Post-crisis infrastructure planning: new challenges for participatory

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Transcript Post-crisis infrastructure planning: new challenges for participatory

Post-crisis infrastructure planning: new
challenges for participatory planning
Christine Cheyne
Massey University, New Zealand
[email protected]
Outline
1) The GFC as justification for planning
reform in NZ
2) Streamlining and simplifying planning
processes – a shift from local to national
consenting
3) Two case studies of national consenting
4) Conclusions – depoliticisation of
environmental planning?
The GFC and NZ
• Much less severe than in USA and UK/Europe – some
finance companies failed but no major bank bailouts
• Economy buffered by recent surpluses and nature of
external trade (weighted towards food esp. dairy)
• June 2014 unemployment rate 5.6% cf. average of
3.9% for 4 years prior to GFC
• A ‘safe haven’ economy?
• A big scare … concerns about financial stability and
resilience and need not to rely on monetary policy
Source: McDermott, Phil, 2010, Cities Matter blog
1. NZ banks had limited exposure to global assets which were
hit hard by the crisis so there was comparatively less
pressure them to cut lending to local households and
businesses
2. A limited fall in household wealth as house prices held up
3. Strong demand from China and other Asian economies for
NZ exports
4. Higher nominal interest rates and lower public debt
allowed use of monetary and fiscal stimulus to offset much
of the shock; and
5. A flexible exchange rate, and product and labour markets
“helped to cushion the adjustment”.
(Mahklouf, 2013)
New Zealand has been bruised by the GFC but overall we’re in better
shape than a lot of other developed nations, particularly in Europe.
Our GDP per capita, measured on an own-currency basis, fell by 1.5
percent between 2007 and 2012 but there were bigger falls in
Norway (3.3 percent), in the UK (5.6 percent), in Denmark (6.7
percent) and in Ireland (10.3 percent). In Greece the fall was 21.4
percent. And since the GFC, New Zealand’s economic performance
has been comparatively better too: International Monetary Fund
forecasts have New Zealand attaining a pre-crisis level of GDP per
capita this year – six years after the start of the GFC. For the United
States it’s expected to be seven years, in France and Ireland nine
years, and the United Kingdom more than a decade.
Gabriel Makhlouf Secretary to the Treasury, 24 July 2013
New policy settings post GFC
• November 2008 change of govt
from centre left to centre right
(National Party)
• Major objective : promote
economic growth and
productivity through regulatory
reform and investment in
infrastructure especially RONS
(or RONPS), water storage
We are in the middle of a global financial crisis and we face the most
difficult economic conditions for a generation.
A month before the election Treasury forecast a decade of deficits. Since then,
the global crisis has deepened, …
But this is not a time to over-react. This is a time for the Government to show
some strength, look beyond the short-term, and reach through this recession.
We are not going to slash and burn. ….
The best hope for the finances of the Government… and the best hope for the
future of our country is economic growth.
Our plan to get the economy growing again includes, among other steps, an
ongoing programme of personal tax cuts, a step-up in infrastructure
investment, a reduction in government bureaucracy in favour of frontline
services, an across-the-board commitment to lifting productivity growth, and a
renewed effort to raise education standards.
John Key, PM, 15/12/2008
National will remove the roadblocks that restrict New
Zealanders’ ability to grow their businesses and grow
our economy.
Within the first 100 days of our first term, National will
introduce to Parliament a bill to reform the Resource
Management Act.
This legislation will simplify and streamline the existing Act.
…
We are determined to remove the handbrake the RMA
places on growth. We are determined to let good ideas
flourish in this country. We are going to get New Zealand
moving again.
John Key, Leader of the National Party, Speech August 2008
Resource Management Act 1991
amendments 2009
• made it easier for applicants to choose a national
consenting process instead of the conventional local
authority-managed process
• established the Environmental Protection Authority
(EPA) to manage the national consenting process
• introduced a nine-month time-limit for boards of
inquiry to release a decision – with discretion for
Minister to grant a month’s extension
Resource Management Act 1991 Section 142(3)
In deciding whether a matter is, or is part of, a proposal of national significance, the Minister
may have regard to—
(a) any relevant factor, including whether the matter—
(i) has aroused widespread public concern or interest regarding its actual or likely effect on
the environment (including the global environment); or
(ii) involves or is likely to involve significant use of natural and physical resources; or
(iii) affects or is likely to affect a structure, feature, place, or area of national significance; or
(iv) affects or is likely to affect or is relevant to New Zealand's international obligations to the
global environment; or
(v) results or is likely to result in or contribute to significant or irreversible changes to the
environment (including the global environment); or
(vi) involves or is likely to involve technology, processes, or methods that are new to New
Zealand and that may affect its environment; or
(vii) is or is likely to be significant in terms of section 8; or
(viii) will assist the Crown in fulfilling its public health, welfare, security, or safety obligations or
functions; or
(ix) affects or is likely to affect more than 1 region or district; or
(x) relates to a network utility operation that extends or is proposed to extend to more than 1
district or region; and
(b) any advice provided by the EPA.
Case study – water storage
• Tukituki Catchment proposal – heard by Board of
Inquiry at request of applicants (Hawkes Bay regional
Council and Hawkes Bay Regional Investment
Company)
• involved plan change for managing water quality in
Tukituki River catchment and resource consents for
construction of dam and irrigation pipes – NZ’s largest
irrigation scheme (approx 25,000 ha) and largest dam
consented under the RMA 1991
Tukituki Catchment Proposal timelime
5 June 2013
Ministers direct the application to a BoI
6 July 2013
Public notification (report due 28 April 2014)
2 Aug 2013
Submissions closed (384 submissions received + 22 further submissions (amounting to approx
5,500 pages of material, and “raising numerous and complex technical issues”)
18 Nov 2013-21
Jan 2014
31 Jan 2014
29 days of hearings (evidence from 131 witnesses (presenting 181 briefs of evidence) + 74
representations / submissions from submitters) resulting in a transcript of the hearing of over
3,700 pages;
Board requests a one month extension (report now due 28 May 2014)
15 April 2014
Board releases draft report
7 May 2014
HBRC requests further extension of 1 month to give longer for comments to be made on draft
report
14 May 2014
Ministers grant extension of 1 month (report now due 28 June 2014)
18 June 2014
BoI delivers Final Report and Decisions to Minister
26 June 2014
Public release of Final Report and Decisions
Two appeals have been lodged - to be heard in High Court in mid November 2014
the hearing itself involved highly contested technical expert
evidence on a number of key matters requiring careful and
methodical consideration and determination by the Board which
inevitably takes time;
the matters raise key issues for New Zealand (and hence the
range and conflict of evidence received by the Board) as to the
sustainable management of freshwater and, in particular,
freshwater quality and quantity limits and the intensification of
land use;
Case study - transport
• 7 current Roads of National
Significance (RONS) project
applications considered by
BoI
• RONS are ‘lead
infrastructure’ projects –
i.e. enabling economic
growth rather than simply
responding to it
Waterview Expressway RONS
• a large and complex project – joining two existing state
highways with approximately 13.2 km of existing and new
state highway in Auckland City
• Application was for 6 NORs (3 alterations and 3 new
designations) and 55 consents (landuse, water, air,
discharge and coastal)
• 252 written submissions – nearly ¾ of which were “nonexpert” of whom about half made oral representations at
hearing
Waterview Connection Timeline
20 Aug 2010
New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) lodges application with EPA
27 Aug 2010
EPA recommends referral to Board of Inquiry
18 Sept 2010
Public notification Board of Inquiry
15 November 2010
NZTA’s Evidence in Chief exchanged
17 December 2010
Submitters’ evidence exchanged
Mid-Jan – 7 Feb 2011,
Caucusing
March
6 April 2011
6 May 2011
Extension (9 working days) to produce final report granted
Board of Inquiry direct experts to redraft certain consent conditions
13 May 2011
Experts deliver redrafted consent conditions
24 May 2011
Board of Inquiry releases draft decision and report
29 June 2011
Board of Inquiry releases Final Report and Decision
Assessment
• Judicial process of Board of Inquiry much more formal and
intimidating for ‘lay’ participants than traditional local
authority consenting – deters participation
• ‘Lay’ submitters marginalised in process – greater time
allocated to, and weighting given to evidence of, experts
• Board members external to local community compared with
councillors or commissioners
• Complexity exacerbated marginalisation
• Tight timeframes imposed at early stages very inconvenient to
many submitters who are not paid by organisations, but
applicant and board able to request extensions
• Timeframes needed extending but even then not adequate
Reduced timeframes will impact on the ability of the
general public to get involved in the decision-making
process. In fact, the general public may become
increasingly removed from the process thereby
limiting the amount of information available to the
Boards of Inquiry when making their
recommendations. Such outcomes could therefore be
said to limit the transparency of the EPA process…
(Abes et al., 2011, p. 69; emphasis added.).
Conclusion
• EPA lacks sufficient independence and is
fundamentally focused on fast-tracking development
• Quality/effectiveness of public participation and
decision-making compromised by concerns about
speed/efficiency of decision-making
• Recentralisation – a return to the National
Development Act 1979? (no localist agenda here!)
• Marginalisation of public participation
• Use of Boards of inquiry and their domination by
lawyers and experts is a form of depoliticisation with
implications for democratic process
Questions/Comments