0.03
-0.04
0.12
+0.08
GDP
GDP
GDP
(7) yev qC GS yR [SGDP
/(S
+S
+S
)] tot
X
C
G
S
-$2225
-$2955
+$742
US$30 tax per tonne
Impacts:
Total carbon emissions, in M tons of C, fall by 13.5%;
why?
Use of the different energy sources:
Demand for composite non-electric goods (coal + non-coal)
Qnel(j,r)
Agriculture
Coal
Oil
Gas
Oil_Pcts
Electricity
1 USA
-7,26
-28,91
-2,37
-10,48
-7,6
-18,16
En_Int_ind
-9,11
Oth_ind_ser
-7,24
Especially so for the energy sources that are more carbon emitting (re:
Demand for intermediate inputs by sector)
qf(i,j,r)
Coal
Oil_Pcts
Agriculture
-18,84
-7,68
-2,56
-1
Coal
-28,91
-7,6
-22,3
-21,06
Oil
-28,91
-7,6
-11,69
-11,21
Gas
-28,91
-7,6
-11,68
-11,35
Oil_Pcts
-28,91
-7,6
-8,13
-7,64
Electricity
-28,91
-7,6
4,08
-3,25
En_Int_ind
-18,84
-7,68
-2,56
-1
Electricity
En_Int_ind
Why the fall in demand?
Prices
Average percentage changes in industry prices for
composite commodities
pf(i,j,r)
Agriculture
%age chngs
0,25
Coal
51,69
Oil
16,36
Gas
16,47
Oil_Pcts
12,03
Electricity
7,52
En_Int_ind
0,75
Exports and Imports
Agriculture
-0,31
0,16
Coal
10,02
-27,34
Oil
9,96
-12,91
Gas
5,61
-11,92
0,9
-8,1
Electricity
-33,15
19,56
En_Int_ind
-2,75
1,05
Oil_Pcts
Why?
Prices
Border Prices
pfob(i,r,s)
Agriculture
1 USA
0,25
Coal
-2,51
Oil
-1,65
Gas
-1,19
Oil_Pcts
-1,07
Electricity
7,59
En_Int_ind
0,85
Oth_ind_ser
0,01
This is reflected in the BOT numbers below
Balance of Trade
DTBALi(i,r)
1 Agriculture
-76,78
2 Coal
343,25
3 Oil
8373,1
4 Gas
1001,57
5 Oil_Pcts
743,44
6 Electricity
-473,8
7 En_Int_ind
8 Oth_ind_ser
Total
-3692,89
7868,28
14086,16
Allocation effect decomposition (I)
atax
1 firm
2 private
1 Agriculture
2
0
2 Coal
-1590
-3
3 Oil
0
0
4 Gas
-394
-59
5 Oil_Pcts
-464
-332
6 Electricity
0
0
7 En_Int_ind
2
0
8 Oth_ind_ser
3
0
Total
-2442
-393
Tax rate
1 Agriculture -2,553
2 Coal
55,578
3 Oil
18,244
4 Gas
17,866
5 Oil_Pcts
13,234
6 Electricity
0
7 En_Int_ind
-3,85
8 Oth_ind_ser -2,362
Largest allocation effect for firms
Main private household loss from oil products
Oil only used for oil products production
Allocation effect decomposition (II)
stax
1 Agriculture
6 Electricity7 En_Int_ind
8 Oth_ind_ser
Total
1 Agriculture
2
0
0
0
0
2 Coal
-2
-1516
-59
-13
-1590
3 Oil
0
0
0
0
0
4 Gas
-40
-149
-83
-123
-394
5 Oil_Pcts
-10
-18
-117
-319
-464
6 Electricity
0
0
0
0
0
7 En_Int_ind
2
0
0
0
2
8 Oth_ind_ser
3
0
0
0
3
Total
-45
-1683
-258
-456
-2442
Loss of coal tax revenues mainly due to less coal
use in electricity production
Loss of gas tax revenues more spread
Oil products mainly used by oth_ind_ser
Terms of trade decomposition
tot
1 pworld 2 pexport 3 pimport Total
1 Agriculture
23
31
5
60
2 Coal
-17
-79
-1
-97
3 Oil
642
-4
11
650
4 Gas
16
-4
31
43
5 Oil_Pcts
1
-2
4
3
6 Electricity
-1
21
2
22
7 En_Int_ind
19
831
105
954
8 Oth_ind_ser
8
-914
13
-893
Total
692
-120
170
742
Oil prices drop compared to composite world trade price index
and US is net importer
Export price of En_int_ind rises compared to world price
Export price of Oth_ind_ser drops compared to world price
Sim 30USD/t on US
Impacts:
Total carbon emissions, in M tons of C, fall by
13.5%;
Use of the different energy sources:
Demand for composite non-electric goods (coal +
non-coal)
Sim 1A. Change Elasticity
New Parameter File
ELKE
USA
EU
JPN
ESUBVAMOD
USA
EU
JPN
1 Agriculture
0,50
0,50
0,50
1 Agriculture
0,03
0,15
0,22
2 Coal
1,00
0,00
0,00
2 Coal
0,50
3,99
4,00
3 Oil
1,00
0,00
0,00
3 Oil
0,50
0,39
0,40
4 Gas
1,00
0,00
0,00
4 Gas
0,50
0,35
1,31
5 Oil_Pcts
1,00
0,00
0,00
5 Oil_Pcts
0,50
1,26
1,26
6 Electricity
1,00
0,50
0,50
6 Electricity
0,50
1,26
1,26
7 En_Int_ind
1,00
0,50
0,50
7 En_Int_ind
0,50
1,19
1,19
8 Oth_ind_ser
1,00
0,50
0,50
8 Oth_ind_ser
0,50
1,36
1,36
9 CGDS
0,00
0,00
0,00
9 CGDS
1,00
1,00
1,00
Sim 1A. Change Elasticity
Main Results
EV decomposition
welfare
USA
EU
JPN
-3314,407
3678,584
675,135
6 tot_E1
3736,045
1092,480
639,310
7 IS_F1
372,773
-146,096
-148,943
Total
794,411
4624,968
1165,503
-15,714
0,813
0,788
2 alloc_A1
Emission Reductions
Sim 1B. 30USD/t on US
Fixing the Trade Balance
The trade balance for the regions, except for one
are fixed (made exogenous).
The savings slack for the previously omitted
region is made exogenous.
Sim 1B. 30USD/t on US
Fixing the Trade Balance
Allocative
TOT
IS_Bal
Total
USA
-2777.41
2784.82
202.91
210.33
EU
2993.73
811.05
-86.64
3718.13
JPN
572.37
560.90
-96.10
1037.17
Sim 1B. 30USD/t on US
Fixing the Trade Balance
PExport is the major change in the TOT effect with
the largest results coming from
Energy-intensive industries
Other industries
Sim 2. Tax by Regions
Impose a USD 30 tax on CO2 emissions in
each region (EU, USA, Japan) individually.
Each row is a different scenario, with the tax
imposed in the country shown in the first
column.
Sim 2. Tax by Regions
Total change in CO2 emissions, M. tons and % in the taxed region
EU
USA
Japan
Emission
USA
EU
Japan
Other
Total
change, %
137
-7133
67
690
-6239
-7,8
-20201
513
199
1111 -18378
-13,5
78
78
-2742
-216
-2801
-8,1
- The effect on world CO2 emissions is the greatest with a US tax. Output is
already more energy efficient in the EU and Japan.
Sim 2. Tax by Regions
- The per capita effect of the tax on EV is considerably
larger in the EU (-30 $) and Japan (-35 $) than in the
USA (-8 $). Most of the change in EV arises from
allocation (especially in the USA), the rest mainly from
TOT (>0 in EU, USA; <0 in Japan).
Change in GDP quantity index, %
USA
EU
USA
Japan
0,00
-0,04
0,00
EU
Japan
-0,14
0,01
0,05
0,02
0,01
-0,10
Sim 2. Tax by Regions
Change in value added, %
EU
USA
Japan
AgricultureCoal
Oil
-0,1
-17,0
-0,1
-18,8
-0,1
-5,0
Gas
0,0
-1,4
0,0
Oil_Pcts Electricity
En_Int_indOth_ind_ser
CGDS
-5,9
-2,1
-2,3
-0,6
-0,1
-0,7
-10,4
-7,7
-2,6
-1,0
-0,1
-1,0
-8,7
-3,2
-0,5
-0,4
-0,1
-0,6
- Output of energy commodities declines in the region that introduces the tax.
- Generally, labour productivity increases. Exceptions to this are Electricity, En_int_ind
and CGDS. Full employment…?
Sim 2. Tax by Regions
Change in the terms of trade, %
USA EU
EEFSUJapan RoA1 EEx CHIND RoW
EU
0,04 0,00 -0,08 0,11 -0,04 -0,12 0,02 0,02
USA
0,08 0,07 -0,11 0,24 -0,14 -0,53 0,05 0,09
Japan
0,05 0,02 -0,01 -0,08 -0,04 -0,08 0,01 0,03
- The TOT changes are large in the other five regions. There,
change in EV arises more from TOT than from allocation.
- Imposing a USD 30 tax in all three regions at the same time, is almost equal to the
sum of the above individual results.
Case: Unilateral Carbon Tax in Japan
Fig. 1A Relation between Carbon Tax Rate and Total Emissions
Reduction
6
gco2t, %
5
4
3
2
1
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
rctax, %
Case: Unilateral Carbon Tax in Japan
vgdp
Fig.2 Change in Value of GDP
0,25
0,20
0,15
0,10
0,05
0,00
-0,05
-0,10
-0,15
-0,20
-0,25
-0,30
Total
CHIND
EEx
JPN
10
20
30
rctax, USD
40
50
Case: Unilateral Carbon Tax in Japan
Fig.3 Terms of Trade
0
-0,02
tot, %
-0,04
-0,06
JPN
-0,08
EEx
-0,1
-0,12
-0,14
-0,16
10
20
30
rctax, US$
40
50
Case: Unilateral Carbon Tax in Japan
Conclusions
Relationship between the scale of carbon tax
and reduction of CO2 emissions in Japan is
determined by the following relation:
gco2t=-5,23*%change rctax**(-0.09);
Scale of carbon tax and change in value of
GDP has almost a linear relationship;
Case: Unilateral Carbon Tax in Japan
Conclusions
- Terms of trade of Japan and net energy exporters
(EEx) tend to deteriorate simultaneously at tax rates
up to US$30, while it improves in other regions.
However, terms of trade tends to deteriorate more for
Japan than EEx at higher taxes above US$30 per ton
of carbon emission.
- As Japan has to reduce its total CO2 emissions by
more than 14% by 2012 compared to its 1990 level, it
is necessary to introduce at least US$30 per ton of C
emissions.
Compare Emission Trading: Carbon Taxes
RCTAX
Tax in EU, US and JPN
(30USD )
World Emission Trading
(4.5%)
30.00USD
7.23USD
qgdp
EU and JPN suffers the
most; China/India gains
slightly
China/India suffers the
most
EV
Decrease in all regions
except China/India ROW
Positive in US, EU and
JPN
qo
Coal reductions are large
in EU, US and JPN
Large coal reductions in
China/India
Conclusion
Our policy instruments are a uniform tax and
an emissions trading system. Which is more
efficiency?
A worldwide emission trading system would
contribute to a reduction in the economic costs for
the countries.
We can achieve a larger cut in emissions with a
smaller decline in GDP and per capita welfare
(EV) by imposing a CO2 tax in the United States
than with an equivalent lump-sum tax in either the
EU or Japan.
Future research section
Allowing energy substitution in GTAP is
important to reflect agents’ reaction in a
context where carbon taxes are used to
reduce CO2 emissions.
Developing countries may not agree in this
approach because it imposes a large
constraint on their economy. Future goals for
greenhouse gas reductions should therefore
vary between the regions, in order to reflect
the share of world emissions.