Transcript The Failed State

Crime, Corruption
and Failed States
[Presentation 09]
After terrorism
and WMDs…..
The third element of the new inter/national
security threat is:
Images courtesy of http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Army.mil-2007-03-27-114351.jpg
and http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Soviet_made_Iraqi_SA-6b_Gainful.JPEG
(4) While there are numerous reasons a state may fail (i.e. lack of
a government that can actually rule), one of the increasingly clear
reasons is that it is rife with crime and corruption….thus what we
once thought as a domestic legal issue, crime, takes on massive
international dimensions.
(5) What we think we used to know:
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That there was always a ‘slimy’ side to economics and politics…as long as it did not get
out of hand, as might be said in Colombia, that this ‘sideshow’ to understand how the
world worked would find its way into our policy, research or action via the news
headlines.
We were willing to treat a bit of this crime as invisible patronage, bribery, even a little
extortion, a ‘criminal element’ and certainly “ordinary, decent crime” as John Darby
would describe it.
Drug dealing, money laundering and gun-running was a bit over the edge…but it did
not (or the US did not see it) define the workings of the international political economy
(IPE). This was a blind spot, like spying in diplomacy.
So, we have not really sorted out issues of crime, corruption, collusion, cartel,
extractive moneyed enterprises, trafficking in human beings, etc. and the links between
them.
(6) We did have a perspective on
“war economies”:
• entrepreneurs and other ‘lucky souls’ always made money on wars…but usually
from opportunism, not from graft and corruption
• industrialists and people that controlled the resources and investments/capital
made money from war
• there would be sectors which experienced, ‘favorable outcomes’ of
war…usually due to product uniqueness and/or volume of sales
• we believed there would be a favorable technological impact of mechanized war
production to a refined civilian economy
• of course territory and treasure might be a ‘spoil of war’
• the issue of post-war economics was the challenge of either rebuilding
individual economies or of creating new post-war systems
(7) But there has been little analysis of the economics of
war, shadow economies, war lords, networks, profiteers,
key natural resources, etc. or recognition of their
seriousness by relevant international bodies until
recently (e.g.: Interpol)
So….
entire new systems of economics are to be examined
without a framework for doing so….
(8)
This leads us into the development of
new cross/inter-disciplinary analyses, based on disciplines such as geography,
anthropology, and international finance
and some new research communities,
the NGOs (Global Witness, International Crisis Group) and networks, such as
Transparency International - the equivalent of Amnesty International (for human
rights), this time in terms of reporting on states’ good governance practices,
and high level journalism.
(9) The growth of the ‘crime’ factor/interest why do we need to pay attention:
Growth in real terms – in early 90s international drug trade barely at $160 billion, now
just over $400 billion; with worldwide consumption of 200 million people, 5% of which
are estimated to be 15 years old or younger (World Drug Report)
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Growth in kind and ‘what fits under what’ – trafficking has significantly moved beyond
drugs now, including humans; computer hacking (cyber crime) means potential link to all
levels of crime, terrorism, banking corruption, money laundering and financial front
companies/charities
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Concern with the links to politics and especially to violent political change: Tamil
Tigers (Sri Lanka), FARC (Columbia), KLA (Kosovo), Chechens…. (MIPT: LTTE;
FARC; KLA; Chechen)
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Of 160 signatories of UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 38 are
deemed ‘free of PCN’ (Political-Criminal Nexus – see next slide); some 108 deemed
‘mixed’; and a dozen or so ‘crime dominated’ (Colombia, Chechnya, etc….)
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(10) Definitional Issues:
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Organized Crime: tight, nationally based criminal groups, profit motive,
often distrust of political organizations; ethnic, religious or other ties bind
them
Transnational or Trans-state crime: the above operating in two or more
nations
Disorganized Crime: transnational in character but of small groups, bias
toward rather ‘hi-tech’ crime
Political criminal nexus (PCN): partnerships designed to undermine the
rule of law because this would work against the aims of two different
criminal and political groups
Kleptocracies: systems of corruption which have strong-man rule and
permit PCNs and other crimes under their umbrella…Mobutu (DRC),
Abacha (Nigeria), Estrada (Philippines)
(11) The Key focus for many is – the PCN
(political-criminal nexus):
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linkage of the underworld and the upperworld…begins in one’s small
region; extended or protected by political corruption and then when needed
the use of ‘visible’ violence for real and ‘show’ effect
role of brides and ‘krysha’ – i.e. protection and facilitation
government regulated criminal activity (e.g.Taliban)
marriages of convenience
growing concern of trafficking in WMD-related materials
absence of strong civil society and rule of law culture and institutions;
fragile links with external agencies for assistance – in such situations, the
PCN can end up determining security (Colombia; China)
(12) How this links to
counter-terrorism:
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Safe haven issue is always a great concern
Crime and corruption cannot thrive unless there are loose standards
on other key issues – sooner or later those associated with
terrorism, especially money & arms
The bottom line of ‘good governance and the rule of law‘ as the goal
and the capacity of each nation to control such activities is
reinforced