Transcript CPD-PMR: WTO Negotiations : Interests and Challenges for

World Trade Organization (WTO) Negotiations:
Interests and Challenges for Bangladesh
Lecture by
Professor Mustafizur Rahman
Executive Director, CPD
Faculty of Business Studies
Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP)
9 April 2010
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Contents
I.
Introduction
II.
The Evolution of the Multilateral Trading System:
From GATT to WTO
III.
Overview of WTO Principles and Rule-based Regime
IV.
Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
V.
Ongoing Negotiations: Issues and Concerns for the
LDCs
VI.
Lessons from Seventh WTO Ministerial Conference (on
30 November – 2 December, 2009)
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I. Introduction
• Trade issues are becoming increasingly important for low income
countries, particularly LDCs such as Bangladesh
• This is because LDCs are getting integrated into the global economy at an
unprecedented pace
• In Bangladesh’s case the policy of trade liberalisation was initiated in early
1980s, gained momentum in early 1990s and has continued thereafter
• Three distinct periods can be identified: phasing, pacing, sequencing
• Main features of Bangladesh’s Trade Policy: Reduction of tariffs; Removal
of NTBs; Reduction of anti-export bias
• As a result, the degree of openness of Bangladesh and LDCs (export plus
import as a share of GDP) is on the rise. This would mean that Bangladesh
and other LDCs are becoming increasingly integrated into the global
economy through export and import of goods, services, capital and labour
(through both factor movement and product movement)
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I. Introduction
Growing Importance of Trade Related Issues for Low Income Countries such as Bangladesh
 Since the 1990s Bangladesh economy has become increasingly integrated with the global economy.
 In 1991, less than a quarter of Bangladesh economy was connected directly with the global economy; in
contrast in 2007 the comparable figure was more than half, about 56%.
Items
FY 1981
FY1991
FY 2001
FY2008
FY2009
1. Export (X) (mln USD)
725
1718
6467
14088
15565
2. Import (M) (mln USD)
1954
3472
9335
20217
22507
3. Remittance (R) (mln USD)
379
764
1882
7915
9689
4. ODA Disbursed (mln USD)
1146
1733
1369
1873
1627
5. FDI (net) (mln USD)
0
24
550
650
941
Total (1-5) (mln USD)
4204.0
7710.5
19603.4
44743.8
50329
GDP (Current Price) (mln USD)
19811.6
30974.8
47306.0
78996.9
89548
Degree of Openness
(Export + Import as % of GDP)
13.5
16.8
33.4
43.4
42.5
Extent of Globalisation (%)
21.2
24.9
41.4
56.6
56.2
X as % of M
37.1
49.5
69.3
69.7
69.2
(X+R) as % of M
56.5
71.5
89.4
108.8
112.2
ODA as % of GDP
5.8
5.6
2.9
2.4
1.8
158.1
100.9
21.2
13.3
10.5
ODA As % of Export
Source: CPD-IRBD Database
 This would mean that developments in the global economy will have important implications for the Bangladesh
economy; both in terms of opportunities that originate from it and the challenges that Bangladesh will need to address.
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I. Introduction
• The importance of WTO is that it seeks to bring discipline to
movements of goods and services by dismantling barriers to
movements of goods and services and also promote investment and
capital flows that relate to trade
• Global movements of goods and services are constrained by:
 tariff barriers
 non-tariff barriers
• The primary objective of WTO and its predecessor, the GATT, is to
 Do away with NTBs
 Convert NTBs into tariffs
 Reduce Tariffs (Nominal tariff, tariff peaks, tariff dispersion)
 Bring discipline to trade-related investment measures
 Bring discipline to trade-related intellectual property rights
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I. Introduction
• A rule-based trading system is helpful for developing countries and LDCs
• However, there are many concerns of LDCs in the context of the current
negotiations
• LDC share in the global trade is less than 1 per cent of global trade. These
countries face many difficulties in integrating with the global economy
• At the same time there are many opportunities for LDCs originating in the
global economy. These need to be realised. LDCs require support for this
• LDCs look forward to strengthened global integration. WTO as an
institution will need to play an important role in this
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II. The Evolution of the Multilateral Trading System:
From GATT to WTO
 WTO's predecessor, the GATT, was established on a provisional
basis towards the end of the Second World War along with other
new multilateral institutions dedicated to international economic
cooperation - notably the two "Bretton Woods" institutions: the
World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
 The original 23 GATT countries were amongst over 50 countries
which agreed to a draft Charter for an International Trade
Organization (ITO) - a new specialized agency of the United
Nations to deal with trade related issues. However, when the
United States government announced, in 1950, that it would not
seek Congressional ratification of the Havana Charter, the ITO
was effectively dead
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II. The Evolution of the Multilateral Trading System:
From GATT to WTO
 GATT evolved following the demise of ITO
 Despite its provisional nature, the GATT remained the only multilateral
instrument governing international trade from 1948 until the
establishment of the WTO in 1995
 In all, eight GATT Rounds were held. The last GATT round was the
Uruguay Round which was the most Comprehensive Round. The GATT
UR for the first time discussed, issues related to trade in Agriculture and
the Services sector
 The WTO was established, after about fifty years of ITO, at the end of
the GATT-UR which was the eighth Round; WTO started to function in
January 1995
• The first Round of the WTO could only be initiated in 2001, at the Fourth
Ministerial Meeting in Doha. This came to be known as the Doha
Development Round (DDR). The Doha Round was expected to be
concluded by December, 2005. Since many issues remain unresolved, the
negotiations in the context of DDR is still continuing
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II. The Evolution of the Multilateral Trading System:
From GATT to WTO
GATT Trade Rounds
Name
Dates
Objectives
No of Participating Countries
Geneva
1947
 Adoption of GATT
23
Annecy, France
1949
 Tariff reduction
13
Torquay, England
1951
 Tariff reduction
38
Geneva
1956
 Tariff reduction
26
Geneva ("Dillon ")
1960-62
 Tariff reduction
26
Geneva ("Kennedy ")
1962-67
 Tariff reduction
 GATT negotiation rules
62
Tokyo
1973-79
 Overall reduction of tariffs to an average level of 35%
and 5-8% among developed nations
 Non-tariff barrier codes
- Government procurement
- Customs valuation
- Subsidies and countervailing measures
- Antidumping
- Standards
- Import licensing
102
Uruguay Round
1986-94
 Broadening of GATT
Limit agricultural subsidies
Include services trade
Include intellectual property
 Establishment of the WTO (World Trade Organization)
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III. Overview of WTO Principles and Rule-based Regime
Ministerial Conferences: 1995-2009
Creation of
WTO
1995
Singapore
1996
Geneva
1998
Seattle
1999
Doha
2001
Cancun
2003
Hong Kong
2005
Geneva
2009
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III. Overview of WTO Principles and Rule-based Regime
The rule-based regime in WTO is premised on two basic principles,
often expressed as four main elements. These two basic principles
are non-discrimination and market efficiency (or open, secure
access)
The four main elements are:
• Most favoured nation, commonly referred to as MFN, means
simply that members of the GATT extend the same treatment to
imports from all the other members, i.e., all members are treated
equally as well as the "most favoured" among them. This is nondiscrimination at the border- favour one, favour all
• National treatment means that imported goods, once they have met
all the requirements of whatever border regime is in place and have
entered into the internal (domestic) market in a member's economy,
will be treated no less favourably than domestic goods are treated
in the domestic market. This is non-discrimination in the internal
(domestic) market
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III. Overview of WTO Principles and Rule-based Regime
 Taken together, these two elements ensure non-discrimination
 Elimination of QRs and NTBs and reliance on tariffs as the sole
instrument of border protection: Tariffication
 The general goal of transparency which is achieved through
publication of trade laws and regulations. Transparency is
expected to improve market efficiency as it is necessary for
participants in the market to know the rules if they are to compete
effectively.
 These four elements: (a) MFN, (b) National Treatment, (c)
Reliance on Tariffs and (d) Transparency, are the four most
powerful Swords of the GATT
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III. Overview of WTO Principles and Rule-based Regime
Provisions of the GATT/WTO
SWORDS
• Most favoured nation
• National treatment
• Reliance on tariffs
• Transparency
• Customs valuation rules
• No unreasonable customs
fees or formalities
• Freedom of transit
• Restrictions on subsidies, no
export subsidies
• Rules for state trading and
monopolies
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
SHIELDS
Grandfather pre-existing preferences
Regional trade agreements
Waivers "in exceptional
circumstances"
Government procurement
Domestic production subsidies
Security exception
Critical shortages of food and
essentials
Balance of payments
Safeguards, antidumping and
subsidy/countervail
S&D for Developing and Least Developed
Countries
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III. Overview of WTO Principles and Rule-based Regime
Rationale for S&D Treatment for LDCs and Developing Countries






Marginalisation of weaker economies in the context of globalisation
Infant industry argument
Lack of technical capacity
Lack of financial resources
Weak capacity to participate in WTO-system
Weak capacity to take advantage of the opportunities emanating
from WTO system
Modalities of S&D Treatment in the WTO





Special and Differential (S & D) Status
Waivers from undertaking obligations and Aid for Trade Package
Staggered Implementation Schedule
Technical Support: Trade and Aid Nexus
Special Market Access Provisions (in the WTO and under GSPs)
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III. Overview of WTO Principles and Rule-based Regime
Decision Making in the WTO
 Single Undertaking: Nothing is Agreed unless Everything is Agreed
 Decision Making Process
- Ministerial Conference
- General Council
- Agreement-Specific Committees
 In WTO, Countries Get Not What They Deserve, But What They
Negotiate
 Decision Making
The WTO continues the GATT practice of taking decisions by
consensus but if a decision cannot be reached by consensus, it is to
be arrived at through majority vote (unless otherwise provided in
the particular agreement under reference). In the Ministerial
Conference and the General Council, each member has one vote
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III. Overview of WTO Principles and Rule-based Regime
How the WTO
Works?
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
• Launched at the 4th WTO Ministerial
Conference in Doha in November 2001(also
known as Doha Development Round)
• Currently Doha Round of negotiations are continuing
in Geneva
Five Clusters of Negotiating Issues
• Agriculture
• Non-agricultural Market Access (NAMA)
• Services (GATS)
• Rules and Trade Facilitation
• “Development” Provisions
 Built-in Agenda; Continuing Agenda; New
Agenda
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
Market Access Negotiations
Major objectives:
 Tariffication of NTBs
 Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers
 Gradual Reduction of Tariffs
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
Pillars of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)
A.Market Access
B.Domestic Support
C.Export Competition
Tariffs
Reductions
Amber Box
Reduction Commitments
Quantitative Reductions
Market Access
Tariff Quotas
Blue Box
Production Limiting
Special Safeguards
Green Box
Non Trade Distorting
Value Reductions
S & D Box
Exceptions for Dev’g
Other Rules
Special and Differential Treatment, Peace Clause, Commitment to Reforms
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO : Agriculture
UR Commitments
Market Access
Reduction Commitments
Time-period
Domestic Support
Reduction Commitments
Time-period
De Minimis
Specific Exemption
Export Competition
Developed
Developing
Least Developed
36% average
15% minimum
6 years:1995-2000
20% average
None
10% minimum
None
10 years:1995-2004 ----
Developed
Developing
Least Developed
20%
13.3%
No reduction
6 years:1995-2000 10 years:1995-2004 --5%
10%
10%
Article 6.2 exemption for certain investment, input and
diversification subsidies
Developed
Developing
Time-period
36% value
24% value
6 years:1995-2000
21% volume
No reduction
14% volume
No reduction
10 years:1995-2004
Specific Exemption
Article 9.4 Transport and Marketing subsidies
Reduction
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Least Developed
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
NAMA
 The current negotiations on NAMA aim at:
 reducing tariffs, including reduction or elimination
of tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation
 eliminating (or accelerated reduction of) tariffs in
particular sectors (the so-called sectoral)
 reducing non-tariff barriers and
 provision of special and differential treatment and
less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
by the developing countries and LDCs
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
NAMA
• It was agreed that:
 the product coverage would be comprehensive, and
without a priori exclusions,
 tariff reduction was to commence from bound rates,
 that all non ad-valorem duties will be converted to advalorem equivalents and
 credit shall be given for autonomous liberalisation by
developing countries provided that the tariff lines are
bound on an MFN basis
 Special market access for LDCs
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
Objectives of GATS
• Expansion of services trade
• Progressive liberalization through successive
rounds of negotiations
• Transparency of rules and regulations
• Increasing participation of developing countries
• Negotiations to take place on offer and request
list
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
GATS: Four Modes of Supply
• Mode 1: Cross-border supply (e.g. international telephony)
• Mode 2: Consumption abroad (e.g. international tourism)
• Mode 3: Commercial presence (e.g. establishment of
foreign bank)
• Mode 4: Movement of natural persons (e.g. doctor working
abroad)
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
GATS: Sectoral Coverage
•
Business Services
•
Health-Related Services
•
Communication
•
Financial Services
•
Construction
•
Tourism
•
Distribution
•
Recreation, Culture & Sport
•
Education
•
Transport
•
Environmental Services
•
Other Services
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
S&D Treatment of Developing Countries and LDCs
• LDCs and developing countries have been given some
flexibilities in fulfilling the obligations under the WTO
 longer time frame for implementation of obligations
 preferential market access
 waiver from various WTO obligations and
 technical and financial assistance
• But, most of the S&D provisions are:
 non-binding and in the form of ‘best endeavour clauses’
 apparently mandatory, yet de-facto non-binding
 only a few provisions are mandatory and binding provisions
• The Doha declaration obligates the WTO to make S&D
provisions ‘precise, effective and operational’
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
S& D Treatment
•
The following kinds of S&D provisions can be
found in the UR Agreements

provisions aimed at increasing trade opportunities (12)

provisions which call upon WTO Members to safeguard
the interest of LDCs (49)

provisions offering flexibility of commitments (30)

transitional time periods (18)

provisions related to technical assistance (14)

provisions in favour of least developed countries (22)
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
Run up to the Hong Kong Ministerial
• The Doha “Development” Round (DDR), was launched at the
end of the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Doha on
9-13 November 2001. The Doha Ministerial agreed on time
schedules for negotiations and for reaching modalities for
framework, and then translating those modalities into a single
undertaking by 1 January 2005
• The Doha work programme suffered a major setback when the
Fifth Cancun Ministerial Conference of the WTO, held during
10-14 September 2003, failed to hammer out a Ministerial
Declaration
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
Outcome of the Hong Kong Ministerial
Agriculture
• Agriculture negotiations are related to three pillars: domestic support,
market access and export subsidies
• Major task was to identify modalities to reduce the $240 billion subsidy
agriculture given to OECD countries (amber, blue and green box
subsidies; domestic support; export subsidy; export credit subsidy)
• As agreed under paragraph 45 of the July Framework agreement, LDCs,
including Bangladesh, are exempted from any tariff reduction
commitment
• A general formula for reduction of tariffs could not be reached
• On the issue of domestic support: it was agreed that export credit subsidy
will be phased out; it was agreed that there would be three bands for
subsidy reduction; in the overall cut in trade-distorting domestic support,
there would be higher linear cuts in higher bands. However, the level of
cuts would be decided later
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
Outcome of the Hong Kong Ministerial
Cotton
• The HK Declaration provided a consensus on cotton issue. It
was agreed that all forms of export subsidies for cotton would be
eliminated by developed countries by 2006. At the closing
session members agreed that trade distorting domestic subsidies
for cotton production be reduced more ambitiously than under
whatever general formula is agreed, and that it should be
implemented over a shorter period of time than is generally
applicable. The members committed to give priority in the
negotiations to reach such an outcome
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
Outcome of the Hong Kong Ministerial
Food Aid
• On the issue of Food Aid, it was agreed that disciplines on in-kind
food aid, monetization and re-exports would be made in a manner
that leaves no loophole for continuing export subsidisation. The
disciplines on export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance
programmes, exporting state trading enterprises and food aid was
to be completed by 30 April 2006 as part of the modalities
• The issue of discipline in food aid remains essentially unsettled
although the text mentions that the level of food aid and interests
of the net food importing countries will be safeguarded. This is
expected to take care of food aid receiving countries. Bangladesh
and other net food importing countries will need to carefully
follow the negotiations on this issue since desubsidisation and
withdrawal of support in developed country agricultural sector is
likely to push up the global food price
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
Outcome of the Hong Kong Ministerial
NAMA
• As regards negotiations on NAMA (non-agricultural market access), the ambition level
has been lowered significantly in Hong Kong. It was agreed that a non-linear Swiss-type
formula (higher the tariff, higher will be the cut), with multiple coefficients, would be
used for the purpose of tariff cuts. Developing countries appear to have withstood their
position in terms of undertaking lower commitments in NAMA
• Although LDCs are not expected to take any reduction commitments under NAMA, any
reduction in the MFN tariffs on industrial goods by the developed and developing
countries is expected to lead to significant preference erosion for Bangladesh and other
LDCs. Besides, LDCs are also expected to bind a substantial number of industrial tariffs
• In some of the developed countries, under S&D provisions, LDCs will get duty-free
access for all their industrial goods. However, in some others the share of goods getting
DF-QF market access would be only 97 percent, and it is apprehended that many
industrial goods of export interest to LDCs would be included in the ‘exclusion list’.
Accordingly, items such as Bangladesh’s apparels will have to enter markets of some
developed countries, most notably that of the USA, (and to some extent Japan) with
MFN duties
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
Outcome of the Hong Kong Ministerial
Services
• Not much progress could be achieved in services. However, Article 3
of Annex C is an important decision which states that “members shall
pursue full and effective implementation of the Modalities for the
Special Treatment for Least Developed Country Members in the
Negotiations on trade in Services (LDC Modalities) adopted by the
Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, with a view to
have beneficial and meaningful integration of LDCs into multilateral
trading system”
• Further, Article 9 (a) of Annex C is important for Bangladesh. It states
that members shall develop appropriate mechanisms for the full and
effective implementation of the LDC Modalities, including,
expeditiously developing appropriate mechanisms for according
special priority including to sectors and modes of supply of interests to
LDCs in accordance with Article IV:3 of the GATS and paragraph 7 of
the LDC Modalities
• However, no specific decision on Mode 4 was taken
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
Outcome of the Hong Kong Ministerial
Aid for Trade
• It is an emerging concept. A governance structure is yet to be put in place to mobilise and
disburse the committed resources. The Director General of the WTO is to constitute a
Task Force to design the governance structure which will provide its recommendations by
July 2006 (Article 7 of main text). Once again, Bangladesh needs to take adequate
preparations to take advantage of these aid flows
Major concerns in this regard are the followings:
• It is not clear whether these resources are additional or being diverted from other
commitments
• More importantly, whether there is a double or triple counting on account of resource
commitments to MDGs and PRSP
• What is also not clear is whether disbursement of these funds will fall under the IMF and
the World Bank conditionalities
• These resources are for all developing countries, and it is not clear how this will be
targeted to LDCs
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
Outcome of the Hong Kong Ministerial
TRIMS
One of the areas where S&DT was accorded to LDCs in Hong
Kong relates to Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). The
transition period has been extended by seven years from 2006, i.e.
till 2013. The LDC proposal was to extend it up to 2021. More
importantly, LDCs will be able to not only continue with old
TRIMS (subject to notification) but also introduce new ones. One
needs to explore to what extent Bangladesh can use this provision
to support its strategic trade policy funding by withstanding the
pressures from the World Bank and the IMF
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IV. Doha Development Agenda of the WTO
Outcome of the Hong Kong Ministerial
• LDCs as a group received a limited market access deal. Some progress
has been achieved in the areas of export subsidy in cotton, and in a few
cases of special and differential treatment. Some promises have been
made on “Aid for Trade”
• Bangladesh’s ambitions from the Ministerial remain largely frustrated
as it did not get meaningful market access, and with no significant
progress in other areas including Mode - 4
• Bangladesh did not anticipate adequately that certain textile importing
developing countries would play such an open and active role against
Bangladesh. The role of Pakistan, and partly, Sri Lanka was to the
detriment of Bangladesh’s interests. Our South Asian solidarity was of
no help to Bangladesh
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V. Ongoing Negotiations: Issues and Concerns for the
LDCs
Agriculture
• Negotiations are taking place as regards tariff reduction for agri-products:
- Two ranges of coefficients for developed and developing countries
- SSM for sensitive products
• LDCs are considering only the defensive interests such as “no reduction
commitments”
• LDCs are reticent on offensive interests such as market access, issue of
preference erosion, and implications of food price increase.
• Bangladesh and other LDCs must identify their offensive interests for the
negotiations
• Duty-free and quota-free access to the developed and developing country
markets is not yet given in a binding manner, i.e. a definitive “shall” is still
missing in the agriculture related text
• Bangladesh and other LDCs need to pursue this
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V. Ongoing Negotiations: Issues and Concerns for the
LDCs
NAMA
• Bangladesh has both “offensive” and “defensive” interests
• Bindings of Tariffs: As an LDC Bangladesh will not be required
to undertake any tariff reduction commitment on NAMA. But it
may be required to take commitments to bound the non-bound
industrial products.
• Bangladesh’s offensive interest lies in ensuring that items of her
export interest does not get into the Sectoral.
•
•
•
Preference Erosion: By all counts preference erosion is becoming an
increasingly important issue of concern for Bangladesh and other LDCs
The Swiss formula will be the modality for tariff reduction. The
coefficients are [7-9] for developed countries and [19-23] for developing
countries
Some studies show that Bangladesh will lose about US$ 300 million due to
preference erosion
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V. Ongoing Negotiations: Issues and Concerns for the
LDCs
NAMA
•
•
•
•
•
•
To offset this, the LDCs are renewing the demand for global zero-tariff
access for all products from the developed countries.
Essentially, for Bangladesh, this would mean getting zero-tariff access in
the US market as other major markets are covered by GSP schemes.
This could provide a short-term trade-off for tariff preference erosion.
For example, tariff on Bangladesh’s products in US market at present
amounted to about US$ 300 million.
CPD Modelling exercise (Bhattacharya et al. 2004) indicates that a zerotariff access in the USA would have increased Bangladesh’s export of
apparels to the US market by about $1.0 billion (or by 50%)
Zero tariff access to the Canadian market, provided since 2001, has
helped Bangladesh to increase her apparel export from $97.91 mln in
FY2002 to FY2007, a growth of about over 5 years!
Negotiations are continuing as to the HK decision on DF-QF
- design of 97% list; phase-in of 3% list; commercially meaningful
market access
CPD-PMR: WTO Negotiations : Interests and Challenges for Bangladesh
39
V. Ongoing Negotiations: Issues and Concerns for the
LDCs
GATS: Mode 4 (Temporary Movement of Natural Persons)
•
•
•
•
Raihan and Mahmood (2004) estimated that an
increase of 2 lakhs of
 Unskilled workers would bring additional US$ 3.5
billion
 Skilled workers would bring US$ 381 million
 Professionals would be US$ 11.57 billion
Bangladesh must negotiate for Mode 4
Bangladesh has not submitted “request” and “offer
proposal” for negotiation
LDC Modalities: An Amendment or a waiver
(signalling conference)
CPD-PMR: WTO Negotiations : Interests and Challenges for Bangladesh
40
V. Ongoing Negotiations: Issues and Concerns for the
LDCs
GATS: Mode 4 (Temporary Movement of Natural Persons)



Bangladesh and other LDCs should submit requests
on mode 4 as early as possible
Bangladesh could consider offering market opening
in some areas, which are already open under
autonomous liberalisation. The offers can be tailored
to protect national interest
It is not only developed countries, which are
indifferent to the legitimate demand of the LDCs; it is
also LDCs, which are not serious about their
mandate and role in the WTO negotiations process.
CPD-PMR: WTO Negotiations : Interests and Challenges for Bangladesh
41
V. Ongoing Negotiations: Issues and Concerns for the
LDCs
S&D Treatment of Developing Countries and LDCs
• LDCs have not been active in coming up with appropriate
S&D proposals to be considered in the negotiation
committee
• Most of the proposals suffer from lack of clarity of language
• Countries should consider redrafting the proposals to
reflect their needs, with the help of experts, as well as
WTO Secretariat
CPD-PMR: WTO Negotiations : Interests and Challenges for Bangladesh
42
V. Ongoing Negotiations: Issues and Concerns for the
LDCs
Negotiations on Rules
• Bangladesh has both defensive and offensive interests in this area
in view of anti-dumping cases against her by India (which has been
favourably resolved) and Brazil (on jute, now under consideration)
• LDCs should articulate proposals to the effect that anti-dumping
duties (ADD) are not imposed on items of their export interest,
particularly on apparels in view of the difficulties emanating from
MFA phase-out
• Problems of LDCs as regards their underdeveloped domestic
industries should be forcefully articulated. The implications of
various anti-dumping measures need to be understood by LDCs
through appropriate homework
• LDCs should argue for greater assistance in establishing
sustainable fisheries and be allowed capacity enhancing subsidies
CPD-PMR: WTO Negotiations : Interests and Challenges for Bangladesh
43
V. Ongoing Negotiations: Issues and Concerns for the
LDCs
Trade Facilitation
• The proposals of Trade Facilitation are tied with
Technical Assistance
• It is unlikely to move forward. Even if they do, TF
will not give rise to new trade opportunities,
though perhaps these will improve the
competitiveness of Bangladesh export in the
global market.
CPD-PMR: WTO Negotiations : Interests and Challenges for Bangladesh
44
VI. Lessons from Seventh WTO Ministerial Conference
(on 30 November – 2 December, 2009)
•
Not much movement at the Conference; however, political commitment
to complete the Doha Round in 2010 and have the eighth Ministerial by
2011
•
LDCs must strive for commercially meaningful (meaningfully
enhanced) implementation of DF-QF initiative
•
Work should continue to address Bangladesh’s interests in the context
of Disproportionately Affected Countries (DACs)
•
GATS Mode-4 and a Waiver for LDCs
•
Compete globally, act locally – build trade-related supply-side
capacities
•
Aid for Trade (AfT): A major thrust is required in support of LDCs such
as Bangladesh
•
LDCs should maintain their solidarity and should not lose sight of their
common interests
•
Important – building negotiating skills to advance Bangladesh’s trade
interests
CPD-PMR: WTO Negotiations : Interests and Challenges for Bangladesh
45
Thank You
for
Your Attention
CPD-PMR: WTO Negotiations : Interests and Challenges for Bangladesh
46