Transcript presentation - University of Toronto

Ukraine from Elections to
Elections: building political
culture through conflict.
CERES – P. Jacyk Program for the Study of Ukraine
University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada
October 15, 2007
Mychailo Wynnyckyj Ph.D.
Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine
Dep’t of Sociology & Kyiv-Mohyla Business School
Summary abstract

Mass participant values matter less to stability than elite
consensus on their own rule framework
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Ukraine’s elite is currently deciding “who/how will decide?”.
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Other questions (e.g. language, land ownership, NATO, subsidies for
newborns, etc.) are noise

How do we interpret “Rule of Law”? (Article 8)
Elite consensus-building is a strategic activity not a tactical
one – actions based on pursuit of tactical interests lead to a
breakdown in strategic (institutional) consensus.

Constitutional Court & Central Election Commission composition

Precedent of 150 deputies resigning from Rada
Stability depends more on elites

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Stable democratic political systems require a participant polity
(Almond & Verba’s Civic Culture)

Prior to 2004, Ukraine’s prospects looked grim (Miller, Reissinger, Hesli)

After Orange Revolution, civic culture seemed to have “arrived”…
Stability requires elite consensus as to the institutional framework
for contestation between competing interests; rule framework
must engender compliance, and be considered legitimate
(Przeworkski, Higley, Lane).

Post-Orange period: building a rule-framework

Tension between tactical positioning and strategic intent
Stages of elite consensus: 3 questions

Who are we?
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How do we make decisions? Who decides?
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Consensus as to the definition of our community (nation?)
Formal markers (symbols, language, capital, flag, anthem)
Rules of the game of politics
Mechanisms of power and conflict resolution
How will we live? What is legitimate/revolutionary?

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Field of policy contestation, wealth distribution
Model of state’s role in the economy
Community
System
Policy
Consensus building – starting point
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26.03.06 – Parliamentary elections.

Party of Regions
32.14%

Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc
22.29%

Our Ukraine
13.95%

Socialist Party
5.69%

Communist Party
3.66%
03.04.06 – Yushchenko article in the Wall Street Journal calling for a
“Pact of National Unity” to be signed by all parliamentary parties

25.04.06 – Luhansk obl-rada passes a resolution that proclaims Russian as
a “regional language” (worthy of protection under the European Regional
Language Charter)
“Blind faith” in strategic consensus

26.04.06 – Official election results published (5 days after announcement) –
new Rada must gather within 30 days & coalition must be formed 30 days
after that.

11.07.06 – After 80 days of coalition talks between Our Ukraine and BYuT,
the Verkhovna Rada elects Oleksander Moroz as Speaker; Socialists switch
sides, and officially sign “Anti-Crisis Coalition” agreement with the Party of
Regions and the CPU.

03.08.06 – After a month of negotiations between Our Ukraine and the
“Anti-Crisis Coalition”, the “Universal of National Unity” is signed by the
leaders of all Parliamentary parties except BYuT. Yushchenko officially
proposes the candidacy of Yanukovych for the post of Prime Minister and
negotiations continue on full inclusion of Our Ukraine into the coalition.
Yushchenko – Consensus-builder

2005 – period of Yushchenko recovery from poisoning

2006 – attempt to build consensual rule framework peaks with “Universal”
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One language, NATO & EU, energy security
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Economic reform – especially land privatization
Things fall apart…
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14.09.06 – Yanukovych in Brussels: Ukraine is not ready to join NATO.

21.09.06 – The Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers rejects 7 Presidential
Decrees as invalid in what became known as the “Countersigning scandal”.

19.10.06 – A rayon-level court rules compulsory dubbing of films into Ukrainian
to be illegal – no appeals from the Yanukovych government.

During subsequent months, meetings between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko
become more frequent: tactical alliance between the two leaders
Tactical interests destroy
consensus-building strategy

20.03.07 – A. Kinakh and the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs defect
from Our Ukraine to the coalition; Kinakh appointed Minister of the
Economy; Yushchenko’s Foreign Affairs Ministry candidate Ohryzko not
confirmed by Parliament; Lutsenko’s apartment raided by police; Deputy
Chechetov (Regions) declares that the Coalition will have 300 deputies soon.

23.03.07 – Kovtunenko and a group of BYuT deputies defect from the
opposition to join the Coalition

02.04.07 – Presidential Decree dissolving Parliament and calling pre-term
elections for May 27 signed. The Cabinet of Ministers and Parliament both
call an emergency late night session – both reject the decree as “illegal” (“ne
zakonniy” and refuse to obey it.
Article 8 of the Constitution (“verkhovenstvo
prava”): “rule of statute” vs. “rule of right”
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Decree 1 (May 27 elections):
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Article 90 not mentioned

Basis is Article 8 – “rights of voters hijacked” says the “garant”
Decree 2: (June 24 elections):
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Article 82 justification – 30 days after Kovtunenko defection which made
the Coalition illegitimate
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Realism (protection of “rights”) – election impossible: deadlock in CEC
Decree 3: (elections in 120 days):
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Justification based on “agreement between parties” – no legal basis
Decree 4: (September 30 elections):
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Ideal “legal” justification – Article 82 and 90 requirements fulfilled
Wanted: Consensus on Strategy!

Tactical political battles are constructive only if there exists
agreement on the strategic “rules of the game”.

Formal rules require codification – adoption of laws
(constitutional amendments) requires consensus

During the Sept 30 elections, 3 differing visions of Ukraine’s
political & economic development were elaborated (though
not necessarily articulated):
Comparative Models:

Our Ukraine: Rule-based politics and economy
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ByUT: State-led (personified leader) transformation
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Party of Regions: Big-Business-State cooperation
Japan/Taiwan
Singapore
South Korea
While the politicians decide on rules…
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The economy is growing! (no thanks to politicians)
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Ukraine is currently 29th world largest economy (not including up to 50%
of GDP that is in the shadow)
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8-10% GDP growth forecast for next 3 years
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Inflation jumped in Aug/Sept 2006 to 13%
10% of Ukrainian families have bought a NEW car during the past 3 years

300 thousand new cars sold in 2005, 400 thousand in 2006
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2007 forecast – over 550 thousand
Dominance of newly created (entrepreneurial) businesses over
former state sector – reduction of “state-capture”
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Ukraine is becoming an innovation based economy

Software outsourcing & specialized/custom manufacturing
Key immediate question for Ukraine:
“Who will make decisions and how?”
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Verkhovna Rada VI – will the session open?

Precedent of 150 deputies (Article 82 vs. 90)

Constitutional Court must decide but cannot
New Constitution?
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Power ministries – Min. of Interior (Pres vs. PM)
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Power in the regions – appointment of governors
Balance of powers problem
Sept 30 election results:
Regions: 34.37%
(175 seats)
BYuT: 30.71%
(156 seats)
OU – PSD: 14.15% (72 seats)
Communist: 5.39% (27 seats)
Lytvyn: 3.96%

Parliament, Cabinet of Ministers, and President (where judiciary?)

Cabinet of Ministers Law & “imperative mandate”
(20 seats)
Coalition building with an eye towards the 2009 Pres election:
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Our Ukraine – Regions coalition (247) benefits Tymoshenko
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BYuT- Our Ukraine (228 seats) (with Lytvyn 248) - benefits Yanukovych
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Broad coalition (max. 403, but realistically 300) benefits Yushchenko
Looking beyond Sept 30:
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Ukraine can become “Taiwan”, “Singapore” or “South Korea”
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NB: From an economic standpoint, all three models look pretty good!
Personally, I find the “Taiwan” model most attractive:
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State & FIG’s cooperate in resource sector (state-capture & oligarchy)
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SME’s flourish in shadow economy with little interference or aid from state

Politics becomes de-personalized (though not necessarily “democratic”)
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To make it happen: Akhmetov, Tymoshenko, and Yushchenko must agree to think
strategically rather than tactically (collect 300 seats from split parties).
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If the “ideal scenario” does not occur, Ukraine is likely to mimic the “fruitful
instability” (Aslund) of the Baltics with governments changing yearly.

Institutional consensus requires political maturity (de-personalized political
leadership, strategic vision) – a scarce commodity among Ukraine’s elites.