Transcript CSI Lecture 3 - War and the World

American Unipolarity and
the Rise of China
Theo Farrell, CSI Lecture 3, 2011
Realist worldview
Why power matters
Offensive Realist
Defensive Realist
What states do
 Balance
 Bandwagon
 Buck-passing
 Chain-ganging
Why polarity matters
 More stable – less prone to war
 Bipolar orders are simple to manage.
 Multipolar orders can slip into war due to ‘chain-
ganging’ (WWI) and ‘buck-passing’ (WWII).
Bound to Lead (Nye, 1990)
Source of power
USA
EU
Japan
Basic resources
Strong
Strong
Strong
Military
Strong
Medium
Weak
Economic
Strong
Strong
Strong
Science
Strong
Strong
Strong
National cohesion
Strong
Weak
Strong
Universal culture
Strong
Strong
Weak
European hegemons
 The Hapsburg Empire (Charles V and Philip II)
 Napoleonic France
 Victorian Britain
 Nazi Germany
Wohlforth’s ”big 3”
1. World system is unabiguously unipolar.
2. Unipolarity is prone to peace.
3. Current unipolarity is stable.
Extent of American unipolarity
 2 – 1 = 1?
 Quantitative + qualitative material advantages
 Largest high-tech economy
 Expenditure on R&D = rest of G7 combined
Unipolarity = peace
 No hegemonic rivalry
 International institutions and hegemonic self-
restraint (Ikenberry)
 Social foundations of hegemony (Reus-Smit)
Why US unipolarity is stable
1. Totality of power gap
2. Geography – ‘stopping power of water’
3. No rising challengers: EU, Japan, China
Soft balancing
 ‘Actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military
preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay,
frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military
practices.’
 Logic: containing U.S hegemonic power
 Trigger: unilateralism under Bush
 Soft balancing strategies: territorial denial, entangling
diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling resolve
Much ado about nothing..
‘Back to the future’: the world in
2025..
 ‘…will be a global multipolar one’
 China and India in C18th: 30% and 15% of
global wealth
 China = world’s second largest economy
 Chinese problems: failing social security net, poor
business regulation, hunger for foreign energy,
corruption, and environmental devastation
Long-range forecasting: reasons to be
cautious
 Leaders and their ideas matter
 Economic volatility and political change
 Geopolitical rivalry and discontinuities
Revisionist state?
 Revisionist states value what they covet more
than what they currently possess
 They will employ military force to change the
status quo and extend their values
Randall Schweller, ‘Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,
International Security 19: 1 (1994)
Naval balance of power
USPACOM
China
Large deck carrier
6
0
Small carrier
10
1
Warships
58
78
Nuclear subs
34
6
Conventional subs
0
62
Implications of Chinese military
modernisation
 Disrupt US freedom of movement in the region
 Narrow US strategic options
SecDef Robert Gates (2009)
Hey big spender
Keeps on growing
Bad debts
 US current account deficit = 1.4 of global GDP and
China current account surplus = 0.7 of global GDP
(2007)
 Sept 2008, China replaced Japan as largest foreign
holder of US debt (= $1.5 trillion or 46% of US debt)
Daniel Drezner, ‘Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great
Power Politics’, Int Security 34: 2 (2009).
‘Responsible power?’
‘It is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to
China’s membership into the international system. We
need to urge China to become a responsible
stakeholder in that system.’
Deputy Sec of State Robert Zoellick (2005).
China as a ‘social state’
1. Participation in int institutions
2. Compliance with int norms:
(sovereignty, free trade, non-prolif, HR)
3. Attitude towards the ‘rules of the game’
A. I. Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power,’ Int Security 27:
4 (2003)
Future looks bright…?