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Crime, Development and Welfare in Latin America Conference “Confronting Crime and Violence in Latin America: Crafting a Public Policy Agenda,” July 2007 Rodrigo R. Soares Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), University of Maryland, NBER, IZA with Joana Naritomi World Bank Overview 1. Crime and Welfare 2. Latin America i. ii. 3. Candidate Explanations i. ii. 4. Measurement Patterns Socioeconomic conditions and repressive policies Quantitative relevance Concluding Remarks 1. Crime and Welfare • Latin America has been traditionally regarded as a particularly violent region of the world: – Deaths to violence 200% higher than North America and Pacific, 450% higher than Western Europe, and 30% higher than Former Communist block (WHO); – 44% of the population reported being victim of some type of crime in the previous year (ICVS); – Crime and violence as the second most important public policy issue, ranking first for countries such as Argentina, El Salvador, and Venezuela (Latinobarómetro 2006). 1. Crime and Welfare Violent Deaths - Regions of the World - 1990s (WHO) 25 Violent Deaths (per 100,000) 20 15 10 5 0 Latin America North America Western Europe Form. Communist Western Pacific 1. Crime and Welfare • Many potential welfare implications: – Direct welfare loss due to increased mortality; – Reduced investments in human and physical capital due to shorter planning horizon; – Material costs, including both direct costs and expenditures on criminal justice and crime prevention; – Loss of human capital and productivity of those deceased, incapacitated and incarcerated. 1. Crime and Welfare • Material Costs: – Direct costs and expenditures on criminal justice and crime prevention: around 2.1% of the GDP per year for the United States, and 3.6% for Latin America (Bourguignon, 1999 and Londono and Guerrero, 1999); – Considering monetary costs related to property crime, number rises to 2.6% for the US and 5.1% for Latin America (Bourguignon, 1999). 1. Crime and Welfare • Welfare loss from injuries and increased mortality: – Recent estimation of the welfare value from gains in life expectancy are quantitatively very important. – For violence, increased mortality has been shown to represent welfare loss of the same order of magnitude of material costs (Soares, 2006): 1 year of life expectancy associated with a yearly social cost of 3.8% of GDP. – Colombia lost 2.2 expected years of life to violence: social loss analogous to permanent decline of 9.7% of yearly income, number for the US would be only 0.9% (Soares, 2006). 100% COLOMBIA PHILIPPINES VENEZUELA CHILE EL SALVADOR BELIZE SURINAME MEXICO BRAZIL RUSSIAN FEDERATION PUERTO RICO KAZAKSTAN BAHAMAS CROATIA LATVIA ARGENTINA SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS ESTONIA UKRAINE KYRGYZSTAN AZERBAIJAN TAJIKISTAN UNITED STATES BELARUS ECUADOR ISRAEL COSTA RICA TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA LITHUANIA TURKMENISTAN ALBANIA BARBADOS PORTUGAL CUBA KUWAIT GRENADA SINGAPORE UZBEKISTAN ARMENIA GEORGIA FINLAND SWEDEN POLAND FRANCE URUGUAY UNITED KINGDOM LUXEMBOURG CZECH REPUBLIC BELGIUM REPUBLIC OF KOREA SLOVAK REPUBLIC BULGARIA AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND HONG KONG CANADA HUNGARY GERMANY ICELAND ROMANIA MAURITIUS MALTA JAPAN SLOVENIA ITALY MACEDONIA NORWAY NETHERLANDS AUSTRIA IRELAND GREECE SPAIN 1. Crime and Welfare Present Value of Social Cost of Violence from Reduced Life Expectancy (% of GDP), 1990s > 250% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1. Crime and Welfare • Indirect consequences of reduced length of life expectancy: – Changes in behavior due to shorter planning horizon: reduced incentives to take actions that generate long-term benefits and short-term costs; – Decreased investments in human capital and health, reduced savings and investments in physical capital, and possibly reduced growth. – Link from mortality to investment in human capital and growth through fertility (Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg, 2006, Kalemli-Ozcan, 2006). – Connection leads to negative correlation between mortality and investment in human and physical capital, and can be a source of poverty traps. 1. Crime and Welfare • Intangible effects for the labor market and business climate: – Deterioration of productivity, consumption, and labor force may constitute major part of Latin American’s cost: 7.1% of GDP according to Londono and Guerrero (1999). – Crime has perverse effects on economic efficiency, reducing investment and employment in poor urban Colombian communities (Gaviria and Velez, 2002). – In Brazil, 52% of managers rank crime as a major business constraint (World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey). – But these dimensions are conceptually less clear and difficult to measure in a straightforward way. 1. Crime and Welfare Social Cost of Violence (yearly cost as % GDP), Latin America and US, 1990s monet. costs (medical, etc.) growth Subtotal + intangibles from Londono and Guerrero (1999) mortality increase public secur. justice system private prevent. opportunity cost of incarcerat. Latin America 2.0 1.1 0.5 1.4 0.1 0.6 0.1 5.8 12.9 US 0.9 0.5 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.0 4.1 - 2. Latin America • International comparisons of crime have to deal with measurement error in crime rates. • Underreporting in official data is related to institutional development (Soares, 2004) may bias conclusions from cross-country comparisons. • Comparing victimization data and official records, on can estimate the reporting rate (fraction of crimes reported to authorities). 2. Latin America Income per Capita and Reporting Rate of Thefts, Cross-section of Coutnries, 1990s 0 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 -1 2 R = 0.6523 ln(reporting rate of thefts) -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 ln(income per capita) 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 2. Latin America • Ignoring this problem can lead to wrong conclusion in terms of the correlation between various variables and development. • But victimization surveys are available only for some countries and few periods of time. • Use information from number of deaths due to violence as the best available alternative for analyzing the evolution of crime through time. 2. Latin America Crime Rates (%) from Victimization Data (ICVS), 1990s 50.0 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 Latin America Africa Asia Burglary Former Communist Thefts North America Contact Crimes Any Crime Oceania Western Europe 2. Latin America Crime Rates (%) from Victimization Data (ICVS), LA Countries, 1990s 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 ARGENTINA BOLIVIA BRAZIL Burglary Thefts COLOMBIA Contact Crimes COSTA RICA Any Crime PARAGUAY 2. Latin America • High crime rates in the region hide considerable cross-country heterogeneity. • Even more so when we look at evolution of death due to violence through time: – One group with increasing trend; – Another with stable or declining trend. 2. Latin America Mortality Rate by Violence, Selected Latin American Countries, Rising Trends 90 80 deaths to violence (per 100,000) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 ARGENTINA 1989 1991 BRAZIL 1993 1995 COLOMBIA 1997 1999 VENEZUELA 2001 2003 2. Latin America Mortality Rate by Violence, Selected Latin American Countries, Declining and Stable Trends 50 45 deaths to violence (per 100,000) 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1979 1981 Sources: Brazil: Datasus; Rest: WHO 1983 1985 1987 1989 CHILE 1991 1993 COSTA RICA 1995 MEXICO 1997 1999 2001 2003 2. Latin America • High crime rates in Latin America span various different types of crime and are not artifact of the particular statistics used. • What can explain this pattern? • Why some countries have been successful at maintaining low violence and others at reducing it, while some have seen increasing violence? 3. Candidate Explanations • Hypotheses can be classified in two groups: – Socioeconomic conditions conducive to an environment where crime is attractive to large fraction of the population; – Government actions targeted at repression of criminal activities. • From this interaction of forces – supply of potential criminals vs. repressive measures – an equilibrium level violence emerges. 3. Candidate Explanations • Concentrate discussion on 7 Latin American countries and a group of comparison countries: – Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela ; – Comparison group: Japan, US, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and Russia. 3. Candidate Explanations • Socioeconomic conditions: – Inequality; – Growth; – Age structure of the population. 3. Candidate Explanations • Repressive policies: – Incarceration of offenders; – Harsher penalties; – Large police presence; – Effective judicial systems; – Respect to the law and a clean and efficient government apparatus. 3. Candidate Explanations Socioeconomic Conditions and Repressive Policies Violence Growth Gini Pop 15-29 Rule of Law Police Judges Incarcer. 2000 1980-2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2001 Selected LA Countries 28.4 0.7% 54.2 27% -0.04 252 7.5 139 Comparison Group 12.4 2.2% 35.2 22% 1.0 398 15.2 282 3. Candidate Explanations Gini Index, Selected Latin American Countries and Comparison Group 60 50 Gini Index 40 30 20 10 0 Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Mexico Venezuela Japan Korea Russia Spain Sweden United States 3. Candidate Explanations Young Population, Selected Latin American Countries and Comparison Group 0.30 0.25 % Pop 15-29 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Mexico Venezuela Japan Korea Russia Spain Sweden United States 3. Candidate Explanations Police, Selected Latin American Countries and Comparison Group 1,200 600 police per 100,000 inhab 500 400 300 200 100 0 Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Mexico Venezuela Japan Korea Russia Spain Sweden United States 3. Candidate Explanations Incarceration, Selected Latin American Countries and Comparison Group 700 incareceration per 100,000 inhab 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Mexico Venezuela Japan Korea Russia Spain Sweden United States 3. Candidate Explanations • High crime rates in Latin America do not seem that surprising after all: – Economic and demographic factors put a large fraction of the population at the margin of engaging in criminal activities; – At the same time, policies toward repression of crime and violence are timid and likely ineffective. • Is this enough to explain the observed differences? 3. Candidate Explanations • Empirical literature offers estimates of effects on crime: – Incarceration: Levitt (1996); – Police: Levitt (2002); – Fraction of young population: Levitt (1999); – Inequality: Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2002b); – Growth: Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2002b). • Taking these seriously, how much can we explain? 3. Candidate Explanations Response of Violence in L.A. if Variables were set to Average of Comparison Group Partial Effect Variable Adjusted Cumulative Effect Counterfactual Level in L.A. % reduction from 28.4 incarceration rate 17.3 39% 17.3 police 21.2 25% 12.9 fraction of young population 26.1 8% 11.9 inequality (gini) 20.3 29% 8.5 growth (income p.c.) 27.3 4% 8.4 3. Candidate Explanations • Violence in Latin America is not exceptionally high, given socioeconomic conditions and repressive policies, and what is known about their effects. • Russia is an outlier within the comparison group; if variables in Latin America were set to average of comparison group excluding Russia, violence would still fall to 14.1 (50% reduction). 3. Candidate Explanations • Quantitative roles of inequality, incarceration rates, and police are the most important. – Incarceration rates and number of policemen are policy variables directly under the control of the government. – Inequality is an outcome variable that changes only very slowly through time (Deininger and Squire, 1996). • Stronger policies in relation to incarceration and policing seem to be the most obvious immediate choice available. 4. Concluding Remarks • Quantitative exercise brings implicit idea that the effectiveness of policies will be transported. This is obviously not the case. • Effectiveness of any given intervention will depend on the way it is implemented and on the institutional context. • Discussion also leaves out many relevant dimensions: police technology and training, effectiveness of judicial system, social norms related to violence, and interactions between citizen and State. • Still, specific experiences show that it is possible to bring these together in an effective way: Bogotá, São Paulo, etc.